

CHAPTER 1

Colonial High Policy, Plans and Surveys

Document numbers 1–52

1 CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)6

28 Jan 1957

‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: minute by Mr Macmillan to Lord Salisbury.¹ *Minutes* by Lord Salisbury and Mr Lennox-Boyd

[Written only eighteen days after becoming prime minister, Macmillan’s famous initiative, and the ensuing officials’ reports, have been extensively quoted in D J Morgan, *The official history of colonial development* vol 5 *Guidance towards self-government in British colonies, 1941–1971* (1980) pp 96 & 103 ff; see also A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, *British imperial policy and decolonization* vol 2 *1951–1964* (1989) p 451 (document no 70, Macmillan’s minute).]

It would be helpful if the Colonial Policy Committee could submit to the Cabinet their estimate of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies over the years ahead.

It would be good if Ministers could know more clearly which territories are likely to become ripe for independence over the next few years—or, even if they are not really ready for it, will demand it so insistently that their claims cannot be denied—and at what date that stage is likely to be reached in each case.

It would also be helpful if this study would distinguish those Colonies which would qualify for full membership of the Commonwealth, and would indicate what constitutional future there is for the others which may attain independence but cannot aspire to full Commonwealth membership.

I should also like to see something like a profit and loss account for each of our Colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge whether, from the financial and economic point of view, we are likely to gain or to lose by its departure. This would need, of course, to be weighed against the political and strategic considerations involved in each case. And it might perhaps be better to attempt an estimate of the balance of advantage, taking all these considerations into account, of losing or keeping each particular territory.

There are presumably places where it is of vital interest to us that we should maintain our influence, and others where there is no United Kingdom interest in resisting constitutional change even if it seems likely to lead eventually to secession from the Commonwealth.

¹ Lord President of the Council since 1952, and chairman of the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee: Robert Cecil, 5th marquess; S of S for Dominion affairs, 1940–1942, 1943–1945, for Commonwealth relations, 1952; S of S for the colonies, 1942.

If your Committee will produce a report on these lines, the Cabinet might well devote the whole of a session to it without other business.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Colonial Secretary.

Minutes on 1

I append copies of minutes on this subject from the Prime Minister to myself dated 28th January, 1957 and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to myself dated 15th February, 1957.

The Colonial Office is now going ahead with a comprehensive review of this subject on the lines there indicated. I should be very grateful if all Departments concerned would give their full co-operation to the Colonial Office, to enable this very important survey to be completed as soon as possible.

S.
25.2.57

Lord President

The Prime Minister sent me a copy of his minute to you of 28th January, proposing that the Colonial Policy Committee submit to the Cabinet their estimate of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies over the years ahead.

2. I agree that a comprehensive review of this kind would be a great help. If it is to be worth doing, however, it must be done thoroughly; and it will take a good deal of time, and involve consultation with a number of Departments. If you agree, I propose to arrange for my Department, in consultation with other Departments as appropriate, to prepare a draft Paper. It will be necessary to approach the problem area by area in the first instance, and I attach to this minute (Appendix) a skeleton plan on which I propose to ask my Department to proceed. When the draft has been prepared, I suggest that it might be considered by the Official Committee on Colonial Policy, before going to the Colonial Policy Committee.

3. The skeleton plan, as you will see, implies one or two glosses on the Prime Minister's minute, and I should perhaps indicate briefly the reasons for these.

4. The Prime Minister drew a distinction between those Colonies which would qualify for "full Membership of the Commonwealth" and those "which may attain 'independence' but cannot aspire to full Commonwealth Membership". I have assumed that, in using the word "independence" in this context, the Prime Minister had in mind the status which we usually describe as internal self-government. It is generally recognised that, whereas some territories, by themselves or in federal arrangement with others, should eventually attain independence as full Members of the Commonwealth, there will remain other territories which, in the foreseeable future at any rate, appear unlikely, for various reasons, to be able to achieve anything other than a considerable degree of internal self-government, with the United Kingdom remaining responsible for at least their defence and external relations.

5. A "profit and loss account" for each Colonial territory must, as the Prime Minister observes, take account of economic, political and strategic considerations. It must also take account of the obligations towards the peoples of any given territory which the assumption of protection or annexation, as the case may be, can be said to have placed upon the United Kingdom. It would perhaps be going too far to say that

Her Majesty's Government should never withdraw protection from, or hand over sovereignty to, any dependent territory otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants. But we would I think all agree that nothing is more dangerous than to gain a reputation for forsaking one's friends; and if in any territory Her Majesty's Government were to withdraw without being able to hand over to a successor government, which could be expected to govern reasonably well in the interests of all its inhabitants, the repercussions would be serious and widespread.

6. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister. I suggest that you should circulate copies of the Prime Minister's minute of 28th January and of this minute to the Colonial Policy Committee and ask that the Departments concerned co-operate with my Department in this work.

A. L-B.
15.2.57

APPENDIX

Skeleton Plan (to be followed in the consideration of each territory or area)

1. *Political and constitutional*

- (a) Outline of the present constitutional system;
- (b) brief description of the internal and external political pressures;
- (c) the way in which these pressures will be reflected in demands for constitutional changes.

2. *Strategic*

- (a) An estimate of the strategic importance of the territory;
- (b) a statement of Her Majesty's Government's strategic requirements;
- (c) an estimate of the extent to which retention of these strategic requirements is dependent upon Her Majesty's Government's retaining jurisdiction.

3. *Economic*

- (a) The effect of independence upon the interests of the United Kingdom in terms of:—
 - (i) direct effect on the Exchequer;
 - (ii) the effect on the sterling area;
 - (iii) trade between the territory concerned and the United Kingdom.

4. *Obligations and repercussions*

- (a) An estimate of the effect upon the political, economic and social development of the territory of the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, including the effect upon racial and tribal minorities;
- (b) The effect of the change of status in the territory upon the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom;
- (c) Whether the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would leave a vacuum which would be filled by a country hostile to the United Kingdom and her Allies.

5. *Conclusions*

2 CAB 134/1551, CPC (57) 27**May 1957**

‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: report (CO print, GEN 174/012) of the officials’ committee (chairman, Sir N Brook) (CO(0)(57)5)

[Extract]

[This report—the central response to the prime minister’s request for a ‘profit and loss account’—contained an enormous amount of basic information and became a major reference-guide in government departments. It was organised into seven parts, viz: (i) West Africa, (ii) East Africa, (iii) Aden and Somaliland, (iv) Mediterranean, (v) Far East, (vi) Caribbean, (vii) Smaller territories. It is probably the most complicated document to be selected for the entire BDEEP project, 76 printed pages long in foolscap, with almost 500 paragraphs, and 463 sub-headings, many of them elaborate. Complete uniformity of layout between the different sections was not attained, and even the paragraph numbering broke down in part (vii). To simplify its presentation here, and make the document less unwieldy, much of the factual material has been cut, and most of the sub-headings have been omitted. Readers can bear in mind that the information (or opinion) for each section is always given in the sequence: political and constitutional, strategic, economic, obligations and repercussions, and conclusions, as set out in the Skeleton Plan (see previous document, appendix). Also in accordance with the Skeleton Plan, specific questions are being addressed, more especially the probable effects of a ‘premature withdrawal’ of British rule.]

*Part I: West Africa**A. Nigeria**(1) Political and constitutional*

... 9. With a few relatively minor exceptions all the political parties in Nigeria want, or profess to want, self-government within the Commonwealth as soon as possible. Nigerians are, broadly speaking, loyal to the Crown, friendly to the British, and attached to the Commonwealth connection. The visit of The Queen and Duke of Edinburgh last year was a great success.

10. Two-thirds of the North’s 18 million inhabitants are Muslims and Islam is a vital factor in their outlook. The remaining 6 million—a sizable minority of rapidly growing political importance—are mainly pagans with some Christians. A small minority of the Muslims—but it includes some of the most influential and able—must be recognised as potentially hostile to us and what we stand for, and inclined to fanaticism and xenophobia. If so far they have resisted the blandishments and bribes of Egypt, this may be almost as much because they regard Egyptians as bad Muslims and Nasser¹ as a King breaker and a cat’s-paw of Moscow as for pro-British reasons. For all their natural courtesy to strangers and good manners—so beguiling to the ordinary Englishman—this minority probably regard us as infidels, distrust us as democrats out to replace their traditional authority by the secret ballot and universal suffrage (including eventually votes for women), and tolerate us only because they feel insecure against the energetic and aggressive Southerners.

11. There is a small Communist-inspired party in Nigeria, the United Working People’s Party, but it has little influence. Potentially it could be dangerous, and constant vigilance is exercised. All the Governments in Nigeria have publicly condemned international Communism as a threat to their own freedom, and so far

¹ Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian prime minister, 1954–July 1956, and president, July 1956–1970.

Moscow has had little success. Efforts at infiltration continue, mainly in the trade unions and centres of higher education, but so far the situation has been well contained. In Nigeria (as in Ghana) the nationalist leaders have all come out firmly against Communism. We may be thankful for this and indeed take some credit for this result of our liberal policy on constitutional matters.

12. The reports of the United Nations Visiting Missions to the Cameroons Trust Territory have on the whole been most laudatory of the British administration. Their last report a year ago stressed the need for more economic and social development to keep pace with the rapid constitutional and political progress. The country is poor and undeveloped. There are considerable possibilities but these need more money than is available. On the political side the main features are fear of domination by the Ibos from Eastern Nigeria and the question of amalgamation with the French Cameroons next door. The two countries were of course one under German rule, and no political party in the Southern Cameroons can afford not to profess interest in ultimate unification with the French Cameroons. It is doubtful whether, if the Federation as a whole became independent within, say, the next ten years, the Southern part of the British Cameroons would decide to stay in it, such is the fear of Ibo domination. The Communist-inspired (and probably financed) U.P.C. (Union de Populations du Cameroun), which was banned in the French Cameroons following the 1955 riots there, constitutes by far the most serious threat to both administrations. It aims at the immediate unification and independence of the British and French sectors, but in the recent elections it gained no seats.

13. The Indians show interest in Nigeria on customary lines, and have a Commissioner in Lagos though there are not more than a few hundred Indians in the whole territory. Their written propaganda is tendentious and sometimes dishonest, but they need not be regarded at present as more than a minor nuisance.

14. The United States has shown signs of seeking to extend its influence and some of the leading Nigerian politicians were educated in America. Relations with the American Consul-General are good.

15. *Probable demands for constitutional changes.* In 1953 the two major Southern parties, Dr. Azikiwe's² National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) and Chief Awolowo's³ Action Group, formed a short-lived alliance to demand "Dominion status" for Nigeria as a whole by 1956. The majority party in the North, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto (now Premier of the Northern Region), opposed the demand knowing that independence so soon would mean domination of the North by the more "educated" Southerners. They put forward as an alternative formula self-government "as soon as practicable." The acute crisis which resulted nearly split the country and there was serious rioting, with loss of life, in Kano which was prevented from spreading only by prompt and firm action. The crisis was eventually resolved by the then Secretary of State (Lord Chandos) at the London constitutional conference in August 1953, when he secured agreement to the present federal form of government and, as regards self-

² Nnamdi Azikiwe ('Zik'), prime minister of Eastern Region, 1954–1959, governor-general of Nigeria, 1960–1963, and first president of the Nigerian Republic.

³ Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Yoruba leader in Western Region, opposed to Azikiwi's 'Ibo nationalism'; founder of Action Group, 1951.

government, to the following formula, recorded in paragraph 28 of the Conference Report (Cmd. 8934):—

“The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s Government were not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a whole, the more so as the Northern delegation, representing over half the population of Nigeria, was unable to depart from its policy of self-government as soon as practicable. The Conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty’s Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way make the continuance of federation impossible.”

This formula is the key to the present political situation.

16. A conference . . . to work out how to carry out the 1953 promise of Regional self-government, including the safeguards, . . . will now open, at Lancaster House, on the 23rd May.

17. At this conference the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group will both renew the demand for immediate self-government for Nigeria as a whole, and the question will have to be discussed; but in the face of expected Northern opposition the Action Group may and probably will be content with Regional self-government for the West, for which they have made careful plans, though they may raise objection to the strict safeguards which the United Kingdom delegation will put forward for the Federal Government and for the continuance of federation. . . . the Southern parties will urge very strongly that, if independence cannot be granted to the country as a whole immediately, 1959 should be the year for the final transfer of power. The grant of independence to Ghana will sharpen their demand. Indeed the Federal House of Representatives passed a resolution, *nem. con.*, on the 26th March, demanding independence for the Federation as a whole (within the Commonwealth) in 1959. There is likely to be heated discussion at the conference on this issue. At the London conference in 1953 Lord Chandos made the following statement:—

“Her Majesty’s Government did not intend to force self-government either upon any part of Nigeria before it felt ready for it or upon Nigeria as a whole so long as any substantial part of it did not consider the time opportune.”

He repeated this statement at the Lagos conference in 1954 and it gave great reassurance to the North.

18. If independence for Nigeria as a whole comes too soon, the North, or parts of it, may talk of secession, particularly if power at the Centre is going to be in the hands of the N.C.N.C. In fact it would be difficult for the North to set up an entirely separate existence since all their imports and exports pass through the southern ports but it is impossible to be certain how much weight would be given to practical considerations of this kind. It is possible that the Southern Cameroons might also decide to leave the Federation on account both of their fear of the Ibos and also of their hope of ultimate amalgamation, as an independent territory, with the French Cameroons.

19. It will be our aim to proceed with constitutional advances at Federal level as slowly as possible, if we can, conceding in 1957 only such major changes as the

creation of the office of Federal Prime Minister, and perhaps a Second Chamber in which all Regions would be equally represented. (In the Federal House of Representatives, the North, with over half the population, have half the seats.) We shall seek to secure that no date is set for self-government for the country as a whole. But success will not be easy.

20. There will be pressure at the conference for the creation of more Regions, or States. To some extent such demands will be prompted by genuine fear of the major tribes by minority groups. But mostly the demands will be made by the Southern parties in order to split the North. Few of these demands have any wide or agreed backing, and it will in any event be necessary for compelling administrative reasons to resist them: the machine of government in Nigeria has already undergone two major upheavals in the last five years because of constitutional changes, and a further upheaval, by the creation of more Regions, would prove more than it could stand, particularly in view of the declining numbers of experienced British officers.

(2) *Strategic*

21. The international airport of Kano (in Northern Nigeria) is on the air communications line to Uganda, Kenya, the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The importance of the trans-African air reinforcement route is great and in certain circumstances it would be vital for reinforcing East Africa, Aden and the Persian Gulf, the harbours at Lagos and Port Harcourt. Both of these sea ports are bases that it would be convenient but not essential to use in limited or global war. . . .

24. So long as the Federal Government remains dependent, our strategic requirements are constitutionally secure. After independence, we shall have to rely on goodwill; though if we are prepared to continue, and Nigeria is prepared to accept, some financial and other forms of aid to Nigeria's defence forces we may possibly be in a stronger position.

(3) *Economic*

... 28. The sterling area would suffer a moderate loss of dollar exchange if Nigeria were to leave it; departure from the Commonwealth, without leaving the sterling area, would have little or no effect on the latter. . . .

... 32. The Nigerian market is a valuable one for United Kingdom manufactured goods. There are also important United Kingdom interests in trading and lesser interests in mining. United Kingdom trade would be affected if independence were accompanied by hostility to United Kingdom traders, but it is to be hoped that there will be no such hostility. After independence there might be a greater tendency to protect new Nigerian industries at the expense of imports and this might affect certain United Kingdom industries, but taking the longer view the interests of both countries in developing the trade between them are great, and these interests seem unlikely to be appreciably disturbed by independence. . . .

(4) *Obligations and repercussions*

35. As in Ghana, self-government is the declared objective and at the Regional level is likely to be reached in the East and West this year and in the North in 1959. The effect of full self-government for the Federation as a whole depends very largely on how soon it comes. The fissiparous forces are very strong in this large country and if Federal independence comes too soon the Federation may break apart.

36. Until the final transfer of power to the Federation, it should be possible, if we are firm enough at the conference—and decent Nigerians will not forgive us if we show weakness to the more extreme and self-interested politicians—for the United Kingdom Government to retain power to suspend the Constitution of any part or the whole of the Federation in case of failure. But it would be politically impossible to use this power in a self-governing Region unless things had gone really badly wrong, enough experienced officials were available to set them right, and the Nigeria police could be relied upon to carry out the United Kingdom's intentions as conveyed to them through their senior officers.

37. When the Regions are self-governing but the Federal Government is still dependent, the machinery of government may work at least as well in the West and the North as it seems likely to do in Ghana. But in both cases, and particularly in the North, much will depend on how many British officials will be willing to stay on for a good many years to come until trained and experienced Nigerians are available in sufficient numbers to take over.

38. In the East, where already only a thin red line of British officers stands between the Regions and chaos, things are likely to go downhill fairly rapidly. If, as seems virtually certain, most of the remaining British go on or soon after Regional self-government, *i.e.*, by the end of this year, chaos must be considered more likely than not within two or three years; and if the power still remains to the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of the Region, that step may be necessary. Alternatively, the Federal Government may have to intervene under the powers which we hope to secure for it to safeguard the Federal interest, as envisaged in the 1953 promise of Regional self-government (see paragraph 15 above).

39. We have made, and shall continue to make, great efforts to persuade experienced British staff to stay on and various expedients have been devised to induce them to do so. But the inducements to go are strong. They can retire with compensation for broken career when the Secretary of State ceases to have responsibility for them and conditions in Nigeria and the utterances and behaviour of Nigerian politicians are all too often such as to quicken their desire to take this compensation and go.

40. It was said earlier that Nigerians generally were loyal to the Crown, friendly to the British, and attached to the Commonwealth connection. That is true, and they have many admirable—and indeed lovable—qualities, in particular a keen sense of humour and the capacity to laugh at themselves. But there is a darker side, which must not be overlooked.

41. Barbarism and cruelty are still near the surface, as is shown by happenings such as these during the past two years: villagers beat to death a well-known Nigerian barrister whose chauffeur-driven car had accidentally killed one of the villagers; the fellow-villagers of a couple found to be receivers of stolen property sewed them together and then clubbed them to death; and the Premier of the North (where some large local government bodies had been asking for the branding of thieves) spoke wistfully, in a speech in the Northern House of Assembly, of the days of slavery and the mutilation of thieves “before the British came.” There is in fact likely to be much less real freedom, especially for the under-privileged, the weak and minority groups, after “freedom” has been achieved.

42. If the danger of administrative breakdowns is greatest in the East, there are no less disquieting dangers of another kind in the Muslim North. The great Emirs

may not tolerate government from Kaduna (the Regional capital) by popularly-elected commoners when the British Governor no longer has his reserved powers. As a shrewd Sudanese observer said recently, "When the British go, the Emir of Kano will rebuild the city walls." Current proposals for devolution of power from the Regional capital to the Provinces are framed to counter this danger, but much depends on whether there will be time to implement them effectively. 1959 is the date for Regional self-government in the North.

43. The position in Muslim courts in the North is unsatisfactory. They apply much of the full rigour of conservative Muslim law to the detriment in particular of non-Muslims. It is more than doubtful how far it will be possible before self-government to carry through the fundamental changes that are required. ...

45. To sum up. If the British withdraw in the next half decade, it is quite on the cards that the North, or large parts of it, will secede, and if this happened a general disintegration might well follow. There is in any event likely to be a general lowering of standards everywhere, which might result in complete breakdown in the East and will almost certainly mean less freedom for minorities everywhere. In some parts there may be a reversion to much of the barbarism of pre-Colonial days. The outward forms of democracy may remain but, as has been suggested by the Governor of the East, the recent general elections there gave the people what may well be their last opportunity of making a relatively free and fair choice of Government. ...

47. The continuance of our prestige and influence, which are at present high, will depend to a very large degree on how far we succeed in these efforts and on how long we can retain ultimate power at the Centre. So long as there is a restraining (British) hand at the Centre, backed by some constitutional sanctions and a reliable machine (civil service and police), there is a fair chance that Nigeria can be held together, and that something like democratic (if not "honest") government will develop. The best hope for Nigeria lies in the present student generation who, one may hope, will as the politicians of the future be less divided among themselves tribally and less self-seeking than the present set. Our restraining hand is thus really needed for a generation. But it is unrealistic to expect that we shall have so long. ...

(5) *Conclusions*

52. In spite of its great promise, and several encouraging features, one cannot avoid forebodings as to the outlook for Nigeria, for the simple reason that we are unlikely to have long enough to complete our civilising and unifying mission. The pass in British West Africa was sold when the Watson Commission Report on the Gold Coast was published in 1948.⁴ The recommendations of that Commission were very radical. They set the pace in the Gold Coast and by so doing they lost us a vital fifteen to twenty years in Nigeria. Successive Governments since have taken the line that the risks of going too slow were probably greater than the risks of going too fast; and it remains true that a slow pace would lose us the great goodwill we have at present and cause much friction. But in West Africa the pace set by the fastest (Ghana) is certainly more than the vast and unwieldy Nigeria looks like being able to take.

53. Loss of the present airfield facilities at Kano would have a most serious effect on the ability to safeguard British interests in the Indian Ocean area.

⁴ See Hyam, ed, *Labour government and the end of empire, 1945-1951* part III, document nos 214 and 215, and Rathbone, ed, *Ghana* part I, document nos 33-36.

B. *Sierra Leone*

(1) *Political and constitutional*

... 57. There has been some talk of "self-government in 1961," *i.e.*, five years after the 1951 Constitution was originally due to expire. This however is not a general cry and full internal self-government and independence are at present no more than fairly distant objectives. There is, however, significant pressure for *some* further constitutional advance.

There are as yet no significant external political pressures. But the example and influence of Ghana are likely to be increasingly felt. Sierra Leone would also not indefinitely acquiesce in lagging behind the political progress of the neighbouring French territories under the *Loi Cadre*. ...

(2) *Strategic*

59. Sierra Leone is of some importance on the trans-African reinforcement route. Freetown is one of the largest and best natural harbours in the world and lies on the route which would have to be used by shipping to the Middle East and beyond if the Mediterranean or the Suez Canal were closed. On present planning the port would in time of war be used primarily as a base for stores and as a NATO convoy assembly anchorage, but the Admiralty do not intend to establish a naval base there.

(3) *Economic*

... 66. ... United Kingdom firms have important interests in trading, and in mining for iron ore, chrome ore and diamonds, and United Kingdom trade would be adversely affected if hindrances were placed on the activities of these firms, or if the territory were to leave the Commonwealth and the sterling area and preferences were discontinued. There is however no reason to think that political independence would lead to Sierra Leone deliberately hindering British firms or leaving the sterling area; Ghana shows no signs of doing either, and Sierra Leone would not be in such a strong position as Ghana to take an independent line. ...

(4) *Obligations and repercussions*

67. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction at the present stage of political, economic and social development would be likely to have grave results and could not be regarded as compatible with her responsibilities for the welfare of the inhabitants. Considerable animosity remains between the Creoles in the Colony area and the indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorate, and, with the withdrawal of British jurisdiction, friction between the two communities would increase and probably lead to violence. There would be violence also in the Protectorate, where recent disturbances have demonstrated the widespread and often justified lack of confidence by the people in their chiefs. Apart from this, responsible government could not be carried on in a territory where the educational system can still produce only 40 students of matriculation standard a year, and where African politicians have as yet had very little experience of political and governmental responsibility.

68. From all reports it would appear that a large proportion of the population of Sierra Leone would view with disfavour any early ending of responsibility by Her Majesty's Government, and a premature withdrawal would be disastrous for the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom in the territory.

69. A premature withdrawal by the United Kingdom leading to anarchy or near-anarchy in Sierra Leone might well be regarded by the French, whose territories border two of the three land sides of Sierra Leone, as a threat to the stability of their territories. It would be unlikely that a country hostile to the United Kingdom would fill the vacuum caused by United Kingdom withdrawal, but it is not inconceivable that the French would feel bound to do so. There might also be some attempt by Liberia to exert influence. At the best Sierra Leone would become another Liberia, possibly like Liberia, with American backing.

(5) *Conclusions*

70. The ultimate future of Sierra Leone is harder to determine than that of many other territories. It is a borderline case, and cannot be said to fall clearly either into the category of dependencies which can obviously become fully independent in time or into the category of those which obviously never can do so. The most realistic goal to set before us at present is that of internal self-government, the achievement of which will depend largely upon the speed at which the economic resources of the territory can be developed, educated Africans produced and the gap between Freetown and the Protectorate narrowed. It is therefore unlikely that such questions as the retention of strategic facilities need become pressing for some years to come, and even when the stage of internal self-government is reached it is unlikely, unless there is a notable change in the political climate meanwhile, that there would be serious difficulty in devising acceptable machinery for the preservation of United Kingdom interests.

71. Nor need vital United Kingdom economic interests be at stake in the political game. British trade with West Africa preceded British administration, and there is no reason why it should not continue after it provided that we so conduct ourselves in the meanwhile as to leave behind us a stable and friendly Government. . . .

73. The maintenance of good relations between the United Kingdom and Ghana will be an important background factor in safeguarding the orderly development of Sierra Leone. Friction between us could well be reflected in internal stresses in Sierra Leone.

C. Gambia

. . . 78. Gambia at the moment is a happy backwater, but it cannot expect to be permanently immune from the general political awakening which is going on in West Africa. It is too small and too peculiar a shape ever to be able to stand entirely by itself. . . .

86. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction within the immediate future would be likely to result in a complete collapse of Government and a cessation of all form of development.

87. A withdrawal would be regarded with complete disfavour by public opinion in the Gambia. The prestige of the United Kingdom there would greatly suffer.

88. A vacuum caused by the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would almost certainly be filled by the French. Anarchy in the Gambia would prove an irresistible invitation to them to extend their influence into the territory.

89. By virtue of its size, the narrowness of its economy, and the precariousness of its financial position, the Gambia is a territory which as far as can be foreseen can

never aspire to full independence. Given that dependence on a bigger country is unavoidable, there is no evidence that Gambians wish to change the United Kingdom for somebody else. It is possible that when economic, educational and political development has proceeded much further than it has at present some form of internal self-government may be possible, if no other form of association with the United Kingdom has been evolved. The people of the Gambia are very pro-British and proud of their connection with the United Kingdom, a factor which is of importance in considering the future of the territory. It is also probable that Gambia would be interested in joining any future West African Federation if ... that should ever become a practical possibility.

Part II: East Africa

(1) Political and constitutional

... 91. Looked at regionally and broadly the external pressures and influences are those inevitable to a zone of dependencies exposed to the anti-colonial propaganda of the Middle East and the attractions to evolving Africans of the body of dogma propagated by what is loosely called the Afro-Asian block of the United Nations. More potent than Communist doctrine in a nationalistic setting, are the egalitarian philosophies of bodies such as the Africa Bureau and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. In view of the relatively few leaders of local opinion, personal contacts and influences have a great importance; every ambitious African can find his Brockway.⁵ The question of external pressures is considered more closely below in relation to individual territories. ...

94. *Kenya*. Internally the political pressures are those of an unstable multi-racial society. For the first half century of Kenya's existence the struggle was between a white settled community, wishing to entrench their position against Asian competition, and a Colonial Government bent on a sometimes sterile impartiality and subject to fluctuating direction from Westminster. The African was a bewildered spectator, gradually acquiring the vocabulary of Western politics and the "felt needs" of Western political theory. With the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, which gave both Asian and African a place in the policy-forming organ of government, a step was taken which ruled out for all time the prospect of self-government for the European Kenyan alone. This settlement was accepted by the Europeans, after a split in their ranks, welcomed by the Asians and at first rejected by the Africans, who subsequently acquiesced in African participation. Before the recent African elections those Africans who had participated declared their support of the Lyttelton formula as an interim measure. They were not returned by the electorate. The habit of compromise is growing and if the races can remain yoked in a pattern subject to control from Westminster for long enough the habit of co-operation and acceptance one of the other may become a natural order of things. This prospect is menaced by the theories of democracy which the African has avidly accepted and which many encourage him to pursue. The move to a common roll, the hall-mark of stable multi-racialism, must be gradual to be enduring. The theories of quantitative democracy lure the African to

⁵ Fenner Brockway, MP (Lab) for Eton & Slough since 1950; pacifist; chairman of British Centre for Colonial Freedom, 1942–1947; first chairman of Congress of Peoples against Imperialism since 1948; chairman of Movement for Colonial Freedom since 1954; prolific author.

stand out against co-operation until he can dominate by numbers. The task of statesmanship in the next decade is to manipulate European fears, Asian timidity and African impatience to a delicate but changing balance which allows no member of the team to run off the field.

95. The pressures for constitutional change will therefore be towards a greater proportionate role for the African. This will be symbolised by the move to break "parity." The main African demand will be greater representation in Legislative Council and the African is likely to realise that adherence to communal voting in more and more constituencies is the course most likely to result in the victory of numbers over quality. The counter-move most likely to preserve European influence in the long term is development of the common roll, at first with high qualifications, which will oblige all candidates to court a mixed electorate. Whether the resident Europeans will recognise this soon enough and have the wisdom to urge this line of constitutional change is the big question.

96. *Uganda.* Legislative and executive power is still in the hands of the Governor. He legislates by and with the consent of a Legislative Council, with a government side of thirty members composed partly of officials (all at present European) and partly of unofficials (some of them Ministers) of all three races who owe their position to an undertaking to vote with the Government on an issue of confidence. The representative side also number thirty; the Governor, as presiding officer, has a casting vote. These representative members are of all three races, all nominated by the Governor, although the African members are presented for nomination by various forms of indirect election. Of the entire council one half of the members are African. In the Executive Council of fourteen, eleven are Ministers; of these six are officials (all European); three African Ministers, one Asian and one European are unofficials. This structure was introduced in 1955 and it was then announced that no major change was contemplated before 1961. In Uganda at present the mystic term "parity" means an equal number of Africans to an equal number of others. . . .

98. Internally the great debate is over the future as a unitary or federal State. This expresses in constitutional terminology something not really thought out in such terms. It reflects a basically tribal problem, *i.e.*, the assertiveness of Buganda, which has had a generation's lead in absorbing the education of the West, and the fear and envy of Buganda on the part of the other tribes of the Protectorate. Her Majesty's Government have declared that they envisage the Uganda of the future as a united country, which only thus will have the resources and the size to stand independent among the nations. Buganda feels that alone they have all the attributes which merit independence in the present age and that their association geographically with the rest of the Protectorate is being used as a pretext to hold them back. The other tribes resent the privileged position of Buganda and think that if only they could acquire the same status they would have the same power and could face self-government without the fear of exchanging Buganda dominance for British "imperialism." . . .

99. Demands for constitutional change will be expressed in self-contradictory forms so long as there is no genuine country-wide political party with a positive programme for self-government; the Uganda National Congress does not yet meet this definition. On the one hand Buganda will claim a greater measure of internal self-government; this has already reached the limit short of separation from the rest of the Protectorate. This effort will be represented to the outside world in "national"

terms which will cloak its parochial intent. On the other hand the other tribes in the Protectorate will press also for greater local self-government (*i.e.*, an attempt to give national characteristics to organs of local government) while showing an attachment to Protectorate institutions and a strong Central Government, which they will regard as a shield under which they can develop their separate strength rather than an expression of their collective interest and growing maturity. The task of the protecting Power must be to develop the central institutions in such a way that they are regarded as an expression of the unity they must yet create and so design these institutions that the immigrant communities, notably the Asians, find in them a niche which they regard as secure, and in which they are recognised and accepted by the African population. The next proclaimed stage in achieving this objective is the inauguration of elections to the representative side of Legislative Council in 1961 on a common roll in a manner which will entrench the fundamental interests of the minority communities.

... 101. *Tanganyika*. The main external pressure on Tanganyika comes from the United Nations, whose Trusteeship Council annually examines a report of the territory and every three years sends a Visiting Mission to inspect and report on its development. These reports are also considered, more cursorily, in the General Assembly, which tends to attempt to stretch Tanganyika on the Procrustean rack of anti-colonial resolutions of general application to all trust territories. The United Nations is also invoked, under the petitions system, as a court of appeal by the disgruntled and ambitious, who are vastly encouraged to excesses by the anti-colonial pack. The trust status of the territory shakes the confidence not only of external investors but also of the immigrant communities who long for some solid reassurance of the endurance of a British connection. The malign influence of United Nations interference has not hitherto been allowed to distort policy but the fear that it will and the need to have some regard to United Nations sensibilities have retarded confident advance. Developments in adjacent territories both north and south can have an unsettling effect on the racial harmony which has so far prevailed; but conversely solid demonstration of a working partnership in Tanganyika could bring stability and hope to East and Central Africa. Internal political pressures are not yet highly developed. Only a small proportion, say 5,000, of the Europeans are settled as farmers on the land and they have not developed a collective political personality comparable to that of the Kenya Europeans. They are leaderless and unassertive. The Asians are supine but have wealth and a readiness to use it to promote political stability. The Africans have little national cohesion but strong tribal affinities and have as yet shown little response to the doctrines of African nationalism purveyed by the Tanganyika African National Union. But this movement could grow rapidly and dangerously in the event of economic distress or the absence of an alternative political vehicle for political self-expression. This exists in embryo in the United Tanganyika Party, founded recently by Europeans and Asians to seek African support and present a non-racial front when elections are introduced. This party may succeed if it can recruit effective African leadership.

102. Demands for constitutional change on the part of the great bulk of the inhabitants are likely for some time to be small and capable of satisfaction by the progressive introduction of the electoral principle and the association of local opinion, particularly African, with the policy-forming organs of government. Strident demands for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and the immediate

attribution of executive authority to Africans may develop from a minority, who can only draw strength if United Nations interference is not kept in bounds and if the extension of the very inadequate social services, notably education, cannot be financed. The task in the next few years is to anticipate rabid African nationalism by mobilising the basic goodwill between the races in an active non-racial political development, which is sustained by but does not outstrip economic and social progress.

103. *Zanzibar*. . . Constitutional development, long stagnant, has recently been rapid. The Sultan's Government is now conducted by an Executive Council, of which the British Resident is President, with seven official members and three unofficial members (Arab, Asian and African) who have been associated with the work of certain departments. The Legislative Council has recently been enlarged, with thirteen official members and twelve representative members, of whom six are to be elected in common roll elections on a qualitative franchise, in July 1957. After the results of the elections are known, the remaining six representative members will be appointed by the Sultan on the advice of the British Resident.

The Arabs of Zanzibar are exposed to Egyptian propaganda, notably from Cairo radio. Their response is mild recalcitrance, which dares not find expression in a manner displeasing to the present Sultan. They have urged constitutional change, have got most of what they asked and may be beginning to doubt its value in face of a growing feeling on the part of the traditionally subject African majority that democratic processes may be the revenge for slavery.

(2) *Strategic*

104. The East African region has great potential strategic importance, situated as it is to the south of the Middle East air barrier and with an aspect towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Climatically European forces can well be held in Kenya which also provides ample training facilities and possibilities of accommodation and local food supplies. The region contains three major airfields, Entebbe, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and two others at Mombasa and Kisumu with very fair facilities. The ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam are well equipped to deal with commercial traffic and the former has certain rudimentary naval facilities which could be improved with some expenditure of time and money. The possibility exists that an oil refinery may be built at Mombasa. At the present time the airfields of the region are essential links in the air reinforcing route from South Africa to the Middle East and from Europe and West Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The existence of the air barrier necessitates the deployment of substantial forces to the south of the Red Sea, and for administrative and climatic reasons about a brigade group will in future have to be maintained in Kenya as a reserve for East and Central Africa, Aden, and the Persian Gulf. Strategically, therefore, the region has acquired greatly enhanced importance in Commonwealth defence. The sources of the Nile in Uganda constitute, while under British control, at least a psychological threat to Egyptian ambition. . . .

(3) *Economic*

. . . 117. East Africa is almost the sole supplier of sisal to the United Kingdom and the principal supplier of coffee. The relative importance of East Africa in the United Kingdom market for some [other] commodities is a post-war phenomenon, resulting

from the dollar shortage, but as far as can be seen there will always be a substantial advantage in having these sterling sources of supply at competitive prices. In 1938, for example, only 39 per cent. of the United Kingdom's imports of coffee came from East Africa, the principal source of supply being Costa Rica. If East Africa left the sterling area, this would affect the pattern of the United Kingdom's imports. If the possibility of denial of supplies is envisaged, the principal difficulty would arise with sisal, for which there are no obvious alternatives available in the sterling area.

(4) *Obligations and repercussions*

118. Looking at the region as a political whole it stands out as a testing ground for the possibility of multi-racial or non-racial development lying geographically between the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the anti-colonial influences of the Middle East and the sub-continent of Asia. The failure of inter-racial partnership in this region, particularly in Tanganyika, would intensify the pull of the Union of South Africa on the Central African Federation, which would then feel itself threatened with hostility from the north and a need to recoil for support on the south. It would also in effect extend the frontiers of turbulence south from the Middle East, place the source of the Nile at the mercy of Egypt, which would feel an urge to secure it, and even perhaps provide a vulnerable area for the expansionist ambitions of India, provided that the Indian bridgehead is not earlier engulfed by African nationalism. Failure would, therefore, produce an important area of instability which would be a grave threat to Western interests in the continent of Africa.

119. At present the balance between racial groups is maintained only by the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Were this withdrawn prematurely that balance would dissolve into conflict and elimination of the weak minorities in Uganda and Tanganyika. In Kenya the European settled element would go down fighting. Since the major tribal groups in the territory have not yet been welded into any national cohesion, tribal jealousies would succeed the subjection of non-African minorities with as a minimum result social disintegration and economic bankruptcy. In all this, so long as it retains jurisdiction, the United Kingdom is the "power of last resort," which by its very existence as an arbitrator prevents recourse to violence and by its experience can often find a way through local antipathies which could not otherwise be reconciled.

120. It can be seen from the foregoing that the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would lead to a disastrous decline in the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom.

121. Whether this vacuum would be filled by a country hostile to the United Kingdom and her allies is difficult to say. Soviet Communism has as yet little foothold or influence in the East African territories, but it is traditionally quick to exploit a situation of chaos and poverty and there is no doubt that there would be potent groups in the abandoned territories who would look to Moscow for advice and support. The Hindu populations would also no doubt appeal to India to come to their rescue, with what result it is hard to predict. ...

(5) *Conclusions*

123. It can be briefly concluded that the withdrawal of United Kingdom influence from East Africa would bring to a shabby conclusion an important and

hopeful experiment in race relations, with repercussions locally on the Central African Federation and a decline in United Kingdom prestige much more significant and enduring than the self-congratulatory applause of the anti-colonial, anti-Western world. African gratitude would be felt only by the self-seeking and expressed by none. An expanding market for United Kingdom goods would contract and become even more sharply competitive; British business connections would be unlikely to survive in any strength the chaotic mismanagement of successor States. (Even in Uganda, often regarded by some as of West African ripeness, there are less than a dozen African civil servants above the subordinate grades.) The Middle East air barrier would be extended southward and might be virtually impossible to overcome. The flank of Africa would be thrown open to subversive penetration from the Soviet Union and others hostile to the West. The Belgian and Portuguese positions would be cruelly undermined.

124. A strengthening of United Kingdom interest would, however, pay dividends. The scope for worthwhile investment in East Africa is illustrated by the growth of the Kenya economy even through the Mau Mau troubles (£8 million new investment, excluding reinvested profits, in manufacturing industry alone in the period 1952–56). The remunerative investment desirable over the next five years on Government account alone has been assessed in the light of the Royal Commission report at £250 million. Minimum loan requirements for the period 1957–60 have been squeezed down to £112 million to bring them within sight of assumed resources, but a realistic assessment of the essential provision to sustain wise policy would be £150 million. In terms of recurrent expenditure Uganda can work within its revenue, Kenya can respond to a declining scale of aid on the present curve but strong efforts will be needed if Tanganyika is to tide over a period of inelastic revenue while its undeveloped resources are brought into play. If these financial conditions can be satisfied the stage is well set for a discharge of our obligations.

Part III: Aden and British Somaliland

A1. Aden Colony

134. ... it is the policy of Government to move as quickly as practicable to internal self-government with appropriate safeguards in the realms of External Relations, Defence, Finance, and Internal Security. The policy was clearly stated in the statement made by Lord Lloyd, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, in the Legislative Council on 19th May, 1956, which defined the aim as "a considerable degree of internal self-government" but stated that "the importance of Aden both strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that Her Majesty's Government cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony."

135. The strategic importance of the Colony of Aden in peace and war lies in the fact that it is British territory providing an important base from which naval, military and air forces can protect British interests in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and ensure the stability of the Somaliland Protectorate. Restrictions on bringing troops by air through the Middle East air barrier greatly increase the importance of Aden in this connection. In addition it is an air-staging post on the trunk route to the Far East. A naval fuelling base under British control in this area is of value, as also are the oil storage, and refining capacity of the port. It may well be

necessary in the future to increase the responsibilities and status of the military headquarters at Aden.

. . . 142. Removal of British influence from the Colony would certainly greatly diminish the prestige of Great Britain in the Middle East and its influence for stability in the area. Moreover it would render the military task of safeguarding British interests in the Persian Gulf scarcely feasible.

143. Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would certainly leave a vacuum which the Government of the Yemen would immediately seek to fill and the Saudi Arabians would be encouraged to pursue more energetically their designs on the Buraimi Oasis.

144. Taking all considerations into account, particularly strategy, economic interests, and prestige and influence in the Middle East, Her Majesty's Government have a strong interest in the maintenance of control of Aden Colony for an indefinite future period. This interest is not, however, inconsistent with granting to the Colony the highest possible measure of internal self-government.

A2. Aden Protectorate

. . . 163. There is a clear obligation on Her Majesty's Government to maintain and uphold its treaties with the Protected States for as long as they themselves wish to remain in that association with Her Majesty's Government. It would not be possible unilaterally to abrogate these treaties, although it may be possible in time to evolve a different kind of relationship.

164. Further, Her Majesty's Government has a general kind of obligation to assist and develop these small and weak States so far as may be possible towards a stronger form of economic and social condition. This has to be done by means of tactful advice and financial aid.

165. Subject to the foregoing, Her Majesty's Government has an interest in continuing to exercise its authority in the Protectorate; but primarily as the hinterland of Aden Colony, and a buffer between that Colony, the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

B. Somaliland Protectorate

. . . 167. The main political and economic problem is presented by the fact that the livelihood of the nomadic inhabitants of the Protectorate depends substantially on their enjoying access to the Haud and Reserved Area which were recognised by the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty as forming part of Ethiopia. The rights of the tribes from the Protectorate to graze and water in Ethiopia were established and recognised by the 1897 Treaty. By the 1954 Agreement, the Ethiopian Government accepted that the tribal organisation set up by the Protectorate Government should continue to function when the tribes were in the Haud and Reserved Area, a liaison organisation being established to preserve the link between the tribes and the Protectorate Government and to transmit to the tribes the instructions of that Government on internal tribal matters. In spite of these concessions by Ethiopia the inhabitants of the Protectorate as a whole deeply resent the fact that these vital grazing areas have been recognised as being Ethiopian territory, a resentment which is increased whenever the Ethiopian authorities do not keep to the spirit of the Treaty and the Agreement in regard to the rights conferred on the tribes from the Protectorate by those instruments. Somali leaders suspect the Ethiopian Government of wishing to

put pressure on the tribes from the Protectorate in the Haud and Reserved Area with a view to compelling them to accept Ethiopian nationality, this being the prelude, they suggest, to a move on the part of Ethiopia to take over the Protectorate.

168. Another important external factor is the movement towards independence in 1960 of Somalia. This country already has a very considerable measure of self-government, and the leaders of the dominant political party have as their aim the unification of all Somalis in a greater Somalia, an aim which is supported by most Somalis everywhere. The ability of the indigenous administration to govern the country effectively after 1960 and to maintain a real independence is doubtful, especially in view of the extent to which they are likely to continue to be dependent on external financial and economic support. Nevertheless, political development in Somalia acts as a spur to the political leaders in the Protectorate who want similar rapid development for their own country. They have been promised a considerable measure of economic and educational development, details of which are still being worked out, and have been told that the primary object of all these developments is to make the Somalis of the Protectorate ready for internal self-government. They have also been told that Her Majesty's Government is not, however, laying down a definite timetable for political advances but that Her Majesty's Government will review the position in consultation with the people of the Protectorate within a reasonable time after 1960. The Somali leaders have made enquiries concerning the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding the possibility of some form of association between Somaliland and Somalia some time after 1960. In reply to these enquiries Lord Lloyd said in a statement approved by the Cabinet and made in Hargeisa in August 1956 that

"when the time comes to consider such matters, the views of the Somalis concerned will be one of the factors of decisive importance in determining Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards any proposals which may be put forward on this subject. Her Majesty's Government would certainly discuss any such proposals with representatives of the people of the Protectorate; and if political and economic conditions were propitious, and the proposals were both well-conceived and favoured by the Somalis concerned, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to support them in principle." ...

170. The Somaliland Protectorate offers strategic advantages somewhat similar to those of Aden, except that its port facilities are not sufficiently developed to be of any value to the Royal Navy, although the Navy's need to secure port facilities there would become actual if we lost the facilities now enjoyed in Aden. As our influence in the Suez Canal area diminishes, so the Southern Red Sea area assumes for us an increasing importance. The preservation of our strategic interest in the Horn of Africa generally is not merely a question of the defence of Kenya (which marches with both Ethiopia and Somalia, and contains some 60,000 Somalis in its Northern Frontier Province) or the importance of insulating the area from unfriendly influences, particularly Egyptian. It is also, as the Chiefs of Staff have emphasised, a question of over-flying and air-staging rights in the Protectorate, together with the right to station forces, to secure concessions in respect of oil and mineral production and pipelines, and to safeguard the use and development of ports and anchorages. Because of the air barriers now erected against us at the eastern end of the Mediterranean air-staging and over-flying rights in the Protectorate, including staging rights for troop carriers, have become important for the reinforcement of the

Persian Gulf, via Nairobi and Aden. Staging facilities might also be required for short-range aircraft, *e.g.*, for the defence of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. ...

173. As the range of aircraft increases, the importance of their staging rights will be correspondingly diminished, but on the assumption that our strategic policy in the Middle East as a whole remains unchanged, and that our interests in the Persian Gulf area continue to be substantial, we are likely to need these rights for at least the next ten years. ...

Part IV: Mediterranean territories

A. Gibraltar

... 195. ... If withdrawal were accompanied by assumption over Gibraltar of Spanish sovereignty, economic and social development would be bound to suffer even if expenditure on the base continued, and independent political development would cease. If United Kingdom jurisdiction and expenditure on the base both ceased Gibraltar would be likely to become a slum very rapidly, like parts of Southern Spain.

196. Any change of status which seemed to satisfy the Spaniards' claim would momentarily increase the United Kingdom's influence with Spain; but it would permanently and disastrously diminish the United Kingdom's prestige internationally. In view of the loyalty of the Gibraltarian population to the Crown and the sentimental attachment of many people in the United Kingdom to the Rock, cession of Gibraltar to Spain is unthinkable. But if it were to develop into some kind of "City State" this would be unlikely to have any effect one way or the other on the United Kingdom's prestige and influence. ...

198.—(i) Spain is bound to continue with its claim to Gibraltar. But any proposal to concede it would run counter to strong loyalist feelings in Gibraltar and here and would have a disastrous effect on British prestige.

(ii) Constitutional demands in Gibraltar itself are not likely to be for more than gradual extension of local responsibility, *e.g.*, possibly by the introduction of a limited Ministerial system.

(iii) Gibraltar is strategically important since it helps to ensure the security of vital Commonwealth sea and air communications. Provided Spain remains in friendly relations with the United States, Gibraltar is not of equal strategic importance to NATO as it is to Her Majesty's Government.

(iv) Her Majesty's Government requires to maintain a naval and maritime air base in Gibraltar together with refuelling facilities, a headquarters and a wireless station.

(v) Though Spain has offered to lease Gibraltar as a base to Her Majesty's Government, and our strategic requirements could theoretically be maintained without retaining sovereignty, such an arrangement in so small a territory would present serious practical difficulties and would become impossible if Spain subsequently became unfriendly. ...

B. Malta

... 207. [HMG's strategic requirements] arise from Malta's importance as a United Kingdom naval and NATO base in the Mediterranean, and to a lesser extent from the usefulness of the Admiralty Dockyard at Valletta. Malta is also an air-staging post on the main trunk routes to the Middle and Far East, and the airfields are suitable for operating bomber aircraft.

208. Her Majesty's Government's strategic requirements cannot be met unless Her Majesty's Government retain jurisdiction in the field of defence and foreign affairs. This is the basis of Her Majesty's Government's interest in the integration plan, which would retain the final authority in the reserved field of defence and foreign affairs to the United Kingdom Parliament and Government. . . .

212. [If UK jurisdiction were ended:] This would mean withdrawal of United Kingdom use of any defence facilities in Malta. This would have the most serious political, economic and social effect on Malta. In the foreseeable future, it would mean economic ruin and widespread unemployment, unless some other Power stepped in. Politically, it would lead the Maltese to look around for "the highest bidder" and probably in the first instance to Italy.

213. If integration is unsuccessful, it will lead to difficulties in the use of the defence facilities of Malta and to a deterioration of Her Majesty's Government's prestige and influence in the Middle East. . . .

C. Cyprus

217. [Pressures] are reflected in an unusual way (as far as colonies are concerned) in demands for constitutional changes. The Turkish Cypriots are completely satisfied with the *status quo*, and are nervous of any constitutional advance. The extremists among the Greek Cypriots (the only ones who have been free to give voice in the last two years) disclaim interest in any advance short of union with Greece. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that, given the end of terrorism and a moderation of pressure and propaganda by the Orthodox Church, many moderate Greek Cypriots would welcome orderly advance along the general lines of Lord Radcliffe's proposals.⁶ It is generally recognised by all moderate opinion both in and outside Cyprus that the existing form of government, with no elective element at the centre, is anomalous in present times. But because Greek agitation has centred so much on "self-determination" for Cyprus, the present situation is that constitutional advance may lead on to self-determination by both main communities, *i.e.*, the partition of the island. It is only by acceptance of partition as an end contingency that the Turks have been persuaded to accept the principle of constitutional advance along the Radcliffe lines.

218. British control over Cyprus was acquired in 1878 to aid Turkey in defence against Russian aggression; the support of Turkey and hence of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area against Russia remains the chief strategic importance of the island to the Western Powers. Cyprus as the third in the chain of British bases across the Mediterranean has acquired the post-war strategic importance of serving as a base for protection of British interests in the Near East, for support to the Bagdad Pact, and for the defence of the southern flank of NATO. . . .

223. Independence, whether or not by partition, would most likely increase tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and lead to less stable internal political and economic conditions. Withdrawal of British administration and capital investment would slow down economic and social development; and the economic effect of cessation of defence expenditure has already been noted. It is doubtful if

⁶ C J Radcliffe, lord of appeal in ordinary since 1949; constitutional commissioner for Cyprus (1956); his proposals envisaged a very wide measure of self-government.

Cyprus would be viable, especially with the running out of its copper ore in the next few years, unless it had ties with some country that could offer a measure of economic support to it. . . .

225. The vacuum would be filled in the first place by Greece and/or Turkey. The former cannot be relied upon for support in the Middle East so long as she can be blackmailed by Egypt through the large Greek population of Alexandria, and to surrender Cyprus to Greece alone would hence be particularly damaging. It may be that under the Eisenhower plan British withdrawal would lead to greater United States influence on an independent Cyprus. Most likely there would be attempts by Russia to keep internal affairs in Cyprus in a ferment through AKEL, the local Communist Party. It is not inconceivable that Nasser might find an outlet for Egyptian imperialism in Cyprus—there are strong trade links with Egypt, and Nasser has given covert support to EOKA.⁷

Part V: Far Eastern territories

A. Hong Kong

. . . 231. By virtue of the Colony's geographical position, history and population, the chief political consideration which influences almost every problem is the relationship of the Colony to China. The present Chinese Government, like the Nationalist Government before it, considers Hong Kong to be Chinese territory awaiting reincorporation with the "motherland." We have no indication of China's timetable for such reincorporation and it seems likely that she hopes to bring it about in due course by peaceful means, awaiting a suitable opportunity to bring the matter to a head. In the meantime, she loses no opportunity of building up her influence within the Colony, particularly in the trade unions and in the schools, and of enhancing her appeal to the local population as "compatriots" of China proper.

232. While there are a number of convinced Left-wing (Communist) and Right-wing (Nationalist) adherents, the majority of the population are politically inactive and unorganised with survival as their major aim in life. So long as the British administration maintains its position and appears to be determined and capable of doing so they are likely to be content with the present position. In any emergency, however, a desire to join the winning, or at least to avoid the losing, side is likely to play a large part, and if there seemed to be a possibility of the Chinese Government shortly taking over the Colony there would be a strong move to reinsure with them. Any signs of weakening on the part of the Hong Kong Government or Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is therefore likely to have damaging consequences. . . .

234. The Colony is quite unsuited for any form of self-government. It is too small in area and resources to stand alone and there are no other territories with which it could combine. The only alternative to British rule is return to China. In any case most of the Colony's water supplies, most of its agricultural land and most of its industry are in the "New Territories," the lease of which expires in 1997. There is virtually no prospect of any Chinese Government renewing the lease, and without the leased area the Colony would be neither economically viable nor militarily defensible. . . .

⁷ AKEL, Reform Party of Working People; EOKA, Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.

236. The Colony has a first-class harbour and in peacetime is useful as a naval and air base. It is a centre for communications in the area and a link in our communications with Japan and the Pacific providing the only satisfactory service and repair facilities for shipping and aircraft, other than those at Manila, for thousands of miles. The Colony is also useful as a source of intelligence close to China. In cold war terms the retention of Hong Kong is of great importance to our position in the Far East. ...

241. ... [With the end of British jurisdiction,] Hong Kong would also be lost as the chief base in the Far East for United Kingdom industrialists, traders, bankers and shipowners; and the heavy but incalculable capital investment associated with those occupations would have to be written off. ...

243. The Colony provides a demonstration adjacent to a Communist country of what can be done by good administration combined with intelligent private enterprise. It is an example of the rule of law and respect for individual freedom. It has, largely at its own expense, done outstanding work in absorbing and resettling the flood of refugees who have confidently turned to it for asylum. It is a valuable asset in the "cold war" and its loss would in many ways be as serious to the Western cause as the loss of the Western sectors in Berlin. While few Asian Governments would be prepared openly to support our colonial position, and none to do anything to prevent the reincorporation of Hong Kong into China, its loss would certainly be widely regretted, and would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence in the area. ...

245. By ordinary colonial standards Hong Kong is both tractable and useful. No trouble is to be expected from pressure for constitutional development, and economically the Colony makes few demands. Owing to its position *vis-à-vis* China it stands, however, in much greater danger from external pressure than any other colony, and this danger is accentuated by the composition of its population and the inevitable struggle for the latter's allegiance.

246. Short of the collapse of the Chinese Communist régime and a disintegration of government within China it must be accepted that in due course the Colony must return to China, at least when the lease of the "New Territories" expires in 1997. There is likely, however, to be Chinese pressure for its return before then and this pressure is likely both to increase and to meet with a readier response from the population if there is any serious setback to the Colony's well-being, or any failure of confidence in the determination and capacity of Her Majesty's Government to maintain their position. If the Chinese were to force us out of the Colony this would be a severe blow to Western prestige in the Far East and a substantial practical loss in terms of British capital investment and communications facilities. We cannot be sure how long we may be able to maintain our position if the Chinese seek to force the issue, but any actions on our part which diminish the Colony's economic well-being and the confidence of the population in Her Majesty's Government can serve only to encourage Chinese pressure and to create conditions in which it will no longer be possible to resist it.

B. *Singapore*

254. ... Singapore together with the Federation [of Malaya] are most important in the defences of Australia and New Zealand, although their defence policy is oriented on SEATO, whose area also includes Thailand and South Viet Nam. Singapore is the

headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East; it possesses the largest and most comprehensive naval dockyard in that part of the world and it provides a base from which our air and land forces in the Federation and elsewhere in the Far East may be supplied and deployed. The United Kingdom's strategic position in the Far East depends upon the maintenance of our military presence in Singapore. . . .

261. If the United Kingdom were to withdraw prematurely, leaving the democratic elements to the mercy of the Communists, the effect on its reputation would be serious, not least in the Federation of Malaya. If, however, the United Kingdom were to withdraw in circumstances which provided reasonable security for the life, liberties, and economic well-being of the people of Singapore, its prestige and influence in the area would be enhanced rather than lowered. Without the full use of military facilities in Singapore the United Kingdom could not fulfil its strategic requirements in the Far East.

262. There is a serious danger that such a premature withdrawal might lead to the Communists in Singapore gaining control. These Communists, like the vast majority of the population, are Chinese and would look to China. If they were to gain control, the vacuum left by the United Kingdom withdrawal would in effect be filled by Communist China. The Federation of Malaya would not be strong enough to prevent this.

C. The Borneo territories (N Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei)

298.—(i) The stage reached in constitutional and political progress in the three territories makes it unlikely that there will be any local demand for independence in the near future.

(ii) No obstacle is accordingly foreseen at present to the fulfilment of the United Kingdom's strategic requirements, for which the territories offer possibilities.

(iii) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, *i.e.*, before the people are sufficiently advanced educationally and politically to be capable of administering stable and effective Governments of their own, would have very little if any direct effect on the United Kingdom Exchequer, but would seriously prejudice political, economic and social development, and react to the detriment and oppression of racial minorities, probably resulting in armed conflict.

(iv) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would damage United Kingdom prestige and influence in the territories and evoke adverse criticism elsewhere, not excluding the anti-colonial countries.

(v) United Kingdom withdrawal would leave a vacuum which would be filled almost certainly by a Government of Communist character or possibly by Indonesia, which has laid claim to Sarawak and would undoubtedly be attracted by the Brunei oil. The Philippines claims to North Borneo, held to be groundless, might also be pursued unless the United States exercised restraining influence.

Part VI: The Caribbean territories

A. The West Indies Federation

... 302. The Federation as initially established will not have strong governmental powers. Its main field of activity will be in economic planning and the co-ordination of West Indian trade interests, but it will have enough power to establish itself firmly if there is a will for it to do so.

... 311. The West Indies at present cost Her Majesty's Government on average about £4 million per annum. Of this over £3 million consists of direct grants in aid of normal administration, grants for special purposes (particularly hurricane rehabilitation) and C.D. and W. grants; the remainder represents the cost to Her Majesty's Government of the present defence arrangements. Although the method of administering grants in aid will change when the Federation is established there will be no change in the volume of aid required from Her Majesty's Government. Theoretically, the whole of this could be saved on the granting of independence. In practice, however, increased assistance for economic development would almost certainly be sought in other ways (in particular public loans) as soon as these more direct forms of assistance ceased. Some of this would be likely to come from the United States and Canada; there would however be likely to be a continuing call on United Kingdom sources and thus the apparent saving would not be likely to be fully realised although it might well remain substantial. ...

320. The movement towards closer association through Federation and towards independent status is a healthy one, as showing an out-growing of the effects of slavery and of the isolation in which the small units of the area have existed for so long. The withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction in due course from a soundly established West Indies Federation may be expected to stimulate rather than to impede local efforts towards development. The greatest danger politically is the growth of a class of political bosses on the Latin-American model, and that the present healthily developing local Civil Services may be affected by nepotism and jobbery. The association of the United States and Canada with the territory after independence is likely to grow and there may well be some friendly rivalry between these two Powers for a predominant place—a rivalry which might well be to the advantage of the West Indies. ...

B. British Guiana

... 334. [The effect of a change of status] would be a question of degree; if done as part of a general withdrawal from a number of the smaller territories, it would have a damaging effect on United Kingdom prestige and influence. In particular it would be likely to impair our relations with the United States, in view of their interest in preventing the establishment of any Communist Government in the Western Hemisphere.

335. In view of the possibility that a premature withdrawal might be followed by the development of a Communist-inspired State on the South American mainland, the United States Government might well step in.

336. Withdrawal before a stable and friendly Government is established (whether or not as part of the West Indian Federation) would result in some saving to the Exchequer but would be seriously damaging to United Kingdom relations with the United States and the West Indian Federation. It would also risk Commonwealth material interests (considerable United Kingdom investments, and Canadian investment in bauxite). Withdrawal after the establishment of a stable and friendly Government would, of course, be another matter.

Part VII: The smaller territories

337. There are numerous small Colonial territories, practically all islands, scattered around the surface of the globe, the considerations affecting which are set

out below. Some of these Colonies have strategic value either to us, the Commonwealth or NATO, *e.g.*, Bermuda and Fiji. Some are dollar earners (*e.g.*, Bermuda and the Bahamas). Some have frankly no material value to the United Kingdom as far as we can see to-day and call for (usually very small) assistance from United Kingdom funds, *e.g.*, St. Helena. Practically none could hope to maintain themselves with a stable administration if we withdrew, and certainly not those which represent any call on our funds. Withdrawal from all, even if practicable on strategic grounds, would represent only a relatively small saving to United Kingdom funds and, particularly bearing in mind the internal chaos which would in many cases result, could only represent a negation of our responsibilities and indeed be degrading. . . .

Falkland Islands and Dependencies

... The strategic importance of the Falklands to the United Kingdom is primarily as a base from which to support Commonwealth interests in the Antarctic, and depends on a régime attached to the United Kingdom connection. . . .

The population is almost entirely of United Kingdom origin with a high percentage of persons born in the United Kingdom. An independent Government would be entirely British and would involve no loss of United Kingdom prestige or influence. Provided the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction did not also involve withdrawal of United Kingdom protection, there would be no vacuum to be filled by an outsider. If, however, protection were also withdrawn, the Falkland Islands would be in danger of occupation by Argentina, and the abandonment of a racially British population to such a fate would be discreditable and severely damaging to prestige. . . .

The strategic value of the *Dependencies* depends partly upon the possibility of discovering minerals of strategic importance. For the rest, its strategic importance is largely negative, *i.e.*, it is important to the Commonwealth to deny it as a base to a potentially hostile Power. . . .

Our withdrawal from Antarctica would mean a loss of United Kingdom prestige and influence, especially in scientific circles. It might also involve the loss of strategic minerals, but this will be easier to evaluate when the results have been assessed of the work done during the International Geophysical Year.

Argentina and/or Chile, which have claims (partly competing) to the Dependencies, would probably step in if the United Kingdom withdrew.

St Helena with Tristan da Cunha

... United Kingdom withdrawal would certainly leave a vacuum in these islands. This might well be filled by the Union of South Africa in the case of Tristan da Cunha and Gough Islands. This would be hard on the Tristan islanders who are coloured within the meaning of the South African apartheid policy. It is unlikely that there would be an immediate claimant to St. Helena but abandonment of this poor and loyal community would be degrading. . . .

Seychelles

... The Colony is too poor in human and material resources to stand satisfactorily on its own and would probably decline into a tropical slum if United Kingdom jurisdiction were withdrawn. The small property owning class of French origin

would have to come to terms with the majority, which is of mainly African origin. Withdrawal from Seychelles would affect the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom only in so far as it would be regarded as an abdication of moral responsibility. ...

Mauritius

... United Kingdom withdrawal under present conditions would lead to a violent upheaval in Mauritius with unpredictable results. The amount of bloodshed might be limited but the effect on the economic and social development of the territory would be likely to be very serious, and prolonged. ...

Our present policy is to fit Mauritius for full internal self-government. Withdrawal cannot be recommended.

Fiji

... It is too early to contemplate Fiji becoming fully self-governing. If we relinquished our administration to New Zealand we should presumably be able to retain, with her agreement, the use of whatever facilities we required. Whilst the Colony remains under our administration no difficulty in controlling our strategic requirements is foreseen. ...

To [withdraw and] leave the Fijians and Indians to fight it out among themselves, when it was we who introduced the racial problem by importing Indian labour, would have a deplorable effect. The Fijians are intensely pro-British and our departure would for them mean betrayal.

The effect of United Kingdom withdrawal would depend on whether New Zealand were to replace us in Fiji. If not, there is the likelihood of strife between the Fijians and Indians and the lapse of the territory into chaos. ...

British Solomon Islands Protectorate

... If the United Kingdom [withdrew and] was not replaced by Australia the Protectorate would revert to a primitive mode of existence with little prospect of advance.

The effect on United Kingdom prestige would probably not be great, but, since it would involve allowing the territory to slide into anarchy, it would be discreditable. ...

Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony

... [If the United Kingdom withdrew:] The islands would relapse into primitive savagery with little hope of advance unless another civilised country assumed the administration.⁸

The effect of withdrawal on prestige would be probably very little, but to permit the Colony to relapse into savagery would be degrading.

⁸ The resident commissioner objected to this statement, commenting that the influence of Christian missions and government was now so great there could be no question of this (CO 1036/331, no 4, governor to Sir J Macpherson, 3 Mar 1958). In the CO, D J Derr specifically objected to the phrase; 'near primitive state' would be better, he thought (*ibid*, no 22).

High Commission Territories: Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland

... Representative institutions are at an early stage of development in all three Territories. There are demands, in varying degrees, for increased powers for Africans. We are endeavouring to encourage the growth of representative institutions but the question of eventual self-government is not likely to be a practical one in the foreseeable future. Other considerations apart, any suggestion that self-government for the Territories was our aim would, of course, be taken badly by the Union.

The practical question in connection with the High Commission Territories is not, therefore, whether they will one day become self-governing but whether they will one day be handed over to the Union of South Africa. . . .

If we were to agree to transfer the Territories in present circumstances it would improve our relations with the Union of South Africa, but we should be regarded by many people in the United Kingdom and overseas as having betrayed our trust. Our prestige and moral standing would be damaged, particularly in the eyes of the peoples of the Colonies and of the Asian and African self-governing members of the Commonwealth.

Because of the damage to our prestige which would result and because it would, in fact, be a betrayal of our trust, we cannot agree to the transfer of the Territories to the Union until the two conditions to which we are pledged have been fulfilled, *i.e.*, until the United Kingdom Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing its views and the African inhabitants have been consulted. Feeling among the African inhabitants and in the United Kingdom about the native policies of the Union of South Africa is such that we are unlikely to be able successfully to fulfil these conditions in the foreseeable future.

3 CAB 134/1556, CPC (57)30 6 Sept 1957 **'Future constitutional development in the colonies': memorandum for** **Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by Sir N Brook**

[In all, four papers were generated in response to the prime minister's directive (document no 1), each of them drafted in the CO:—CP(0)(57)5 was a factual statement following the 'skeleton plan', circulated to ministers as CPC(57)27, dated May 1957 (document no 2);—CP(0)(57)4 was a more specialised factual overview of 'economic and financial aspects', and became CPC(57)28, dated 26 July 1957;—CP(0)(57)3 was an attempt to be more analytical, with attached summaries: this was never circularised to ministers, and it was decided at the officials' meeting on 11 July 1957 to replace it by a much more schematic general paper;—CPC(57)30, dated 6 September 1957, was this general paper, signed by Sir N Brook (document no 3, printed here). Brook's paper incorporated some of the points made in the officials' discussion, particularly by the Treasury representatives, Sir F Lee and W Armstrong, but also the late addition of a rather specific CO doctrine about the desirability of not transferring power until a colonial people 'could live together in harmony' (para 15). It was also pointed out that capital assistance requests might not cease at independence (CAB 134/1551, minutes of Colonial Policy Official Committee meetings on 5 June & 11 July 1957). The three papers which were circulated to ministers were inter-related parts of the full response to the prime minister's directive, and not a sequence of papers which modified or qualified each other. The 'economic' paper CPC(57)28 is not reproduced here, its substance being represented in Brook's final paper. It had four sections: (i) colonial balance of payments (of which it was said 'any assessment of an individual territory's standing was too hypothetical for realistic analysis'), (ii) sterling assets of colonies, (iii) UK financial

assistance, (iv) special position of Hong Kong. It is fully summarised, with statistical tables, in Morgan, vol 5, *Guidance towards self-government in British colonies, 1941–1971*, pp 98–100; Brook's paper is summarised at pp 100–102. All three papers are summarised in A G Hopkins, 'Macmillan's audit of empire, 1957', in P Clarke & C Trebilcock, eds, *Understanding decline: perceptions and realities of British economic performance* (1997), pp 234–260.]

1. In his minute of 28th January, 1957 (C.P.C. (57) 6), the Prime Minister asked that an estimate should be made of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies in the years ahead, and that this study should set out the economic, political and strategic considerations for and against the grant of independence.

2. The Colonial Office, with the co-operation of the Departments concerned, have prepared a comprehensive review of all the present Colonial Office territories (save the Federation of Malaya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and also of the High Commission territories in South Africa. This review has been circulated separately (C.P.C. (57) 27). It suggests some conclusions regarding individual territories. But any further examination of the problems of any territory, or region, with a view to a reassessment of policy, would require special consideration after consultation with the Governors concerned.

A separate study of the economic and financial considerations has also been circulated (C.P.C. (57) 28).

3. On the basis of these detailed studies the Official Committee on Colonial Policy have attempted to suggest certain general conclusions, under the headings Constitutional, Economic, Strategic, and Political. I was asked to submit these on their behalf. The strategic sections (paragraphs 9–12) have been approved by the Chiefs of Staff.

Constitutional

4.—(a) *Independence*

(i) The following territories are likely to obtain independence within, and become candidates for membership of, the Commonwealth within the next ten years:—

Federation of Malaya, in August 1957.

Nigeria, perhaps in 1960 or 1961 (or quite soon thereafter).

West Indies Federation, perhaps in 1963.

Central African Federation (after 1960).

Singapore, if it joins the Federation of Malaya.

(ii) *Central African Federation*. The print (C.P.C. (57) 27) does not deal with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are parts of the Central African Federation. The Federation is already self-governing in all matters which have been agreed to be federal (though in relation to certain types of legislation Her Majesty's Government have powers of veto which were inserted into the Constitution to ensure that African interests were safeguarded); and a great measure of responsibility in respect of defence and external affairs has been delegated to it. Most matters concerning the African population are, however, reserved to the territorial Governments (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). The Commonwealth Secretary retains certain responsibilities for native affairs in Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial Secretary retains ultimate authority for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The

Federal Constitution contains a provision for its review by an Inter-governmental Conference which the Federal Government and the United Kingdom Government have agreed should be convened in 1960 to consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.

This does not, of course, commit Her Majesty's Government then to grant such a status to the Federation. But there will be strong pressure for it from the Federal Government, and Her Majesty's Government will have to shape their policy so as to reconcile the desire for independence among the Europeans in the Federation with the desire of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for continued protection by Her Majesty's Government and with the safeguards incorporated in the Federal Constitution of 1953. The preamble to the Constitution provides that:—

“Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue, under the special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire, those Governments remaining responsible (subject to the ultimate authority of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom) for . . .”

A later passage in the preamble runs:—

“. . . the association of the Colony and the Territories in a Federation would . . . enable the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward . . . towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.”

Her Majesty's Government are committed to interpret “when those inhabitants so desire” as meaning “when a numerical majority of all the inhabitants of whatever race so desire.” At present there is no prospect that such a majority would favour independence for the Federation at any rate if it involved either the independence under predominantly non-African control of the Northern Territorial Governments or the disappearance of those Governments or the transfer of further responsibilities from them to the Federal Government.

On 6th February, 1957, the Colonial Secretary said in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government could not abandon their ultimate responsibility until they were satisfied that Africans in the Northern Territories had transferred their loyalties from Westminster to the Federation and their own territorial capitals. At present it cannot be claimed that this transfer has been made.

(iii) *Uganda*. Although Uganda is not named here among the candidates for independence within the next ten years, there will almost certainly be African pressure for rapid advance, which may take the form of demands for a considerable measure of self-government in 1961 and independence in, say, 1967. Uganda cannot be expected by then to have acquired the skill in government, or to have developed the racial harmony, which would justify the United Kingdom Government in relinquishing their authority. They may, therefore, be obliged to maintain their authority in the face of opposition and criticism. In a lesser degree similar considerations might apply to Sierra Leone.

(b) *Internal Self-Government*

The following territories, listed geographically, appear the most likely to show significant developments in internal self-government during the next ten years:—

Singapore	Sierra Leone
Cyprus	The Gambia
Gibraltar	Aden Colony
Kenya	Somaliland Protectorate
Uganda	Mauritius
Tanganyika	British Guiana
Zanzibar	British Honduras

Malta has had internal self-government for ten years, and the integration scheme would maintain this arrangement.

The general classification in this sub-paragraph allows for a large variety of political changes, as must be expected in such differing territories. Singapore may join the Federation of Malaya and move into the independent class; Somaliland may be joined with her neighbour in a "United Somalia" enjoying some sort of independence, probably outside the Commonwealth; the future international status of Cyprus has yet to be determined; British Honduras, which at present has the opportunity to work a constitution with a large measure of responsible self-government, may suffer a set-back; the future of British Guiana remains uncertain until its people have made a second attempt at representative government; in the East African territories, particularly in Kenya, the devolution of responsibility will largely depend on the growth of inter-racial confidence, which cannot be predicted in terms of time. What can be said is that in all these territories there are political forces making for progress in internal self-government, and that neither economic nor strategic considerations need inhibit its orderly development.

(c) *The Remaining Territories*

Such forces are less apparent in the remaining territories; in most of them there are no discernible signs of pressures for significant advance in self-government within the next decade. The most distinct change could perhaps be expected in Hong Kong but, if it comes, it will hardly be of a kind discussed in the previous sub-paragraph.

Economic

5. It is difficult to present economic and financial considerations territory by territory, or even region by region. The print circulated under cover of C.P.C. (57) 28 discusses in some detail the main features of the Colonial balance of payments, the Colonial sterling assets, present and likely demands for United Kingdom financial assistance to Colonial territories, and the special position of Hong Kong. The main considerations involved in the question of granting independence fall under the following headings:—

- Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom.
- Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom.
- Effect on the use of sterling balances.
- Effect on sterling area balance of payments.
- Effect on United Kingdom trade.

Some of the general points under each heading are set out below, but it may be pointed out at the start that, with the exception of the budgetary implications for the United Kingdom, the economic and financial implications of the grant of independence to Colonial territories do not flow from the grant of independence

itself but from the policies which may be followed by the particular countries after independence.

6.—(a) *Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom.* The cost of the Colonies to the United Kingdom Government in terms of expenditure through the Colonial Development and Welfare (C. D. & W.) Vote, the Colonial Services Vote and the Colonial Development Corporation (C.D.C.) is at present running at about £51 millions a year. Ministers have decided against any regular pattern of Government-to-Government aid for independent Commonwealth countries, and by corollary against the C.D.C. embarking on new schemes in such countries. Moreover, it is established policy that territories on attaining independence or leaving the Commonwealth cease to be eligible for grants-in-aid or C.D. & W. funds. The further this process goes, the greater the reduction in the burden on the Exchequer on this account. But the net saving in the foreseeable future would almost certainly be considerably less than is generally imagined. The reasons for this are various. In general, the territories which are nearest to the attainment of independence tend to be least in need of Exchequer assistance. Thus, Ghana had no territorial allocation under the 1955 C.D.W. Act, and the C.D.C. had inconsiderable investments there. But if we decide to give independence to a territory before it can hold its own financially, there are likely to be special reasons for our decision—reasons which might also lead us to continue financial support after independence. Thus the Federation of Malaya will continue to need, and has been promised, considerable financial assistance in connection with the Emergency and the building up of her armed forces. The West Indies also have asked for financial assistance on a considerable scale after independence.

(b) *Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom.* Grants made available under the C.D. & W. Acts in the current period (1955–60) to all Colonial Governments account for only one-sixth of their expenditure on development. The remaining five-sixths are being found from their own resources and external loans. (This is the overall picture: in the case of some of the smallest and poorest territories C.D. & W. assistance provides almost the whole of the capital required for development.)

It is estimated that the needs of Colonial Governments for loan finance on the London Market will run at about £25–30 millions a year over the next few years. The need for loan finance on this scale would not, of course, disappear with the grant of independence. Independent Commonwealth countries are permitted to come to the London Market for loans, and Colonial territories after attaining independence would still wish to do so, if, as we would hope, they so order their affairs that their credit stands high enough to make this a practical proposition. The experience of the past two years, however, suggests that the London Market may not be able to meet all the demands likely to be made on it.

(c) *Effect on the use of sterling balances.* The Colonies are large holders of sterling assets: the total of Colonial sterling assets at the end of 1956* was £1,311 millions (of which £160 millions was held in Dominion and Colonial securities). Of this total £1,115 millions was held on public account and £196 millions on private account. We

* Throughout this section, references to Colonial sterling assets, balance of payments and trade figures up to the end of 1956 include Ghana and the Federation of Malaya.

have encouraged the Colonies to make the maximum possible use of their sterling assets in the financing of their current development programmes, but there are certain definite limitations, arising from the nature of some of these assets, on the extent to which this is possible. Our present estimate is that, excluding the Federation of Malaya, Colonial Governments may draw some £130 millions net over the next three or four years from the funds available in one way or another for development expenditure, provided that present plans are executed at the rate proposed and no sudden increases in revenue occur. This does not mean that total Colonial sterling balances are likely to fall by this amount, since there are other official and private balances which may follow different trends. What the overall trend will be depends upon the course of commodity prices, internal inflation, capital inflow, &c., and is virtually unpredictable. The mere fact of the grant of independence should not in itself make any appreciable difference to the trend except in so far as it must be expected that standards of prudence would probably fall after independence. It would certainly be possible for a Colony which became independent and pursued rash policies of over-development and Government expenditure to get quickly into an inflationary situation leading to a rapid fall in its sterling holdings and, in terms of a call on resources, a considerable strain upon the United Kingdom. It should be borne in mind that any running down of sterling balances represents a real but inescapable burden on the United Kingdom. It does, however, seem probable that this factor may be less important as regards the remaining Colonial territories after Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded.

(d) *Effect on sterling area balance of payments.* The Colonies as a whole have contributed to the strength of the Sterling Area in recent years. During the period from 1951 (when balance of payments estimates for the Colonies were first compiled) to 1956 the Colonies have had a net current account surplus in their balance of payments owing to a succession of boom conditions in various Colonial commodities. They have also attracted non-sterling capital for investment. If any of these territories after the grant of independence decided to leave the Sterling Area—particularly those which are large dollar-earners—the consequences for the United Kingdom and the rest of the Sterling Area could be serious. The chief danger would be that the country concerned would wish to convert its balances into dollars either directly or indirectly by retaining its dollar earnings and running down its sterling holdings. This could be a serious threat to sterling. Fortunately, however, there is no reason to believe that any of the present candidates for independence would find it in their interest to leave the Sterling Area after independence. The Government both of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya have stated clearly that it is their intention to remain in the Sterling Area at present. In general, if there were a premature grant of independence which resulted in a serious deterioration in political and economic conditions, this might easily cause a serious loss to the Sterling Area's dollar reserves. On the other hand, postponement and any pique resulting from it would be more likely to lead to abandonment of Sterling Area connections. Again, however, when Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded this factor may well be less important as regards the remaining Colonial territories.

(e) *Effect on United Kingdom trade.* The Colonies are of considerable trade importance to the United Kingdom. In 1956 United Kingdom exports to the Colonies were valued at £422 millions or 13 per cent of total United Kingdom exports. Of this figure, £343 millions were in manufactured goods, which also represented 13 per

cent of the total exports of these goods from the United Kingdom. In 1956 the United Kingdom imported from the Colonies goods to the value of £376 millions or 10 per cent. of the United Kingdom's total imports: of this figure, £190 millions were in basic materials and represented about 17 per cent. of the United Kingdom's total imports of these materials. The United Kingdom's share in Colonial trade is about one-quarter of the total.

Any premature transfer of power which resulted in serious political troubles and a lasting deterioration in a territory's economic circumstances would of course seriously affect United Kingdom trading and financial interest in that territory. On the other hand, assuming an orderly transfer of power and no appreciable falling-off in a territory's economic activity, the grant of independence need not adversely affect the United Kingdom's trading position in the territory concerned. We do not enjoy any formal advantages over our trading competitors in the Colonies, save to the extent that we benefit from Imperial preferences. The great majority of Colonies grant preferences to a greater or lesser degree, though the value of such preference to the United Kingdom varies greatly, but these preferences would not necessarily be affected by the attainment of independence. But though the United Kingdom possesses no formal guarantee of trade advantage in the Colonies deriving solely from their status as dependent territories, we undoubtedly possess certain intangible advantages over our trade competitors in the Colonies: for example, the employment of British administrators and technicians means the adoption of British standards and practices over a large field, and this, coupled with the strong financial and economic links with the United Kingdom, results in a natural tendency to "buy British." Such intangible trade advantages might well be diminished in many cases with the grant of independence. The dangers of this should not, however, be exaggerated. So far as the import of British goods and services on private account is concerned, the Colonies already pursue a very liberal trade policy and are not restricted as to the source of their imports except to a minor extent on balance of payments grounds. So far as imports and services financed on Government account are concerned, there is no doubt a considerable intangible advantage in the fact that Colonial Governments are required to place their orders through the Crown Agents for Oversea Governments and Administrations, though the Crown Agents themselves do not restrict their tenders to British firms. There is, however, no reason why a Colonial Government after independence should not continue to make use of the services of the Crown Agents. This is true even if the country were to go outside the Commonwealth. The Crown Agents still handle Government business for Ceylon and even Iraq. Once more, it is not so much a question of the grant of independence itself, but the policy pursued after independence.

7. To sum up, the economic considerations tend to be evenly matched and the economic interests of the United Kingdom are unlikely in themselves to be decisive in determining whether or not a territory should become independent. Although damage could certainly be done by the premature grant of independence, the economic dangers to the United Kingdom of deferring the grant of independence for her own selfish interests after the country is politically and economically ripe for independence would be far greater than any dangers resulting from an act of independence negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill such as has been the case with Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. Meanwhile, during the period when we can still exercise control in any territory, it is most important to take every step open to

us to ensure, as far as we can, that British standards and methods of business and administration permeate the whole life of the territory.

8. *Sharing the burden.* Total demands for investment from all quarters are well beyond the present capacity of the United Kingdom's resources; and unless it proves possible to obtain sufficient help with long-term investment in the Colonies—much of it bound to be unremunerative—their economic standards may fall. Thus, leaving political considerations apart, any arrangement which served to transfer to some other Commonwealth or foreign country some part of the Exchequer burden, or the demand for investment, would be welcome. It would be particularly helpful if Canada could be brought more into this field and could be persuaded to share part of our burden, and the possibilities of securing Canadian help merit further study. It must be pointed out of course that, except in the case of Canada which is outside the Sterling Area, the mere transfer of the investment burden to other Commonwealth countries within the Sterling Area may not represent full relief for the United Kingdom, since these countries are themselves importers of sterling capital from the United Kingdom, and would increase their demand for such capital in order to discharge their increased responsibilities. Such a transfer would, however, as has been pointed out, relieve the *Exchequer* burden on the United Kingdom.

Strategic

9. The Colonies provide an essential contribution to the facilities required to maintain and control United Kingdom world-wide sea, air and wireless communications. In certain areas they also provide the bases where British forces are stationed in support of United Kingdom interests and of United Kingdom contributions to regional defence organisations. The territories of East and West Africa are also the greatest potential sources of military manpower within the Colonial Empire. Whether we could rely on making use of this manpower in wartime would depend upon the circumstances in which we were involved in war.

10. The most important Colonial territories for military reasons are:—

Gibraltar	Singapore
Malta	Nigeria
Cyprus	East Africa
Aden	

As indicated in the constitutional section of this paper, all these territories are expected to show significant developments in internal self-government in the next ten years, and Nigeria and Singapore (if it merges with Malaya) may cease to be dependent territories during that time.

11. There are certain Colonies, mainly smaller islands, whose strategic value is of a negative character in that their occupation by an unfriendly Power would be detrimental to the United Kingdom or to her Allies, *e.g.*, the West Indian territories, the Pacific islands covering Australasia, the Falkland Islands, the Somaliland Protectorate and the small islands in the Red Sea and its approaches administered as part of the Aden Protectorate.

12.—(a) The value of Gibraltar in controlling Commonwealth and NATO sea and air communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean would not be diminished by an orderly progress towards internal self-government. Cession to Spain, however,

would reduce its strategic value to the West and would certainly make it of no value whatsoever to the United Kingdom for her own interests.

(b) Malta is unlikely seriously to demand independence in view of her financial reliance on the United Kingdom. The proposal for integration is unlikely to interfere with the fulfilment of United Kingdom or NATO strategic requirements.

(c) It is the military view that United Kingdom strategic requirements in Cyprus can only be fully met by British sovereignty over the whole island. Any system of partition or condominium would seriously restrict the use of the island as a base from which to support the Bagdad Pact or British interests and, to a lesser degree, NATO. Nevertheless, if we were forced by political considerations to do so, we might be able to group the more essential military facilities within enclaves, relying on treaty rights for the remainder. Whatever arrangements are made, however, it is important that we retain responsibility for the external defence of Cyprus.

(d) The importance of Aden as a headquarters and support base for the protection of British interests in Arabia, the Somaliland Protectorate and the Persian Gulf and as an air-staging post has recently been much enhanced by the potential air/sea barrier and in proportion to the increased Saudi and Yemeni threat. Our essential military requirements could not be guaranteed were complete independence to be granted, but some degree of internal self-government with proper safeguards for British military requirements might be acceptable.

(e) There is no present practical alternative to Singapore as a base for the deployment of naval and air forces in support of SEATO and ANZAM. The Borneo territories are geographically suitable, but virtually no facilities exist at present. Singapore cannot be viewed in isolation from Malaya, and military facilities in both are complementary. In the event of a merger between the territories, a development which Her Majesty's Government have indicated that they would favour, it would be expected that the Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to cover Singapore. The danger inherent in a merger with the Federation of Malaya is that a later Malayan Government might deny the United Kingdom continued use of Singapore as a base.

(f) The emergence of the potential air/sea barrier in the Middle East has emphasised the importance of the reinforcement route through West Africa and the deployment of ground forces in East Africa. No foreseeable political developments in East Africa should prejudice United Kingdom military requirements.

(g) In Nigeria the question of independence may call for a decision on United Kingdom strategic needs in the very near future. Kano is essential to the Central African air-route. Even this in certain circumstances depends on the use of Dakar. If Kano is denied to us it will be necessary to consider a route round Africa via Gambia or Sierra Leone, Ascension Island and South Africa (which would be practical only for long-range aircraft) or, alternatively, across French West and Equatorial Africa. Neither alternative would leave us freedom of action.

Political

13. Successive Governments in the United Kingdom have for many years pursued, with a broad measure of public support, a Colonial policy of assisting dependent peoples towards the greatest practicable measure of self-government. It is presumably not intended to depart from this general policy, nor to weaken it, as

regards individual territories, by imposing any delays which could be interpreted as artificial. A complementary aspect of the same policy, it is suggested, is that we must retain some measure of jurisdiction or protection where this is patently required in the best interests of peoples whose system of government, of law, or administration, and of political habit, derive from United Kingdom custom and advice. The United Kingdom stands to gain no credit for launching a number of immature, unstable and impoverished units whose performances as "independent" countries would be an embarrassment and whose chaotic existence would be a temptation to our enemies.

14. In many territories it is only British authority and administration which enables peoples of different racial or tribal loyalties to live in peace with one another. The United Kingdom bears some past responsibility for encouraging directly or indirectly, the immigration and settlement of non-indigenous peoples. The present responsibility is to persuade the races to tolerance and co-operation; this is a slow process. Conditions in East Africa, Mauritius, and Fiji, for example, are such that it would be irresponsible to remove jurisdiction and control before the process has been carried well beyond the present stage.

15. In sum, it should remain our aim to maintain our authority in each territory until a transfer of power can be shown to be generally desired by its people and they have shown that they can live at peace with one another and are capable of sustaining independent status with a reasonable standard of government. In most of the smaller territories there is at present no widespread desire to escape from ultimate dependence on the United Kingdom. It might at first sight seem attractive and advantageous, in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the territories concerned, that responsibility for certain dependencies should be transferred to other Commonwealth countries; for example, Canada might assume responsibility for Bermuda, or New Zealand for Fiji. It is, however, far from certain that the countries of the older Commonwealth would be prepared to assume complete responsibility of this kind, and such transfers would be repugnant to political opinion in this country and to the peoples affected. They would, too, need to be carefully assessed against the opportunity which they might provide for India to propose a like arrangement in, say, Mauritius or Fiji, or for South Africa to intensify her claim to the High Commission territories. As already noted in this paper, it would, however, be worth seeking some Commonwealth participation in the financial burden at present borne by the United Kingdom alone, in respect of Exchequer aid to the Colonies and Colonial investment.

16. Any premature withdrawal of authority by the United Kingdom would seem bound to add to the areas of stress and discontent in the world. There are territories over which jurisdiction might be surrendered without prejudice to the essentials of strategy or foreign relations, and at some modest savings to the Exchequer. But would we stand to gain by thus rewarding loyalty to the Crown which is an enduring characteristic of so many Colonial peoples? The United Kingdom has been too long connected with its Colonial possessions to sever ties abruptly without creating a bewilderment which would be discreditable and dangerous.