British Empire Discussion

This is one of my favourite periods too - particularly as I have a family connection to the disaster. My grandfather was captured in Singapore. He was an RAF tailgunner and was basically taken from the ship bringing him to the base to Changi. He was taken to Burma to work on the railroad but he actually managed to escape. He lived with the hill tribes of the Karen for a long while before making it back to India. In fact, so few people escaped from the Japanese (those recaptured were generally decapitated) that British Military Intelligence was suspicious that he was a plant or a spy for a while. A few weeks later he was informed that he could not be a spy as he'd been sent by the RAF to Singapore by mistake! As he was a pre-war recruit and with a family, he was supposed to have stayed in Britain to train new recruits rather than travel with his squadron. So he spent over a year in Japanese captivity, escaped, lived in the jungle and travelled hundreds of miles through enemy controlled territory due to a clerical error!

oh wow what the nips done to our pow,s is unforgiveable as is some of the UK,S top politions and generals at the time, i have loads of books concerning the disaster at singapore plus my old battalion was the last british unit to cross the strait from malaya to singapore the argylls

Singapore was hailed as a fortress,which we know it wasnt,the Naval base was built on the wrong side of the harbour,and all it,s defence,s were facing the sea.long standing promises had been made by the UK to Australia regarding Singapore so it had to be built even as they kept cutting the cost,s.Before the war in the east broke Percival who would end up army commander wrote a report about the state of the defences and that the RAF was building bases where it wanted which meant they had to be defended rather than work hand in hand with army.Singapore was nothing but a bluff as was sending out the Prince Of Wales and Repulse led by Admiral Phillips who had sailed a desk for years and didnt or want to understand the power of aircraft attacking ships.
Even when they opened Singapore the Royal Navy couldnt even send a ship that was left up to the Americans.Only one army unit was trained in jungle warfare and that was the Argylls the rest kept up peacetime practices.

Actually, Singapore was not only a signal event for Britain, it would also mark a major turning point in Australian military history. Up until Singapore, Australians served pretty much wherever the British army served. However, the disaster at Singapore made the Australian government ultra cautious and they pulled back virtually all of their troops to Australia or New Guinea - and there they sat for most of the rest of the war. They were happy to allow the Americans to pick up the slack from Britain for Australia's security and have never really relied on British military support since the fall of Singapore.

Singapore signalled the end of Britain as a world power for all to see,Australia was quite happy to beleave all the propoganda concerning singapore and when it was lost they had their scape goat in the shape of the UK.
The Austrailian goverment pulled all their troops back home which was quite right and they fought a bitter land war in New Guinea against the nip,s,plus also RAN ships fought with the Americans.Austrailia had little choice but to rely on the US as they never had the same industrial output as the UK for heavy weaponry.
But Austrailians fought hard and made landings in borneo,and also provided huge assistance to the Royal Navy,s Pacific Fleet as their home base was in sydney and heavy repairs took place in melbourne and Freemantle.Plus Austrailia also had pilots in the UK serving in bomber command and also in the Fleet Air arm.After the war Austrailian troops served with the British in the Malayan emergency and in the borneo confrontation as well as Korea.
It was not untill the Uk announced that it was pulling out of east of Suez did Austrailia really ditch the UK for the US as they were still buying British weapons planes and ships .

Have you read All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939-1945 by Max Hastings? He is quite scathing about Australia post Singapore saying that they really went into a hole for the remainder of the war. This of course is blamed on the Australian politicians and not on the desire or ability of the Australian armed forces themselves. It should be said that the Pacific theatre was the secondary theatre for the allies anyhow but it did mark the end of a concerted imperial response. In WW1 the Australian army was under the direct command of the Imperial Defence forces and so basically under British control. By WW2, Australia and the dominions had far more powers for their own decision making - basically they were independent nations under the control of their own governments.

yes i have read All Hell Let Loose i have to say i am not a huge fan of Max Hastings, the Austrailian divisions in the 8th army fought hard and the Australian goverment lobbied to get it,s division releived at Tobruk after lots of hard fighting much to the chargin of the UK gov.It should be said that the Pacific theatre was a mainly american war as the UK never had the forces to send untill the war in europe was over and the UK limited it,s self to the Indian Ocean and the protection of India.
So no one could Blame the Austrailians for looking to America seen as how the UK failed in it,s promises to protect it,s colonies and dominions,so it is all what if,s some historions like to blame everyone else but the UK or US for what went wrong but both failed in large parts in there obligations to their allies .

I t still doesnt detract from the fact that Singapore was a huge bluff which back fired on the British,and one that British presteige would never recover from.
The whole of the UKs war plans for the pacific fell apart once she became embroiled in a war with Germany and Italy as the Royal Navy was not strong enough to dominate all three oceans even during ww1 the Royal Navy had to rely on Japan protecting convoys in the Pacific and med.
Also the nip,s were running out of ammo even at the gates of Singapore and if the British and empire forces fought on the nips would have had to pull back,the UK 18th division had also not long arrivied and was full of fresh troops as they had been diverted to Singapore enroute to north africa.
Crates of hurricanes had also arrivied in Singapore and would have put up more of a fight than the useless brewster buffalos which the RAF had started with,my own personal option is that once the war in the east started HMS Prince Of Wales and Repulse should have been sent to reinforce the US fleet,even if HMS Imdomitable had not run aground and been able to sail with Force Z she also would have been sunk as Fulmars were no match for the Zero,s the nips used.

Notwithstanding the total mismanagement and undeserved 'over-confidence' of the men on the ground, it should be remembered that Britain was effectively having to fight two huge wars at the same time. Britain would've been busy enough just fighting the Germans, without the added difficulty of Japan joining in. Churchill had the strategic sense (despite his imperial ideas) to see that Europe was the key theatre of war. Having said, that Britain may have struggled to win WW2 without the Pacific War as it was Japan's decision to go for the oilfields of Indonesia rather than the oilfields of Siberia that helped drag the US into the war on the side of the British. There is a fascinating battle in 1939 that may well have convinced the Japanese to take this disastrous decision. It is the battle of Khalkin Gol (not sure of the spelling) in Manchuria. The Japanese probed the Soviets to see how serious they were in defending their vast empire. They got hammered by the Soviets who happened to be commanded by a certain general Zhukov (later of Moscow, Stalingrad and Berlin fame). Had they been successful at this battle they may well have opted for the Siberian oilfields as a target. Instead, they headed South and convinced themselves that the Americans from their colony in the Philippines could disrupt their communication lines and so attacked Pearl Harbour. It is a fascinating what -if of world history. Had Japan attacked the Soviet Union in December 1941 instead of the USA then the axis powers may well have pulled off a victory. Of course, this was partly Hitler's fault, as he did not want Germany to have any binding alliances (thinking that that was what hurt Germany in WW1). But an effective alliance with Japan would've been very useful. As it was, Hitler declared war on the USA hoping to get the Japanese to declare war on the Soviet Union. The Japanese and the USSR remained neutral to one another until August 1945!

Yeah the what-if is fascinating but the western colonies were ripe for the picking,the Dutch homeland had been overrun,Britain was fighting for its mere survival not only in Europe but in North Africa,they had taken nearly all of their experienced soldiers from the east and moved them to were the fighting was and had also ordered all modern naval units home stripping the Pacific.
Of course Europe was the key the Germans were the most powerful enemy and Britain would have buckled even just fighting them,Churchill diverted valuable tanks and aircraft to Russia instead of sending them to the east if they had been sent to Malaya and burma then the outcome might have been totally different.
But as it was they went to Russia and our eastern colonies were lost to us for 3 years Malaya was making money for the British war effort with its exports of rubber and tin and Burma with it,s oil my view would have been to send assets to there.
Mainly because since 37 when the japs invaded china relations were strained to breaking point more so when America announced it was going to embargo japan and the UK followed suit.

the other problem with losing Malaya was that the British lost the world's largest production of quinine - the prophylactic that prevented malaria. This was an absolute catastrophe for the allied war effort in the Pacific and undoubtedly led to many more deaths than would otherwise have occurred.

that is true yes,losing malaya and singapore caused alot of problems for the allies and it could also have led to the break down of the convoy system round the cape had the japs moved seriously into the indian ocean

It should be remembered though that Britain was effectively fighting Two major wars simultaneously - that was always going to be a huge 'ask'. In some ways, it is surprising that Britain could funnel as many resources as they did the Pacific Theatre.

true but after Singapore the British sent out the r class battleships unmodernised and slow with a cpl of heavy cruisers the only real unit of any worth was Warspite the old hermes was there as well and this was the force to stop the japs in the Indian ocean.
Once the attacks on ceylon started the Navy lost the heavy cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire and hermes all to air attack,even in the 30,s the UK new that if they had to fight a european war against Germany they would be almost unable to send martime reinforcements east to deal with the japs as they would have to strip the Med fleet.
Britain was lucky that Japan turned its eyes elsewhere and they were able to conduct a holding operation on the Indian Burma border untill strength was built up slowly,namely once Italy was knocked out the war,but even then the army in the east was under manned.

Just found this fascinating thread. When I was at the Royal Military Academy (early 1980's) I wrote my final essay on this topic (it was not part of the curriculum and I had to ask special permission to do so). Strange that the biggest single military defeat of the British Army was not on the curriculum for Trainee Army Officers!!
In my opinion Singapore was not doomed from the beginning and could have been held, had both the military AND the civilian authorities been better prepared. Brigadier Ivan Simpson of the Royal Engineers subsequently wrote a very interesting little book called 'Too Little - Too Late'. Some Military staff officers during the 1930's were well aware of the risks of a land invasion from the Malay peninsula, and also of the 'Fortress Singapore' myth. Yet nobody would listen. The Argylls were the only battalion to conduct effective jungle training prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and that was down to the personality and drive of their commanding officer.
In my opinion the Allied Forces lost the fight in Malaya because of poor command and communication (on several occasions unnecessary withdrawal orders were given and troops fell back from defensive lines that they could have held), and because the will to fight did not exist down to section level.......sapped by poor leadership and confusion, by lack of jungle training and by the fact that eveyone thought that Singapore would hold.
By contrast, prior to the invasion the Japanese had formed the 'Doro Nawa' unit in Taiwan which existed to ensure that every single soldier understood, why they were going to Malaya and what they were likely to find there (they were all given a little handbook to take with them which explained this and also how to survive on minimal rations and equipment in the jungle). Their morale was high and their leadership excellent. Their plan was to take Singapore in 100 days, and they did it in 70.
While my new book (http://merdeka-lachlangunn.blogspot.com/) is set in Malaya in 1957, some reference is made to the events of WW2.

Singapore is a classic case where both sides were literally on their last legs. It is the classic example of how important morale and initiative is to conducting a successful campaign. The Japanese themselves were so close to calling it quits in February - it reminds me of the battle of Shiloh in the American Civil War where both the Union and Confederates bludgeoned each other to a standstill - they had a parley where both sides were willing to surrender to the other - fortunately for the North, the Confederates surrendered first. Often generals only see their own side of the equation and forget that the opponent may be getting it just as bad if not worse. The Fog of War is a real problem and one that contributed to the British surrender in Singapore. Had they known the true state of the Japanese forces they may well have concluded that it was better to fight on. Had they known how bad Japanese captivity was going to be, they almost certainly would have fought on.

i really dont think the british army could have or would have fought on, the japs had captured the fresh water reservoirs and the british had lost massive amounts of supplies in malaya its self the japs called them the churchill supplies.
british airpower was gone the outdated brewster buffalos had been swept from the skies yeah crated hurricanes had arrivied but the docks were a mess the city of singapore was very badly bomb damaged.
there was no water to put fires out,the north of the island had not been fortified the c inc had lost the respect of his men who had been out manovered all the way down the penisular so morale was through the floor.
most british reinforcements were not even fully trained and didnt know how to use a rifle most just wanted it over with and the civilians would have suffered big time casulties through the roof.
so the goverment was between a rock and hard place fight on totally destroying singapore and selling the armies lives dearly for the honour of the empire or surrender save the civvies and troops who didnt wanna fight anyway half baked recruits against battle hardened jap troops what chance they have.another thing the royal navy had withdrawn to ceylon as it never had the units available, so even if the british had hung on the royal navy would have had to pull ships from other stations to convoy in supplies and reinforcements plus evacuate the wounded which meant that either the atlantic convoys or the med would have lost cover for their ops and prolly the navy would have lost alot more ships in the pacific, and losing the repulse and prince of wales had already shown that ships couldnt operate without air cover and the raf had been destroyed in singapore and the runways out of action so what then

This campaign shows the importance of gaining and holding the 'initiative'. The Japanese really were on their last legs too, but they were calling the shots and were deflecting the Allies from understanding just how weak and overstretched they were themselves. Had the British had a more vigorous command during the campaign, it would not have been impossible to have regained the initiative and to have forced the Japanese on to the back foot

i seriously doubt it was just a lack of british command and control,britain was suffering from decades of underspending on defence,the fleet had been cut no new major warships built other than nelson and rodney untill the kgv class.
several c in c,s had saw that the northern route was wide open and asked for more troops planes and tanks and they were all knocked back. the uk sent 200 hurricanes to russia in 1941 and 400 tanks so it just shows you how far down the chain the far east was in british eyes. the uk and america racially profiled the japs as buck tooth spec wearing orientals who couldnt shoot straight etc.
the british empire was overstreatched in 1941 they were on the back foot in africa,had been kicked out of europe,the raf had 99 hurricane and spitfire squadrons in europe and the german navy tied down a vastly superior force of royal navy ships by doing nothing.
maybe if the uk sent even a few tanks and trained it troops in malaya and singapore in jungle warfare maybe just maybe we could have beaten the japs.
singapore was in turmoil even as the british 18th division was disembarking their ships in singapore harbour,why was the north of the island not fortified,cost and churchill was one of the people who caused the stop go building of the base.

In many ways, it was a lack of imagination on the part of Britain. Rather than building more up to date battleships, they should have invested in more aircraft carriers. The Germans had spent the 20s and 30s redesigning their military doctrines around the tank. The British, being on the winning side, felt no compulsion to re-examine the way that they were doing things. There was a slow mechanisation process in the 1930s, but it still tended to rely on the tactics of 1918. Even the Japanese had realised the power of aircraft and the ability to project them via carriers as being the secret to success in the Pacific. The British were tied to outmoded tactics with outmoded weapons. The exception was actually the RAF, which had done a reasonably good job at promoting (if reluctantly at times) the Spitfire and long range strategic bombers. The RAF did not have a good ground support plane but fighters and bombers were well catered for.

lack of imagination was a part of it, but starving the forces of cash was a bigger part ,we had generals with vision percy hobart for one drummed out because his views didnt match up with the treasurey and ended up as a lance corporal in the home guard i mean this was the guy that thought up the funnies.percival was defo not a force commander his men had no confidence in him there was far to many cheifs i mean brooke popham a ex raf air marshall what did he know and admiral tom phillips who didnt beleive that air power would be a factor.he was dudley pounds right hand man and lets not forget the battering the royal navy suffered in the med mainly from airpower.
lets not beat about the bush lack of funds was the main factor, no defences facing north no tanks and a serious lack of training for the troops serving there,