Political and Administrative Priority Issues |
These varied from District to District, both before 1957 when
the transfer of power began to gain momentum and later. Since field
administrators tended to be moved every two years on average they
experienced a variety of situations. The tasks of the administration
were to maintain law and order, administer justice, collect revenue
and stimulate and foster development of all kinds. In some cases,
such as Central Province from 1952 to 1958, because of the Emergency,
the maintenance of law and order had top priority. In others, such as
Central and North Nyanza where litigation, particularly over land,
was a popular pastime, the administration of justice made heavy
demands on a D.O.'s time. The collection of revenue required constant
supervision, but much of the task was effectively delegated to Tax
Clerks who, with the support of the Tribal Police (later Administrative
Police) generally did a more than adequate job. This left
development which, then as now, generally depended on local attitudes
and initiatives, the availability of capital and expertise and the
resourcefulness of the administration and other officials of central
government departments. The amount of time administrators were able
to spend on development depended to some extent on how much they had
to devote to their other responsibilities but, for the great majority,
the challenge of this innovative side to their work ensured that most
planned their time in such a way that they spent as much as they
could out amongst the people away from divisional headquarters.
"One point I should like to make with all emphasis, having
been involved with the post-colonial process of development
administration (not in the narrow academic sense) in United Nations
programmes over the past fifteen years, is that the administration of
the East African territories (and no doubt the others) was not simply
a matter of law and order. Development was the preoccupation,
the pride and the pleasure of almost every administrative officer.
Even the development planning process was well ahead in
world terms. (The Swynnerton Plan for Kenya predated the 'Whitaker'
plan for Ireland by some years). It is true that the Colonial power,
Britain, was niggardly (or sometimes ideologically profligate, as
with the ground nuts scheme), but the resources made available were
expended with committed zeal by the teams of administrators,
specialists, and missionaries, not to speak of the African participants,
The charge that it was otherwise is either ill-informed or
ill-motivated." (Gavaghan)
This preoccupation with development was hardly affected by the political situation even after the first Lancaster House
conference of early 1960. True, the D.O.'s barazas became longer
as they had to include information about the implications of
constitutional change and many questions (from African tribesmen
and officials who were often worried or frightened about what the
future might hold for them) had to be answered in these barazas,
in African District Council and Locational Council meetings and on
any occasion where groups of farmers or officials were gathered
together. Very quickly, however, discussion would return to local
issues concerned mainly with development of various kinds. As
McLean remarks, however, "it would have been different had I
been working in an area where Mau Mau were a real problem..."
Gavaghan's account of some of the main events in Kiambu where he
was D.C. in 1959 indicates what some of the issues were in Central
Province;-
"The position of D. C. Kiambu, in particular, was set in
all the main ferments and developments of the time. My tenure saw
the fall-out of the fighting emergency, the mass return of the same
Mau-Mau detainees with whom I had lived, the apparent recrudescence
of Mau-Mau in the guise of the Kiama Kia Nuingi with its, probably
fortuitous, but cleverly exploited links with The (Nairobi) Peoples
Convention Party, the platform of Tom Nboya; the emergence and
election of a new wave of Kikuyu politicians and parliamentarians,
such as Dr. Kiano, my own M.P.; the effective implementation of land
consolidation (made possible by the emergency policy of villagisation)
despite the opposition of the 'absentee' detainee landowners;
the landless squatters and the multi-racial parliamentary
lobbies that supported them; the rise and fall of the white proponents
of multi-racialism, their replacement by former white
'die-hards', converted to the espousal and service of African power;
the ambivalent attitude of the Government (and Colonial Office)
towards African political activity where it confronted the last
vestiges of the 'native authority'. Somewhere in all this, mention
must be made of the sincerely felt, and classically British, attitude
towards African 'loyalists' who had to be protected and sustained
while the policies for which they had loyally stood and died were
being abandoned by their colonial mentors." (Gavaghan)
The later case studies illustrate the nature of the
field administrator's work in some districts in the 1958-63 period.
|
Government Policy in the Districts & Relationships
|
There is agreement by the contributors of this paper that there was little evidence at the field level of government policy of any kind. There had been
national development planning for sectors of the economy, albeit with separate
emphasis on African land development, with the Swynnerton Plan for agriculture
as the most well known example. At the field level the staff of the different
government departments tended to busy themselves implementing their own policies,
although there was coordination of an informal nature (D.O.s and colleagues
from other departments working together at Divisional H.Q. and on joint safaris in
their areas) and coordination at District level in the District Team meetings which
were usually chaired by the District Commissioner). With the winds of change
veering so markedly in Nairobi (and probably in London) perhaps it was not
surprising that field staff lacked direction from the centre. Commenting,
particularly on the period. 1959-62 Scott recalls "It was predominantly a period of
uncertainty for the field officer, when colonial development policies lost their
momentum in face of the prospect of an early handover to majority African rule,
and when central government ceased to have any direct message for the field
Staff."
Gavaghan is more specific:-
"It is very difficult to pin down, even by examples, the extent to which there
were policies, but no policy. A District Commissioner needed guidance on a
multiplicity of issues, from security (as late as 1952 there was high level
evasiveness about the very existence of Mau-Mau, and from 1954-58 continuous
ambivalence on the subject of the release or 'perpetual' detention of Mau-Mau
leaders) to African chairmanship of African District Councils,
to the allocation of land to Africans in the Scheduled Areas (The 'White Highlands').
A general impression of advance towards independence was given... but there was
no apparent linking of the relevance of separate policies to this end, and
certainly no.... explanation to District Commissioners upon which they could
base decisions or risk dissent. As a result there was an uneasy fluctuation
between service loyalty and a sort of dutifully mutinous liberalism."
Most District Officers welcomed the freedom which an administrator enjoyed,
after all, this was one of the reasons why many of them had joined the Colonial
Service. "Even after due allowance for youth and the softness of distant
recollection the scope for using initiative seemed endless. I personally was
almost never instructed from above on what to do - except on e.g. organising
elections on new franchises - and even less frequently on how to do it. Most
of the time what I did was up to me rather than my masters. Unwelcome
instructions could be and were avoided by a variety of means." (McLean)
Relationships with superiors were generally good and there are several
reasons why this was not surprising. As Gavaghan recalls - "We were an elite corps
of an elite system, created for the benevolent exercise of paternal power". One was made to feel at home early on - an 'insider'. "We
all had quite enough to do without interfering with each other, though there was
a strong element of my parishioners first, last and all the time". (McLean) One's D.C. or P.C. understood this - they had been there
themselves and this was also their attitude in their occasional battles with
the Secretariat in Nairobi. "I always felt a Kenya D.C. had a high degree of
discretion to do as he saw fit, I felt very free to act, while at the
same time was sure of the fullest support from my P.C." (Scott). The
difficulties of physical communication made delegation necessary and officials
from the Chief Secretary downwards relied heavily on the integrity and good
sense of their subordinates. Despite this general picture of paternal D.C.'s
and avuncular P.C.'s there were clashes of opinions and personalities. As one
of our contributors records "....too frank an expression of opinion between D.C.
and P.C. levels could become hazardous to career". (Gavaghan)
The relationships between the expatriate administration and the 'native authority
(Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, Headmen etc.) are not easy to analyse. At the personal level,
with few exceptions, they were good. The officials of the native authority formed
a crucial link in the organisation, between the senior administrators and the
general public. "The close working companionship with the chiefs, headmen, tribal a vivid memory" (McLean). However officials of the native
authority were in a difficult position, reference to which will be made shortly,
just as were their fellow nationals who occupied more senior posts in the
administrative service. Our relationships with the latter were also generally
good, initially because they were 'one of us! and later because they earned our
respect. An extract from Scott's comments on the Africanisation of the Provincial
Administration illustrates the high regard in which African officers were held.
"I wish to record our debt to Kenneth Hunter, P.O. Nyanza in the 1940s, who
secured this appointment of the first African Assistant Administrative officers,
who were a well-regarded group in the service throughout my earlier days, and
provided some of the first African District Commissioners about 1962. By the
early 1960's many African District Assistants were in the service in
South Nyanza in 1962/63 the major divisional centre Migori on the Tanganyika
border was entirely African-run, with no major shortcomings. About the time of
the General Election we received our first African D.0. at Bungoma, a Makerere
graduate who made himself thoroughly at home in the job much sooner than a cadet
of former years straight out from England could have been expected to do...
I had no qualms about handing over at Bungoma in November 1963 "to Mathew Mwenesi
who was then taking over his second post as District Commissioner." (Scott)
The difficult position of African officers of all ranks in the administrative
service referred to above (and this applied to other departments too, especially
the Kenya Police) arose because they were regarded or had to operate, as though
they were separate and removed from the nationalistic political aspirations of
their countrymen." Gavaghan describes this as follows:-
"The concentration of effort on the building up of the 'native authority', as
against the political representation, was debated as early as the 1948 Senior
Devonshire Course and related Cambridge Summer Conference. (Lord Milverton,
Sir Grantly Adams, Prof. Arthur Lewis, Andrew Cohen).- It was seen that the
induction of the best available Africans into the Colonial Administration was
'scaffolding', while the democratic process, was 'building', but the dichotomy was never resolved, nor any real policy thrashed out. The result was that
African Administrative Officers were, and were seen to be, on the other side
of the divide from the elected members or leaders of political factions, to
the detriment of both and of peaceful evolution. It has token independence
for the two to grow together, parallel with the fusion of 'loyalists' and
'freedom fighters'."
"The ramifications of this basic practice (rather than policy, because it did not
seem to be at all thought out) were very extensive. The apparatus of the 'native
authority' was maintained, albeit often in a very shabby, low paid, untrained
and uneducated form, (how to put into the hand of a Headman or Sub-Chief 37
shillings and 3 cents monthly wage?), long after it had been overtaken by
the quality of person available to the main thrust of political activity."
"A dangerous gulf was opened between the 'loyalist native authority' allied with
the Provincial Administration (and often with white settler and some Asian
traders), on the one hand, and African political aspiration of all shades,
ages and educational level on the other."
"I recall a District Commissioners' meeting in Nyeri in 1958, when I was
unanimously outvoted on the issue of allowing universal suffrage for a
proposed post of paid Town Mayor (regardless of former Mau-Mau affiliation)
for the hundreds of new towns created out of emergency villages and land
consolidation. It was decided that the 'native authority' must be maintained
intact, rather than intermarried with the newly emerging pressure groups."
(Gavaghan)
Thus, in commenting on relationships with the native authority, Gavaghan feels
that there was "a fair degree of exchange of information and views, often on
a cordial and mutually respectful basis, but I-doubt whether we were really
'talking' to each other, except at the level of the realities which we had
imparted. Their own realities were occluded by the dilemma in which they were
placed, between the colonial power and the people." (Gavaghan)
Relationships with European farmers and businessmen and with the Asian
community were "infinitely complex and varied, but always coloured by rank,
influence, social prestige (not always on the side of the District Commissioners),
which were part of the colonial situation. Individual warmth there could be, but
this situation was essentially artificial and mutually uncomprehending."
(Gavaghan). One was always conscious of the fact that being an
administrative officer created barriers. Initial acceptance and friendliness
in games of rugby or cricket would often change to a more reserved atmosphere when
one's occupation was revealed. As McLean relates. "Relations with other
expatriates, (i.e. non-administrative service) especially farmers were more
difficult. Most of them, unlike most of at least the younger administrators,
could not see that decolonisation was inevitable. They imparted feelings to the
Africans that bore no relation to reality. With honourable exceptions they
believed the Africans were and would continue to be better off under colonial
rule. Sometimes their actions were so ill-judged as to be almost unbelievably
provocative. We got on well as individuals but there was an underlying
feeling that the administrators were selling them out which made it difficult
to obtain the degree of cooperation that one would have wished." (McLean)
|
Notes on Kenya by Terence Gavaghan
|
In preparing these notes I have gone back to Margery Perham's
'The Colonial Reckoning' Reith Lectures in 1961 (also see transcripts in side panel to the right)', not only
for their acute perception at the time, but because she herself
had for so long exercised an influence on the formation and
moral sense of many of those involved. The following brief
extracts may be useful in illustrating an enlightened and
authoritative view of the immediate post independence balance
sheet, without benefit of a further fifteen years of hindsight:
"If Britain's record in Africa is to be understood, it
is essential to have a comparative picture of the
Africa Britain found and the Africa she is leaving."
"Government with all its faults was a thousand times
better than the unregulated contact of men, white,
brown or black, armed with a new and terrible power
to corrupt and destroy" (surprisingly reminiscent
of J.S. Mill On Liberty 100 years before... "they
are fortunate to find an Akhbar or a Charlemagne").
"Among many economic benefits was the security, both
physical and economic, which allowed the infrastructure
for future development to be laid."
"The defects of the service were less due to the faults
of its members than to the lack of direction given to
it by its masters, all the way down from the Governors
to the British public."
"The office of District Commissioner should stand out
in history as one of the supreme types developed by
Britain to meet a special demand."
"What sort of men were these last?" (P. Woodruff
on the Indian Civil Service - "The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians").
My own involvement was successively as District Commissioner
(strictly not supreme type) between 1946 and 1959 in Mandera,
Maralal and Kiambu Districts; as Under-Secretary for
Localization and Training 1960-1; and as Under-Secretary and
Ag. Permanent Secretary in the Governor's Office through
1961-2. A special task was that of Officer-in-Charge of the
rehabilitation of 'hard core' Mau-Mau detainees from 1957-8.
I was also (founder) President of the non-racial Senior Civil
Servants Association of Kenya, in 1959-60, which involved
negotiations with the Chief Secretary, the Governor, the Dep.
Under Secretary at the Colonial Office (Philip Rogers) and
the Colonial Secretary (Ian Macleod). I was released in
November 1962 to the United Nations as Chairman of an
international Establishment Commission in the Somali Republic
to unify and reform the public services in the former British
and Italian colonies making up the newly independent State.
The whole period of my service from the end of the Second World
War to November 1962 seems, in retrospect, to have been
dominated by a number of confusedly definable influences,
notably:
The parallel induction of Africans into the Colonial
Administrative Service and into national political
life as legislative councillors/later members of
parliament.
The reform and expansion, (but not integration except
at University level), of the three racially
organised educational systems.
The separate expansion of local government in African
and non-African areas.
The extension, and to some extent integration, of the
franchise, and the gradual movement to parliamentary
parity and majority of Africans.
The introduction of national development planning,
again with separate emphasis on African land development.
The transport and communications 'explosion', which
transformed accessibility to hitherto remote areas,
particularly African.
The increasing application of external political and
cultural influences, particularly American, Russian and
Indian.
The halting steps towards racial equality and integration
set off by the Second World War, advanced by liberal
movements such as the Capricorn Africa Society and the
ephemerally adopted concept of multi-racialism, leading
to a pragmatic acceptance of African power, which
finally disposed of any question of equality being a
matter of choice.
My more immediate experience must be divided into phases and
roles:
As District Commissioner, the often perplexing and
mutually competing responsibilities of maintaining
order while promoting development, both with slender
resources; of facilitating the growth of political
movements away from violence and yet towards democratic
representation; of working, against a backdrop of
mounting African restiveness, of European unease and disunity, of shifting Asian allegiances, with both
genuine liberalism and determined reaction, with
both enlightened policies and covertly restraining
interests and influences.
As Officer in Charge Rehabilitation, the
extraordinary and unique relationship with many
thousands of committed 'forest' or 'freedom fighters',
whatever the term may be, gave unusual insights both
into their attitudes and aspirations, and the formal
and informal policies of those responsible in the
Government.
As President of the Senior Civil Servants Association
and (at the same time) Under Secretary for Afrlcanization/
Localization &Training, I was exposed both to
the varied aspirations of senior civil service members
of all races and to the attitudes towards them of
senior Kenya Government and Colonial Officials.
As Under (and Ag. Permanent) Secretary in the Governor's Office, I was involved in the final constitutional processes, drafting, conferences, etc.; in the debate
over the Northern Frontier District vis-a-vis Somalia
and Ethiopia and, mainly as an attendant observer, in the
web of relationships between the outgoing colonial apparatus
and the aspiring and mutually competitive African politicians,
both in and out of Government.
Any views which are expressed inevitably reflect a retrospective
amalgam of experiences from each vantage point. That of District
Commissioner cannot be taken in isolation, even as 'The Man in
the Middle '.
Nevertheless, the position of District Commissioner Kiambu,
in particular, was set in all the main ferments and
developments of the time. My tenure saw the fall-out of the
fighting emergency, the mass return of the same Mau-Mau
detainees with whom I had lived, the apparent recrudescence
of Mau-Mau in the guise of the Kiama Kia Muingi with its,
probably fortuitous, but cleverly exploited, links with
The (Nairobi) Peoples Convention Party, the platform of
Tom Mboya; the emergence and election of a new wave of
Kikuyu politicians and parliamentarians, such as
Dr. Julius Gikonyo Kiano. my own M.P.; the effective
implementation of land consolidation (rendered possible by
the emergency policy of villagisation) despite the opposition
of the 'absentee' detainee landowners. the landless squatters
and the multi-racial parliamentary lobbies that supported
them; the rise and fall of the white proponents of multiracialism,
with its brief hey-day of favour from the
Colonial Office; their replacement by former 'white die-hards',
converted to the espousal and service of African power; the
ambivalent attitude of the Government (and Colonial Office)
towards African political activity, where it confronted the
last vestiges of the 'native authority'. Somewhere in all
this, mention must be made of the sincerely felt, and
classically British, attitude towards African 'loyalists' who
had to be protected and sustained while the policies for
which they had loyally stood and died were being abandoned
by their colonial mentors.
Out of this background I have selected a small number of
the huge array of problems large and small that confronted
any District Commissioner. The criterion of selection has
been, not only their intrinsic significance, but also my
awareness of them at the time.
General District Policy Formulation
It is very difficult to pin down, even by examples,
the extent to which there were policies, but no policy.
A District Commissioner needed guidance on a
multiplicity of issues, from security (as late as 1952
there was high level evasiveness about the very
existence of Mau-Mau, and from 1954-8 continuous
ambivalence on the subject of the release of 'perpetual'
detention of Mau-Mau leaders.
The former led to the
death of Senior Chief Waruhiu who persistently sought to alert the Chief Native Commissioner's Office; the latter to the ill-advised 'leader to darkness and
death' speech delivered, but not drafted, by Governor
Renison to African Chairmanship of African District
Councils (as late as 1959-60 the plaque recording the
opening of the ADC Hall in Kiambu was inscribed in
honour of the then Colonial Governor - contrary to my
recommendations on handing over the District); to
allocation of land in the Scheduled Areas - 'The White
Highlands' - to Africans (in 1956 a proposal to purchase
for the Samburu people several border ranches, with
very tenuous European occupancy, was blocked. In 1958
two transfers of land at Limuru, one to a competent
Kikuyu businessman for a petrol station, the other to
the African District Council for an industrial estate
railway siding, were disallowed). A general impression
of advance towards independence was given (albeit with
categorically no time scale), but there was no apparent
linking of the relevance of separate policies to this end,
and certainly no kind of seminar discussion nor
explanation to District Commissioners upon which they could
base decisions or risk dissent. As a result, there was
an uneasy fluctuation between service loyalty and a
sort of dutifully mutinous liberalism.
The Maintenance of the 'Native Authority'
The concentration of effort on the building up of the
'native authority', as against the political
representation, was debated as early as the 1948 Senior
Devonshire Course and related Cambridge Sumner
Conference. (Lord Milverton, Sir Grantley Adams, Prof.
Arthur Lewis, Andrew Cohen). It was seen that the
induction of the best available Africans into the
Colonial Administration was 'scaffolding' while the
democratic process was 'building', but the dichotomy
was never resolved, nor any real policy thrashed out.
The result was that African administrative officers
were, and were seen to be, on the other side of the
divide from the elected members or leaders of political
factions, to the detriment of both and of peaceful
evolution. It has taken independence for the two to
grow together, parallel with the fusion of
'loyalists' and 'freedom fighters'.
The ramifications of this basic practice (rather than
policy, because it did not seem to be at all thought out)
were very extensive. The apparatus of the 'native
authority' was maintained, albeit often in a very shabby,
low paid, untrained and uneducated form, (How to put
into the hand of a Headman or Sub-Chief 37 shillings
and 3 cents monthly wage?), long after it had been
overtaken by the quality of person available to the main
thrust of political activity.
A dangerous gulf was opened between the loyalist native
authority allied with the Provincial Administration
(and often with white settlers and some Asian traders),
on the one hand, and African political aspiration of
all shades, ages and educational level on the other.
I recall a District Commissioners' meeting in Nyeri in
1958, when I was unanimously outvoted on the issue of
allowing universal adult suffrage for a proposed post
of paid Town Mayor (regardless of former Mau-Mau
affiliation) for the hundreds of new towns created out of
emergency villages and land consolidation. It was
decided that the 'native authority' must be maintained
intact, rather than intermarried with the newly emerging
pressure groups.
The Land Question
In Kiambu (and in a pastoral sense, Samburu) district,
the land question was at the root of everything. It had
underlain the KCA, Mau-Mau and the KKM and had enlisted
support for the Nairobi Peoples Convention Party, and
the landless/squatter/returned detainee opposition to
land consolidation. Almost to the end, the land question
was seen by the outside world, and by most white Kenya
farmers, as being a clear cut matter of successive
Royal Commissions having apportioned sacrosanct 'White
Highlands' and 'Native Reserves'. Even the Provincial
Administration was hard put to it to maintain or further
the 'Devonshire' declaration of paramountcy of African
interests. The political issue was not aided, (in spite
of excellent work done) by the creation of a separate
African Land Development Board, effecting a kind of
benevolent, 'bulldozer apartheid'. The Highlands Order
in Council, upon which the division was founded,
remained almost unbreached as to its interpretation in
favour of white exclusiveness up to independence, in line
with the rearguard action of maintaining the 'native
authority' and the 'scaffolding' of the provincial
administration.
Communication and Relationships
The network of formal relationships elaborated into District
Officers' meetings, District Team meetings, District
Commissioners' meetings, Provincial Commissioners' meetings
and so on (with some overlap at District level with African
District Council and Committee meetings) afforded much
opportunity for exchange of views, but this channel of
communication seemed to become attenuated on its way upwards.
Perhaps this was because of the nebulous (and often
powerless) role of the Chief Native Commissioner/Minister
for African Affairs at the apex; perhaps because the
groundswell of opinion from the field met the real power
of Colonial Office diktat only obliquely by being switched
sideways from the Minister of African Affairs to the
Chief Secretary - the 'universal joint' of a Colonial
Government; perhaps because too frank an expression of
opinion between District Commissioner and Provincial
Commissioner levels could become hazardous to career.
A corresponding set of formal relationships for the
'native authority', interwoven with the above, achieved
a fair degree of exchange of information and views, often
on a cordial and mutually respecting basis, but I doubt
whether we were really 'talking' to each other, except
at the level of the realities which we had imported.
Their own realities were occluded by the dilemma in
which they were placed, between the colonial power and
the people. Relationships with settlers, businessmen,
the Asian community, were infinitely complex and varied,
but always coloured by rank, influence, social prestige
(not always on the side of the District Commissioner),
which were part of the colonial situation. Individual
warmth there could be, but the situation was essentially
artificial and mutually uncomprehending. (I particularly
recall the surprise when having driven in full uniform with an elderly Indian member of a Parliamentary delegation
to inspect land consolidation and he being amazed and
delighted that a District Commissioner should exchange
waves with schoolchildren, we walked together hand in
hand into a large and hostile Kikuyu anti-consolidation
meeting). As to communication with Africans generally,
I do not think, for all the upstairs/downstairs cordiality
that could and did exist, we ever could have been on a
'wavelength'. We were once told, for example, in the
East African Standard that Africans lined the street
to watch the Queen-Mother pass and showed their
enthusiasm by silent respect 'as is their custom'. This,
of course, was nonsense and the explosions of popular
emotion which have been seen since independence give the
lie to any such self-deception.
We were an elite corps of an elite system, created for
the benevolent exercise of paternal power. We could not
be other than what we were, but we did not meet the
people on common ground.
Morale
We have been asked particularly about morale and this is
no simple matter. There can be good morale about bad
causes and bad morale in good causes, each involving a
value judgment. The morale of the colonial administrative
service at District level remained remarkably high and
fairly unified through all vicissitudes, largely because
it was based upon a broadly homogeneous cultural
background and training, with a sincerely held view of
duty in 'trusteeship'. When I once complained of an
'emergency' District Officer having, in my view, behaved badly over a detainee matter, his District Commissioner
remarked 'but of course he's not one of us'! Woodruff
similarly recounts a story of a single discreditable
member of the Indian Civil Service of 100 years ago,
remarking with satisfaction that it is pleasant to be
able to record that he was not an Englishman (Dutch
I think). But there was another face to all this.
There were opposed sets of good morale. The 'die-hard
settlers', the 'hard-core Mau-Mau', the religious
observers, all had it. There was even good morale about
coat-turning that sometimes approached treachery. When
Jomo Kenyatta had finally been released and was
inexorably moving towards the formation of a Government
of The Kenya African National Union, some extraordinary
behind-the-scenes manoeuvres went on at Cabinet Office/
former settler Minister level, designed to supplant
him by stimulating parliamentary support for Tom Mboya.
When these failed those concerned readily fell in behind
Kenyatta, as if they had never sought to upset him.
Again, there was the case of African District Officers,
chiefs, etc. closely allied to their European
counterparts, who were allowed and encouraged (not in
writing) to get on with the hard graft of security,
interrogation, control, enforcement, rehabilitation,
and so on, as long as things went well. When they did
not, as for District Assistant Sam Githu, George Medal,
he stood trial for murder/manslaughter (of a detainee
who died of pneumonia after a blow), before a newly
arrived judge from England, without any official submissions
(despite urgent representation that they should be made)
as to the general (and officially acceptable) background
to the offending blow, or to his own remarkable record of
'loyalty'. After his conviction and sentence a collection
was taken up to alleviate the damage to his personal
circumstances (and perhaps to a few consciences). Morale
was severely dented by such examples, which were not
confined to Africans.
To set these remarks in context, I should perhaps confess
that, immediately after I had written a confidential
memorandum to the P.C. in 1958 about the urgent need for
policy guidance to District Commissioners in the post
Mau-Mau period, I was hauled before the Governor and
Minister for African Affairs (to both of whom I had
reported directly on rehabilitation), accused of
disloyalty and other defects affecting morale, summarily
relieved of my post and transferred to Central Government
for 'correction'. My morale and my friendships survived
and my fortunes were later restored.
Justice
There is no reference in the guidelines to the question
of justice and it can only be presumed that the promoters
of the symposium have adopted the hypothesis that justice
was as essential an element as constitutionality in the
conduct of affairs of the time. Both, of course, depend
upon the point of view. It would take a book to do
justice to this most important element and I mention it
only to ask that it be introduced as explicitly into the
general deliberations as it will be implicit in the
discussion of each aspect, (such as collective punishment,
mass detention, villagisation, interrogation, the
'doctrine of compelling force' used in rehabilitation, etc.).
I was too involved in each to attempt an objective
evaluation in a brief paper.
Hindsight
Apart from the academic, historical and nostalgic advantages
of evaluation at this remove from events, there is practical
value in the analysis of certain aspects for their possible
relevance to the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (and later South Africa/Azania) situations.
Constitutionality
In Kenya we worked on the premise that there was a
basic constitutional position to be respected and
sustained in the colonial occupation of Kenya
(indeed in the Sultan of Zanzibar's suzerainity
over a ten mile coastal strip) and thus in the process
of decolonization. In fact, it was just a question of
power. We took it in the 'scramble for Africa', we
held it, we would have been pushed off it. We chose
to go a little beforehand, partly because we thought
it right. I believe (and recommended) that a little
less pomposity about 'constitutional instruments' and
'granting independence', as if freedom were something
to be given away or withheld, would have been at least
good sense.
At the time that Britain took parts of Africa, (apart
from by whimsy or accident) the policy was generally
to serve the imperial mission by occupying the
territory gained and thus keeping others (Germans,
French, Italians, Belgians) out. Had we been able to
see the policy of decolonization in a more pragmatic
light, it would perhaps have been possible to get the
settlers to see that, just as their presence was
essential to resist the advent of other European
powers, so their departure was essential to resistance
to incoming communist ideology and to continuing good
relationships between Britain and Africa. They might have spent less time on things like the Federal
Independence Party and more on moving towards a mutually
respecting and profitable separation on an agreed
programme. Three essential elements in such a programme,
highly relevant to Rhodesia, are cash, an escape route
and interim security. Kenya eventually had all three.
Kith and Kin
This is related to Constitutionality above and is used only as a popular
tag of the time to cover an attitude of mind which
extended from Britain, through the Colonial Office,
to the very doors of the colonial administrator and
the white settler. The attitude was quite ambivalent
and Macleod and Alport were important exponents of it.
It consisted in the treatment of administrators and
settlers alike as people who (although irritatingly
related and therefore in need of protection for
political, economic or family reasons) wer'e somehow
to blame for the situation in which they were placed
in the last days of power. Alport would not even
admit members of the colonial administration to the
Commonwealth Relations Service. He wanted a 'clean
break' (as I asked at the time of the Conservative
Research Committee 'with a dirty past?').
No good came from this totally misleading and
condescending attitude, which is implicit in much
of the treatment of the Rhodesian UDI question.
Britain controlled the colonies with its parliaments
and policies, settled them with its people, guided
them with its powers and finance and officials, and
itself benefited from the arrangement. Any other
group of British (or for that matter, European)
settlers, placed in the same circumstances, would have behaved in much the same way. They need to be treated
with respect but, if necessary compelled to comply
while being afforded opportunities of escape and
readjustment with their families elsewhere.
Pace of Change
It is impossible to pronounce on such a matter, unless
one takes the 'right wing' view that 'they were not
ready', or the view of absolute morality that
colonialism is indefensible anyway and should be
terminated forthwith. Nevertheless there were ways
in which matters could have been advanced; in integration,
in Africanization of the civil service, local government,
and industry. There could have been an attitude of
'lets run ahead and see if they can do it', rather
than of waiting to be pushed or threatened into
responsive movement.
Turnbull. in Tanganyika, may well not have been intended
to be the last colonial governor but he (and Nyerere)
saw to it that he was ahead of Kenya and with less
resources. Conversely, Kenyatta is reported to have
expressed the view that his nine years of imprisonment
and detention gave Kenya and himself a needed
opportunity to build up the capability of self-government.
(The anecdote should not be lost to history
of the Duke of Edinburgh asking him, as they stood
side by side as the Kenya flag stubbornly refused to
unfurl at the Independence ceremony in Jamhuri Park,
'are you sure you don't want to change your mind?').
Law and Order versus Development Administration
One point I should like to make with all emphasis,
having been involved with the post colonial process
of development administration (not in the narrow
academic sense) in United Nations programmes over
the past fifteen years, is that the administration of
the East African territories (and no doubt the others)
was not simply a matter of law and order. Indeed,
there was not always too much of either.
Development was the preoccupation, the pride and the
pleasure of almost every administrative officer, with
extraordinary results of infinite variety achieved
with slender resources. Even the development planning
process was well ahead in world terms. (The Swynnerton Plan for Kenya predated the 'Whitaker'
plan for Ireland by some years).
It is true that the Colonial power, Britain, was
niggardly (or sometimes ideologically profligate, as
with the ground nuts scheme), but the resources made
available were expended with committed zeal by the
teams of administrators, specialists, missionaries,
not to speak of the African participants. The charge
that it was otherwise is either ill-formed or ill-motivated
and inhibits sound planning for the
future.
Afterthoughts
Without the kind of colonial rule exercised in the (British)
African territories, for all its faults and moral vulnerability,
there would possibly not today exist a United Nations of 150 odd
free and equally participating members, of whom nearly one-third are from the African continent.
Furthermore, the infrastructure for the transfer of
resources on the scale envisaged by UNCTAD and the
New International Economic Order has much of its roots
in the human and economic developmental achievements of
the colonial period.
|
Nandi District, January 1960 - March 1961 by E.N. Scott D.O.
|
Party political position
Nandi was a political backwater
in early 1960. The District Commissioner, Dick Symes-Thompson, felt it necessary to campaign to get the people to
realise how rapid constitutional change would be after the
first Lancaster House Conference which had just taken place.
The Congo debacle in mid-1960 seriously alarmed the Nandi,
raising the spectre of a disastrous premature independence
for Kenya. It is likely to have been one of the factors that
prompted them to support the Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU), an alliance of the pastoral, coastal and certain west
Kenya tribes, formed about August of that year when national
political parties were once again allowed.
The General Election of early 1961 was a foregone conclusion.
The KADU nominations were won by the more sophisticated
Nairobi politicians who although originally from the area
took little interest in district affairs before or after the
elections but managed to sweep the board on the day. Kenya
African National Union (KANU) candidates made little impact
in the district. The election, on a limited franchise, was
a good-humoured affair.
Political and consequent administrative priority issues.
During my period as Acting District Commissioner I continued
the policy of alerting the Nandi to the rapid acceleration of
political change. From July onwards I had to devote much
effort to reassuring them that the British would not do a
bunk, Congo-style, and leave them with a ruined country.
The one major conflict of my time in Nandi arose from my
pressing land registration and water reticulation in one area
of North Nandi. The scheme was well under way when I took
over, with the support of the majority of the landholders.
But a small, vocal minority objected, prompted by a leading
Nyanza politician who was restricted to that area. I was encouraged by the older Chiefs to insist on the completion of
the scheme, but the matter was not so easily resolved as it
proved a convenient rallying point for the younger politicians.
The Provincial Commissioner, Jack Wolff, told me that
Government did not want development pressed against the wishes of the people, and there matters rested, to be resolved by
Dick Symes-Thompson on his return from leave. Similar
programmes continued unhampered in other areas of the district.
Apart from these preoccupations I continued the administration
and development of the district, working closely with
the smallholder development. Towards the end of my time as
Acting D.C. manpower resources were shifted from development
work to cope with the registration of voters for the 1961 General
Election. Officers of the other departments felt that I
had made unnecessary calls on their staffs for help with this
task, which proved not to be as heavy as I had expected.
|
South Nyanza District, November 1962 - March 1965 by E.N. Scott D.O.
|
Party political position
The district was the home of
the great (now greatly-lamented) Tom Mboya, but Nairobi was
his power base and he played little part in district affairs
during my short time there.
The district was pro-KANU to a man, but in this period I
recall no significant political activity. The census of 1962,
on which future district representation was to be based, was
over before I arrived, and the election of 1963 was still to
come when I left.
Political and administrative priority issues
As I have
said, politics had minimal impact on this district's affairs
during my time.
Before going on leave in early 1962 I had informed the
Secretariat of my wish to undertake the role of District
Officer to one of the new African District Commissioners,
the first of whom were taking up their positions about that
period. Soon after my arrival in South Nyanza my request was
granted with the appointment as D.C. of Ezekiel Josiah. All
I knew about him was that he had only quite recently been
appointed a District Officer, and I recall wondering what it
would be like to work for a young and inexperienced man in
such a senior position. However when I looked him up in the
Staff List I found he had joined the Service about the time
I was born. He needed none of the propping that I had
expected to have to provide in the role I had volunteered for.
I don't recall that he wrote many letters, but he was good on
the telephone and in face-to-face contact with callers and in
barazas.
Not that South Nyanza was a difficult district to run at
that period. When the D.C. had a serious motor accident in
early 1963 and was away for a month to six weeks and I had to
mind the store I had no difficulty in combining the largely
routine duties of D.O. with keeping an eye on matters that
were the proper concern of the D.C.
The one near-crisis was the threatened African civil
servants' strike of early 1963. The caretaker government with an African Minister of Finance, Tiad refused them a pay rise, and
the entire work force was to come out. I recall being
invited to an eve-of-strike meeting in the District Clerk's
office, next to my own. They were worried about my reaction
as de facto District Commissioner, and I suspect also because
there had not been a strike in the service before. I did not
see any important consequences for government in tha.t district
and was mainly concerned about ongoing relationships within the
service. I assured the meeting that as a fellow trade
unionist (as indeed I was, as a member of the Senior Civil
Servants' Association) I did not criticise their proposed
action, and neither I, nor any member, of my association would
perform the functions of any striking officer. I did however
urge them not to let any equipment in their charge get damaged,
and not to let their standing in the eyes of the African public
suffer in any way. They were plainly relieved at my taking
this line. In the-event, as far as I can recall, the dispute
was settled and the strike was called off before it ever
started.
In my last weeks in South Nyanza I was initiating preparations
for the 1963 General Elections, and considering the
vast population and the limited manpower resources I felt that
whoever was going to be responsible on the day would have his
hands full.
|
Bungoma, District, March - November 1965 by E.N. Scott D.O.
|
Party political position
Bungoma (or Elgon Nyaza as it
was when I first took over) must have been one of the most
deeply divided districts politically in the country at that
time. The predominant Abaluhya population was mainly pro-KADU,
but one of their sub-tribes on the boundary with Kakamega
supported the main nationalist party. The area that gave most
concern was on the slopes of Mount Elgon, in the north of the
district, where the ethnically distinct Elgon Masai had
secured a constituency of their own when parliamentary
boundaries were redrawn after the 1962 census. Even though
the population of this constituency was only about half that
of either of the other two in the district, the Elgon Masai
were only a bare majority of its population, the rest being
mainly Bukusu. This did not stop the Elgon Masai from regarding
it as their constituency, from which their candidate should be
returned unopposed. As they chose to back the opposite party
(KANU) to that of the Bukusu majority of the rest of the
district, great tension - and later considerable disorder -
followed from this situation.
Only one national political figure, was associated with the
district at this time. This was Masinde Muliro, who had entered
the Legislative Council at the first African elections in
1957, and had been one of the founding fathers of KADU in
1960. Although still representing the district when I arrived,
he had chosen to make his future power base the neighbouring
town of Kitale, in Trans-Nzoia District in the former White Highlands. He descended on Bungoma District frequently during
the election campaign when he was of course still a minister in the caretaker government.
The 1963 election was the largest of its kind yet held in
Kenya (or since, I suspect) as it was: the first with full
adult franchise and on a common roll. It involved separate
elections, each lasting two days of polling, for the new
Regional Assemblies, for the Senate, another-new institution,
and the House of Representatives, in that order, the whole
extending over a ten day period. In Bungoma it provided for
the election of one Senator, three Members of the House of
Representatives, and no less than nine Members of the Regional
Assembly. The overt issues were immediate independence under
Jomo Kenyatta (the KANU platform) versus the establishment of
a confederal Kenya based on strong Regional Assemblies (KADU).
I must say I despaired of the regional government system, on
nomination day when I saw the poor quality of candidates
offering themselves. I should add here that a dozen or so
more ambitious people had staked their political future on the
four senior seats, that is to say, for the National Assembly.
The next thirty or more aspiring politicians in this mediumsized
district, which had never before sent more than one member
to a representative body outside the district, were the
contenders for the regional seats.) The underlying issue
for the local majority party (KADU) was the defence of the tribal
homeland through the development of suitable alliances.
Malcolm Macdonald's master-stroke as Governor was the decision to allow Internal Self-Government immediately after the
election. This was a giant step towards early independence.
At the same time it was the death-knell of the Regionalism
which KADU had fought so hard to achieve. If there had been
a period' of some months, better still a year, between the
election and self-government, the Regional Government system
would have had a change to get established. (I write not as
a supporter of the notion but as an observer very much
participant in the situation.) Instead it was strangled at
birth by the KANU government.
Political and administrative priority issues
In the Pre-General Election period, I took over the old Elgon
Nyanza District about two months before the great upheaval of
the General Election. In this period I had to:-
1. maintain security in a notoriously inflammable
district, the point of origin of the Dini-ya-Msambwa
troubles a decade earlier;
2. hand over the western third of the district to be
incorporated into the new Busia District, a last minute
political creation to bring the future Western
Region's complement of districts up to three - the
rest of the district being formed from the Abaluhya
areas of the old Central Nyanza;
3. provide physical and moral support to the staff of
this new district, which was being established with
no capital input from Central Government;
4. administer the old Elgon Nyanza African District
Council 'in commission' until its responsibilities and assets could be taken over by the future Bungoma
and Busia County Councils;
5. make physical preparations for the six days of polling
at widely scattered points throughout the district;
6. hold the ring for the competing politicians and their
respective supporters during the election campaign,
a task of some delicacy in view of 1 above and the
political situation already described. In practice
this meant licensing political meetings after a weekly
meeting in my office with all candidates, listening to
their complaints against each other and generally
keeping an ear to the ground;
7. maintain existing development policies (aid to better
farmers, land registration and water reticulation in
selected areas) and routine district administration.
I felt I had minimal experience for a task of this nature,
though certainly the difficulties in Nandi had alerted me to
some of the problems of dealing with political situations. I
also had minimal staff resources, particularly after my D.O.
was removed to go and fight a fire somewhere else a fortnight
after I arrived, and his replacement only arrived after the
elections. I had a most supportive and encouraging boss In
Bob Wilson as Provincial Commissioner at Kakemega, only an
hour's drive away. It also helped that financial resources
for the election were virtually unlimited - we could spend as
required from the D.C.'s votes to set up the administrative
machinery for polling. I should add that I had in Abdul Naag,
our Pakistani District Assistant, a most capable executive
officer for the administration of the election.
All in all, I had to cope with a complex and quite open ended
situation in a period of great tension. With the rest of
the country going through the same 'traumas there was no-one
available to help if very much went wrong.
As for the post-General Election period, I have chosen not to go
into detail on the election itself. It was a nightmare period
of constant activity, stress, near-breakdown in the early
stages until the polling machinery got run in, and we were
glad to be able to call on a company of the military to show
the flag in the tricky Mount Elgon area.
When the dust settled and counting was over I found myself
in an internally self-governing Kenya but with my role changed
from District Commissioner to Regional Government Agent,
answerable (as I then understood matters) to the elected
assembly at Kakamega, where my boss was now Civil Secretary,
One early issue was to establish the financial and establishment
consequences of Regional Government. Under the Constitution the Central Government had to transfer the necessary
revenue and field staff to the Regional Governments, and we were
deluged with paper from the. Secretariat on preparations these
changes. African officers were to have the option to transfer
to the Region.of their choice: as far as I can recall
expatriates were to be seconded. I debated with Keith Foot,
my opposite number at Busia, where our loyalties lay. For
him no 'mucking around with constitutions' made him anything
but a servant of the central government of the day, and
therefore a Kenyatta man. I on the other hand understood my
duty, in my new role, to lie towards the Regional Assembly.
Any doubts were cleared up when the new Minister for Home
Affairs, the redoubtable veteran Nyanza politician Oginga
Odinga, visited the Region perhaps six weeks after the election.
The Minister called all the Administrative Officers in the new
Region together at Kakemega and told us there would be no
transfers of staff or funds to regional control until the
Regional Assemblies were clearly capable of administering them
responsibly. In the event this never happened, and the
regional system finally lost all significance when the KANU
government, crossed the floor in late 1964, linking up with the
former KADU opposition and clipping the wings of its own
radical supporters. I therefore continued nominally as
Regional Government Agent, but for most practical purposes was
the direct representative of the Central Government.
For most practical purposes responsibility for law and
order was transferred to the Police, a matter of immediate relevance in Bungoma from the first weeks of Internal Self-Government. Our success in keeping the parties from each
other's throats during the election period had an unhappy
sequel about a fortnight after the end of counting, when the
two distinct tribal elements in the Mount Elgon area set on
each other, leaving a number of dead and some hundreds of houses burnt down. Operational control in such a situation
now lay with the police, and I put the bulk of the Tribal
Police (later to be known as Administrative Police) under the
control of the capable African Assistant Superintendent of
Police for the duration of the troubles. I was instructed by
the Civil Secretary to keep out of active operations, and
found my own most useful role in this situation was as a rear
link in support of the police commander, negotiating, the
provision of General Service Unit (para-military police)
reinforcements from national resources. I do not recall the
details, but I believe the constitution had important provisions about
G.S.U. reinforcements crossing regional boundaries. Matters
calmed down after a week or so of arson and general disorder.
No ring-leaders were ever identified; curfew-breakers and
other minor offenders were allowed to go home after a period
on remand, the confiscation of their weapons and the payment
of small fines. A Commission of Enquiry sat many months after
the event but as far as I know never published its findings -
a reflection, I believe, of the KANU/KADU rapprochement of
late 1964.
All else seems in retrospect to have been anti-climax. A
visit by Jomo Kenyatta as Chief Minister to this strongly KADU
district in August passed off unexpectedly most amicably. It
must have played some part in demonstrating to the people that
the elaborate Regional system was a defence against potentially
friendly forces.
Once the Mount Elgon upset had subsided I set about running
the County Council elections, which passed off peacefully in
October. As Returning Officer I played a potentially dangerous
and no doubt improper role in dissuading a Bukusu candidate
from standing in the Mount Elgon area. I was sensitive to the
anxieties of the Elgon Masai about their representation in the
new County Council. As it turned out the Bukusu candidate,
who appreciated that what I was trying to do was for the peace
of that turbulent area, nearly got lynched by his own
supporters outside the office where I had been receiving
nominations, so I had to let him put in his papers after all.
Neither Central Government nor the Regional Government
appeared for the moment to have the least interest in
determining district development policies, and we staff at district level carried on with what seemed good to us and the
local people: the encouragement of better farming and in
particular the process in a few gazetted areas of land
adjudication and registration. In fact (although this is not
properly part of my story here) it was years rather than
months before the Central Government had much idea of what
its policies should be in rural development.
I could have stayed on for some months at least as Regional
Government Agent. In spite of my ambiguous position I found
myself persona grata with both the Regional assembly and with
the new African Civil Secretary, Sila Beit, an old friend from
my days in Nandi, who was of course the central governments
Provincial Commissioner in all but name. However with a very
young family I found deteriorating living conditions and
particularly worsening medical facilities too great a worry
and so sought a further Secretariat posting. Even in my last
weeks in the field the possibility of a major break-down of
security remained a very real concern as the KADU bosses at
the final constitutional talks before independence threatened
to secede and split the country into fragments.. Had this
happened I would have implemented plans we had drawn up in
Bungoma to evacuate the expatriate families to neighbouring
Tororo in Uganda. Again, we owe it to the political genius
of Malcolm Macdonald, that this crisis never eventuated.
|
C. McLean. D. 0. Ukwala - mid 1957 - mid 1958
|
In Ukwala many of the adults were working away from home, in the
cities or on the European farms. Litigation, usually over land, was a
major recreation amongst those who remained. Most central and local
government services were well developed. There was little scope for
major initiatives. One simply ran the existing set up as best one could,
putting in minor improvements where this seemed possible. Collecting
taxes, checking central and local government accounts (every single tax
clerk in the Division was convicted and sentenced in my year there)
listening to land suits and trying.criminal cases filled the working week.
During my time in the field only in Ukwala did I spend an average of as much
as 3 and a half days a week in the office or in court. Elsewhere my practice was to
leave on Monday morning to work out in the division, returning from these
safaris on Thursday evening to hold court on Friday, and do office work on
Saturday mornings.
Oginga Odinga was helpful both in Ukwala, and when I was at the KIA.
In Ukwala one (i forget which) of the various electoral rolls was being boycotted
by the citizens. Oginga Odinga was cross about this. He organized a
series of meetings at which we both appeared on the platform. Only Oginga Odinga spoke for him briefly. He simply said "We the political leaders of
the African people do not like this franchise. But we want it to work so that
we can show how overwhelming your support is for our policies. So register,
all of you Mr McLean here will explain how it is done. Do what he says, and
we can get rid of him and his like all the quicker".
|
C. McLean. D.O. Eldama Ravine 1961 - 62
|
In Eldama Ravine development was the main activity. The land had been
ruined by deafforestation, overstocking, overgrazing, and cereal monoculture;
but not beyond repair. It retained a potential which, properly harnessed,
could improve living standards dramatically in a short space of time. Many
years of apparently fruitless effort had established what ought not to be done.
We had run out of wrong things to do. So a combination of effective development
techniques was deployed by experienced officers, with adequate funds at
their disposal on land which gave greatly increased yields rapidly to people who
were inclined not only to cooperate but to assume the initiative. The trick
was to concentrate on one biggish scheme at a time. Once the majority of the
people in the area were convinced, social pressure operated in favour of rather
than against new techniques. There were at one time queues forming for the
treatment after the first schemes had successfully got off the ground. The
nature of the schemes varied. Planned resettlement on smallholdings in clearings
in the forest zone: land consolidation with individual holdings of arable
or ranching land of economic size where this was.possible: Texas 4 block ranches
where individual holdings were not possible because of a lack of water supplies
or because the land needed time to recover; dam building; individual farm planning;
loans to farmers; cooperatives; piped water supplies; dips; improved breeds
of livestock and crops; cash crops. The essentials however were that a scheme
should embrace a community, rather than an individual; that it should show
quick results; that grants and loans were available but dependent on a substantial
contribution from the community (usually raised by selling off surplus stock) who
were expected to collect their contributions, decide on all disbursements, and as
far as possible police and otherwise manage their affairs with only technical
advice from the extension workers. Community pride and confidence then led very
quickly to further expenditure on roads, schools, and health services, and individuals
began to invest heavily and profitably as traders, machinery contractors
and transport operators.
Arap Moi was a frequent visitor to Eldama Ravine. He
asked for action over constituents' difficulties and in return defined the
support he was prepared to give for government sponsored measures. It would
be tedious to list the range of issues on which we cooperated.
|
C. Fuller
P.O. - Chepkerio - Blgeyo - Marakwet District Dec. 1958 - Aug. 1960
|
My first post as full D.O. in charge of a division.
There were the ongoing tasks of all D.0.s (supervision of the Locational
Councils and Tax Clerks and of the African Court; magisterial duties etc.), but
my main duties were:
a) The establishment and administration of a 4000 acre pilot scheme for land
consolidation and registration, linked to which was the planning of new roads for
the area, a water reticulation system for domestic and dairy farming purposes and
farm planning.
b) The building of some twelve primary schools in different parts of the division
which comprised a high plateau in the West (8000-9000 ft.), thorn scrub lowland
in the east (3500-4000 ft.) and a 5000 ft. escarpment between the two.
c) Building an office for the Coops.Officer and houses for African staff of the
Tribal Police, Coops and Community Development Departments.
d) Assisting my colleagues at Division H.Q. (the District Agricultural Officer,
Divisional Livestock Officer, and District Coops. Officer) and the local farmers
in their efforts to develops agriculture and dairying and marketing cooperatives.
The plateau area was exceptionally fertile (almost virgin forest soils down
to more than 25 ft. in many areas arid a reliable rainfall of about 50 inches) and
was capable of producing vegetables (especially potatoes) of high quality and
yield, pyrethrum and grass which was the basis of a flourishing dairy industry.
The problem was not one of trying to stimulate the local farmers, but one of trying
to cope with their persistent demands for assistance of all kinds.
This was, without doubt, the most enjoyable part of my service life, when
I felt I was really helping the process of development. The Elgeyo were almost
exclusively concerned with development - of schools, agriculture and dairying.
Despite the significant and rapid changes which were taking place in national
politics their only real interest in political events was forced upon them and was
that of how to avoid domination by the large tribes (especially the Kikuyu). There
was very little evidence of a positive desire to be responsible for the running of
their own affairs. In terms of politics, therefore, my main duty in barazas was to help explain the constitutional changes which were taking place, encourage the
people to take a constructive interest and reassure them (more in hope than
certainty) that their land would not be taken from them.
The only other memorable event of a political nature was of two days in 1960
when I escorted Margery Perham round the division and to a meeting with European
farmers at Moiben. She had the difficult task of speaking to them and answering
questions about their future in Kenya and the attitude of the Colonial Office.
When I returned from leave in December 1960 I was posted to Kilome in southern
Machakos as Divisional District Officer. My nine months in this district contrasted
strongly with my experience in Elgeyo. The Wakamba were much more politically
aware also that they were not nearly as strongly represented politically at
the national level as their numbers (3rd largest tribe in Kenya after the Kikuyu
and Luo) might suggest.
In Kilome I had my first experience of active local politicians, some of
whom exploited their growing power and influence to their own advantage by suggesting
to the people that they need no longer observe certain practices which had been an
integral part of development policy. The non-observance of the Land Usage Bye
Laws was perhaps the most glaring example of this. There were some instances
(not only in Machakos District) where soil conservation works were actually
destroyed, no doubt to illustrate to the people and the administration the power
of the local politicians and their contempt for what they regarded as examples of
colonial institutions. To their credit, most of the 'national leaders' denounced
this practice as illegal and folly as soon as .it was brought to their attention.
This situation did, however, lead to pressure from one's departmental
colleagues, particularly, the agricultural staff, urging one to show strength
and bring any miscreants to justice. Some of them were rather too fanatical in
this respect and revealed insensitivity to the rapidly-changing political
situation, but one could understand their concern at the prospect of many years
hard work almost literally flowing down the rivers into the Indian Ocean.
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Morale
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The contributors to this paper agree that morale was generally high. The
esprit de corps which existed in the Kenyan administrative service remained
strong and sustained its members even when they felt neglected or misrepresented
by their ultimate masters in Whitehall. Gavaghan refers to "...an
attitude of mind which extended from Britain, through the Colonial Office, to the
very doors of the colonial administrator and the white settler. The attitude
was quite ambivalent and McLeod and Alport were important exponents of it. It
consisted in the treatment of administrators and settlers alike as people who
(although irritatingly related and therefore in need of protection for political,
economic or family reasons) were somehow to blame for the situation in which they
were placed in the last days of power. Alport would not even admit members of
the colonial administration to The Commonwealth Relations Service. He wanted a
'clean break' (as I asked at the time the Conservative Research Committee 'with a
dirty past?')".
Gavaghan agrees however that the "...morale of the colonial administrative
service at District level remained remarkably high and fairly unified through
all vicissitudes, largely because it was based upon a broadly homogeneous
cultural background and training, with a sincerely held view of duty in 'trusteeship'." McLean supports this - "Morale was, in my case, high.
I had expected the job to last ten years and said so at my selection interviews
so there was no question of disappointed career expectations. The experience was
invaluable. Nor did I hear any of my contemporaries complaining. The older men
had perhaps more reason for unease, but said little. Wives and children had a
harder time, but without them it would have been a lonely business".
With reference to the post 1959 situation, Scott writes - "The first
Lancaster House Conference was a big shock to expatriate morale in Nandi, but a
far bigger one was the disorderly Belgian retreat from the Congo a few months
later. My own statements in barazas notwithstanding, this fiasco and the
earlier Mau-Mau troubles provided details for one's picture of Kenya's ultimate
independence... Expatriate families at Homa Bay two years later had no
particular worries over politics or security; in any case we were all too taken up with trying to ward off serious illness in the absence of proper medical
support. In Bungoma, morale remained high through all the ups and downs
of 1963, supported in particular by the thriving multi-racial club where the
'bright young things' were not D.0. Cadets just arrived from Oxbridge but
African Land Registration Officers and the like not long out of High School.
The worst moment was when KADU threatened to split the country a few months
before Independence."
Unhappily, the Emergency created special problems for the administration
in Central Province, particularly for African District Officers and Chiefs, "....
who were allowed and encouraged (not in writing) to get on with the hard graft
security, interrogation, control, enforcement, rehabilitation and so on, as
long as things went well. Sometimes they did not, as for District Assistant
Sam Githu, G.M., who stood trial for murder/manslaughter (of a detainee who
died of pneumonia after a blow) before a newly arrived judge from England,
without any official submissions (despite urgent representations that they
should be made) as to the general (and officially acceptable) background to
the offending blow, or to his own remarkable record of 'loyalty'. After his
conviction and sentence a collection was organised to alleviate the damage to
his personal circumstances (and perhaps to a few consciences). Morale was
severely dented by such examples, which were not confined to Africans."
(Gavaghan).
This experience is related to indicate that, within the general situation
of high morale, the Emergency was a sad and often dirty business which created
a severe clash of loyalties for the African administrators and Native Authority
caught up in it, as well as a repugnance which they and their European counterparts
shared in what was often a nauseous task.
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What was it like to be an administrator in Kenya during
decolonisation?
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If we put aside the problem of Central Province during,
the Emergency then the following comments from McLean would
probably represent, fairly accurately, the feelings of most
administrators.
"The short answer is 'great fun'. It soon became obvious that constant effort was needed
to keep even very simple benefits generally available. Law and
order is basic, and very little of the results of violence had
to be cleared up in order to forge a conviction of how important
it was to achieve it. Justice was inseparable from law and order,
though the need for due process amongst tribesmen who seldom
argued the toss took rather longer to sink in. Collecting the
revenue was essential if any kind of service was to be provided.
It could be tedious, but it also, like law and order work, got
the D.O. out into the country, talking to the people, beginning
to understand how society worked."
"Law, order and justice were a considerable advance
on what some old men remembered of the time before the Europeans a
arrived. But the most interesting and rewarding work was on
development; - on raising the standard of living. The business
of getting two blades of grass or two ears of corn to grow where
only one grew before was, in predominantly pastoral or agricultural
societies, the foundation, but had to be tied in with
work on health, education, communications and local authorities.
Seeing results in this field was very satisfying. In my
experience, however, those engaged in it tended to see the
trees and not the wood, the failures rather than the successes."
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Hindsight - Could we have managed decolonisation better?
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Decolonisation could have been managed differently.
Whether it could have been managed better - and for whom - will
no doubt remain a matter for much argument. There is complete
agreement, however, between the contributors to this paper, that
Africanisation could have been implemented more quickly and that
this would have paid handsome dividends, especially in the goodwill
which it would have generated.
"It is impossible to pronounce on such a matter,
unless one takes the right wing view that 'they were not ready',
or the view of absolute morality that colonialism is indefensible
anyway and should be terminated forthwith. Nevertheless, there
were ways in which matters could have been advanced; in integration,
in Africanisation of the civil service, local government
and industry. There could have been an attitude of 'let's run
ahead and see if they can do it', rather than of waiting to be
pushed or threatened into responsive movement. Turnbull, in
Tanganyika, may well not have been intended to be the last colonial
Governor, but he (and Nyerere) saw to it that he was, ahead of
Kenya and with less resources. Conversely, Kenyatta is reported
to have expressed the view that his nine years of imprisonment
and detention gave Kenya and himself a needed opportunity to build
up the capability of self-government." (Gavaghan)
"On Africanisation - we could have done more sooner, but
one has to see this question in terms of the great foreshortening
of the timetable that occurred with the first Lancaster House
Conference in early 1960, Before this I saw our aim as the long
term improvement of the Africans' situation under some form of
power-sharing constitution. After that conference my own expectation
was of independence under majority African rule within two
years, That this grew into nearly four years was an outcome of the
KANU/KADU split. My own feeling is that once we had got into gear
for the decolonisation process the additional time was well spent.
But I do wonder what was done to accelerate the Africanisation of
the Provincial Administration during the first six to nine months
after the conference. I do not feel that there had been much change
in pace evident in postings to Nandi by the time I left in March of
the following year," (Scott)
"... having arrived, the colonial powers willy nilly
created the forces that were to cause their expulsion, in good or
bad order, depending on the accuracy of their political perceptions
and the strength of their resolution. Whether better policies would have avoided the Emergency altogether I do not know. But it
was stupid to attempt to pretend that Kenyatta would never be
allowed to take over. Thereafter progress to independence seemed at
the time to be too slow. Whole hearted commitment to it and effective
preparation could have speeded it up by a year or so, This might
have paid dividends, in goodwill and trust, and in bettor government.
It was noticeable how first internal self-government and then
independence got government moving again with a real sense of
purpose. But with hindsight the timing may have been spot on. It
worked. Kenya has remained stable and relatively prosperous and
better disposed to its erstwhile colonial power than most."
(McLean)
Scott has no doubt that "where we were rightest of all was
Malcolm Macdonald's inspired decision as Governor, to go straight
into Internal Self-Government after the 1963 election result was
announced. The country got the benefit of regionalism as a very
short-term political expedient, without lapsing into the balkanisation
which could have occurred if the regional system had had a
chance to get established."
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1956 Map of Kenya
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Colony Profile
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Kenya
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Reith Lectures
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Margery Perham's Six Lectures: The Colonial Reckoning
Transcripts of Lectures:
Lecture 1: Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Imperialism
Lecture 2: African Nationalism
Lecture 3: The Politics of Emancipation
Lecture 4: The Problem of White Settlement
Lecture 5: The Colonial Account
Lecture 6: Prospects for the Future
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Decolonisation Timeline
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1944 | Eliud Kathu appointed as one of two representatives of
African interests in the Legislative Council. |
1944 | Formation of Kenya African Union (K.A.U.). Focussed on
land as the most fundamental political issue |
1945 | Post-war settlement scheme launched to train and assist
new settlers selected by European Settlement Board. |
1946 | Two African councillors appointed to Nairobi Municipal Council. |
1947 | Jomo Kenyatta became President of the K.A.U. |
June 1948 | Legislative Council met with first multi-racial unofficial
majority. |
June 1950 | Re-organisation of Local Native Councils into District Councils
with increased powers to raise and spend local funds. |
May 1951 | Visit of Colonial Secretary (Griffiths) for discussions
about a revised constitution. |
July 1952 | Formation of County Councils in European areas with powers
to raise rates and discharge functions of local government. |
Sept 1952 | Appointment of East African Royal Commission. |
Sept 1952 | Murder of Chiefs Uaruhiu and Nderi. |
Oct 1952 | Declaration of state of emergency to deal with Mau-Mau. |
Oct 1952 | Arrest of Jomo Kenyatta. |
1953 | Publication of Troup Report outlining ten-year plan for
development of European Highlands and capital investment
of 50 millions pounds. |
June 1953 | K.A.U. proscribed. |
Aug 1953 | Tom IIboya became General Secretary of Federation of Registered
Trade Unions - with trade union colleagues he questioned
conduct of Emergency. Oginga Odinga in Central Nyanza and
Ronald Ngala in Mombasa also critical of colonial rule. |
Apr 1954 | Third visit of Oliver Lyttleton (Colonial Sec.) resulting in
Lyttleton Constitution and the establishment of a Council of
Ministers. This provision for multi-racial government accepted by
the African members of the Legislative Council but rejected
by Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya. |
Apr 1954 | Political initiative taken by new African elite who had
little direct connection with the old K.A.U. leadership. |
Apr 1954 | Formation of Federal Independence Party by section of
Europeans in opposition to Lyttleton Constitution. |
June 1954 | Swynnerton Plan for vigorous development of African Land Units. |
June 1954 | Formation of United Country Party by section of Europeans
in support of Lyttleton multi-racial constitution. |
Mar 1947 | First African elections, on a qualified franchise, for the
election of eight Africans to the Legislative Council. Odinga, Mboya, Ngala and other younger men more educated than their predecessors, unseated the former nominated members. |
1958 | Attempt to amalgamate District Associations disallowed. |
1958 | New constitution opposed by African elected members. |
1958 | Areas of Kenya that had been slow to develop political
consciousness were drawn into the national movement. |
1958 | Tribal attitudes split the nationalist movement into
several groupings as tribes became conscious of their
.separate and conflicting interests. |
Jan 1960 | Lancaster House constitutional conference in London -
principle of African majority rule estabilished. |
Jan 1960 | Fundamental source of divisions within the nationalist
movement was the land question and economic issues. This led to a split of the nationalist movement into the
Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) comprising the
Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba and allies and the Kenya African
Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.) comprising the Kalenjin,
coastal and minority tribes. |
Feb 1961 | General election. Most 'open' seats won by African
candidates. K.A.N.U. formed the largest single group in
the Legislative Council, but refused to accept office
unless Jomo Kenyatta was unconditionally released from
restriction. Governor refused and invited K.A.D.U. to
form a government, which it did. Ronald Ngala, its
leader, assumed the office of Leader of the House. |
Feb 1961 | Discussions in London and Nairobi to bring some agreement
between K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U. about constitutional
advance failed. |
Feb 1962 | Constitutional conference in London to discuss a new
constitution, internal self-government and Independence.
The fears of the smaller tribes led K.A.D.U. to demand a
quasi-federal government with newly created Regional
Authorities. K.A.N.U. accepted this rather than delay
Independence. |
May 1963 | General Elections to the Central and Regional legislatures.
K.A.N.U. won a majority in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate and formed a government with Jomo Kenyatta
as Kenya1s first Prime Minister. |
May 1963 | In the Regional Assemblies K.A.N.U. won a majority in the
Eastern, Central and Nyanza Regions. K.A.D.U. won a
majority in the Rift Valley, Coast and Uestern Regions. |
June 1963 | Internal self-government. |
Dec 1963 | Independence. |
1964 | The K.A.N.U. government abolishes the regional structure
of government. |
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