

Falklands War: Countdown & Conflict 1982

by Roger Lorton



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Other works by the author:

A-Z of Policing Law 2nd Ed. 2001 ISBN-10: 0117028126 / ISBN-13: 978-0117028128

A-Z of Countryside Law 2nd Ed. 2000 ISBN-10: 0117023833 / ISBN-13: 978-0117023833

A-Z of Neighbourhood 2001 Law ISBN-10: 0117026212 / ISBN-13: 9780117026216

Internet books:

The Falkland Islands: History

Falklands War: The First 400 Years

Website:

<http://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/>

"The Purposes of the United Nations are:

- 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;*
- 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;*
- 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and*
- 4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." ¹*

¹ *Article 1* of the United Nation's *Charter* signed on June 26th 1945 at a ceremony in San Francisco. Ratified by both Britain and Argentina on October 24th 1945.

Article 73

'Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- 1. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;*
- 2. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;*
- 3. to further international peace and security;*
- 4. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; ...'*

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Resolution 637 (VII) (1952)

“Whereas the right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights... The General Assembly recommends that;

- 1. The Member States of the United Nations shall uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations;*
- 2. The Member States of the United Nations shall recognize and promote the realization of the right of self-determination of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories ... and shall facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such Territories”*

Introduction



The Falklands War is the name popularly given to the conflict that took place during April, May and June of 1982 between the United Kingdom and Argentina. An undeclared war fought on two stages – the windswept archipelago in the South Atlantic; and the diplomatic chessboard based primarily at the United Nations in New York, albeit with side games taking place all around the world.

The fighting was harsh on both fronts.

On and around the Falkland Islands, 255 British lives were lost in a remarkable feat of arms that could not have succeeded if the diplomatic war had not been fought and won at the same time.

This work is about that diplomatic war. It is about the political battles that led up to it. There are better works covering the detail of the military battles; so I have concentrated on a rather murkier world. As with my other works in this series, I have employed a time-line enhanced by the words of those involved. In this case retrieved from the many files recently released by the British Government under the 30 years rule.

Historically, the Falklands War of 1982 was just the most violent skirmish in a long running diplomatic war of attrition that started between Britain and Spain in 1765. Shots were fired in 1770 without anyone getting hurt and, close though it became to a full blown war, British diplomacy won the day. Casualties were also avoided in 1833, when the Royal Navy suggested that a trespassing Argentine garrison should leave. That diplomatic engagement was still simmering 150 years later. It still burns today.

This work is not about all of that history. Those details can be found in my other works – *Falklands War: The First 400 Years*; and the ever growing *Falkland Islands History*.

The direct diplomatic roots of this skirmish can be tracked back to 1945 and the United Nation's founding *Charter*, and then to 1960 with *Resolution 1514*. The latter, in its turn, led to *Resolution 2065* (1965) which raised Argentine hopes for its claims of sovereignty over what it saw as a British colony breaching its territorial integrity.

This is about 1982.

Roger Lorton

January 2013

1960 - 1970



1960 – in **June** Britain ratifies the *Antarctic Treaty* covering the area south of latitude 60°S. Sited outside of the designated area, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands remain unaffected by the *Treaty* and the 'frozen' sovereignty claims within its zone. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are designated as 'Dependencies' of the Falkland Islands, reflecting the fact that while they are administered from the Falklands and share the same Governor, they remain separate for sovereignty purposes. Neither are listed at the United Nations for the purposes of decolonisation.²

September 23rd, the Chairman of the *Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Nikita Khrushchev, proposes a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

December 14th, the United Nations *General Assembly* passes a *Resolution* known as the *Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*.

Resolution 1514 states, *inter alia*:

“Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, ...

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

Declares that: 1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.ⁱ

2 In October 1946, Britain submitted a list of its colonies and other territories that it administered for the purposes of Article 73. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands were not included, nor were any of the Antarctic or sub-Antarctic claims. The constitutional arrangements for these sub-Antarctic islands were subject of Letters Patent in 1908. Argentina made no claim until 1947 when Argentina President Peron issued *Decree No. 14 062*.

December 15th, *Resolution 1515* recognises the right of States to dispose of their own natural resources and on the same day, *Resolution 1541* states; “ *A Non-Self Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by - (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.*”³

1961 – March 14th, the British Government, in response to a speech by President Arturo Frondizi, reminds the Argentine Government that the Falkland Islands' Dependencies are British territory.

November 27th, *UN Resolution 1654 (XVI)* establishes a *Special Committee* of seventeen members with a mandate to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the *General Assembly*. Its title - *Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples.* ⁴

1964 – Grytviken whaling station on South Georgia finally ceases operations after 60 years. First discovered by the explorer Captain James Cook in 1775, South Georgia had attracted a number of whaling concerns around the turn of the 20th century including the first at Grytviken (*Compañía Argentina de Pesca* 1905), and another at Leith (*Salvesen & Co* 1908), all operating under British leases.

Argentina's Government circulates an instruction to the nation's schools, requiring that they teach the subject of the Falklands in an ‘anti-imperialistic’ way. “*I ... remind you that next September 8, at the Meeting of the 24, the future of our Malvinas Islands shall be considered. The Representatives of the foreign powers, .. shall consider the problems inherent to colonialism and peoples’ self-determination and, in that agenda, the Malvinas Islands shall be included in the British colonies. The Argentine Republic can not and must not accept this decision because Malvinas Islands are a piece of its territory that was seized by force... it is very important – due to the psychological force of this action – to explain to the students of the educational institutions of the country the vicissitudes that the nation is experiencing, under the threat of the definite loss of a piece of its soil.*”⁵

September 8th, while the *Special Committee* (C24) are meeting at the United Nations headquarters in New York, Miguel Fitzgerald, an Argentine national, lands a *Cessna* light aircraft at Port Stanley, plants an Argentine flag in the ground, hands a proclamation to a confused bystander, and flies away. Argentina's Government publicly dissociate themselves from this stunt.

September 9th, at the UN, the *Committee* listen to Argentina’s representative, Dr. José María Ruda, make a very long speech in which he sets out his country's demand for the Falkland Islands; asserting -

- that Spain's reservation in the 1771 agreement was the reason that ended the dispute⁶
- that when the British left in 1774, the lead plate only claimed one Island ⁷

³ *cf. Resolution 2625 (1970)*

⁴ Following *Resolution 1810 (XVII)* of 17 December 1962, the membership of the Special Committee was enlarged by seven members. As a result, this Committee is now known more commonly as the *Committee of 24* or, just the *C24*. Current membership is higher, but the *C24* tag has stuck.

⁵ *Malvinas as an educational policy* Alberto Sileoni 2010

⁶ Untrue. Britain and Spain came close to war when Spain ejected the garrison at Port Egmont in 1770. Spain, unable to secure France's support, was forced to back down and restore the British to West Falkland. Spain, in desperation, referred to its own claim in the final agreement whereas Britain, the diplomatic victor, felt no such need.

⁷ Untrue. The actual wording starts, “ *Know all the Nations, the Falkland Islands, with its ports, warehouses, landings, natural harbours, land and coves belonging thereto, are of exclusive rights and ownership of his most sacred Majesty George III, King of Great Britain ...* “. The garrison withdrew in 1774, but British interests remained with its sealers and whalers. *cf. Falklands War: The First 400 Years* Roger Lorton 2012

- that Port Egmont was destroyed in 1777, with the full knowledge of Britain ⁸
- that the Nootka Sound agreement limited British rights in the South Seas ⁹
- that Argentina became independent in 1810 rather than 1816 ¹⁰
- that David Jewett applied Argentine fishing regulations to the Islands ¹¹
- that Buenos Aires made Don Pablo Areguati Governor in 1823 ¹²
- that Vernet's first expedition was '*partially successful*' ¹³
- that the Lexington attacked Puerto Louis under a French flag ¹⁴
- that Britain and America conspired together ¹⁵
- that Britain expelled '*almost all*' the Argentine settlers in 1833 ¹⁶
- that the Islanders' are only a temporary population ¹⁷
- that Britain's possession violates Argentina's '*territorial integrity*' ¹⁸

Dr. Ruda also asserts that Britain, having '*abandoned*' the Islands in 1774, thereafter acknowledged both Spain's and then, via inheritance, Argentina's, sovereignty.¹⁹

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- 8 Untrue. An order was given in 1780 for Spanish forces to destroy Port Egmont, following the declaration of war between Spain and Britain the previous year. There is no evidence to show that the order was carried through and some of the original buildings can be seen to this day.
- 9 Untrue. The *Treaty* between Spain and Britain did limit both country's activities and the creation of '*new*' settlements, but its applicability to the Falkland Islands controversial. This peace *Treaty* lost all validity with the renewal of war between the two States in 1796 and was only partially reinstated in 1814 when peace returned. In any case, the Nootka agreement included a secret clause allowing action should a 3rd party State (ie. Argentina) make any bid for territory.
- 10 In 1810 the first *Junta* in Buenos Aires declared for Ferdinand VII of Spain. Hardly an act of independence.
- 11 Untrue. Jewett was a Privateer licensed by Buenos Aires, turned Pirate after taking neutral Portuguese ships. He made an obscure claim to the Falklands in 1820 on behalf of the United Province of the Rio de la Plata, but forgot to tell them about it upon his return to Buenos Aires a few months later. No '*order*' for this claim has ever been found.
- 12 Untrue. Areguati was an employee of the partnership formed to exploit the wild cattle on the Falklands, following the great drought in Argentina. The partnership included a German (Vernet), an Englishman (Schofield) and a Buenos Arian (Pacheco). The expedition sent in 1824 failed completely. No title was granted to Areguati, or anyone else.
- 13 Untrue. Expedition members were rescued by a British sealer, *Susannah Anne*, which found them starving in July 1824 just 5 months after their arrival on East Falkland; and after being abandoned by Areguati the month before.
- 14 There is no evidence to support the claim that the *USS Lexington* flew the French flag when it cleared out what its Commander believed to be a nest of pirates from East Falkland in 1831.
- 15 Again there is no evidence to support this assertion, and much to the contrary. There was some limited liaison between the *Charge d'Affaires* in Buenos Aires however with Baylies (US) consulting Parish (UK) on Britain's sovereignty.
- 16 Untrue. In fact it was only a trespassing garrison from Buenos Aires which was asked to leave. All but 4 of the settlers which had arrived between 1826 and 1832 remained. The settlers included a mix of nationalities. Buenos Aires had been warned by Britain regarding its territorial pretensions in diplomatic protest in 1829.
- 17 Untrue. Some of the current population of the Falklands can count back 9 generations.
- 18 A strange assertion as the Falklands have never formed any part of Argentina's territory. Nor were they ever part of the Viceroyalty de la Rio de la Plata, the Spanish colony. Spain's claim to East Falkland lasted until 1863.
- 19 There has never been any such acknowledgment and the concept of inheritance (*uti possidetis juris*) was, and is, controversial. Britain does not recognise *uti possidetis juris* as a principle of international law. Whilst Dr. Ruda's speech has been criticised for adopting an inaccurate, indeed distorted, version of history, there is little doubt that the speech was a diplomatic success and instrumental in the General Assembly vote for *Resolution 2065* the following year.

In his right to reply, the British Representative tells the C24 that his Government holds that the question of sovereignty over the Islands is not negotiable, but that they are willing to discuss the maintenance and development of peaceful relations between the UK and the Falkland Islands on the one hand and Argentina on the other. He adds that the UN's committees are not competent to decide questions of sovereignty.²⁰

September 12th, demonstrator's stone the British Embassy Residency in Buenos Aires.

September 18th, the C24 produces its report, taking note of the existence of a dispute. US delegate, Adlai Stevenson, responds that the issue of territorial sovereignty is not a matter for the UN.

1965 – January 6th, Argentina's *Commission for the Recovery of the Falkland Islands* demands that the; “Argentine flag should fly everywhere in Puerto Soledad, the island's capital.”

September 21st, the Argentine Government formally invites Britain to enter into negotiations on the question of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

November 1st, the British Government send a diplomatic *Note* to Buenos Aires pointing out the Dependencies are not part of the Falkland Islands; and not within the C24's remit.

In **December**, at the UN, Argentina's representative demands that the Falkland Islands should be decolonised in accordance with *Resolution 1514 (XV)* of 1960; and that the only course of action is for Britain to “return” them to Argentina.

Britain responds that it has no doubts as to its sovereignty over the territory, and that, as a result, there was no question of Argentina's territory having been disrupted. The spokesman also argues that no provision of *Resolution 1514 (XV)* could be interpreted as denying the principle of *self-determination* to the inhabitants of territories which were the subject of a territorial claim by another country.

December 16th, the *General Assembly* of the UN passes *Resolution 2065*.

“The General Assembly:

Having examined the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Taking the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory,

Considering that its Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Noting the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,

1. **Invites** the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in

20 *The New York Times* Sept. 9th

mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. Requests the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations.”²¹

1966 – January, Argentina's claim is raised with Foreign Secretary Mr. Michael Stewart, when he visits Buenos Aires. Stewart responds that Britain does not recognise any claim and he emphasises the importance of the Islanders' views; *"In our experience, no good is served by keeping unwilling subjects under one's flag, but when the inhabitants' wishes are clear, as in this case they are clear, then the wishes of the Falkland islanders are more important than those of either the Government of the United Kingdom or that of Argentina."*²²

He also adds; *"when one was confronted with a community whose wishes were clear and undoubted, one had to produce very powerful arguments to override them.."*

6 Royal Marines are deployed to train the Falklands' *Local Defence Force*; the only troops on the Islands.

In **June**, there is a military coup in Argentina, led by General Juan Carlos Onganía.

July 19th, in a reaction to *Resolution 2065* and the invitation of last September, a preliminary meeting is held in London, at which the Argentine Ambassador submits a diplomatic *Note* formally demanding the “*restitution*” of the Falkland Islands. The British delegation rejects the implication that Britain's occupation of the Islands is illegal, but agrees that there should be some detailed examination of ways to decrease friction, and to limit the scale of the dispute.

July 23rd, England and Argentina meet in the *World Cup* football competition. Following Argentina's controversial defeat in the *quarter-finals*, Argentine newspapers report; *"First they stole the Falklands from us, and now the World Cup."*

September 28th, an armed group of 19 Argentines from the extremist *Condor* group, hijack an *Aerolíneas DC4* with 26 passengers on-board and force it to go to the Falkland Islands. When the aircraft lands on the race-course at Stanley some Islanders go to assist but are seized. Those hostages are released later in the day in an exchange with Marines' Captain, Ian Martin, and the local Police Sergeant, Terry Peck, taking their place. Arms are issued to the *Defence Force*, which surrounds the aircraft.

September 29th, following a mass with Father Rudolph Roel, the hijackers agree to surrender.

There are demonstrations in Buenos Aires and shots are reported being fired towards the British Embassy.

A *Royal Marines* platoon is stationed near Port Stanley.

21 United Nations *Resolutions* are not mandatory, only advisory, with the exception of those pronounced by the Security Council. General Assembly *Resolutions* require a simple majority to pass, unless they are declared to be an '*important question*', in which case a 2/3rds majority is required. How long a *Resolution* remains '*in force*' is unclear and appears subject to events and changing circumstances. *Resolutions* such as 2065 which dealt with specific issues perhaps the more so. Argentina today still attempts to rely on the request to negotiate made out in 2065. It is very debatable whether this is a realistic position to adopt.

22 *The Times* Jan. 14th

In **November**, talks take place between British and Argentine officials. A 30 year 'sovereignty freeze' is proposed by the UK at the end of which the Islanders' will be free to choose between British and Argentine rule. Argentina rejects the proposal.

December 16th, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* is adopted by the *General Assembly* in *Resolution 2200A (XXI)* - " *Article 1 - All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.*

Article 2 – All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

Article 3 - The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."²³

1967 – March, the British Government states formally to Argentina that they are prepared to consider a cessation of sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions and provided that the wishes of the Islanders are respected. A 'Memorandum of Understanding' is prepared.

June 13th, Britain's proposal states; "Article 1: her Britannic Majesty will be prepared to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands to Argentina provided that the change is acceptable to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands."

Argentina rejects the proposal, and the right of veto it gives the Islanders.

November 18th, the US Embassy in Buenos Aires writes to the *State Department* in Washington on the talks taking place between the UK and Argentina; "As the British Embassy Officer sees it, the most difficult problem in transferring the Islands to Argentina still remains gaining the acquiescence of the Islanders themselves. The Argentines' have always tended to think this was relatively unimportant, apparently believing that the British were using this problem simply as a device to avoid coming to terms with the sovereignty issue. However, even though the British are willing to accept Argentine sovereignty over the Islands, they cannot transfer Island administration to the Argentines against the will of the Falkland Islanders ..."

October 21st, Governor Haskard complains about the proposals regarding sovereignty; " .. Our links, sentimental and economic, bind us firmly to England. Argentina, seen through Falkland eyes is unknown, foreign, aloof, disdainful, corrupt, feared, ..."

1968 – a copy of the 'Memorandum' is shown to the Islands' *Executive Council*.

February 27th, Members of the British Parliament receive an open letter:

"To Members of Parliament

ARE YOU AWARE THAT -

Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the Falkland Islands to The Argentine.

23 This *Covenant* did not take effect until March 23rd, 1976, when Britain ratified it. Argentina did not sign.

TAKE NOTE THAT -

The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future - they do NOT want to become Argentines - they are as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation - five out of six were born in the Islands - many elderly people have never been elsewhere - there is no racial problem - no unemployment - no poverty, and we are not in debt.

ARE YOU AWARE THAT -

The people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a Foreign Language, Law, Customs, and Culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life, unique in fact, when you consider that the Islands are 8,000 miles from the Country which they still call 'Home' in spite of the Immigration Act.

Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965: "The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them." British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has been silence.

QUESTIONS -

Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in Power Politics?

Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on use?

What can you do to prevent it?

What are you doing?

WE NEED YOUR HELP! "

In **March**, the *Falkland Islands Emergency Committee*, an unofficial body, is formed to promote the wishes of the Islanders regarding their future.

March 27th, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Chalfont, is forced to defend his Government's position in the Lords; *"Her Majesty's Government's object in conducting these talks was to secure a satisfactory and lasting modus vivendi between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, and that Her Majesty's Government have thought it right in pursuance of this objective that the question of sovereignty should be discussed...*

Her Majesty's Government believe that a transfer of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and Argentina, and one which would fully safeguard the special rights of the Islanders. That is one condition. The cession of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement of this nature. While the power to decide over a transfer of sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government, they would agree to such a cession first on the condition I have mentioned, that it must be part of an agreement fully satisfactory in other respects, and, secondly, only if it were clear to us, to Her Majesty's Government, that the Islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests...

My Lords, the legal question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands resides with Her Majesty's Government. It will be for Her Majesty's Government to negotiate and arrive at decisions with the Argentine Government. We shall do so on the basis of the two principles I have already outlined, ... There is no question of bartering over the heads of anybody here. All I have said is that we regard the wishes of the Islanders as being of great importance; and, of course, we have studied those wishes constantly in the course of the negotiations. There is continuing consultation all the time with the Governor of the Falkland Islands about this matter; and, as I say, in all this we shall regard their interests as paramount."

Chalfont is subjected to strong criticism both in Parliament, and in the British press.

April 1st, in response to the criticism, the British Government publicly states that there will be no cession of sovereignty against the wishes of the Islanders.

April 25th, Lord Shepherd answers a question on the suitability of a referendum in the Falkland Islands; *“My Lords, a plebiscite appears to be unnecessary and unsuitable in the circumstances of the Falkland Islands, particularly as we regard consultation with the people as a continuous process. ... a plebiscite is an unusual process within the British Commonwealth. The situation in the Falkland Islands is that there are some 1,200 electors, some 800 of whom are householders. We believe that the type of consultation we have in mind, which may take place over a period of years, is quite suitable and will be democratic. We believe that by this process ... not only Her Majesty's Government, but Parliament also, will be satisfied that the wishes of the people of the Falklands are clearly understood.”*

August, the final version of the ‘*Memorandum of Understanding*’ is agreed; *“The Government of the United Kingdom, as part of such a final settlement, will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after -*

- (i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and*
- (ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so secured.”*

In **November**, Lord Chalfont, Minister of State at the renamed *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* (FCO), visits the Islands tasked with explaining the situation to the Islanders.

In a publicity stunt paid for by an Argentine newspaper, Miguel Fitzgerald, attempts to repeat his 1964 landing of a Cessna aircraft at Stanley Racecourse. Frustrated by obstructions on the track, he crash lands in Eliza Cove Road. Fitzgerald is unhurt.

December 5th, Chalfont, on his return to London, submits his report; *“I do not believe that the Falkland Islands can continue to exist for many years, as they are presently constituted. I believe one day that the Falkland Islands may be prepared to choose Argentine sovereignty. We must at all costs avoid giving the impression that we want to get rid of them, since that would set up precisely the reaction we would want to avoid.”*

December 11th, following Lord Chalfont's report, the Government decides not to continue in its attempt to reach a settlement on the basis of the ‘*Memorandum of Understanding*’ as Argentina is not prepared to accept that the ‘*Memorandum*’ should include a statement that any transfer of sovereignty would be subject to the wishes of the Islanders.

Stewart makes a statement in Parliament later the same day, which announces the decision to continue negotiations and confirming that the British Government will continue to insist on the importance of the Islanders' wishes. He also assures the House that the on-going negotiations do not include the Dependencies.

December 17th, Argentina's Representative to the UN complains about; *“..recognition of the Argentine sovereignty, as a definite solution, [being] subject to the wishes of the islanders.”*²⁴

December 19th, the Representatives of both Argentina and Britain inform the *General Assembly* that

24 *United Nations: The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial, a pending question* Jorge Arguello 2010

negotiations are continuing and that both Governments agree that there has been progress towards, “*narrowing the area of divergence.*” During the debate Argentina demands that its sovereignty be recognised, and asserts that the principle to be applied is not that of self-determination but rather that of national unity and territorial integrity. Britain repeats that it has no doubts about its sovereignty and that no transfer of such sovereignty could be made against the wishes of the inhabitants.

1969 – November 21st, Lord Caradon, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, says; “.. *I now have to inform you that, although divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution of the dispute, it has been agreed that, within the general framework of these negotiations, special talks with a view to reaching agreement on practical measures for the implementation and promotion of free communications and movement in both directions between the mainland and the Islands, will take place early next year at a mutually convenient time.*”

November 27th, the *Daily Express* prints a claim that there is oil to be found near the Falkland Islands.

1970 – October 24th, *General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)* states; “... *By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.... Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, (through the)*”²⁵

- *establishment of a sovereign and independent State,*
- *free association, or*
- *integration with an independent State, or*
- *the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people...*

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter...

The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles...”²⁶



25 *Resolution 1541* of 1960 established the first 3 criteria for 'decolonisation'. This later *Resolution* added a fourth.

Britain's position is that its modern relationship with its *Overseas Territories* complies with this fourth part and that those *Territories* should now be removed from the C24's list.

26 *Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.*

1971 - 1981



1971 – in **February**, both Britain and the United States withdraw from membership of the C24.

“The withdrawal from membership in the General Assembly's Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of the United Kingdom and the United States was noted with regret by a number of members when the Committee convened in 1971. Both States, it was observed, had served on the Committee since its inception and together were responsible for the administration of the majority of the remaining dependent territories. In the view of some Committee members, the withdrawal of the administering powers impeded the full and speedy implementation of the General Assembly's Resolution of 14 December 1960 concerning the granting of independence.”²⁷

In **May**, the Governor Lewis reassures the Islands' *Legislative Council* on proposals for a communications agreement between Britain and Argentina; *“Her Majesties Government (HMG) is insisting that any agreement on communications shall be conditional upon an arrangement such as the 'sovereignty umbrella'... HMG sees the whole communications exercise as a way of defusing the sovereignty issue and helping the Islands without any concession on sovereignty or their Britishness. I was not appointed Governor and Commander in Chief of these Islands with a view to assisting in disposing of part of the Queen's realm.”*

In **June**, special talks are held in Buenos Aires between delegations from Argentina and the UK. The talks consider; *“.. the adoption of measures aimed at facilitating the movement of persons and goods between the Argentine mainland and the islands and at promoting the establishment of cultural, social and economic links. Both Governments declared they would continue to exchange views on these matters.*

... both parties agreed that nothing contained in the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks should be interpreted as a renunciation by either Government of any right to territorial sovereignty over the islands or as a recognition of, or support for, the other Government's position with regard to such territorial sovereignty; and that no acts or activities undertaken pursuant to the joint statement should constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying the position of either Government with regard to territorial sovereignty over the islands.”

June 22nd, Argentina and Chile sign an *Arbitration Agreement* whereby they agree to submit their dispute over the Beagle Channel to international arbitration. It is agreed that Queen Elizabeth II should act as arbitrator and should select a panel of five judges from the *International Court of Justice (ICJ)* to assist her. ²⁸

²⁷ *UN Yearbook 1971* Britain's reason, as given to the UN, was that the *Special Committee* refused to recognise that it had a modern relationship with its Overseas Territories; and that it was their wish to remain associated with the UK.

²⁸ Argentina does not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ as extending to sovereignty issues and was unable therefore to approach the ICJ directly. Britain invited Argentina and Chile to take the various claims over the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic islands to the ICJ in 1955. Both Argentina and Chile declined. At the time, Argentina referred to a *‘.. fundamental principle in accordance with which territorial sovereignty cannot be submitted for discussion or put in issue ..’* and stated that the matter was too *“.. self-evident to require judicial determination..”*

August, during talks between the UK and Argentina, an agreement is reached on a wide range of communications matters, of which the most important is the establishment of air and sea services between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, to be provided by Argentina and the United Kingdom respectively. Other matters covered are:-

- the provision by Argentina of a travel document (the '*white card*'), which guarantees freedom of movement within Argentina for residents of the Islands and serves as the only documentation necessary for Argentine residents visiting the Falkland Islands (the Dependencies are not included);
- certain reciprocal exemptions from duties and taxes;
- exemption for residents of the Islands from any obligation to Argentine military service;
- the harmonization of postal, telegraphic and telephone rates;
- provision of school places and scholarships in Argentina for children in the Islands;
- and the establishment of a special consultative committee in Buenos Aires to consist of representatives of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy, to deal with any questions arising over communications.

The *Agreements* are set out in a joint statement signed by both Governments. *LADE* immediately initiates an amphibious flight between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. ²⁹

November, three Islanders' using the *LADE* flight, are forced to accept Argentine ID cards before being allowed into Argentina, contrary to the agreement concerning '*white cards*'.

1972 – January, Argentina's Government calls for renewed talks on sovereignty.

A *Briefing Note* is prepared for Lord Chalfont by the FCO; “*At present the Islands are something of a liability to Britain; they no longer have a strategic value and they are difficult and expensive to defend, while remaining a constant source of friction in relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole.*”

May, Argentina agrees to construct a temporary air strip near Stanley; to replace the amphibian service provided by *LADE*; while the Governor applies for a grant of £1615 million for the construction of a permanent airport.

The United Kingdom joins the European Community by signing the *Treaty of Rome*.

July 6th, Argentina protests the inclusion of the Falkland Islands in *Annex 4* of the *Treaty of Rome*, as an *Overseas Territory* of Great Britain, making the Islanders citizens of the *European Union*.

October 23rd, Argentina's Foreign Minister addresses the *General Assembly* at the UN and tells them that the only final solution to the differences between Argentina and the UK would be the handing over of the Falkland Islands. The UK protests in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General .

November 16th, a temporary air strip constructed by the Argentine Air Force, comes into operation with a weekly air service between Port Stanley and Comodoro Rivadavia.

November 21st, further negotiations between Argentina and Britain over communications issues commence in Port Stanley.

²⁹ *Líneas Aéreas del Estado* (English: Airline of the State) is an airline based in Comodoro Rivadavia, operated by the Argentine Air Force.

1973 – April, during preparatory discussions about another round of talks, the Argentine delegation indicate that they wish to move forward on the basis of the 1968 *Memorandum* proposals. The British negotiators respond that they are only prepared to discuss practical matters and not sovereignty and that Islanders must be present at the negotiations. Argentina refuses to accept Islander participation. Negotiations stall.

August 15th, in a letter addressed to the the C24, Argentina blames the paralysis in negotiations on the attitude of the British; claiming that the UK has changed its position, “*substantially.*”

August 21st, Britain responds that any solution must - (a) recognise the rights of the inhabitants to self-determination, and (b) should provide for them to express their wishes regarding this.

December 14th, at the UN the *General Assembly* passes *Resolution 3160*.

“*The General Assembly:*

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Recalling its Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its Resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which it invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of Resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations,

Mindful that Resolution 2065 (XX) indicates that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with regard to the aforementioned islands,

Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands,

1. ***Approves*** the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 August 1973 concerning the Territory;

2. ***Declares*** the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

3. ***Urges*** the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation;

4. ***Requests*** both Governments to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations. “

1974 – March, the new *Labour* Government in Britain suggests a 'joint-sovereignty' arrangement to the Argentine Government; as a possible answer to the impasse addressed in *Resolution 3160*.

June 11th, Ambassador James Hutton in Buenos Aires passes a *Note* to the Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes outlining the British position; “... *I am pleased to inform you that I have now received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to propose that the discussions between Britain and the Falkland Islands should be resumed on the basis of the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to the Islanders in the hypothesised event of a condominium. These discussions would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islanders.*

I am to explain that the main aim of Her Majesty's Government in entering into negotiations on the basis of a condominium would be to settle the dispute about sovereignty by accepting Argentine co-sovereignty over the Islands, and that the end product might be a treaty resolving the Anglo-Argentine dispute and creating a favourable atmosphere in which the Islanders could develop according to their interests. For the duration of the Treaty the two parties would accept shared sovereignty over the Islands. The co-domini would be Her Majesty The Queen and His Excellency the President of the Argentina Nation.

There are several forms which a condominium might take but the basic elements might include the following:

- 1) The British and Argentine flags would fly side by side and the official language would be English and Spanish;*
- 2) All 'belongers' of the Islands would possess dual nationality;*
- 3) Existing colony passports would be replaced by travel documents issued in the co-domini;*
- 4) The present constitution, administration and legal system would have to be adapted to the needs of a condominium. The Governor might be appointed alternatively by the Queen and the President of Argentina;*
- 5) Further constitutional change would require the agreement of the co-domini.*

I also have to inform you that a Joint Session of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Islands have informed the Governor that they had no objection to talks being held with the Argentine Government on the safeguards and guarantees required in a condominium. However, I am to state that Her Majesty's Government would feel free to invite representatives of the Islands to form part of the British delegation, and that before final agreement the Islanders would have to be formally consulted and their acceptance sought by some form of popular representation. On this basis, Her Majesty's Government propose that, if the Argentine Government agree, official or preliminary official talks should take place in Buenos Aires as soon as possible”

On seeing the proposal, Argentina's President, Juan Peron, is reported as saying; “*Let's accept. Once we have one foot in the Malvinas nobody will get us out and before long Argentina will have full sovereignty.*”³⁰

June 26th, Minister of State, David Ennals, in a Parliamentary written answer says; “... *if discussions are resumed, representatives of the Islanders will be invited to join the United Kingdom Delegation.*”

July 1st, President Peron dies of a heart attack.

Argentina's Foreign Ministry responds to the offer of *joint-sovereignty* by insisting that any talks must be preceded by British recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Negotiations stall again.

30 Ex- Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas in an article for *La Nacion*, March 2012.

In the UN, Britain resumes cooperation with the C24, recognising its obligations under *Article 73* of the *Charter*, but does not rejoin. In practice this means that while information regarding the development of the British territories on the C24's *non-self governing territories* list is provided, Britain does not take part any active part in the discussions during the *Committee's* annual debates; although reserving the right to do so in the cases of Gibraltar and the Falklands. The C24 is now a *sub-Committee* of the UN's *Fourth Committee* and the UK does involve itself with the *Fourth's* annual deliberations as any draft *Resolution* passing from the C24 through the *Fourth Committee* is likely to be adopted by the *General Assembly*.

At the end of **July**, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, suggests that Buenos Aires should be informed that, while Britain is prepared to talk, the exercise will be useless and counter-productive without Islander participation.

September 12th, an agreement is reached for the *Argentine State Oil Company*, to supply petroleum products to the Islands at mainland prices.

In **October**, the Governor states that any; “... *case for dialogue with Argentina, has gone by default.*”

December, *Cronica*, mounts a press campaign advocating an invasion of the Islands although the Argentine government publicly dissociates itself from the newspaper's campaign.

Minister Vignes tells David Ennals that there are only two options; invasion or negotiation.

1975 – In **March**, Minister Vignes again intimates that Argentina is contemplating an invasion. The new British Ambassador to Argentina, David Ashe, is instructed to warn the Government in Buenos Aires that any military action will be met by force.

March 25th, the Argentine Government writes to the UN regarding press speculation that oil deposits have been uncovered near the Falkland Islands. The letter states that Argentina will not recognise the right of any foreign Government to explore for, or extract, minerals or hydrocarbons in that area.

April 10th, in answer to a question in the House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts state; “ *Yes, my Lords. It has always been our policy that representatives of the islanders should be present at all substantive talks, and this will continue to be our unchanging policy.*”

May 5th, Britain delivers a letter to the UN stating that it has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, nor any doubts about its exclusive sovereign rights to explore for, and exploit, the natural resources of the Falkland Islands continental shelf.

During **July**, discussions are proposed with regard to joint Anglo-Argentine development of the resources of the South-West Atlantic. Argentina counter proposes that such discussions should be linked to the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of years, as a means of settling the dispute. Argentina also proposes that they should occupy the uninhabited Islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and that this occupation should be accepted without condemnation by the British Government.

Britain's response is that such action is unacceptable. The Argentine Government immediately rejects any talks on economic co-operation.

Air passengers from the Falkland Islands are required to obtain clearance from Argentina's Foreign Ministry before flying, in defiance of the *'white card'* arrangements under the 1971 agreement.

In **September**, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan meets with the new Argentine Foreign Minister, Sr. Robledo, at the United Nations. Callaghan tells Robledo that there can be no discussions on sovereignty and that any attempt by Argentina to take the Islands by force will be resisted forcefully. Robledo responds that there is; “no question of an Argentine invasion of the Islands, nor of an attempt to solve the problem by force.”

September 9th, at a meeting of the *International Parliamentary Union* in London, Argentina accuses Britain of an act of '*international piracy*' in establishing a colony on the Falklands. The meeting is picketed by Islanders.

October 16th, the British Government announces a comprehensive economic survey, under the leadership of Lord Shackleton, to inquire into the development possibilities of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.³¹

Christian Salvesen Co., based in Edinburgh, writes to the FCO to inform them that the company owns two old whaling harbours on South Georgia and is trying to acquire two more: “*It is a long shot, but I think that sometime in the future there may be use for these bases, either for fishing or for oil. I hope that HMG will not absentmindedly hand it over to Argentina.*”

Argentina's Ambassador to London returns to Buenos Aires.

October 22nd, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issue a press release stating that it has not granted permission for the Shackleton mission.

In **November**, the *Joint Intelligence Committee* reports to the British Government that, whilst unlikely, an invasion of the Falklands by Argentina remained a possibility.

November 14th, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires is informed that the research ship *RSS Shackleton* will require Argentine permission to carry out any research within 200 miles of the Argentine coasts, and that '*Argentine waters*' is being interpreted to include the area around the Falkland Islands.

December 8th, Argentina's Ambassador to the UN makes a speech on the dispute at a plenary session of the *General Assembly*; “*We are prepared to continue our efforts, but the limits of our patience and tolerance should not be underestimated if we should have to face an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate by the other party The Argentine Government reserves its position regarding the responsibility which rests with the British Government for the breaking-off of negotiations and will not fail to assert its rights in the form which it deems most appropriate.*”

December 10th, Buenos Aires confirms that Shackleton's team cannot travel via Argentina. The *naval attaché* in Buenos Aires is warned that *RRS Shackleton* will be seized if found in Argentine waters.³²

December 16th, the *Cronica* newspaper sponsors a public subscription to finance an invasion of the Islands.

December 17th, James Callaghan and Foreign Minister Arauz Castex meet in Paris. Callaghan indicates his belief that progress can be made with economic co-operation. Castex suggests that Argentine scientists should be added to Shackleton's team. He offers a retired Admiral who is to be given the position of '*deputy leader*' and says that Shackleton's *Report* should be followed by sovereignty talks.

31 Son of the explorer, and a respected Labor peer. Shackleton was under little illusion that his report was to emphasise the importance of Argentine/Island relations and to included the possibility of a take-over.

32 There appears to have been a belief that Lord Shackleton's mission and the *RRS Shackleton*, named after his father, were connected, which was not the case.

Lord Shackleton declines to accept any Argentine representative as a part of his team. Argentina immediately protests, issuing a communiqué stating that the survey is an unwelcome initiative, to which Argentina has not agreed. Shackleton's team are refused permission to land anywhere in Argentina.

1976 – January 2nd, the Shackleton inquiry team arrives in the South Atlantic.

Foreign Minister Castex, describes the timing as “*unfriendly and unthoughtful*,” coinciding as it does with the 143rd anniversary of the arrival of *HMS Clio* at Puerto Louis 1833.³³

Castex adds that, if the British Government refuses to resume negotiations the the two countries are; “*.. rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... in the end he could only see one course open to Argentina irrespective of what Government might be in power ... Fortified by the support of the entire Argentine nation as well as all the other nations of the world assembled in New York, his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome*”.

On the same day, his Ministry issues a statement, “*The people of the Republic should take note that its Government, together with the armed forces and the other institutional organizations which make up the Argentine State, share an unbreakable zeal for the defence of the dignity and rights of the nation, and that they will act without precipitation but with all the persistence, prudence and energy which may be necessary to achieve justice.*”

Argentine military aircraft overfly the Islands.

January 8th, the *Joint Intelligence Committee* reports to the Government in London that an invasion remained unlikely but that Argentina would increase the political pressure, possibly by withdrawing its Ambassador.

January 13th, following an exchange of *Notes* between Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Minister Castex, the Argentine Government suggests that the British Ambassador be withdrawn.

January 14th, James Callaghan makes a statement in the Commons; “*Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. ... When I saw Senor Robledo, the then Argentine Foreign Minister, in New York last September, I put to him the proposition that our two Governments should consider discussing the possibilities of economic co-operation in the South-West Atlantic region. I reminded him of what I said to his predecessor about the report of Professor D. H. Griffiths on the hydrocarbon prospects of the region, a copy of which I had had made available to his predecessor. I informed him that we were setting up an economic survey of the Falkland Islands. Its purpose is to quantify the options for future economic development. As the House knows, this survey is being held at the request of the Islanders. ... However, after the nomination of Lord Shackleton in October, the Argentine Government stated that the survey would not be welcome to them.*”

33 Buenos Aires made its pretensions over the Falklands known in a *Decree* of 1829 against which the British Government formally protested. This warning was ignored however and a garrison of troops from Buenos Aires arrived in the archipelago in October, 1832. It was these that Commander Onslow of the Royal Navy asked to leave on January 2nd 1833 with the words; “*I must inform you that I have received orders from the Commander in Chief of the naval forces of His Britannic Majesty in South America, to make effective the right of His Britannic Majesty's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Being my intention to hoist the flag of Great Britain in the territory tomorrow, I ask you to kindly lower yours and withdraw your forces with all objects belonging to your Government. I am, Sir, your very humble and very obedient servant.*” Argentina's flag was lowered on the 3rd and returned to their Commanding Officer with the message that the British had found a; “*a foreign flag in the territory of His Majesty.*”

On 17th December I had the opportunity, while in Paris, of reviewing developments with the new Argentine Foreign Minister, now Senor Arauz Castex. I gave him a full explanation of the essentially independent nature of the economic survey. Unfortunately, it has not so far been possible to find the means of bridging the gap between my proposals for talks on economic co-operation and Argentine insistence on simultaneous negotiations about the transfer of sovereignty.

As the House is aware, the Argentine Government have stated that the Argentine ambassador, who returned to Argentine in October, will remain in Buenos Aires until further notice and that, in view of the present state of affairs over the Falklands question, it would be advisable for the British Government to withdraw our Ambassador. ... Meanwhile, I shall shortly be recalling Her Majesty's ambassador for consultations."

February 4th, an Argentine destroyer fires at the unarmed *RRS Shackleton* when she is 78 miles south of Port Stanley and attempts to 'arrest' the ship. "At 12.30 GMT on 4th February, an Argentine destroyer, the "Almirante Storni", fired shots across the bows of the Royal Research Ship "Shackleton". The Argentine destroyer threatened to fire into the hull of the "Shackleton" if she did not heave to. Subsequently the destroyer ordered the "Shackleton" to proceed to the port of Ushuaia near Cape Horn. The Governor of the Falkland Islands instructed the captain to continue steaming towards Port Stanley, which he did ..."34

Britain immediately protests. Argentina counters with a *Note* claiming the waters around both the Falklands and the Dependencies for a distance of 200 nautical miles.

February 6th, *La Nacion* reports; "In spite of a request by the Command of Naval Operations the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action."

February 11th, Under-Secretary Rowlands travels to New York with instructions to inform the UN that the British Government are fully prepared to defend the Islands.

February 12th, Rowlands meets the new Argentine Foreign Minister, Sr. Quijano at the UN. Quijano assures him that no repeat of the attack on *RRS Shackleton* will occur.

February 17th, *La Nacion* reports that the British Government has promised that *RRS Shackleton* will not operate in Argentine waters. This is denied in London.

March, the *Cabinet* in London, approves proposals for a fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute, including the possibility of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic, and "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship".

March 4th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan, on the recommendation of Lord Shackleton, suggests that the runway on the Islands is extended. Reg Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development, from whose budget the costs are likely to come, delays any decision by saying that further study is required.

March 23rd, a military *Junta* takes control of Argentina in a *coup*.

April, the *Junta* introduce a compulsory course on geopolitics in Argentine secondary schools designed to cover 'Argentine National Sovereignty'.

In **May**, the *Shackleton* inquiry presents its report which, contrary to the assertions of the FCO, show *inter alia*, that the Islands make a profit for the Exchequer and are self-supporting in that they balance their own budget.

34 *Undersecretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Edward Rowlands to Parliament, February 5th.*

The *Report* also criticises the powers that the *Falkland Islands Company* has to make decisions affecting the lives of the Islanders, without any requirement to consult with them first.³⁵

Speaking in Parliament, Viscount Boyd refers to the rights of the Islanders and quotes a Canadian newspaper article; '*Somewhere in the Third World there must be hidden away the secret rules about who is entitled to self-determination. One suspects that they consist of just one rule and one exception. The rule seems to be that any colonial territory, however minuscule, is not only entitled to independence but obliged to demand it. The exception simply states that European populated territories are different.*'³⁶

June 22nd, Shackleton acknowledges that his *Report* is "not palatable" and comes at an "awkward moment."

Shackleton's *Report* is quietly 'shelved.'

In **August**, Argentina proposes a gradual transfer of sovereignty with a provisional administration lasting no longer than eight years and alternating British/Argentine governors. Britain does not respond.

September, Argentina lands a military expedition on Southern Thule, in the South Sandwich Islands consisting of 20 soldiers under the command of a Major.

November 15th, the UN's *Fourth Committee* review the issue of the Falklands. During the debate the UK Representative states that Britain has been unable to accept earlier *Resolutions* as they fail to give due weight to the principle of self-determination. Argentina responds that it is the principle of '*territorial integrity*' that should be applied and not that of self-determination.

December 1st, the *General Assembly* passes *Resolution 31/49 (XXXI)*³⁷

" *The General Assembly*:

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973,

Bearing in mind the paragraphs related to this question contained in the Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, and in the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976,

Having regard to the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee concerning the Territory,

1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee concerning the Territory;

2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the populations of the islands;

35 Shackleton's report turned the FCO's notion of an expensive liability on its head, revealing that the Islands were actually being de-capitalised by the UK. Shackleton estimated that UK based companies had made a 4 million GBP '*profit*' between 1950 and 1970, even when defence costs, subsidies and grants had been taken into account.

36 "*Falkland Islanders cling to Britain*" in the *Alberta* newspaper.

37 The vote was 94 in favour, while 32 countries abstained including the UK, the USA and most of Europe.

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in General Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII);

4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned Resolutions;

5. Requests both Governments to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible on the results of the negotiations.”

“The United Nations, which cannot take sides in the dispute, is urging the two parties to negotiate on the subject of the sovereignty of the islands, according to the interests of the islanders. Great Britain, however, contrary to the letter and the spirit of Resolution 2065, at the beginning of 1976, insisted upon the right of self-determination of the Malvinians, refused to discuss the problem in-depth and attempted to replace the subject of sovereignty with Argentine-British economic cooperation in the region of the south-western Atlantic.”³⁸

December 29th, a helicopter from *HMS Endurance*, visiting Southern Thule to retrieve scientific equipment left earlier in the year, discovers the Argentine military presence there.

1977 – January 5th, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* in London is summoned to the FCO in order to explain the military base on Thule.

January 14th, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds that the purpose of the Thule operation is to establish a scientific station within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty. They express the hope that nothing will cloud the “*auspicious perspectives*” for negotiations. The landings are not made public in the UK.

February 1st, a *Joint Intelligence Committee* assessment describes the South Thule occupation as a political act that may be considered so successful by Argentina as to encourage further displays. Intelligence suggests that the Argentine Navy is preparing contingency plans for an invasion of the Falkland Islands.³⁹

February 2nd, in a statement to Parliament, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland announces his Government's decision that; “*...the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic.... I must make certain things absolutely clear.*

First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would take place under a sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced.

Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern.

In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.”

38 *Estarategia* No. 43-44 Nov- Dec 1976, Jan-Feb 1977. Article by General Juan E. Gugliamelli

39 The assessment included a suggestion that Admiral Massera would create an incident to provoke a British reaction in order to strengthen his position within the *Junta*.

February 16th, Under-Secretary Edward Rowlands arrives in the Islands to hold talks with the Islanders' representatives who agree to co-operate in working out terms of reference for formal negotiations; *"We understand that the Minister will have to have discussions on the sovereignty question while in Argentina. We realise that these discussions will take place under the sovereignty umbrella and so the stand of all parties concerned will remain unaffected by the fact of these consultations."*

February 18th, the Queen's arbitration panel, considering the *Beagle Channel Case*, gives its decision, in favour of Chile. On the issue of inheritance (*uti possidetis juris*), the panel says; *" the Parties were agreed in principle that their rights in the matter of claims or title to territory were governed prima facie (and if no recognized basis of derogation existed) by the doctrine of the uti possidetis juris of 1810.*

*This doctrine—possibly, at least at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law—is peculiar to the field of the Spanish-American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the Spanish Crown, —and even if both the scope and applicability of the doctrine were somewhat uncertain, particularly in such far-distant regions of the continent as are those in issue in the present case, it undoubtedly constituted an important element in the inter-relationships of the continent."*⁴⁰

In violation of the original agreement signed in 1971, Argentina refuses to accept the decision, saying that it is under no obligation to comply with any decision that damages its "vital" national interests. Argentina's Government declares the decision 'null and void'.

Reviewing the situation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office conclude that Argentina's failure in its dispute with Chile has increased pressure on the *Junta* to gain some success over the Falkland Islands. Edward Rowlands travels from the Falklands to Buenos Aires, in order to gauge the Argentine attitude.

April 20th, in the House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, says of the Falkland Islands; *" There is absolutely no doubt in this country in legal or Government circles about where sovereignty lies. It is here, in the United Kingdom."*

April 26th, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Dr Owen, tells Parliament; *" The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general. In these negotiations the issues affecting the future of the Islands will be discussed and negotiations will be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation which will contribute substantially to the development of the Islands, and the region as a whole. A major objective of the negotiations will be to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, whose people the Government of the United Kingdom will consult during the course of the negotiations. The agreement to hold these negotiations, and the negotiations themselves, are without prejudice to the position of either Government with regard to sovereignty over the Islands. .."*

40 This claim of 'inheritance' from Spain also underpins Argentina's arguments for sovereignty over the Falklands. The decision here is notable in that it clearly recognised *uti possidetis juris* as a political arrangement which suited the emerging South American States by identifying existing borders with their neighbours. The original agreement was made at the Conference of Lima in 1848, but was 'backdated' to each country's date of independence. In Argentina's case this is 1816, but then also 'backdated' to 1810 which they deem the first act that eventually resulted in the Republic. It is important to note that the base line of *uti possidetis juris* was accepted by both parties before arbitration began. Britain does not recognise *uti possidetis juris*.

July 13th, delegations from Argentina and the UK meet in Rome.

In **September**, Argentine Navy vessels fire on Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats working in Falklands waters.

September 23rd, in *The Sunday Times*; “*The Falkland Islands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those States, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self determination.*”

Port Stanley airfield's fuel supply is cut off by Argentina.

October 28th, the *Joint Intelligence Committee* reports its concern regarding Argentina's increasingly hostile attitude and, in particular, the belligerence of the Argentine Navy.

November 21st, British Ministers decide to establish a military presence in the area of the Falklands before negotiations with Argentina resume in December. A nuclear submarine, *HMS Dreadnought* and the frigates *Alacrity* and *Phoebe* are ordered to the South Atlantic. The frigates stand-off about a thousand miles distant, while the submarine heads to the immediate vicinity of the Falklands.⁴¹

December 13th, talks resume in New York. Agreement is reached to set up working parties to inquire into both sovereignty and economic co-operation.

December 18th, Edward Rowlands meets *Island Councilors* in Rio de Janeiro to update them on the progress of the negotiations.

The small British task force retires.

1978 – the *Falkland Islands Association* opens a London office. Seismic surveys take place around the Falklands continental shelf.

February 14th, talks continue in Lima, but little progress is achieved. Argentina refuses to acknowledge that the Islands have any continental shelf.

The Argentine base on South Thule is noticed by passengers on the *Bransfield*.

May, news of the Argentine base on South Thule appears in the British press for the first time.

A storm destroys parts of the Argentine built runway at Stanley.

July 5th, Edward Rowlands makes a statement in the House of Commons regarding the situation on South Thule; “*We are not dealing with an illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands themselves. But our estimation, Thule is... about 1,200 miles south-east of the Falklands. It is an inlet in the Southern Thule group of islands, which are in turn the southernmost of the South Sandwich Islands, themselves one of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, as opposed to the Falkland Islands themselves. ...*

Nor are we dealing at this time with a military occupation. It is important to say that. Although the Argentines use service personnel for logistic support in their Antarctic work, their activities on Thule are purely scientific. I do not think that anybody has challenged that assumption. We have a dialogue with the Argentines about scientific work in this area, and they have both explained to us and given details publicly of the scientific work that has been carried on. ...

41 *Operation Journeyman*. It now seems certain that Argentina remained unaware of the presence of these vessels.

We object to the fact that they are being carried out on British territory without our permission. That is the bone of contention ... What the Argentines are doing there does indeed constitute a violation of our sovereignty, and, as hon. Members are already aware, we have firmly protested to them about this. Our sovereignty position has thus been protected fully and explicitly. ... When we learnt of it, we pursued the matter immediately. We are going back 18 months, but at that time we had reason to believe that the dispute would be resolved speedily and satisfactorily.

I had a difficult decision to make on how to handle the issue. I thought that it would be wrong for us to have a slanging match with the Argentine Government. The original presence of the Argentines on the island had become known earlier and it had been mentioned in the Falkland Islands. ... it was my view that we should not enter into a public slanging match on an issue which, I firmly believe, can and should be resolved by diplomatic and political action.”

Constantino Davidoff, a Buenos Aires scrap metal merchant, seeks permission from *Christian Salvesen Co.* to remove the old equipment from the whaling stations at Leith, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. The Governor advises against it, but the FCO does not object.

August 21st, Argentina complains to the UN that the divergent views of the UK and itself has led to an impasse and that if the UK held to its decision to extend maritime jurisdiction to 200 miles, then that would be a violation call by the *General Assembly* for the two parties to refrain from “*unilateral modifications*” of the situation as required *paragraph 4 of Resolution 31/49 (1976)*.

December 18th, a further round of talks take place in Geneva which achieves an agreement over scientific activities in the Dependencies. This is rejected by the Islanders who see it as an erosion of sovereignty.

1979 – January 8th, Argentina and Chile agree to Papal mediation over the Beagle Channel dispute.

March, talks recommence in New York between Britain and Argentina. No progress is made on any of the issues before the negotiating teams. Argentina issues a stamp set celebrating the 150th anniversary of the '*Civil and Military Command of the Malvinas*', a reference to Argentina's first attempt to claim the archipelago in a *Decree* issued by the Province of Buenos Aries in June 1829; and which had resulted in a British diplomatic protest.

May 1st, a refurbished airport opens at Cape Pembroke with 4,000 ft of paved runway.

May 3rd, there is a change of Government in Britain and the Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, becomes Prime Minister. A briefing paper for the new FCO Minister responsible for the Falkland Islands, Nicholas Ridley, states; “*The Argentines insist on sovereignty but are prepared to provide safeguards for the Islanders' way of life. HMG have insisted that sovereign rights over the islanders must continue to rest with HMG as long as the Islanders so wish, but that, if this is absolutely safe-guarded, new sovereignty arrangements could be contemplated.*”

June 12th, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Comodoro Cavandoli indicates that his Government will require sovereignty to be a central part of any negotiations with the new British Government.

June 26th, Dr. Carlos Helbling, in a speech in Cordoba, calls for; “*The reconquest of the Malvinas; effective control of the Antarctic and the reoccupation of the geopolitical area belonging to the nation.*”

July, Minister Nicholas Ridley, visits the islands. He proposes a '*leaseback*' system, but the Islanders are not enthusiastic. Ridley then travels to Buenos Aries for preliminary talks. An agreement is reached on the

reinstatement of Ambassadors, but little else. The British Minister is informed that Argentina will find it unacceptable for the Islanders to become *'third parties'* to any negotiations and that Buenos Aires is insisting that negotiations move, *"at a more dynamic pace"*.

September 19th, Davidoff, signs a contract with *Christian Salvesen Co.*, giving him an option to purchase the equipment still on South Georgia. The option is to be exercised during 1980 with a condition that any equipment remaining after March 1983 reverts to *Salvesen*.

September 20th, Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, attempts to gain an agreement on policy with the Prime Minister and other members of the *Defence Committee*. He puts forward three options:

- *'Fortress Falklands'*;
- protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; and
- substantive negotiations on sovereignty.

Carrington recommends the last option and again suggests that, in his opinion, the best solution is some kind of *leaseback* arrangement with a preferred term of 99 years. He highlights that it will be necessary to ensure that the option has the support of the Islanders, and of Parliament, and asks for an answer before his meeting with the Argentine Minister, scheduled for the following week.

September 21st, asked to comment, the Lord Chancellor says; *"It would be a sorry business to give over British subjects of UK origin to the whims and changes of a South American dictatorship."*

September 22nd, David Howell, the British Energy Secretary writes to Prime Minister Thatcher; *"I have seen Peter Carrington's paper PM/79/81 to you on the subject of the Falkland Islands ... I am, however, rather uneasy about the proposed arrangements for the maritime zone outside territorial waters. It is true that the presence of oil (or gas) has yet to be proven, but the continued interest of the oil companies and the results of recent geophysical surveys .. lead us to think that there is at least a good chance that hydrocarbons are there. We ought to be very careful about adopting a course which could lead to British oil companies losing a favourable position ... before we agree to the course he has proposed, we should have a full discussion on its implications."*

September 25th, Lord Carrington informs Nicholas Ridley that the Prime Minister declines to be rushed into making any decision on his proposals and that Ridley should inform the Argentines that the Government were still considering this; *"complex problem."*

October 12th, the Foreign Secretary again asks for a decision on his proposals, but once again the Prime Minister postpones an answer.⁴²

In **November**, Mr Ridley turns down an invitation from Argentina for a further, informal, exchange of views.

1980 – January 29th, the *Defence Committee* agrees that a new round of talks should be arranged, and asks Lord Carrington to seek written confirmation from the Falkland Islands *Council* that it is its wish that talks with the Argentine Government resume. The *Islands Council* agrees.

February 7th, the *Penguin News* publishes an editorial; *"We can trust the British Government as little as we trust the Argentina Government and feeble cries of 'Keep the Falklands British' and other clichés will win us no*

42 The British Government was in the midst of negotiations over Rhodesia, which were deemed more urgent.

support. Instead we should look to ourselves and proclaim the Falklands belong to us, and not to Britain, Argentina or any other foreign country. We could set ourselves the greatest goal that a people could have – independence.”

February 13th, the Islands Council agrees to send a representative to the talks to be held in New York; “.. In view of the “exploratory and without commitment” nature of the talks they felt that in spite of one or two Councillors having some reservations, they should accept your invitation to send participants as members of your delegation on this occasion.”

On **April 28th**, talks are resumed with the British delegation being led by Mr Ridley, the Argentine team by Minister Cavándoli.

April 29th, on the second day of talks, the leader of the Argentine delegation, Comodoro Cavandoli, states that agreement on all matters was; .. *subordinate to a general agreement on the future of the islands and agreement by the islanders. Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions.*

A sticking point is reached during the discussion on a joint *communiqué*, with the British wishing to refer to the two days of meetings as ‘discussions’; and the Argentines wanting to call them, ‘negotiations’.

April 30th, the final *communiqué* states that; *‘the discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature, and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit.’* It concludes by saying that the two governments, *‘intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.’*

In **June**, Lord Carrington proposes to the *Defence Committee*, that an agreement could involve a transfer of title over the Falklands and the Dependencies, including the continental shelves and the maritime areas provided that these were immediately *‘leased back’* to the UK for an indefinite period. In addition agreements could then be reached regarding co-operation on fishing and the exploration for oil. The *Committee* are hesitant but agree that he can discover whether such an agreement is possible.

July 10th, a telegram is sent to Minister Cavándoli via the British Ambassador suggesting that some *lease-back* arrangement be explored.

August 7th, Rex Masterman Hunt takes over as Governor.

August 27th, *Christian Salvesen Co.* notify the Falkland Islands of its contract with Davidoff.

September 10th, Ridley and Cavándoli hold secret talks near Geneva; “*Mr Ridley opened the proceedings by saying that he had the authority of his Ministerial colleagues to put forward the ideas which he was about to explain but that anything agreed at this meeting would have to be ad referendum and would be subject to endorsement by the British Cabinet and, no less important, would have to be acceptable to the Islanders.*”

Cavándoli responds that; “*The only difficulty he saw was in the length of the lease ... a period of, say, 20 years would have to be ruled out as being much too short for the Islanders. We ought to think of some median figure (Comandante Bloomer-Reeve suggests 75 years).*”

Cavándoli goes on to suggest that the British Government remove the *Royal Marine* detachment as part of any agreement to underline to the Islanders that Argentina was no longer viewed as a threat, and to please Argentine public opinion. He also suggests that the terms of any lease should include an Argentine right to buy or rent land on the Falklands. It was agreed that both parties should report back to their respective Foreign Ministers.

On his return to London, Ridley reports to Carrington; *“So we are left with a clear option to decide what to do on the merits of the problem. We can either seek a solution by negotiation along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we could get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off the talks (with all the obvious consequences). I do not think that there is much to gain by attempting to find a different package: both sides are close to their rock bottom positions. ... I believe it can be sold to the Islanders, but I am not certain.”*

In early **November**, Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires reports that the *Junta* have endorsed the concept of *lease-back* but will wish to negotiate over the length of the lease.

November 21st, Foreign Minister Ridley, en-route to the Falklands, stops over in Buenos Aires. Argentina's Government were not warned of the visit to the Islands and they appear irritated.⁴³

November 22nd, Mr Ridley arrives at Stanley to put forward several possible futures, including a *freeze* on Argentina's claim for a set period followed by a transfer of sovereignty, some kind of *joint administration* and *lease-back*.

November 24th, a public meeting is convened in the Town Hall in Stanley. Ridley puts forward his three proposals but these are met with annoyance and anger and he is shouted down. Clearly not expecting this response, Ridley is reported to lose his temper and respond that the Islanders' would be to blame for the consequences.

The discussions in Stanley are reported in Buenos Aires by journalists from Argentina who are present. *La Prensa* comments; *“.. 15 years of useless negotiation: London's proposals are unacceptable from every point of view.”*

November 27th, the issue is raised in Parliament with both MP's and Lords calling for a statement. Ridley's staff send a telegram back to London; *“It will take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects for leaseback.”*

November 28th, in *The Times* newspaper; *“... the question of the future of the Falkland Islands has now come to the fore once again. On his current visit to the islands Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, has put forward a number of options; and because one of them involves the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina - though the islands would simultaneously be leased back to Britain - it is bound to cause a stir. This is all to the good.*

The Falklands are one of those difficult issues that have hung fire for many years and, while there can be no easy solution, it is healthy that their future should be openly discussed. The various possibilities, however unpalatable they may be to many people, have at least to be examined.

The starting point must be the principle, restated by Lord Carrington this week, that nothing will be done against the wishes of the islanders themselves. They are a small and isolated community, of almost entirely British origin, and there can be no question of simply handing them over to Argentina against their will. This would be true whatever the type of government that held office in Argentina, and is particularly true in view of the bloodstained record of the present military regime, itself the product of extraordinary political instability over many years.

43 *Falkland Islanders at War* Graham Bound 2002

On the other hand the status quo, in which the islands are in a kind of limbo, unable to take full advantage of their economic potential and constantly facing the threat of some kind of pressure from their large neighbour, is also unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory for the islanders themselves, with their declining economy; and it is unsatisfactory for Britain, which not only finds their support a financial drain but is prevented by the continuing dispute from developing its relations with Argentina as fully as it might. There can be no question of abandoning a small community in the South Atlantic. But it is legitimate to look for ways of settling the dispute which would be acceptable to all and allow them to develop the resources of the region.

One of the factors in the situation is the sheer predominance of Argentina in Falklands affairs. Apart from a ship which sails from Tilbury for the Falklands four times a year the only regular communications with the outside world are through a limited air service run by the Argentine Air Force. In recent years the Argentines' have abstained from threatening gestures and have, sensibly, presented a pleasanter face to the islanders. This is the only way for them to win their good will.

The advantage of the lease-back option outlined by Mr Ridley - similar to that of Hong Kong's new territories - was that it nominally meets the Argentine requirement on sovereignty, while leaving the islanders to maintain their own pattern of life. It would provide the basis for agreements on oil exploration and fisheries, which would help the Falkland economy, as would the development of tourism. In the last analysis, however, the islanders themselves would have to be convinced that they wanted it and that there were proper safeguards. This should be achieved through the merits of the idea, not through coercion. "

November 29th, Ridley's final meeting with the Islands Council fails to result in a decision. Interviewed by a reporter from the Islands' newspaper, *Penguin News*, Ridley is asked whether Argentina was prepared to make life difficult for the Islanders. He replies; *"I am a man of peace. I would feel that I had failed if that happened. I can't foresee what Argentina would do, your guess is as good as mine, because you live near them and know them perhaps better even than I do. I merely say that in the long term one has to come to terms with one's neighbours and one has to live in peace with them. What one cannot do is live in a perpetual state of siege and antagonism, suspicion and bellicosity."*

As Minister Ridley departs on the LADE flight back to Argentina, he is jeered by an angry crowd of Islanders.

December 2nd, Nicholas Ridley makes a statement to the House of Commons; *"We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Islands. The Argentines, however, continue to press their claim, The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation ... Following my exploratory talks with Argentina in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all the parties. In this the essential is that we should be guided by the wishes of the Islanders themselves. I therefore visited the Islands ... in order to consult Island Councillors .. and .. all Islanders , on how we should proceed. ... The essential elements of any solution would be that it should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the Islanders while releasing the potential of the Island's economy and of their maritime resources... I have asked them to let me know their views in due course."*

During the debate, Parliament overwhelmingly rejects the leaseback proposal. The attitude of the FCO towards the Islanders is heavily criticised.

Minister Cavándoli is sent a message stressing the need for patience; *"Islander distrust of Argentines acute. Even if agree to lease-back being explored, eventual acceptance will depend on very long lease, no Argentine presence, international guarantees and probably financial assistance to develop economy."*

The Argentine press come out against the idea of lease-back.

December 3rd, Lord Carrington and Home Secretary William Whitelaw are asked to consider the effects of the proposed *Nationality Act* on the Falkland Islanders. Whitelaw is opposed to any special treatment for them.

December 11th, Ambassador Ortiz in London, speaks to Ridley, urging more talks.

At the United Nations, the *General Assembly* adopt *Resolution 35/118 - 'Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.'*

*Annex – 9. 'Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to discourage or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the right to self determination and independence by the people of those Territories.'*⁴⁴

December 18th, Britain protests to Argentina about proposals for oil exploration in Falklands waters.

1981 – January 7th, the Falkland Islands' *Joint Councils* pass a motion stating; “*While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward by Mr. Ridley for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which this House should be represented and at which the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.*”

January 27th, Argentina objects to a group from St. Helena emigrating to the Falklands.

February 23rd, representatives of the two Governments meet in New York. The British delegation includes two Islanders, Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace. Britain proposes a '*sovereignty freeze*', but this is rejected.

“Comodoro Cavandoli ... could not understand or accept that Argentina's one requirement, sovereignty, should be ignored permanently. The British side had said that Islander wishes had to be taken into account; why could not Argentine wishes be taken into account? ... Mr. Ridley wanted to make it quite clear that the British Government had no doubt at all of the legality and strength of their title to the Islands. ... It would indeed be possible to go on resting on that position for all time.”

February 24th, talks continue for a second day concentra communiqués on the wording of a press release.

February 26th, a final communiqué is released, but a dramatically shorter version than that agreed following a last minute intervention by the Argentine Embassy.⁴⁵

March 13th, Lord Carrington tells the Prime Minister that there is little point in further talks while the Islanders remained hostile to the *leaseback* proposal; “*... We can reach no conclusions now; ... If in the end the Islanders decide that they would prefer the status quo to any deal involving cession of sovereignty, then we must prepare for the possibility of a deterioration of our relations with Argentina...*”

March 17th, the Papal arbitration panel, considering the Beagle Channel dispute, concludes with a decision favouring Chile. Argentina once again rejects the result.

44 Argentina was already pushing for greater freedom of movement to and from the Islands including the right for its people to own property, and to live there however, they do not appear to have considered that this restrictive *Resolution* applied equally to Argentines wanting to live in the Falklands.

45 The official final communiqué said almost nothing of what had taken place during the talks, nor anything of any agreement, merely stating that the question would be examined during “*further negotiations.*”

In **April**, Argentina announces a sale of oil exploration licences for an area called, '*Magalenes Este*', which extends to within 96 miles of the Falkland Islands and crosses the median line between Argentina and the archipelago.

During early **May**, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires strongly urges a further round of talks, including a discussion about sovereignty, in order to keep diplomatic channels with Argentina open. London declines on the ground that substantive negotiations without the Islanders' consent runs contrary to the Government's public commitment to the principle that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount.

May 18th, the FCO take out an advertisement in the *International Herald Tribune* threatening legal action against any oil company which attempts to operate in '*disputed waters*'.⁴⁶

May 29th, General Galtieri, Commander-in-Chief of Argentina's Army, makes a speech to mark '*Army Day*', which includes a reference to the dispute; "... *Neither are we prepared to allow those who are discussing with us the return of island territories that are Argentine by historical inheritance and legal right to interfere in the slightest way with the search for and exploitation of the wealth of our continental shelf... Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient in our handling of international problems, which in no way stem from any appetite for territory on our part. However, after a century and a half they are becoming more and more unbearable.*"

June 18th, First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Henry Leach, has a meeting with PM Thatcher about defence cuts; "*The point he wished to emphasise was the most serious miscalculation which we would be making [if] we disregarded the deterrent effect of a major maritime capability in peacetime.*"

June 30th, a review of policy takes place at the FCO in a meeting chaired by Minister Ridley. Falklands' Governor Rex Hunt is present, as is the British Ambassador to Argentina. Governor Hunt makes it clear that the Islanders wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Argentina, and that they do not believe that a *leaseback* settlement can provide the guarantees they want.

The meeting concludes that the British Government should play for time; that the new *Legislative Council*, when elected, should be persuaded to allow negotiations to continue; that the Islanders should be educated as to the various pros and cons; and that contingency plans should be updated. Ridley urges a *Defence Committee* meeting on the issue.

On the same day in the House of Lords, Lord Trefgarne announces, on behalf of the Government; "*I can confirm that HMS "Endurance" will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic Region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty's ships will be deployed in the area.*"

Islanders respond in an open letter; "*The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision.*"

46 Possibly the first time the press had been used to advertise a '*diplomatic démarche*'.

July 9th, the *Joint Intelligence Committee* updates its threat assessment taking the view that Argentina is more likely to pursue diplomatic and economic measures than than the use of force, although they may try to establish a foothold on one of the Dependencies; or even on one of the remote Falklands Islands.

The British Embassy in Buenos Aires reports to the FCO that several Argentine newspapers are carrying articles about the withdrawal of *HMS Endurance* from the South Atlantic, claiming that Britain is; “*abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands.*”

July 20th, Ridley warns Lord Carrington that if Argentina concludes, possibly by early 1982, that the Government are unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously, retaliatory action must be expected.

July 27th, Dr. Camilion in Buenos Aires, writes to the British Ambassador expressing his Government's concern at the lack of progress at the last round of talks. Referring to the fact that ten years had passed since the agreements on communication, he states that, in his Government's view, it is not possible; “*to postpone further a profound and serious discussion of the complex essential constituents of the negotiations – sovereignty and economic co-operation – in a simultaneous and global fashion with the express intention of achieving concrete results shortly. A resolute impetus must therefore be given to the negotiations. The next round of negotiations cannot be another mere exploratory exercise, but must mark the beginning of a decisive stage towards the definitive termination of the dispute.*”

That same day, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares negotiations to have become; “*... an unpostponable priority for its foreign policy ... it is not possible to defer this question which affects territorial integrity and national dignity.*”

In **August**, Constantino Davidoff applies to the Argentine navy for permission to use one of their Antarctic transport ships to get to South Georgia.

“*Ministry officials, acting on the perceptions of the moment regarding the need to reaffirm an Argentinian presence on all South Atlantic islands, enthusiastically recommended Davidoff to the Transportation Bureau of the Navy (auxiliary ships). The legal presence of Davidoff's men would prevail long after the British Antarctic Survey left the place, ... In international forums this action would reassert Argentina's interests in the sub-Antarctic.*”⁴⁷

September, Davidoff is granted permission and a Naval ice-breaker, the *Almirante Irizar*, from the *Antarctic Squadron* is allocated for the purpose.

The Argentine Navy commence planning '*Project Alpha*', in which Argentine marines are to be secreted amongst Davidoff's workers in order to establish a presence on South Georgia.⁴⁸

September 14th, the *Defence Review* announces that *HMS Endurance* will be withdrawn from the South Atlantic before the end of March, 1982.

An intelligence report quotes an Argentine diplomatic view that; “*.. the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had been construed .. as a deliberate political gesture.*”

September 15th, Lord Carrington writes to PM Thatcher; “*... the Argentines are showing renewed impatience for an accelerated rate of progress. They have sent a Note and circulated a communiqué at the United nations deploring the hitherto slow speed of negotiations and the lack of results and making clear that, if progress is*

47 *The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention* Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1987 p.121

48 *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* David A. Welch 2005 p.78

not made soon, they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose. ... I remain convinced that leaseback, ... provides the most likely, and perhaps, the only, basis for an agreed solution ... In short, the present outlook is not good."

September 22nd, Dr Camilion addresses the *General Assembly*. He refers to the, "*present illegal occupation*" of the Islands and expresses his Government's hope that they would be; "*... able to report in due course to the General Assembly that this series of negotiations concerning the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which we hope will begin soon, was the last one.*"

September 23rd, Lord Carrington meets Dr Camilion at the UN to inform him that the British Government cannot coerce the Islanders. The Foreign Secretary suggests that it would be preferable for Argentina to put forward proposals when talks resumed after the Island elections.

Dr. Camilion emphasises that the key question remains that of sovereignty, which has to be negotiated between the United Kingdom and Argentina and that the Islanders cannot be allowed a veto.

Also on the **23rd**, in a note to Ambassador Fearn; the Head of the South America Department of the FCO explains that Ministers have come to a decision that; "*... the domestic political constraints must at this stage continue to prevent us from taking any steps which might be interpreted either as putting pressure on the Islanders or as overruling their wishes. Specifically that meant that an education campaign in the Islands and the United Kingdom has, at least for the present, been ruled out*".

September 24th, Camilion is quoted in the Argentine press as saying that the two sides agreed on the need for change, adding that; "*Lord Carrington advanced to the point of saying that the present status quo is difficult to sustain today.*" This is presented as a "*significant advancement.*" Camilion is also reported as dismissing the Island elections as being of no importance to Argentina.

Lord Carrington responds that Dr. Camilion can; "*.. have been left in no doubt about our commitments to respect the wishes of the Islanders.*"

October 2nd, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires writes to London highlighting his opinion that there is now a clear risk that Argentina will conclude that talking is a waste of time. He believes that it would be better to speak frankly, and face the consequences.

October 14th, a new Falkland Islands *Legislative Council* is elected. The *Council* agree that negotiations should continue, but that sovereignty cannot be discussed.

Talks scheduled to be held in Geneva in December are postponed, at the request of Argentina.

October 30th, *British Nationality Act* receives Royal Assent.⁴⁹

The *British Antarctic Survey* (BAS) proposes the closure of their base at Grytviken, due to cuts in their budget.

November 10th, Lord Murton argues in the Lords against the proposed withdrawal of *HMS Endurance*; "*The interest of the world at large in the Antarctic is indicated by the fact that a further nine nations have signed the original 1961 treaty during recent years, making 21 in all. Meanwhile, Argentina continues to press her claims to the Falkland Islands. The recent argument put forward is that they form part of the Argentinian continental*

49 The Act was not due to come into force until 1983, but had the effect of removing British nationality from any Falkland Islander who did not have a parent or grandparent born in Britain. This legislation was not aimed specifically at the Falklands, but was part of a larger review dealing with immigration and the right of abode in the UK.

shelf. That proposition would appear difficult to accept, bearing in mind that the Falklands lie some 350 miles from the Patagonian coast. The argument, no doubt, is coloured by the thought of oil. For good measure, Argentina has now extended her claim of sovereignty to include two parts of the Falkland dependencies; namely, South Georgia, which is 800 miles south-east of the Falkland Islands, and, to the south, Sandwich Islands, which are still further to the south-east and even more remote from Argentina herself.

... Against the general background of uncertainty in the region it seems improvident of the Ministry of Defence—one presumes with the tacit acceptance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—to withdraw the Royal Naval Ice Patrol Ship HMS Endurance from Antarctica in 1982 as part of the wider decision to reduce the size of the active fleet. ... Could this decision not be interpreted by all other involved nations as a sign of declining interest in the Antarctic by Great Britain? Obviously there can be no such intention. But the best and most obvious way to prove it, in my view, is to reverse the decision to scrap HMS Endurance.

December 2nd, Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister; “... talks are due to be held on 17 and 18 December in Geneva; Richard Luce will head our delegation, which will include two Island Councillors. Islander opinion is even more strongly opposed to any 'deal' with the Argentines over sovereignty. We have reiterated that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount. We therefore have little room for manoeuvre, ... The Argentines have requested this meeting, so we can allow them to make the running.”

December 8th, a new *Junta* takes over in Buenos Aires, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, who is both Army commander and President designate. Other members are Admiral Jorge Anaya and Air Force General, Lami Dozo. Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez is appointed Foreign Minister.

December 15th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry requests a postponement of the talks due to start on the 17th. Britain agrees.

December 16th, Constantino Davidoff leaves Argentina for South Georgia aboard the *Almirante Irizar*, to assess the work needed at the old whaling station. Notably, his letter informing the British Embassy of the proposed visit is delivered after his departure.⁵⁰

December 18th, the *Junta* meet to discuss the Falkland Islands.

December 20th, the *Almirante Irizar* arrives off South Georgia, but does not apply for entry clearance from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) station at Grytviken.

December 21st, Davidoff lands and inspects the whaling station at Leith.

December 22nd, in his inauguration speech, President Galtieri makes no reference to the Falkland Islands.

December 23rd, after the Argentine vessel leaves, a member of the BAS checks the whaling station and finds the phrase '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*' scrawled on the walls.

December 31st, London is informed of the unauthorised arrival of the *Almirante Irizar*.



50 In a letter to the British Ambassador dated March 25th, 1982, Davidoff would claim that this letter was delivered to the Embassy on December 11th.

1982



January 6th – acting on instructions from London, Britain's Ambassador in Buenos Aires raises Davidoff's violation of British sovereignty with the Foreign Ministry, and demands the scrap dealer comply with Falkland Islands' Dependency laws. Argentina's Minister requests time to investigate the matter.

Lord Carrington proposes a further round of negotiations to take place in New York on 22/23 February.

January 19th – the Junta approve 'National Strategy Directive 1/82'; *“The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources; has resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain the political objective. This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military departments..”*

January 24th – an article in *La Prensa* predicts that the Argentine Administration will present strict conditions for the continuance of negotiations with Britain. Author Iglesias Rouco, also refers to probable US support and to the belief; *“.. in the US and Europe that .. Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year, .. although the government may not have foreseen this alternative, a military attempt to resolve the dispute cannot be ruled out when sovereignty is at stake. Moreover, it is calculated that such an operation will be relatively simple in view of the scant military resources of the area.”*

The article also suggest a development of Argentine policy towards its Beagle Channel dispute with Chile - part of; *“an ambitious diplomatic and strategic plan which would assure the country of a relevant role in the South Atlantic”*.

January 27th – Argentina responds to Carrington's proposal in a *bout de papier* delivered to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires; *“The Argentine position on the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands is well known by the British Government ... in the first place, British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the above-mentioned archipelagos is the basic element of the Argentine position. It remains a sine-qua-non requirement for the solution of the dispute. So long as this question is unresolved the dispute will continue.”*

Buenos Aires agrees to a fresh round of negotiations but calls for them to be “serious” and “in-depth” and culminating; *“within a reasonable period of time and without procrastination”*.

The message also points out that UN *Resolutions* do not refer to the “wishes” of the Islanders, but rather their “interests”, which Argentina does not consider to be the same thing. Argentina proposes the establishment of a permanent negotiating commission, to meet in the first week of each month, and subject to denunciation by either side without notice.

In early **February**, two Buenos Aires newspapers, *La Prensa* and the *Buenos Aires Herald*, publish articles discussing the advantages and disadvantages of military action.

February 3rd – Davidoff's unauthorised intrusion is made the subject of a formal protest to Argentina.

February 5th – *Conviccion* magazine, considered the voice of the Argentine Navy, reports; “*..for 149 years the usurpers have enjoyed nothing but advantages.*”

February 8th – an editorial in the *Buenos Aires Herald* says that the dispute has gone on; “*..far too long and that unless solved in the only reasonable way – by transferring the islands to Argentina, it will be resolved in a messy and damaging way that will harm the interests of everyone involved ... and it is time that the British, deservedly famous for the intelligent realism of their foreign policy, recognised this and took the only sensible course open to them.*”

On the same day, the British Government responds to the *bout de papier* of the 27th; “*Her Majesty's Government wish to reaffirm that they are in no doubt about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Falkland Islands Dependencies, their maritime zones and continental shelves. They can not therefore accept the Argentine assumption that the purpose of the negotiations is the eventual recognition by HMG of Argentine sovereignty in the area...*”

February 9th – in *The Buenos Aires Herald*; “*New Argentine Governments, no matter what their provenance or their ideology, have at least two things in common: they all aspire to reduce the inflation rate and they all strive to establish, once and for all, unquestioned Argentine sovereignty over the islands known in English as the Falklands ...This Government is no exception but ... its Falklands approach will be far tougher than anything we have seen so far. Besides the attendant historical rights and the infinite patience so far shown by Argentina, the truth of the matter is that the Malvinas situation is seriously interfering with our security in the South Atlantic, is limiting our economic and geopolitical plans, including ones relating to Antarctica, and bears moreover in a most negative fashion on our dispute with Chile over the Beagle. Looking at the subject from an international, or western, viewpoint, the British presence there deprives Argentina of its proper participation in the defence of the region against constant Soviet penetration ... this makes any strategic planning for the area virtually impossible or of doubtful value. So if it is borne in mind that it is not only this country which finds itself daily more prejudiced by Britain's inexplicable obstinacy, it seems easy to predict that an initiative involving force could count not only on the understanding of the international community, particularly of the third world, but also on the support, or at least the interested tolerance, of NATO ...*”

February 12th – in *Latin American Weekly Report*; “*Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands . . . If not met, other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered.*”

February 15th – Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister; “*... there is one new element. The Argentine Government have given us, as a prior notification of their position and objectives at New York, a substantial and toughly worded document which asserts that the sole purpose of the negotiations is to cede sovereignty to Argentina, denies the relevance of the Islanders' wishes (as opposed to interests) and, without explicit threats, refers to the Islanders' dependence on services provided by the Argentines. ... We are therefore prepared for a difficult session in New York ...*”

Margaret Thatcher's Private Secretary responds: *"She has commented .. that we must also make it clear to the Argentinians that the wishes of the Islanders are paramount."*

February 18th – Argentina rejects Britain's protest of the 3rd; *".. the Argentine Government reiterates to the British Government that its sovereign rights over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands continue in full force, and it therefore rejects the protest contained in the communication."*

An article in *La Prensa* by Iglesias Rouco says; *".. The least that can be asked of military governments is that they do not dither in the face of any military eventuality when questions of sovereignty are involved. After decades of fruitless negotiations, Argentina has good cause to know that Great Britain will not give up the Malvinas either voluntarily or via any agreement that would mean losing its administrative power in the islands. .. So the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think in terms of force...."*

February 23rd – Sr. Davidoff turns up at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, and apologises. He informs the Embassy that he wishes to return to South Georgia on March 10th, with 30 workers, and expected to stay some 6 months. He is reminded that he must comply with the appropriate formalities upon his arrival at South Georgia.

February 26th / 27th – sovereignty negotiations resume in New York. Two Islanders are present, Tim Blake and John Cheek. The British side propose a permanent negotiating commission to report within one year, while the Argentine delegation press for an answer within a month.

"Mr. Luce explained that he wished to make the British position clear from the outset. We had no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. The wishes of the Islanders themselves were paramount ... Sr. Ros recalled that Argentina had been trying to reach a solution to this dispute for over 16 years ... He stressed that the principal question for Argentines' was sovereignty. The key to their position was the need for Britain to recognise Argentine sovereignty in the area. ... Argentina had no intention of disturbing the Islanders' style of life; what they wanted was a balance between Islanders' interests and Argentine sovereignty rights. ... Sr. Ros commented on the inclusion of wording recording the Islanders' right to participate in the Commission. While the Argentines had no objection to the Islanders' presence, it must be clear from the outset that they were members of the British delegation: there must be no question of giving the Islanders the right to participate as a third party. ... Sr. Ros then questioned the inclusion in the draft of a sentence to the effect that no approaches which might lead to a solution of the dispute should be ruled out. For the Argentines it would not be possible to accept any agreement that excluded the Argentine claim to sovereignty. ... Mr. Fearn did not see how a Negotiating Commission could operate if its outcome were prejudiced."

March 1st – following the end of talks, the joint press release merely says; *" The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense."*

On the same day, and with little apparent reference to the events in New York, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues its own statement; *" At the meeting held in New York on 26 and 27 February, the representatives of Argentina and Great Britain considered an Argentine proposal to establish a system of monthly meetings with a pre-established agenda, pre-arranged meeting place, and led by top-level officials. The aim of such meetings will be genuinely to speed up to the maximum the negotiations in train to achieve recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and by this means to*

achieve substantial results within a time which at this advanced stage of the discussions will necessarily have to be short. Argentina has negotiated with Great Britain over the solution of the sovereignty dispute over the Islands with patience, loyalty and good faith for over 15 years, within the framework indicated by the relevant United Nations Resolutions. The new system constitutes an effective step for the early solution of the dispute. However, should this not occur, Argentina reserves to terminate the working of this mechanism and to choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests."

The British delegation responds that this; *"creates a more difficult and unhelpful climate for continuing the negotiating process.*

March 2nd – *La Prensa* discounts the use of force, however *Clarín* says; *"The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include South Georgia as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to terminate the function of such a negotiating mechanism and to resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands."*

Tim Blake and John Cheek return to the Islands but are unable to comment due to the level of confidentiality insisted upon by the FCO. In the *Penguin News*; *"The meetings have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that would not exist in most other democratic countries ... we, whose way of life is up against the wall are left uninformed and wondering."*

March 3rd – *La Prensa* reports a potential cooling of relations between the two countries and states that Britain has only a limited time period in which to acknowledge Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands. The same article goes on to demand that a transfer of sovereignty be completed before the 150th anniversary of the British "take-over" in 1833; ie before the end of the year.

The *Buenos Aires Herald* sees the Foreign Ministry announcement as containing a "veiled threat", and warns Britain that this time Argentina, *"means business."*

On receiving news of the Argentine press reports, PM Margaret Thatcher minutes; *"we must make contingency plans."*

March 5th – the Cabinet in London ask that the next *Defence and Overseas Policy Committee* paper include; *"Annexes on both civil and military contingency plans for counter-action against Argentina."*

Unidentified military aircraft are reported to have flown over Stanley.

March 6th – an Argentine LADE Hercules transport aircraft lands at Stanley airport citing an in-flight emergency involving a fuel leak. *"... Overflights by Argentine military aircraft were a frequent topic of conversation. The emergency landing of an Argentine C-130 at Stanley Airport .. had given the people the jitters. (As port Stanley reported by telegram, the plane arrived without formal warning and it was only thanks to a local ham radio operator that anyone knew it was coming in. The control tower was not manned since it was a Sunday, and the plane could presumably have landed before anyone could have got out to the airport. As it was there was still time for the Airport Manager, Mr. Gerald Cheek, and a contingent of armed marines, to drive out to the airport before the plane landed). The incident certainly demonstrated the relative ease with which unannounced military aircraft could land at Stanley ..."*

“Ricupero cited the recent surprise landing of an Argentine air force Hercules at Stanley and surmised that despite what Costa Mendez had told his own Ministers, this might indicate the sort of additional pressure which the Argentines might feel tempted to use.”⁵¹

March 8th – Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher asks the Foreign Office, and Ministry of Defence (MoD), to prepare for an Argentine blockade or invasion. *HMS Endurance* is instructed to remain 'on station' at the Falklands. Governor Hunt increases security at the Islands' airport.

Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington telegrams Rex Hunt asking him to discover the views of local *Councillors* concerning a resumption of negotiations with Argentina.

March 10th – the British Embassy receive a message from Davidoff to say that he is sending a party of 41 workers to South Georgia to dismantle the derelict whaling station at Leith; an operation he expects to take 4 months. An Argentine naval support vessel, *Bahia Buen Suceso* has been chartered for the salvage operation. The Embassy staff are unable to contact Davidoff in order to remind him of his obligations.

March 11th – Davidoff's lawyers are warned that there will be consequences should he not comply with the entry instructions. *Christian Salvesen Co.*, owners of the whaling station, confirm that they are aware of Davidoff's plans, and that his contract has been extended to March 31st, 1984.

March 12th – the *Latin American Weekly Report* states in an article; *“The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, if Britain fails to make concessions. These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands. Government officials feel that the international repercussions of a hard line against Britain will be manageable... in the light of Washington's preoccupation with security in the South Atlantic,... [Washington]... would be happy to see the issue settled. It could then open the way to the installation of US military bases in the South Atlantic...a development over which there has been much speculation in Buenos Aires since Galtieri took power.”*

Intelligence reports indicate that the Argentine Navy Commander, Admiral Anaya, is behind the more belligerent press reports and is arguing for a series of military actions.

"The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hands, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the [Argentine] navy..."⁵²

March 16th – South Georgia's magistrate inspects the whaling station at Leith and leaves a prominent notice; *'British Antarctic Survey... Leith Field station... Unauthorised Entry Prohibited.'*

March 19th – the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails directly into Leith Harbour, bypassing Grytviken in breach of Embassy instructions. A large party of both civilian and uniformed personnel are observed to land, shots are fired, and the Argentine flag raised.

Following an exchange of messages between the Falklands and London, instructions are sent to Grytviken requesting that they demand that the Argentine commander lower his country's flag. This is conveyed to the Captain of the *Bahia Buen Suceso* who responds that he has clearance from the Foreign Office.

51 *PREM 19/657 Telegram No. 42 of 11 March 1982.* This telegram details a conversation in Brasilia between Ambassador George Harding and the Head of the Brazilian America's Department.

52 *Memorias Políticas* Oscar Camilion 1999

The Customs House at Leith is found to have been broken into.

Argentina's Minister in London is summoned and told that the incident is regarded as serious. He is also told that if the *Bahia Buen Suceso* does not leave forthwith, the British Government will take whatever action it deems necessary. The same message is relayed to Argentina's Foreign Ministry, who deny any knowledge of the affair.

March 20th – BAS staff on South Georgia deliver a message from Governor Hunt to the Captain of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*; *“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the base commander Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”*

In London, the Prime Minister is informed. A protest is conveyed by the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, which informs the Argentine Foreign Ministry that Britain is prepared to take any action deemed necessary.

The British Embassy in Buenos Aires telegrams London; *“.. Davidoff was never, of course, given any permission by this Embassy but, on the contrary, warned personally in February ... and through his representative here on 11 March that next time he must follow correct procedures. ... I suggest that great restraint be used at least until it is clear whether this is a deliberate challenge authorised at high level, or just a piece of low level bravura combined with Davidoff's well-known fecklessness.”*

HMS Endurance is ordered to sail immediately from the Falklands to South Georgia, with its own small detachment of marines, plus reinforcements from the Falklands unit.

March 21st – Captain Adolfo Gaffoglio, the *LADE* representative at Stanley, informs Buenos Aires of the departure of *Endurance*. He also reports that the *LADE* office has been broken into and the Argentine flag covered with a Union Jack. *“Tit for tat you buggers,”* is written on the desk in toothpaste and *“UK OK”* on the office windows with spray paint.

Foreign Minister Costa Mendez informs the British Ambassador that the Argentine naval vessel is not in South Georgia officially, that it has no military personnel on board and that the ship will depart that very day. Argentina's Foreign Ministry expresses the hope that the significance of the affair will not be exaggerated. There is no apology. Ambassador Williams makes it clear; *“.. that if the party left without regularising their conduct at Gryviken they would have made an illegal landing and be liable to arrest..”*

A BAS observation point is established overlooking Stromness Bay. The Argentine flag is lowered.

March 22nd – the *Bahia Buen Suceso* sails away early evening; but some Argentines have been left behind. *“Base Commander has confirmed presence of at least six Argentines still ashore at Leith, in latest report from his observation party.... In addition to launch ... they had also seen a landing craft ... they also observed a vehicle with a mechanical arm on the jetty...”*

Lord Buxton, visiting Stanley, telegrams the FCO to urge the cancellation of Davidoff's contract; *“It has been naïve to regard Davidoff as a casual scrap dealer and it is abundantly clear that every move has been carefully researched, planned and timed throughout... If our reaction is placatory and is not firm and final this time I predict that more unopposed illegal landings will follow and probably next time somewhere in the Falklands. British reactions are being tested.”*

Ambassador Williams reports; *“The Argentines .. appreciate the gravity of the hoisting of the Argentine flag, but say that they have just received reports that there has been a parallel insult to the Argentine flag at the LADE office in Stanley.”*

HMS Endurance receives orders, transmitted from London, to remove any trespassers from South Georgia. Captain Barker's instructions clearly state that he is not to use force and, if resisted, should withdraw and seek fresh instructions.

March 23rd – those orders are copied to Argentina's Foreign Ministry, by the British Ambassador.

Costa Mendez, expresses surprise that the British Government is proceeding so rapidly to such very grave action, without exhausting the diplomatic options. He gives a warning that, if the action to remove the party on South Georgia is not postponed, those like himself, who are trying to deal with the dispute in a moderate way, will lose control of events. Mendez threatens that harsh action will precipitate a harsh response, and that perhaps the men should be removed by an Argentine vessel in order to take some heat out of the situation.

Ambassador Williams, conveying this to the FCO, adds that he considers the events at South Georgia as *“trivial and low-level misbehaviour.”*

The FCO respond; *“Our intention is to conduct this operation correctly, peacefully and in as low a key as possible. We hope that the Argentine Government will, if they are able to do so, advise the Argentine workmen at Leith to co-operate. In view of the considerable public interest here ministers will be making a statement in Parliament today on the situation and on the action we are taking... any lesser action than we are now taking would not be defensible to public and parliamentary opinion.”*

In Parliament; *“We were informed on 20 March by the Commander of the British Antarctic Survey based at Grytviken on South Georgia that a party of Argentines had landed at Leith nearby. The Base Commander informed the Argentine party that its presence was illegal as it had not obtained his prior authority for the landing. We immediately took the matter up with the Argentine authorities in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Embassy in London and, following our approach, the ship and most of the personnel left on 21 March. However, the base Commander has reported that a small number of men and some equipment remain. We are therefore making arrangements to ensure their early departure.”*

There is uproar in the House of Commons; *“... if she [Mrs Thatcher] doesn't get the Argentines out by next week there will be a major disturbance.”*⁵³

However, *HMS Endurance* is ordered to wait at Grytviken while Lord Carrington sends a message to Costa Mendez; *“In view of the high emotional tone that this incident has created in the United Kingdom, it is now essential for the Argentine personnel that still remains in South Georgia to be evacuated promptly.”*

If the Argentine Government can order the immediate return of the Bahia Buen Suceso to Leith Harbour to carry out this action, the use of HMS Endurance will not be necessary. If this is not done, we would have no alternative but to proceed. ...

Our principal objective now is to avoid that this issue should gain political momentum. It is essential for us not to lose the vital political climate for our mutual efforts regarding the peaceful resolution of the Falkland dispute through negotiations.”

Argentina's Navy Command orders the ice-breaker *Bahia Paraiso* to take its marines as quickly as possible to Leith to protect the Argentine workers there.

53 *Diaries: Into Politics* Alan Clark 2000 p.306.

Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo is; “.. directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.”

March 24th – intelligence reports suggest that the forced removal of the workforce at Leith will be used by the *Junta* as a pretext for military action either at South Georgia, or against the Falkland Islands.

The *Bahia Paraiso* arrives at Leith. Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz, together with ten marines, disembark. Three landing craft and a military helicopter are noted by the observation team.⁵⁴

Lord Carrington, writes to the Prime Minister; “... the situation on the dispute has developed to a point where we now face the prospect of an early confrontation with Argentina.”

March 25th – Argentina deploys two corvettes, *ARA Drummond* and *ARA Granville*, armed with *Exocet* missiles, between South Georgia and the Falklands, in a position to intercept *HMS Endurance* if it attempts to return to the Falkland Islands.

Captain Barker on *Endurance* recognises the senior officer's pennant flying over the *Bahia Paraiso* as being that of the Commander of Argentina's Antarctic Squadron. Contingency plans against a withdrawal of Argentine services from the Falklands are prepared in London.

Dr. Mendez suggests that the impasse could be broken if Britain accepts that the workers at Leith now comply with the landing formalities by going to Grytviken where they could have their 'white cards' stamped allowing them to return and work at the whaling station.

On being informed, Governor Rex Hunt's response is that; “Proper documentation does not mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them with an entry permit in the normal way, for 16 weeks only. If they cannot produce passports, base commander will issue them with temporary certificates of identity, embossed with his magistrate's seal, and bearing an entry permit for 16 weeks.”

Dr. Mendez says that he will have to consult the President and that the Ambassador could expect a reply on the 26th.

The military *Junta* convenes in Buenos Aires to discuss its plans for an invasion of the Falklands. In the meeting, Britain is accused of employing 'gunboat' diplomacy.⁵⁵

“Britain's escalation of the dispute – especially its demand about passports – came as a complete surprise ... There was unanimous agreement that we could not permit it.”⁵⁶

March 26th – the *Bahia Paraiso* is observed to sail away from Leith by the observation team; “Argentine party are still ashore at Leith. Although only two people were actually sighted this morning, smoke was emerging from several buildings and 2 boats were still alongside jetty. 65 blue drums had been stacked at inshore end of jetty. A large quantity of stores and equipment was visible, even dead reindeer. Consider shore party were working late into evening yesterday disembarking stores from *Bahia Paraiso* and are now established for a long stay at Leith. It is clear that this operation had been preplanned for some time as *Bahia Paraiso* came from Antarctic and not Argentina.”

54 Astiz was notorious as the “Blond Angel of Death” having gained a reputation in Argentina's 'Dirty War' of the late 1970's. He was wanted by both France and Sweden in connection with the murders of their citizens.

55 Not an idle reference as the term is particularly associated with Lord Palmerston; Britain's Foreign Secretary in 1832/33.

56 Interview with Larni Dozo quoted in Welch 2005

Governor Hunt telegrams London regarding Mendez's proposal; *"After all the offences committed by Davidoff and his men, letting the shore party return to Leith after proper clearance at Grytviken will go down like a lead balloon with the Islanders ... I am more than ever convinced that this whole exercise was carefully planned ... Proper documentation does not (repeat not) mean stamping of white cards. I am instructing the base commander to ask for passports and, if produced, to stamp them in the normal way with an entry permit..."*

Marines arrive at Port Stanley to relieve the garrison which is at the end of its tour. Ministers decide that both detachments should remain for the time being.

The *Junta* in Buenos Aires meet again; *"Costa Mendez's view was that, from 1956, Britain's behaviour was always to deal, but not on the basis of force. Rhodesia was the most recent example. There Britain had abandoned 600,000 British subjects. The sum of perceptions led to the conclusion that Britain would not respond with force. .. Mendez explained the situation and said British actions required military action in order to get them to negotiate seriously. .. How could we doubt his judgement?"*⁵⁷

After the meeting, Dr. Costa Mendez makes a public statement; *"a firm decision has been taken to give the men on South Georgia all necessary diplomatic protection...nor is this protection diplomatic only, since there is a navy ship called Bahia Paraiso in the area to provide any necessary protection."*

March 27th – Ambassador Williams reports his fears that Dr. Costa Mendez has been less than honest with him; that Argentina had been *"playing us along"* and that the *Bahia Paraiso* had armed marines on board; *".. I cannot, however, discount the possibility that any action on our part to disrupt the Argentine working party at Leith will be taken as a trigger for armed action by the Argentines."*

Naval vessels, accompanied by a submarine, are seen to sail from Buenos Aires by the British *defence attaché*, Stephen Love.

Margaret Thatcher considers taking the sovereignty issue to the ICJ; *"if we win or if we lose, at least we know where we are."*

March 28th – Lord Carrington telegrams US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig in Washington to appraise him of the situation; *"... I should accordingly be grateful, if you would consider taking the matter up with the Argentines. Stressing the need to defuse the situation and find a solution we can all accept. ... I fear the gravest consequences."*

All leave for military and diplomatic staff is cancelled by the *Junta*.

Argentina's Foreign Ministry sends a message to the British Ambassador; *"The activities of the group of workers disembarked at Leith are of a private and peaceful character based on the undisputed fact that they were known in advance by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and in any case on the fact that they are being carried out on territory subject to the special regime agreed in 1971 between the Argentine and Great Britain. It is moreover within Your Excellency's knowledge that these territories are considered by the Argentine Republic as her own However the British Government has reacted in terms which constitute a virtual ultimatum backed by the threat of military action in the form of the despatch of the naval warship Endurance and a requirement for the peremptorily immediate evacuation of the Argentine workers from the Island. ... a disproportionate and provocative response aggravated for having received wide diffusion in the press ...*

In light of this attitude my Government can only adopt those measures which prudence and its rights demand,

⁵⁷ Interview with Admiral Jorge Anaya, quoted in Welch 2005 p.87

in this context the Argentine workers in South Georgia must remain there since they have been given the necessary documentation to do so..."

Military aircraft overfly Port Stanley.

Ambassador Williams reports that Costa Mendez is insisting that South Georgia is included in the *white card* scheme.

Governor Rex Hunt's response is swift; *"The 1971 Communications Agreement does not apply to the Dependencies .. (and) .. does not absolve the holder of the requirement to present himself to an immigration officer as a recognised port of entry and .. Davidoff knew that the recognised port of entry for South Georgia was Grytviken. I am appalled at the arrogance of the message which confirms my previous fears that the Argentine Government are using Davidoff as a front to assert with a physical presence their sovereignty claim over South Georgia."*

Vessels from the Argentine fleet sail out of Puerto Belgrano, including the *Cabo San Antonio*, a tank landing ship, and the troop carrier, *Islas de los Estados*. Intelligence indicates that the Argentine submarine, *Sante Fe*, is making a reconnaissance of the beaches near Stanley.

The *Bahia Paraiso* is observed holding station, 15 miles off the north coast of South Georgia.

March 29th – the Admiralty in London direct a nuclear powered submarine, *HMS Spartan*, to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar and send the support vessel, *RFA Fort Austin* from Gibraltar to resupply *HMS Endurance*. Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a "viable" naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of 7 destroyers and frigates, on exercises near Gibraltar, could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks.

Argentine press reports refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and announce that 5 Argentine warships are now heading towards South Georgia. *Clarín* says that all of Davidoff's working party had been issued with *white cards* before departure.

Ambassador Williams, in Buenos Aires, writes to London; *"I am receiving gestures of sympathy ... but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures."*

March 30th – demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires call for democracy.

4 more Argentine warships are reported as sailing from Puerto Belgrano.

A message is sent to the Argentine Foreign Minister from the FCO; *".. The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. .. our objective throughout has been to seek a solution which both our Governments can accept. A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests. .."*

In London, the *Defence Operations Executive* meets and receives intelligence regarding a naval task force lying 800 miles north of the Falklands, consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft.

A further British nuclear powered submarine, *HMS Splendid*, deploys from Faslane and a third, *HMS Conqueror*, is readied. This is publicised by *International Television News (ITN)* in Britain.

Intelligence reports suggest that the *Junta* do not believe it likely that Britain will send naval reinforcements.

March 31st – Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse is ordered to make covert preparations for a military reaction if there is an invasion.

The *defence attaché* in Buenos Aires reports that all the Argentine fleet is now at sea.

After articles appear in the British press, publicising the departure of the nuclear submarines, Dr. Mendez is widely quoted as saying that; “*Argentina would not give way to threats of force ..*” that the workers at Leith are; “*.. Argentine workers working on Argentine soil.*”

Intelligence suggests that April 2nd is the day of 'action' and that a marine infantry brigade is being prepared for an invasion. There is evidence of an unusual level of co-operation between the three Argentine military services.

GCHQ Cheltenham reports Argentine radio traffic ordering the submarine, *Sante Fe*, to take reconnaissance troops to Mullet Creek, near Stanley.

Prime Minister Thatcher speaks to President Reagan on the 'hot-line' requesting his immediate intervention with General Galtieri.

Admiral Sir Henry Leach advises Margaret Thatcher that Britain could, and should, send a task force if any of the Islands are invaded; “*Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.*”

Governor Hunt is informed of the probability of an invasion, while *HMS Endurance* is ordered back to Stanley.

April 1st – at the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, demands from the *Security Council* a *Resolution* calling on the Argentine Government to refrain from the use of force in the South Atlantic.

“*.. we had never been to the Security Council before with this dispute. It had only touched the Fourth Committee; it had scarcely been to the plenary of the General Assembly and it hit everyone by surprise. The day before the invasion I got word to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council which I did. I rang up colleagues in turn personally, saying would you be down at the Council in an hour's time, the invasion of the Falklands is pending. My American colleague (Jeanne Kirkpatrick), who was very mixed up with Latin American policy, said that I had gone mad and that she would block the vote.. I said that if you are going to block me from having a meeting you will have to do it in public and I shall insist on a public meeting so ..? My Russian colleague said: it is April 1st and I know this is an April Fool's joke, the kind of thing you do the whole time, but you don't know your own rules; it is after mid-day. I had quite a problem persuading him that this was serious ... Eventually we got the Council in action...*”

Argentina's Representative responds that: “*It was ironic and inadmissible for the Council to be convened by the United Kingdom on that day to consolidate the spoils of colonial plundering. Argentina rejected being accused when in fact what should be judged, if justice was to be served and peace preserved, was the conduct of the accuser.*”

The President of the *Council* appeals to Argentina not to invade.

US Secretary Haig, sends a message to Lord Carrington, indicating that the United States Government will do all it can to help.

In Buenos Aires, the British Ambassador asks for, and is given, a written statement of the Argentine position; “*Since the problem raised is disregard of Argentine sovereignty, – I judge pointless the despatch of a person to examine the events in the Georgias since Argentina considers this incident resolved. In fact the workers there are carrying out their tasks under normal lawful conditions without any breach of the agreement previously*

reached between our two countries – bearing in mind the antecedents and course of the negotiations undertaken from 1964 to today we would have accepted the despatch of the representative proposed by Great Britain if his task had been to negotiate the modalities of transferring sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and their dependencies to the Argentine Republic which is essentially the central cause of the present difficulties. I cannot omit to draw attention to the unusual British naval deployment towards our waters reported in the international press which can only be interpreted as an unacceptable threat of the use of military force. This obliges us to refer to the UN organization where Argentina will circulate a note on the antecedents of this case.”

Intelligence reports suggest that an invasion force will be assembling off Stanley during the night. This is relayed to Governor Hunt by the FCO; *“ We have apparently reliable evidence than an Argentine task force will gather off Cape Pembroke early tomorrow morning 2 April. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.”*

Governor Hunt warns the population of the Islands, and places his small force of Royal Marines, together with elements of the Volunteer Defence Force, on stand-by. British forces in the UK are put on immediate notice of deployment.

Secretary Haig speaks to the Argentine Ambassador in Washington. He tells him that Britain would respond to any action, and that the use of force; *“Would reverse our cooperation in Central America and the hemisphere. The reaction of the American people will be overwhelming, we will have to side with the British, and US-Argentine relations will be back to the worst days.”*

ARA *Guerrico*, a corvette with two helicopters and 40 marines aboard, joins the *Bahia Paraiso* at South Georgia.

Governor Rex Hunt reports his dispositions; *“(1) Royal Marines disposition will be made near expected landing beach and will do what they can to contain landing and to defend airport. (2) FIDF will round up Argentines in Stanley before dawn tomorrow and bring them to Government House for safe-keeping. They will then deploy at probably helicopter landing sites. (3) Marines will fall back to outskirts of Stanley but will not fight in Stanley. Survival party will take off to the hills as Argentine forces reach Stanley. I shall remain at Government House. ...”*

The British Ambassador in Washington receives a message; *“The State Department have just told me that their Ambassador has informed them from Buenos Aires of his meeting with the Argentine President. The latter would not say what the Argentines were going to do. The Americans have deduced from this that the Argentinians are therefore planning to go through with their military operation. The Argentine President muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about surrendering sovereignty. The State Department are now asking President Reagan to telephone the Argentine President personally...”*

President Reagan telephones Galtieri, before contacting PM Thatcher with the result; *“I have just talked at length with General Galtieri about the situation in the Falklands. I conveyed to him my personal concern about the possibility of an Argentine invasion. I told him that initiating military operations against the Falkland islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina and I urged him to refrain from offensive action. I offered our good offices and my readiness to send a personal representative to assist in resolving the issues between Argentina and the United Kingdom.*

The General heard my message, but gave me no commitment that he would comply with it. Indeed, he spoke in terms of ultimatums and left me with the clear impression that he has embarked on a course of armed conflict. We will continue to cooperate with your Government in the effort to resolve this dispute. Both in attempting to avert hostilities and to stop them if they should break out. While we have a policy of neutrality on the

sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force.”

April 2nd – Governor Hunt declares a *State of Emergency* on the islands at 3.25am. He receives permission to destroy Stanley airstrip; “.. if you can do so, to prevent it being used after invasion to resupply an invasion force.”⁵⁸

Operation Rosario, the Argentine code name for its invasion of the Falkland Islands, commences at 4.30am with Argentine *special forces* landing at Mullet Creek. *Moody Brook* Barracks are attacked, but the Royal Marines have already left to take up defensive positions. The noise of the attack on the barracks alerts the population in Stanley.

5.30am: Argentine Marines come ashore in amphibious vehicles at York Bay. A C-130 transport plane loaded with Argentine troops, lands at Stanley airfield.

6.30am: Argentine *special forces* attack Government House. They encounter well placed British defences, and suffer the first casualties of the war.

7.15am: an armoured column making its way from York Bay to Stanley is engaged by a section of Marines commanded by Lt. Trollope. One *Armoured Personnel Carrier* is hit by two missiles before the section withdraws.

The main invasion force arrives off Stanley at 8.30am.

9.15am: Governor Hunt negotiates a ceasefire with Rear-Admiral Carlos Bussers.

10.30am: Governor Rex Hunt formally surrenders the Falklands to General Osvaldo Garcia. Hunt refuses to shake Garcia's hand, telling the General that; “*This is British property and you are not invited*”. Garcia responds; “*It is very ungentlemanly of you to refuse to shake my hand*” to which Hunt replies; “*It is very uncivilised of you to invade my country.*”

Brigadier General Mario Menendez is appointed as Argentina's Governor on the Islands.

Rex Hunt, in full regalia, together with his family and the surrendered Marines, are airlifted to Montevideo.⁵⁹

At 4.30pm, the Government House telex-operator has a conversation with an operator in London.

LON (London): HELLO THERE WHAT ARE ALL THESE RUMOURS WE HEAR THIS IS LONDON

FK (Falklands): WE HAVE LOTS OF NEW FRIENDS

LON: WHAT ABOUT INVASION RUMOURS

FK: THOSE ARE THE FRIENDS I WAS MEANING

LON: THEY HAVE LANDED

FK: ABSOLUTELY

LON: ARE YOU OPEN FOR TRAFFIC IE NORMAL TELEX SERVICE

FK: NO ORDERS ON THAT YET ONE MUST OBEY ORDERS

LON: WHOSE ORDERS

FK: THE NEW GOVERNOR'S

LON: ARGENTINA

FK: YES

LON: ARE THE ARGENTINIANS IN CONTROL

58 There were not enough explosives available to do serious damage.

59 One section of Marines, under the command of Corporal York, stationed on the Camber Peninsula, and were not captured. They surrendered on April 4th.

FK: YES YOU CAN'T ARGUE WITH THOUSANDS OF TROOPS PLUS ENORMOUS NAVY SUPPORT WHEN YOU ARE ONLY 1600 STRONG. STAND BY.

An emergency meeting of the Cabinet in London approves the formation of a task force to retake the islands.

Margaret Thatcher receives advice from the FCO; *".. which summed up ... that Department. I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All the considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking:.... And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister."*

President Galtieri reports the success of the invasion to the Argentine people in a short broadcast; *"Compatriots: We have recovered, safeguarding the national honor, without rancor, but with the firmness that the circumstances require, the Austral Islands that make up the national heritage ... by legitimate right. The step just taken was decided without taking into account any political calculation. It was designed on behalf of each and every one of the Argentines, regardless of sectors or factions and with the mind set on Governments, institutions and people than in the past, without exceptions; and through 150 years, have struggled to claim our rights. I know, and we acknowledge with deep emotion, that already the whole country lives the joy of a new gesture and it is preparing to defend what you own regardless of sacrifices,"*

Galtieri is greeted by jubilant crowds (estimates exceed 200,000), in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires.

*".. Argentine press reports indicate that some 4,000 to 5,000 troops are on the Islands, and the 10 to 14 naval ships in the area include the country's only aircraft carrier as well as several guided missile destroyers, frigates, corvettes, transport and amphibious craft, and at least one submarine."*⁶⁰

Britain breaks off diplomatic relations and gives Argentina's Ambassador 4 days to leave the country.

Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, sends a message to all the Commonwealth Heads of Government calling for them; *"... to stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination and the rejection of the use of force.."*

Australia's envoy to the United Nations, David Anderson, denounces Argentina's invasion to the Security Council; *"... We have considered carefully the statements made in this Council yesterday and this morning by the distinguished Representative of Argentina. Nothing contained in those statements could justify the act of aggression which has been committed by the Argentine armed forces in clear violation of Article 2.3 and Article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations."*

Major Patricio Dowling takes charge of both internal security and the Islands police station.⁶¹

In New York, the British Mission to the UN considers tactics for the Security Council; *".. We decided in the Mission that if we were going to get a Resolution – we didn't think the odds were good but we must do it quickly, avoid all the negotiations over blue drafts and black drafts and I don't know what other drafts, we must slap down something we could live with – we must demand that Argentina withdraw and we must get a vote on it within 24 hours because if we allowed it to drag out it would be fatal. So we did exactly that; we put the Resolution down in final form and there was a very rigorous debate..."*

60 CIA Situation Report #1 CIA-RDP84B00049R000701780020-2

61 An unpleasant character, Dowling was proud of his Irish heritage and hated all things British.

US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, attends a dinner given in her honour by the Argentine Ambassador. Her attendance is criticised in both the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*.⁶²

April 3rd – in the Guardian newspaper; “*At a defensive and unhappy press conference in the Foreign Office – itself a rare event – Mr. Nott denied as “ridiculous and quite untrue” rumours at Westminster that he had offered his resignation to Mrs Thatcher, and Lord Carrington rejected with a shake of his head any suggestion that he might resign. But the irony of a government elected to strengthen Britain's defence posture finding itself in this position will not be lost on MPs ...*”

PM Thatcher speaks to Parliament, which is sitting in emergency session; “*The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands....*

... I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment....

The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. HMS Invincible will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday. ...

The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.“

On the advice of two former Prime Ministers, Harold Macmillan, and James Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher forms a committee to oversee the crisis. Dubbed the ‘*War Cabinet*’ OD(SA), is made up of, in addition to the PM, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Defence Secretary John Nott, Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe and Conservative Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson.

The Bank of England freezes all Argentine assets and Argentine imports are banned.⁶³ Argentina responds by a tit-for-tat freezing of British assets and a ban on imports. To avoid the possibility of a technical default, Argentina insists that it will continue to pay interest on its outstanding international debts via an escrow account in New York.

A diplomatic approach is made to the European Union and, in particular, West Germany, Argentina's largest trading partner within the EU, for an embargo of goods to, and from, Argentina. British Embassies throughout the world start to approach Heads of State with requests for support.⁶⁴

62 Kirkpatrick was a noted supporter of Galtieri within the Reagan Administration. *cf. Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* L.I. Barrett 1984.

63 Valued at \$1.5 billion. Export credit insurance was also suspended. *The Financial Times April 7th*. Argentina was already in financial difficulty and the effect of these measures was to push the country further into debt.

64 “... a most unequal competition between a heavyweight diplomatic machine which had been playing power politics on the world stage for more than four centuries, and a foreign ministry that could just about manage relations with a few of its Latin American neighbours” *The Falklands War 1982* Duncan Anderson 2002,

At 7.30am local time on South Georgia, the commander of the *ARA Bahia Paraiso* demands the surrender of Grytviken, erroneously claiming that Governor Hunt has already surrendered the Dependencies. The British commander declines.

0930am: CIA Situation Report #2, *"The Argentines continue to provision and reinforce their initial landings ... The British, who will lack a land base and probably face logistical problems, will be hard pressed to oust a force of the size anticipated. ... Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have given unqualified support to Argentina's claims, but have expressed hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Venezuela, traditional supporters of Buenos Aire's claims, has thus far withheld open support and called for a negotiated settlement. The Chileans, now negotiating with Argentina for control of the Beagle Channel, refuse to support Argentine claims."*

Argentine troops are transported by helicopters from the *Bahia Paraiso* to King Edward's Point on South Georgia. A squad of Royal Marines engage the Puma helicopters bringing one down. *ARA Guerrico* gives supporting fire for the Argentine force, but her guns jam after only half a dozen rounds have been fired. One seaman on the *ARA Guerrico* is killed by small arms fire from Royal Marines on the shore. More than 200 rounds are fired at the Corvette which suffers considerable damage. Reinforcements from the *Bahia Paraiso* land on South Georgia.

Outnumbered, Royal Marines commander, Lieutenant Keith Mills, surrenders South Georgia, together with 22 marines and 13 BAS staff. Another 13 BAS staff in field parties are distributed around the Island.

President Galtieri summons the German Ambassador to see him; *"Galtieri, who looked nervous, began by saying that he wished to explain the Argentine position to friendly countries with the aim of bringing about a diplomatic solution to the Falkland crisis.... the German Ambassador asked whether Argentina was still prepared to hold talks aimed at reaching an honourable solution ... Galtieri replied that everything was negotiable with the exception of final recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands."*

France agrees to stop supplying Argentina with *Exocet* missiles, *Super Etendard* aircraft and *Pucara* aircraft engines, and withdraws her technical teams.

At the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, obtains the *Security Council Resolution* he has been working for.

".. I avoided the sovereignty issue, because I knew I was on a very sticky wicket on that and concentrated entirely on the illegality of the acquisition of territory by war, my eye being on the Arabs. .. to my amazement we won it – we got our Resolution."

Attempts to delay any *Resolution* are defeated in a procedural vote. During the debate, Argentina's representative states; *".. that his Government had proclaimed the recovery of its national sovereignty over the territories of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich islands in an act that responded to a just Argentine claim, an act of legitimate defence in response to the acts of aggression by the United Kingdom. Argentine jurisdiction extended throughout the islands, an Argentine Governor being there. He emphasized that in that manner an end had been put to a situation of tension and injustice that had been a constant element of disturbance to international peace and security. He added that his country would act in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter and make every effort to reach a just and peaceful solution."*

Security Council Resolution 502 -

" The Security Council,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the

Security Council on 1 April 1982 calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. ***Demands*** an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. ***Demands*** an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

3. ***Calls*** on the Governments of Argentina and the United Nations to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."⁶⁵

April 4th – *HMS Conqueror*, sails for the South Atlantic. Senegal offers staging facilities via Dakar airport for British military aircraft heading to and from Ascension Island.

La Prensa reports; “*The recovery of Malvinas, by our country, was a matter of international priority in the entire world.*”

Reg Silvey, Falklands lighthouse keeper, makes radio contact with the UK.

Newspapers in Buenos Aires report that the loss of the Falkland Islands means that Britain will also have to forgo its claims to the Antarctic territories. Venezuela and Panama issue statements in support of Argentina.

The *Washington Post* reports; “*Britain's Prime Minister spoke the simple truth when she labeled the Argentine act, “unprovoked aggression.” It is more than likely that the Argentines have made a serious mistake ... for Mrs. Thatcher is a tough woman... the British do not appear to be in a mood to be pushed around.*”

The settlements at Goose Green and Darwin are occupied by Argentine troops. Two Argentine postal officials travel to the Islands.⁶⁶

Rear-Admiral Eduardo Girling summons the German *military attaché* and announces that the Falkland Islands would be defended with all available means and forces, including Soviet assistance which would be accepted for this purpose.

April 5th – aircraft carriers, *HMS Invincible* and *HMS Hermes*, sail for Ascension Island. *HMS Yarmouth* and *HMS Broadsword* are ordered to Gibraltar.

Following recriminations in the press, Lord Carrington resigns as Foreign Secretary, together with Foreign Office Ministers Richard Luce and Humphrey Atkins. Lord Pym is appointed as the new Foreign Secretary. The Defence Secretary, John Nott, also offers his resignation but the Prime Minister refuses to accept it.

At an impromptu news conference in his office, US President Ronald Reagan says that; “*... the confrontation between Britain and Argentina has put the United States in a very difficult position because it is friendly with both countries.* “

65 10 votes for, 1 against (Panama) and 4 abstentions, (Spain, China, Poland, USSR).

66 Argentine stamp clubs were ecstatic. During April the post office at Stanley (renamed Puerto Argentino) recorded a daily average of over 7,000 letters and packages. Child 2008.

Messages of support from the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Belize, Nepal and Mauritius, arrive in London. Other countries make statements deploring the Argentine invasion. Portuguese Foreign Secretary, Dr. Leonardo Mathias, is reported as saying that if Britain asks to use the *Lajes* Air Base, in the Azores, to refuel, that request would probably be granted. The Government of New Zealand breaks off diplomatic relations with Argentina, while Australia recalls its Ambassador to Buenos Aires. Canada also recalls its Ambassador and imposes an arms embargo on Argentina. Chile condemns Argentina's use of force.

Governor Hunt and the captured Royal Marines arrive back in the United Kingdom.

"The Argentine occupation forces have imposed strict military rule ...The Islanders are under house arrest until further notice, and anyone defying this order is threatened with immediate imprisonment. ... Other penalties have been imposed in the face of growing hostility from the Islanders. These include 30 days in prison for rude gestures against the military, 60 days for irreverence to the Argentine flag... Messages from radio hams ... say that troops are searching homes and confiscating equipment."

HMS Endurance heads away from South Georgia.

Governor Rex Hunt, together with Royal Marine Majors Norman and Noott, brief the Prime Minister. *"The Prime Minister congratulated the party on the courage they had shown ... She .. enquired whether those in Port Stanley in the days preceding the invasion had been any more aware of the likelihood of an invasion. The Governor replied in the negative. He had been inclined to think that the Argentine President was sabre rattling as on previous occasions. ... Major Noott said that the Argentine forces had not appeared to be particularly skilled or brave. They had, for example, shown reluctance to go outside Port Stanley because they had heard that a section of six marines were still at large ..."*

April 6th – Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury sends his envoy, Terry Waite, to the Vatican with a request for the Pope to appeal to Argentina to obey international law; *"The Archbishop believes the Pope has already done this privately but the Archbishop (whose Province includes the Falklands) believes that a public utterance by the Pope would have an impact on Argentinian opinion as it is a strongly Catholic country."*

A letter is smuggled out of the Falklands; *"On behalf of the civilian population of the Falkland Islands, we, the undersigned Civil Servants and Administrators, request that a protecting power be appointed to help to arrange the temporary evacuation of the civilian population of these Islands under the terms of the Geneva Convention. We further request the immediate dispatch to Port Stanley of an Observer from that power."*⁶⁷

April 7th – Germany, Nigeria and Denmark condemn Argentina's invasion of the Falklands.

SS Canberra is requisitioned as a troop carrier by the British Government.⁶⁸

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym addresses the House of Commons; *"The whole House and the country is struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed... Why did Argentina's ruler suddenly decide in the last days of March to resort to arbitrary and brutal aggression? I suggest that part of the answer lies in the very brutality and unpopularity of the Argentine regime itself. Inflation is raging in Argentina, at the rate of 140% a year. The regime is notorious for its systematic contempt of all human rights. Since 1976, there have been thousands of arrests and killings, often described in a tragic and disgraceful*

67 Smuggled out in one ladies bra, the letter was signed by 13 people including the Chief Constable, the Registrar General, the Government Medical Officer, the Collector of Customs, the Harbourmaster, the Master Forrester and the Mechanical Superintendent. The request had not been discussed with the general population, many of whom subsequently disagreed with the letter's contents once they became known. *cf. PREM 19/617 telex 14 April*

68 The owners, P&O, refused to charter the vessel to the British Government.

euphemism as "disappearances". Only a few days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands there had been riots in Buenos Aires, and many people had been arrested. Harassed by political unrest at home, and beset by mounting economic difficulties, the regime turned desperately to a cynical attempt to arouse jingoism among its people. The Falkland Islanders have thus become the victims of the unprincipled opportunism of a morally bankrupt regime. Our purpose is to restore their rights. ...

The British ambassador in Buenos Aires and most of his staff are being withdrawn. ... A small British interests section will continue to work in the Swiss embassy, and we are most grateful to the Government of Switzerland, who are most expert in these matters,

What we in Britain must now do, with the support and backing of all freedom-loving countries right across the world, is to see to it that Argentina's illegal and intolerable defiance of the international community and of the rule of law is not allowed to stand."

A 200 mile 'maritime exclusion zone', to take effect on the 12th, is declared by the British Government.

In a report prepared by the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research; *"According to Embassy London... Tory moderates and Foreign Office are concerned that Prime Minister Thatcher has been listening largely to the Ministry of Defence, especially senior naval officers, and may not adequately be considering non-military options. ... Second thoughts are surfacing among Argentine politicians about the wisdom of President Galtieri's adventure as it becomes clear that the cheap victory so confidently expected may still elude them.."*

President Reagan approves an attempt at mediation to be led by US Secretary Alexander Haig.

Argentina's new Governor, Brigadier General Benjamin Menendez, flies to the Falklands.

April 8th – operating rights allowing Argentine Airlines to fly into London are suspended. Australia bans Argentine imports; *"Mr. Fraser said that his Government would not have done this for any other country in the world. They had done so because it was Britain and Mrs Thatcher who were concerned."*

A Chiefs of Staff meeting proposes an operation to retake South Georgia before the end of the month; *"I received the clear impression that the Defence Staff have drawn a distinction between an operation against South Georgia (which they regard as certain) and operations against the Falkland Islands (which they regard as subject to parallel political or diplomatic activity)."*

Alexander Haig arrives in London, the first stop in his 'shuttle diplomacy', attempt to mediate.

Margaret Thatcher is briefed; *"For the meeting with Mr. Haig, you should be aware that the United States intelligence agencies are helping and supporting our own intelligence effort with unreserved openness and generosity. Mr. Haig himself has assured Sir Nicholas Henderson that if there is anything we need in the area of covert support and assistance we have only to ask. Profiting from this, a telegram of requests has already gone over to Washington."*

The Prime Minister meets Alexander Haig at 7.30pm. During the discussion Secretary Haig admits that, although it failed to see the invasion coming, British intelligence had put together a compendium that was; *".. much better than anything which the United States had compiled."*

Haig puts forward a three part proposal involving; a) Argentine withdrawal, b) a return to the administrative *status quo* that had existed before the invasion, and c) a return to negotiations between Britain and Argentina. He adds that stages a) and b) would be supervised by an international body. Thatcher is unwilling to accept the involvement of an international body unless it is prepared to supervise a test of self-determination for the Islanders. Both Haig and Thatcher recognise that this would not be acceptable to Argentina.

British Ambassador, Sir John Nicholas Henderson, in Washington appraises the *War Cabinet* of Argentina's attempt to gain support in the Organization of American States (OAS); *"There is an intense debate among the OAS delegations here, including the American one, about the legal questions involved in invoking the Rio Treaty. Some contend that the Falklands dispute falls outside the legislative (not geographic) scope of the Treaty others are reluctant to see the Treaty invoked lest it be used by Argentina to legitimize its invasion. ... To convene the OAS under the Rio Treaty and to pass a Resolution requiring action would need 15 to 16 votes which it (Argentina) is not at present finding it easy to obtain."*

A *Washington Post* article states; *"Argentina will have to give first, for Britain is determined, as it must be, that the English-speaking Falklanders choose their own fate and affiliation. At issue is not so much a disputed claim to abstract sovereignty as the principle of negotiated self-determination on which Britain's peaceful dissolution of the Empire has been based since World War II."*

April 9th – 3 Commando Brigade (Royal Marines) sails from England aboard the *SS Canberra*.

Secretary Haig reports back to Washington; *"The Prime Minister has the bit in her teeth, owing to the politics of a unified nation and an angry Parliament, as well as her own convictions about the principles at stake. She is clearly prepared to use force, though she admits a preference for a diplomatic solution. She is rigid in her insistence on a return to the status quo ante, and indeed seemingly determined that any solution involve some retribution. .. All in all, we got no give in the basic British position .."*

An editorial in the *Jornal do Brasil* announces; *"We are on the edge of a confrontation. The fact that a powerful fleet was ready to sail after only 5 days preparation when the normal time for an operation of such scope is usually much greater, is a clear indication of English intentions. ... It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that there took place a violent action – and that any possibility of a successful outcome to any negotiations depends on the fact that acceptable satisfaction is given to the country that suffered the action – in this case England.... The possibility that Argentina could invoke, in its defence, the Rio Treaty, is fading away: and this means simply that Argentina cannot make use of the natural instrument for the defence of countries of the continent. And it cannot, because it was, in this case, the aggressor. .."*

A Cuban plane is forced to land at Brasilia. It is found to be loaded with electronic surveillance equipment.

America's CIA offers an update; *"... the Argentines are reportedly lengthening the air strip in Port Stanley to accommodate A-4, MIRAGE, PUCARA, and C-130 aircraft and reinforcing the island with additional troops and air defence equipment..."*

April 10th – in Moscow, *Pravda* reports; *"... The times when disputes could be settled by gunboat diplomacy are gone ... it is clear that Britain is responsible for the consequences of this reckless policy, for it is precisely Britain that over many years stubbornly refused to carry out UN decisions on decolonization."*

Economic sanctions against Argentina are approved by the European Economic Community; to come into force on the 16th for a period of one month.

Letters start to appear in the Falklands, addressed to the Argentine conscripts; *"Dear Friend, Argentine Soldier - From the depths of my heart, today I send you these few lines and hope that as you receive them you find yourself in very good health. I hope that in defending our sovereignty you do it for the love of God and love for the Motherland. Every day we pray that God help you and that it might end soon, we are proud of you."*⁶⁹

69 Mostly from school children, and obviously dictated, many examples were found after the surrender.

Secretary Haig arrives in Buenos Aires. President Galtieri tells a patriotic rally taking place in the Plaza de Mayo that he will do battle if the British come.

The UK's Mission to the UN considers the legality of the *exclusion zone*; *"The General Assembly's definition of aggression (contained in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) recalls that it is for the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. Article 2 of the definition states that - "The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." Resolution 502 (1982) adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1982 referred to - "an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina" - and went on to determine that a breach of the peace existed ... Article 3(a) of the definition states that - "the invasion ... by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of another State" - qualifies as an act of aggression.*

Accordingly, a true reading of the definition of aggression together with resolution 502 (1982) leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is Argentina which is committing aggression by its invasion and first use of force in defiance of the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council on 1 April 1982 (S/14944). Moreover, Resolution 502(1982) leaves no doubt that it is Argentina which bears responsibility for the current breach of the peace in the region.

... Article 3(c) of the definition of aggression lists - "the blockade of the ... coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State - as an example of aggression. ... The UK is not "another State" because the maritime exclusion zone surrounds British territory."

April 11th - the only Member of the Falkland Islands *Legislative Council* in London, Mr. J.E. Cheek, writes to the Prime Minister suggesting that an, '*Andorra*' style arrangement may be an acceptable solution allowing the territorial integrity of the Islands to be guaranteed by Britain and other permanent members of the *Security Council*.

Interviewed on BBC radio, Francis Pym is asked whether Argentine shipping will be sunk if found within the exclusion zone. Pym replies; *"That is the position."*

Information is received from the Swiss *charge d'affairs* in Montevideo, that the 22 Royal marines, and 3 civilians, captured on South Georgia are being moved, but their destination is unknown.⁷⁰

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, is interviewed on national television. She says that she does not see a need for the US to make a choice between Argentina and Britain and that the only appropriate action is for the US to help both countries avoid war. Kirkpatrick states that the US has never taken a position on the Falklands, adding; *".. that if the islands rightly belonged to Argentina its action could not be considered as 'armed aggression'."*⁷¹

The Government of Peru calls for a 72 hour truce; *"In order to avoid an armed confrontation which would constitute ... a serious threat to international peace and security."*

Secretary Haig telegrams London; *"... I now expect to arrive in London about 0630 am Monday April 12. ... In the meantime, I am sure you would agree that any military confrontation must be avoided at all costs until you have been able to consider this draft proposal. Although it is clear serious problems remain; some progress has been made."*

70 When the British Embassy closed, a '*British Interest Section*' was set up at the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires staffed by a few civil servants from the Embassy. Set up to maintain contact with British subjects in Argentina, the Swiss were experienced at handling this arrangement.

71 *PREM19/616*. Secretary Haig came to believe that his attempts at negotiation were being thwarted by Kirkpatrick and others.

Margaret Thatcher responds; *“I should certainly prefer to avoid military confrontation. But Argentina is the aggressor, and is still trying to build up the occupying force in the Falklands. The right way to prevent naval incidents is therefore for Argentina to remove all her naval vessels from the maritime exclusion zone. The Argentine Government has had plenty of warning.”*

April 12th – 4.00am: the declared 200 mile *exclusion zone* comes into effect.

Haig returns to London to negotiate with the British Government. On his arrival, he receives information from Washington that there are 34 Soviet fishing vessels in the area of the Falkland Islands, providing intelligence to the Soviet Union.⁷²

He also receives a telephone call from Costa Mendes in Buenos Aires; *“Senor Costa Mendes had told him that he saw no reason for him, Mr. Haig, to go to Buenos Aires again unless any agreement about the Falkland Islands provided for the Governor of the Islands to be appointed by the Argentine Government and for the Argentine flag to continue to be flown there. If that was not possible, the the Argentine Government must have assurances that at the end of negotiations with Britain there would be a recognition of Argentine sovereignty.”*

Haig responds via the US Embassy in Buenos Aires; *“I have introduced ideas here along the lines discussed at the presidential palace Saturday night... The talks have been exceedingly difficult, but some progress has been made. I hope to leave here this evening for Buenos Aires... Time is of essence. The British will not withhold the use of force in the exclusion zone unless and until there is an agreement. I hope to bring to Buenos Aires a U.S. proposal that holds the prospect of agreement, thus averting war.”*

The Government of Japan calls upon Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands while *La Prensa* in Buenos Aires announces that the Peruvian armed forces have been put on alert. This is denied by the Government in Lima.

Informed of the telephone call by Costa Mendes, the Prime Minister responds that; *“.. the Argentines were clearly playing for very high stakes. We could not possibly accept Senor Costa Mendes' demands.”*

Derek Mellor, the British Ambassador to Paraguay, is informed that the Government of Paraguay will not; *“take sides.”*

HMS Spartan arrives 'on station', off Port Stanley.

April 13th – New Zealand bans all imports from, and exports to, Argentina.

Negotiations between Alexander Haig and the British Government continue.

“Mr. Haig said that he wished to take stock. As we knew, he had heard overnight from the Argentine Foreign Minister that his Government needed an outcome to the negotiations which embodied a de facto change in the administration of the Islands and a process leading to ultimate Argentine sovereignty. ... the proposal for an interim Commission did not represent a sufficient degree of change towards de facto Argentine administration. The provision for negotiations on the definitive status of the Islands was inadequate as a commitment to ultimate Argentine sovereignty.”

Commenting on the ... Argentine points, the Prime Minister said that they amounted to a demand for the handing of the Islands to Argentina with no provision for democratic processes. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Argentine demands bore no relationship to reality. The Prime Minister commented that it was essentially an issue of dictatorship versus democracy.

⁷² Fears of Soviet involvement would haunt Haig throughout the Falklands War and may explain his often erratic approach to ideas about negotiation v military action.

Mr. Haig said that he had made it abundantly clear to Argentina that if conflict developed the United States would side with the United Kingdom.”

British Chiefs of Staff assemble at the Ministry of Defence to discuss the retaking of South Georgia.

In a meeting between General Medeiros, the Minister in charge of Brazil's National Intelligence Service, and Ambassador George Harding; *“Medeiros ... said that he thought the Argentine action in invading the Falklands was completely crazy and incomprehensible. He did not see an easy way out of the present impasse.”*

At a meeting of the OAS *Permanent Council*, the Venezuelan Representative makes a speech demanding the British fleet's withdrawal and stating that Argentina has a total right to defend its territory. He adds that the *Security Council's Resolution 502* is biased against Argentina, which has suffered the theft of its territory by the UK and which was; *“justly responding to that robbery.”* The final OAS *Resolution* only expresses the Organization's; *“profound concern.”*

A party of 13 civil servants, including the Chief of Police, the Registrar General and the Chief Secretary, are deported from the Falklands. *Executive Council* member, Bill Luxton, and his wife and daughter, are also deported by 'Chief of Police' Patricio Dowling for 'political reasons.'

April 14th – following discussions with the British Government, Secretary of State Alexander Haig returns to Washington.

The container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* is commandeered by the British Government.

PM Margaret Thatcher makes a speech to the House of Commons; *“..we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. This, too, is in accordance with the Security Council resolution. In this approach we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world, and also by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig, who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires.*

On his first visit last Thursday we impressed upon him the great depth of feeling on this issue, not only of Parliament but of the British people as a whole. ... We made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not affected by the act of invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.

On his second visit on Easter Monday and yesterday, Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion – ideas concerning the withdrawal of troops and its supervision, and an interim period during which negotiations on the future of the islands would be conducted. Our talks were long and detailed, as the House would expect. Some things we could not consider because they flouted our basic principles. Others we had to examine carefully and suggest alternatives. The talks were constructive and some progress was made. At the end of Monday, Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution.

Late that night, however, Argentina put forward to him other proposals which we could not possibly have accepted, but yesterday the position appeared to have eased. Further ideas are now being considered and Secretary Haig has returned to Washington before proceeding, he hopes shortly, to Buenos Aires. That meeting, in our view, will be crucial ..”

A small squadron comprised of *HMS Antrim* and *HMS Plymouth*, together with Royal Marines and special forces, rendezvous with *HMS Endurance* near South Georgia.

A report in the *New York Times*; *“The Argentine position, as outlined by officials here today, is that while it is willing to allow some form of transitional government that could include Britain and a third party such as the*

United States or the Organization of American States, Argentine sovereignty would have to be recognized by the transitional government. In addition, Argentina would be the final authority on the island even in the transitional phase. One high-ranking military official said that only the Argentine flag could fly.”

Secretary Haig informs President Reagan; *“I am convinced that Mrs. Thatcher wants a peaceful solution and is willing to give Galtieri a fig leaf provided she does not have to violate in any fundamental way her pledge to Parliament... Her strategy remains one of pressure and threat; by and large, it's working. ... Galtieri's problem is that he has so excited the Argentine people that he has left himself little room for manoeuvre. He must show something for the invasion -- which many Argentines, despite their excitement, think was a blunder -- or else he will be swept aside in ignominy.”*

Speculative press reports in the USA allege that the Americans are already providing the British Government with assistance in intelligence and operational matters. Alexander Haig telephones the British Prime Minister to outline his fears that the negative reaction in Argentina will bring negotiations to an end.

An article in Clarin discusses Secretary Haig's mission; *“Alexander Haig ... left Buenos Aires last Sunday with an Argentine proposal for the establishment in the Malvinas Islands of a 'transitional government' until December 31, headed by an Argentine Governor, but he also carried a 'working draft' ... not examined at Presidential level. Secretary Haig sought to use that draft – which at no time became an official document of the Argentine Government – in his conversations with British authorities ... in the opinion of officials, “with this draft the United States became a defender of Prime Minister Thatcher, instead of a friendly broker. .. Haig went to Washington to await the results of a meeting today of the British Parliament, at which time Margaret Thatcher must report on the results of the lengthy round of conversations ... these results are also being awaited with expectations in Buenos Aires, which believes that if the Prime Minister is forced to resign, she might be replaced by current Foreign Secretary Pym or former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington which could perhaps “facilitate conversations on an agreement, and never going back to the status quo that existed on the Islands before the first of April.” If this course were not followed, the sources said that “in the absence of a solution, the alternative could be, regrettably, war” ...”*

An article in the *Jornal do Brasil* argues that the principle question was not one of sovereignty, but the two most important principles of the UN Charter – the right of self-determination and the duty of Governments to put an end to colonialism. The article goes on; *“to question the right of Buenos Aires to replace British colonisation with Argentine colonisation ...”*

Presidents Pinochet of Chile, and Alvarez of Uruguay, sign a joint statement emphasising the principle of 'self-determination.’

April 15th – the British destroyer group hold position in mid-Atlantic.

US President Ronald Regan again appeals to President Galtieri in a telephone call; *“General Galtieri reaffirmed to me his desire to avoid conflict with your country, and his fears that conflict would cause deterioration in recently improving relations with the United States. He said that the advance of your fleet and the blockade of the islands were making his situation difficult. ... General Galtieri promised to deal honestly and seriously with Secretary Haig.”*

Argentina's Foreign Ministry deliver proposals to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires involving (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) withdrawal of both sides from the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands – Argentine forces to withdraw to the mainland and British forces to a distance of 3000 nautical miles within 7 days and to their “usual operating bases” with 15 days, and (3) Britain to adopt measures to comply with

Resolution 1514, completing the decolonization by 31 December 1982 in accordance with *Resolution 2065*; “in this case the principle of Argentine territorial integrity is applicable.” In the interim period the Governor is to be an Argentine appointee.

Argentina's *Junta* announce the creation of the *South Atlantic Operations Theatre*.

*“The creation of the “South Atlantic Operations Theatre” is an important element of the defence of our national sovereignty in the large area it covers: 200 maritime miles from the continental coast and around the reconquered islands of Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich. Once the “Theatre” has been established, the military Committee may order actions of self-defence in situations that could endanger national security. Vice-Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo, Commander of Naval Operations, has been appointed Commander of the South Atlantic Operations Theatre.”*⁷³

April 16th – Margaret Thatcher writes to President Reagan; “Thank you for your message of 15 April about your conversation with General Galtieri. I am sure that neither you nor Al Haig, following his most helpful visits here, are in any doubt about the strong wish of the British government, Parliament and people to avoid conflict. We have done our utmost to put Al Haig in a position where he has reasonable proposals to offer the Argentine Government.

I regret we have seen no corresponding flexibility on the part of the Argentines. I note that General Galtieri has reaffirmed to you his desire to avoid conflict. But it seems to me ... that he fails to draw the obvious conclusion. It was not Britain that broke the peace but Argentina. The mandatory Resolution of the Security Council, to which you and we have subscribed, requires Argentina to withdraw its troops from the Falkland islands. That is the essential first step which must be taken to avoid conflict. ...”

The Task Force commences its departures from Ascension Island, while *Wideawake Airport* registers 300 aircraft and helicopter movements, giving Ascension Island the busiest airport in the world for a day. *HMS Sir Tristram* arrives from the West Indies.

US Secretary Haig arrives in Buenos Aires.

April 17th – Australia's Prime Minister Fraser telegrams President Reagan; “In the aftermath of a failure of Al Haig's efforts, many countries would watch to see and be guided by the stand the United States took. It seems to me that in such circumstances it would amount to a serious blow to western values, and to the western alliance itself, if the United States did not unequivocally support Britain.”

In Moscow, the Foreign Ministry gives a formal statement; “We consider impermissible the attempts by the United Kingdom to re-establish colonial status and we openly oppose such attempts. We qualify them as contradictory to the decision of the UN General Assembly on decolonization of these Islands and as creating a threat to peace and security.”

Pravda reports that the United States is seeking a major base on the Falklands.

The officials who returned to the UK on the 15th are debriefed.; “Perhaps 40% of the former population of the town have moved out into the hinterland, where morale is high ... There has been no collaboration with the occupying forces. Indeed several Islanders have been openly defiant. ... Mr. Luxton was confident that many were determined to stay as long as possible, even if there was fighting. But some might well wish for temporary evacuation ... Nor is the Argentine's attitude to evacuation clear. They are making those who want to leave pay for their passage .. it may be that the Argentines would not wish to see a mass exodus.”

⁷³ Announced to the public in *La Nacion* on the 23rd.

ARA Sante Fe, leaves Puerto Belgrano with a compliment of marines and fresh supplies for the Argentine troops garrisoning South Georgia.

Argentine postal workers now operating in Stanley commence a run of 2 million stamps commemorating the change of control.

The British submarine *HMS Splendid*, arrives “on station,” off the Falkland Islands. An alert at Ascension Island identifies what is believed to be a submarine of the USSR navy. The remaining ships put to sea.

Secretary Haig sends a message to the US Embassy in London; *“I threatened to break off this process. As a result, I was invited to meet with the Junta, and spent two hours with them this morning (Saturday). The character of the group is essentially as I imagined: Galtieri is the least bright and given to bluster; the Admiral is ultra hard-line; the Air Force General is bright, political reasonable relatively speaking, but clearly third in influence. I impressed on these men in the strongest terms that British resolve was beyond doubt, and that they were on a collision course with military humiliation and economic ruin. With the possible exception of the Admiral – whose definition of glory has little to do with military success – I would say these men are worried. ... The Junta urged me to stay ... I agreed to do so. The ten-hour session that ensued was excruciatingly difficult. ... The Argentines are now developing a new formulation but I expect it will be pregnant with the concept of assured Argentine sovereignty. ... As of now the situation is grim. I will receive a new Argentine text during the night and then decide whether or not to break off.”*

President Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher. *“... the President wished to assure the Prime Minister that he well understood what efforts she had made to reach a compromise. He did not think she should be asked to go any further.”*

Secretary Haig telegrams Washington; *“At 10:40 pm local time we received a very discouraging response which I have asked to discuss tomorrow morning with the junta and the President. I will advise you of the results.”*

The Governments of Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia announce that they will increase trade with Argentina to compensate for the economic measures adopted by the European Union, and other countries.

Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that three British journalists have been arrested for espionage in Ushuaia.

April 18th – 29 deported Royal Marines, and 13 British Antarctic Survey personnel, arrive in Montevideo.

Secretary Haig telegrams London; *“The Argentines delivered to me at the hotel at 2am this morning a revised text resulting from yesterday's marathon session. Although their revisions are still unsatisfactory, I believe we now have – for the first time since we began this mission – some movement towards a workable solution ... We will renew our deliberations at the Casa Rosada at 2pm local ...”*

April 19th – in Madrid, the extreme right-wing *Falangist Organisation* stage a march in support of Argentina's take-over of the Falkland Islands and call on the Spanish Government to seize Gibraltar.

Another telegram arrives from Alexander Haig; *“We have completed another very long session today ... We are finally close to what is probably the maximum obtainable from the Argentines. You should understand that there will be some problems for you as it now reads but it is workable. The only remaining element will be addressed later this morning and covers the very important issue of withdrawal of forces where serious problems still remain ... I will keep you abreast after today's meeting.”*

Ambassador Henderson in Washington contacts the FCO; *“I have just seen McFarlane at the White House who told me that Haig had been on the secure line. He was transmitting to the State Department ... the latest text of what the Argentinians were prepared to accept. Clearly, Haig did not think that it would be satisfactory from our point of view...”*

Secretary Haig transmits the results of his negotiations in Buenos Aires. The agreement, as proposed by the *Junta* consists of (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the 'zone', (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) withdrawal of half of Argentina's force within 7 days to Argentina and all of the UK's to a distance of 1750 nautical miles, (5) the UK's Task Force and submarines to return to their normal bases within 15 days, (6) Argentina to withdraw its remaining forces within 15 days, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a *Special Interim Authority* to verify compliance which will also oversee the local authority on the Islands, (9) the *Executive and Legislative Councils* to have Argentine members, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the *Special Interim Authority* to fly together, (11) rights of residence, and ownership of property, to be the same for Islanders and Argentinians, (12) *“December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories .. and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute. ..”*

Haig sends a personal telegram to Foreign Secretary Pym in London; *“ My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps back from the text you and I discussed in London..... I do not know whether more can be wrung out of the Argentines. It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, including Corps Commanders, may be exercising vetoes. Certainly I can do no better at this point... My best immediate judgment in this situation is that I should return to Washington and report to the President.”*

The British Government issues a statement to the press; *We have just received the proposals which Mr. Haig has brought out of Buenos Aires. They are complex and difficult, and at first sight they do not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament, particularly on the need to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders. We shall be studying them carefully ...”*

Junta member, Admiral Anaya, visits the Falklands while *HMS Conqueror* arrives off South Georgia with orders to prevent any Argentine reinforcement of South Georgia.

United Nations Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, offers his good offices and assistance should the Haig mission fail. Argentina calls for an emergency meeting of the OAS so that an invocation of the Rio Treaty can be discussed.

April 20th – in advance of a proposed meeting of the *Coordinating Bureau* of the *Non-Aligned Movement*, being urged by Argentina, the British *High Commission* ask the Indian Government to press for a statement that is consistent with *SC Resolution 502*. In information attached to the request, the *Commission* explains; *“The fundamental element of the British Government's approach to the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands is that the wishes of the Islanders themselves must be paramount. For their part, the Argentines deny that the Islanders have the right to determine their own future and maintain that the issue is simply one of decolonisation. The Falkland Islands issue is not one of declonisation. As normally understood, decolonisation has consisted of the withdrawal of an alien administering power and the transition of new states to independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of their people, to whom sovereignty and the powers of sovereignty are transferred. The UN has never countenanced the decolonisation of a territory by*

agreeing to hand over its people to alien rule in the face of their persistent opposition. For Argentina to incorporate the Falkland Islands in its territory on the pretext of decolonisation would simply constitute the imposition of colonial status on the Islands by force in violation of all UN agreed norms of conduct ... It would offend the principle of self-determination..."

The hospital ship *HMS Hecla*, sails from Gibraltar.

Francis Pym writes to Haig; *"I agree that we need to study the text which you brought back from Buenos Aires, and we are doing so urgently.."*

Air force *Junta* member, Lami Dozo, visits the Falklands while 12 teachers from the Islands arrive at Montevideo having refused to work with the Argentine authorities on the Islands.

Haig responds to Pym; *"It is imperative that you maintain military pressure. I see no other way of bringing the Argentines to a position satisfactory to you. ... As you know, Argentina has asked for an OAS Council meeting to convoke an organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty. ... We propose to abstain on the ground that the Rio Treaty was not designed to apply to cases in which members themselves took acts of force..."*

The OAS meet to discuss the conflict. While the majority are supportive of Argentina, there is no decision on any action. The Mexican Representative says that his country will not impose sanctions on Britain regardless of whether or not the OAS vote for it. Further discussion is deferred till the 26th.

April 21st – Francis Pym makes a statement to the House of Commons; *"My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House yesterday that I would be travelling to Washington tomorrow to discuss with Mr. Haig our reactions to the latest Argentine proposals. ... Any negotiation which is concluded satisfactorily must deal with certain critical points: in particular the arrangements for the Argentine withdrawal; the nature of any interim administration of the islands, and the framework for the negotiations on the long-term solution to the dispute for which the United Nations resolution calls. We put to Mr. Haig, when he was in London, ideas which we believed would commend themselves to the House and accord with the wishes of the islanders. He subsequently took them to Buenos Aires. The latest Argentine proposals—despite Mr. Haig's efforts—still fail to satisfy our essential requirements in certain important respects relating to these points. They reflect continuing efforts by Argentina to establish by her aggression and her defiance of the United Nations—a defiance continued and aggravated by her reinforcement of her invasion force—what could not be established by peaceful means."*

Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams London from the UN; *"Yesterday's vote in the OAS is seen here as a diplomatic setback for us, the first serious one we have encountered since the crisis began. If the Argentines succeed on 26 April in getting a two-thirds majority in favour of economic or other measures against the UK, this will be a major defeat for us in UN terms... The Argentines are continuing to press hard for the early adoption of a communiqué by the [Non-Aligned Movement] Coordinating Bureau. A drafting group has been set up under Cuban Chairmanship consisting of Argentina, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia. The present plan is for the Coordinating Bureau to meet on 23 April. The Argentines have apparently shown some flexibility and indicated a readiness to accept a reference to SCR 502, provided that there is a resounding reaffirmation of previous NAM pronouncements on sovereignty. We are working hard on the Commonwealth members of the drafting group, amongst whom Bangladesh is being particularly helpful. ..."*

The British Government takes the decision to recover South Georgia. Ambassador Henderson is asked to quietly inform the Secretary of State; *"Haig's immediate reaction, when I told him, was one of surprise and concern ... He thought that our proposed action would aggravate the problem and make a return to negotiation more*

difficult ... After he had had time to think about it a bit longer, Haig seemed to me to come round more in support of our proposed action, he quite saw the need for us to show firmness, which was all that the Argentine leaders would understand ...”

Argentine Decree 757 renames Stanley - Puerto Argentino.

An Argentine naval force, including the Carrier *25 de Mayo*, is located between the Argentine coast and the Falkland Islands *Maritime Exclusion Zone*. A British submarine is ordered into the area.

April 22nd – the FCO issue advice to all British nationals in Argentina that they should leave the country.

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym travels to Washington to discuss the latest peace proposals; *“Haig wants to return to Buenos Aires for a further (and probably final) effort to find a negotiated solution. He agreed with Mr. Pym that the gap between the Argentine and British positions was a very wide one ... he was not optimistic that agreement could be reached.”*

In a meeting of the European Parliament; *“The European Parliament – profoundly shocked by the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and more than ever convinced that territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations, ... Condemns unreservedly the invasion of the Falkland Islands...”* In a meeting of the European Parliament; *“The European Parliament – profoundly shocked by the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and more than ever convinced that territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations, ... Condemns unreservedly the invasion of the Falkland Islands...”*

Junta member, President Galtieri, visits the Islands while the first elements of the British task force arrive off the archipelago.

Special Air Service reconnaissance teams are landed on South Georgia; one on the Fortuna Glacier, another 9 miles east of Grytviken. Two *Wessex* helicopters crash in *“whiteout”* conditions at the glacier. There are no casualties but the force is taken off again due to the poor conditions. *HMS Brilliant* is ordered to South Georgia as a reinforcement.

Discussing the OAS meeting, and the Rio Treaty, an article in the *New York Times* says; *“Argentina has invoked the wrong Treaty at the wrong time to promote the illusion that all Latin American nations support its seizure of the Falklands. They don't, and some that do serve only their own territorial ambitions.”*

The British team in Washington, working with the Americans, amend Argentina's proposals in an attempt to find some *'middle ground'*. The result includes, (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) neither side shall introduce more forces into the *'zone'*, (3) within 24 hours the UK is to rescind its *exclusion zone*, (4) both sides will withdraw half of their forces and equipment within 7 days; with the UK's force standing off to a distance equivalent of 7 days steaming at 12 knots. Argentina's forces to be put into a condition whereby they could not be reinserted within 7 days, (5) both sides forces to return to their usual operating areas or normal duties within 15 days, (6) the USA to verify compliance, (7) all economic and financial sanctions to be terminated without delay, (8) a *Special Interim Authority* to verify compliance which will also ratify decisions made by the local authorities on the Islands, (9) the *Executive* and *Legislative* Councils to have Argentine members each drawn from the local community, (10) the flags of the UK, Argentina and the members of the *Special Interim Authority* to fly together at its HQ only, (11) residence and ownership of property to be equal between Islanders and Argentinians without prejudice to the rights of the inhabitants, (12) *“December 31, 1982, will conclude the Interim Period during which the signatories shall complete negotiations on removal of the Islands from the list of non-self governing territories .. and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity ..”*

April 23rd – Defence Secretary John Nott supports his Ministry's suggestion for the early deployment of Vulcan bombers to Ascension Island; *“The Vulcans with air refuelling has a radius of action and bomb carrying capability to reach the Falkland Islands from Ascension Island which is 3,350 miles away. A force of 10 Victor tankers would be required to support a single Vulcan round trip from Ascension Island. There is enough fuel at Ascension to support this operation. The US Administration has today confirmed that there would be no objection to out deploying Vulcan aircraft to Ascension...”*

Norway bans imports from Argentina.

Following reconnaissance flights over the Task Force by Argentine aircraft, Britain asks Switzerland, via its envoy in Buenos Aires, to deliver a warning to Argentina that; *“ In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under article '51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”*

Inglesias Rouco, writing in *La Prensa*, says; *“..this is a time for arms and war is now inevitable.”*

At the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons considers another approach to the *Security Council*; *“ Recent conversations which I have had confirm that the longer we can keep out of the Council the better. The Non-Aligned members are already feeling slightly uneasy that a combination of our tactics and Panamanian/Argentine clumsiness led them to support a Resolution which contained nothing about the Argentine case on sovereignty. I have also had reliable confirmation that, if we use force, and particularly if we inflict casualties, there will be an immediate return to the Council ... and that we will be seriously isolated. .. If the Haig mission collapses, someone is bound to call the Council fairly soon and there will be precisely those calls on us which we wish to avoid, eg. the suspension of military preparations combined with some time-consuming and ineffective mechanism such as the Secretary-General's good offices. All the above reinforces my conviction that we should for the moment continue to soldier on here for as long as we can, keeping the diplomatic initiative and avoiding recourse to the Council..”*

Special forces are landed again on the Fortuna Glacier during a lull in the blizzard. *HMS Antrim* and *HMS Plymouth* rendezvous with *HMS Brilliant*. *HMS Endurance* remains near South Georgia to stay in touch with the observation parties.

April 24th – Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward's Task Group rendezvous' with the destroyers in mid-Atlantic.

Alexander Haig telegrams PM Thatcher; *“Francis Pym and I have just concluded our discussions ... He will be bringing back to London a text which I put forward as a basis for a peaceful settlement. Francis made it very clear that some of what I suggested presented problems ... Whether the text we have suggested would be accepted in Buenos Aires I cannot say. It would certainly require the Argentines to move well beyond their positions at the end of my latest visit there. ... We are at the point now where we have only the finest tolerance between a peaceful solution and tragedy...”*

The Argentine Government, party to the North American Space Agency's *Landsat* programme, ask NASA for satellite coverage of South Georgia. The Americans quote *“technical problems”* and decline; *“Eagleburger made*

*two further points. First, it was vital that this should not leak. Second, it was obvious that the longer the "technical problems" continued, the more clear it would become to the Argentinians what was happening. The second two days coverage would be of the open sea to the west of S. Georgia. It would be of great help to him ... to know whether ... this could be of some military value to the Argentinians."*⁷⁴

Foreign Secretary, Pym, arrives back in London with the latest version of the Haig peace plan, which he presents to the *War Cabinet*. Whilst the Foreign Secretary is inclined to accept the plan, Margaret Thatcher is prepared to resign if the *Cabinet* agree with him. The *Cabinet's* decision therefore, is not to reject the plan outright, but to rely on President Galtieri rejecting it first.

PM Thatcher sends the British response to Haig; *"This whole business started with an Argentine aggression. Since then our purpose together has been to ensure the early withdrawal by the Argentines in accordance with the Security Council Resolution. We think therefore that the next step should be for you to put your latest ideas to them. I hope that you will seek the Argentine government's view of them tomorrow and establish urgently whether they can accept them. Knowledge of their attitude will be important to the British Cabinet's consideration of your ideas."*

General Oscar Joffre, with the Argentine *10th Infantry Brigade*, and Brigadier General Omar Parada, with the *3rd Infantry Brigade*, arrive to reinforce the Falklands.

HMS Brilliant, *HMS Antrim* and *HMS Plymouth* regroup at South Georgia.

Secretary Haig responds to Thatcher's telegram; *"In light of your reply I shall, tomorrow, present my ideas to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez..."*

April 25th – Ambassador Charles Wallace, in Lima, reports to London; *"Sources close to the President told me yesterday that he was deeply worried about the present situation. It was also suggested to me that there might be in existence a secret undertaking between the Argentine and Peruvian armed forces dating from ... 1979. ... The terms of the undertaking would commit the armed forces of each country to the defence of the other in case of aggression by a third, clearly with Chile uppermost in mind."*

Argentine submarine, *ARA Sante Fe*, having landed 50 reinforcements and supplies for the garrison on South Georgia, is seen leaving Grytviken by the helicopter from *HMS Antrim*. The helicopter attacks the submarine with depth charges while helicopters from the other British ships join in. The *Sante Fe* is so badly damaged its crew abandon her in shallow water by the BAS jetty at King Edwards Point and flee towards Grytviken. Rather than stick to the original plan, a decision is taken to attack immediately and a company of 72 men is formed of Royal Marines, Special Boat Service and Special Air Service personnel. These are landed under the covering fire of Antrim and Plymouth's 4.5" guns.

137 Argentine troops on South Georgia, together with the submariners, surrender. The only casualty is an Argentine submariner who sustains a leg wound.

BBC Radio reports; *"The message we have got is that British troops landed on South Georgia this afternoon, shortly after 4 pm London time. They have now successfully taken control of Grytviken; at about 6 pm London time, the white flag was hoisted in Grytviken beside the Argentine flag. Shortly afterwards, the Argentine forces there surrendered to British forces. The Argentine forces offered only limited resistance to the British troops. Our forces were landed by helicopter and were supported by a number of warships, together with a*

⁷⁴ PREM19/621. Telegram No. 1441. Along with many other countries, both the UK and Argentina were participants in this programme and were entitled to request satellite images. Supposedly neutral, the USA found it difficult to refuse Argentina's repeated requests. They adopted a rather more flexible approach with British requests.

Royal Fleet Auxiliary. During the first phase of this opinion, our own helicopters engaged the Argentine submarine, Santa Fé, off South Georgia. This submarine was detected at first light and was engaged because it posed a threat to our men and to the British warships launching the landing. So far, no British casualties have been reported. At present we have no information on the Argentine casualty position."

A message is sent to London, from South Georgia;

" Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen."

In New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister, says, in an off-the-cuff remark, that Argentina is now at war. This is not confirmed by his Government in Buenos Aires. The BBC report anti-British demonstrations in Buenos Aires while in Venezuela, shipping workers boycott British ships.

April 26th – Australia's prime Minister issues a press statement; *"The British Government's decision to use force to re-establish its administration in South Georgia is a natural consequence on the invasion of the Falklands and South Georgia by Argentine forces, and the failure of Argentina to comply with the demands of the United Nations Security Council to withdraw its forces. Argentina has refused to take effective action to settle the dispute by peaceful means, and has ignored repeated warnings from the British Government that the circumstances justified the use of force. The Argentine Government continued to reinforce its military presence in the Falklands. The British military action should therefore not have come as a surprise..."*

Margaret Thatcher pens a memo to Secretary Haig; *"The repossession of South Georgia of course alters the situation regarding the tremendous efforts you are making to produce a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. On the one hand there is the important change that the Falkland Islands Dependencies are no longer occupied by Argentina. On the other hand, the successful British military action should bring home to Argentina her interests in negotiating seriously for a settlement.."*

A 'defence area' is declared around the task group as it sails south. Argentine troops stationed at Leith, on South Georgia, surrender.

Margaret Thatcher warns, in a speech to Parliament, that the time for diplomacy is running out; *"The Falklanders' loyalty to Britain is fantastic. If they wish to stay British we must stand by them. Democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. . . . The people who live there are of British stock. They have been for generations, and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is about the wishes of the people."*

The OAS meets in Washington; *"Consultation under the Rio Treaty began .. today. Most Rio Treaty signatories were represented ... Costa Mendez's violent speech was followed by warm applause. A firm statement by Haig that force had been used by an American State and Security Council Resolution 502 laid down the basis for a settlement was greeted with total silence. .."*

Costa Mendez claimed ... British aggression threatened not only Argentina but the peace and security of the whole Latin American region. The British attack on South Georgia demonstrated how the UK disregarded the

course of peaceful negotiation. The UK had answered Argentina's peaceful intentions (sic) with "an act of war. .. Argentina would defend itself to the maximum extent: the Argentine flag would not be lowered until the last drop of blood had been expended by the Argentine soldiers.."

Ambassador Henderson in Washington contacts London; "Haig has telephoned me following his speech at the OAS which he said went down like a lead balloon. Nobody was likely again to call him even handed. He had spoken to Costa Mendez and told him that time had run out. Haig said that he would be presenting his proposals to the Argentinians on a take it or leave it basis. They would have 24 hours in which to answer yes or no."

A message is transmitted to PM Thatcher from Estanislao Valdes Otero, the President of the OAS meeting; ".. I have been instructed to transmit the appeal of the Foreign Ministers of the Americas that the Government of the United Kingdom .. immediately cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 on the Inter-American Treaty of reciprocal Assistance, and also refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security and immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and the interests of the Islanders. .."

Governor Menendez appoints himself as Head of the *Malvinas Joint Command*.⁷⁵

April 27th – Francis Pym receives a message from Secretary Haig via the US Embassy in London; We believe that your success on South Georgia may now give us greater reason to hope that the Argentines will regard the presently drafted framework as a preferred alternative to further armed conflict. If this hope is not misplaced, we may have an extremely critical opportunity – perhaps the last – before an escalation of the fighting takes place ... we have proposed to the Argentines that I leave for Buenos Aires as soon as that can be arranged – perhaps in the next few hours. .. If I do not go to Buenos Aires, I will instruct our Ambassador there to deliver our text and ask for a prompt Argentine reply, thus .. we should know within a day or two whether there is reason to hope that a settlement can be reached.."

Ambassador Henderson in Washington telegrams John Nott; ".. had a general discussion with Weinberger, .. he is delighted by the South Georgia operation and tells me that the President is also. He is sceptical whether the current negotiations are going to get anywhere. .."

The Daily Star newspaper speculates about Chilean cooperating in exchange for arms sales.

Henderson to the FCO; "Haig has telephoned me again ... He said that the Argentinians had come forward with three alternatives. The first was that he should go to Buenos Aires but only after the conclusion of the OAS debate which would mean not earlier than Wednesday 28th April. Haig had replied .. that would be too late. The second proposal was that Haig should ask HMG to halt the advance of the British fleet. Haig rejected this as quite impossible. .. The third idea was that Haig should transmit his proposals immediately through the USA Embassy in Buenos Aires. He has decided to do this..."

Plans for the retaking of the Falklands, Operation Sutton, are presented to the War Cabinet.

Sir Ian Sinclair QC advises the British Government that Argentine prisoners must be treated as Prisoners of War under the terms of the Geneva Conventions.

⁷⁵ As Mendez was actually junior to both Joffre and Parada, his orders were subsequently viewed as 'suggestions'. In a typical display of rivalry amongst Argentina's military, by the end of April, 5 Argentine Brigadier-Generals and one Admiral had set up separate HQ's on the Islands.

Henderson sends another telegram; *“Haig just told me that US Ambassador is on way to see Galtieri. He has delivered proposals to Costa Mendez. He will give him one hour to study them..”*

Argentine naval forces are deployed to intercept the British task group.

The OAS continue its discussion of the Falklands conflict. Only Guatemala and Nicaragua endorse Argentina's invasion. Mexico, Trinidad, Costa Rica and Colombia are all critical.

14 Islanders, deemed 'troublemakers' are detained at Fox Bay East.⁷⁶

April 28th – Secretary Haig telephones Francis Pym; *“Mr. Haig said that there was still no word from Buenos Aires. There appeared to be a stalemate, with the Navy in favour of action, and the Air Force and Army preferring negotiation. ... if there was still no reply by the morning of 29 April, the United States would go public. ...”*

The Prime Minister tells a *War Cabinet* meeting that the American proposals for an Anglo-Argentine agreement have been communicated to the Argentine government with the request that they should be accepted without amendment or rejected, but that no reply has as yet been received from the Argentines.

Margaret Thatcher sends a message to President Reagan; *“.. In the Cabinet's view, the proposals must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Argentines, who have ignored the deadline and publicly restated that they are not prepared to alter their position on sovereignty.”*

A final *Resolution* is adopted by the OAS urging Argentina and the UK to; *“.. immediately to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of the sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands and the interests of the Islanders.”*

On leaving the OAS meeting, Costa Mendez tells the waiting press that; *“The first phase – OAS endorsement of Argentinian sovereignty – is complete.”*

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym telegrams Washington; *“... The (OAS) Resolution is not acceptable to us. We cannot forego our undoubted rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as the Resolution suggests we should. The OAS Resolution is to be conveyed to the President of the Security Council. Argentina may additionally seek an early debate in the Council and the adoption of a Resolution on similar lines. We have so far been successful in keeping the issue out of the Council since the adoption of SCR 502. ... We therefore continue to hope that the Council will stand fast on 502. We will be working hard to achieve this.”*

Haig telephones Pym from Buenos Aires; *“He had just spent one and a quarter hours with Costa Mendez who had made a clear and plaintive request for the negotiating process to continue. Costa Mendez has said that the alternatives were for Argentina to bring in “the others” (by which Haig presumably meant the Russians: Haig commented that he doubted that they would be interested) or go to the UN. He had asked Haig whether he would forward further suggestions to us. Haig had told him that the proposals as they stood offered Argentina more than she could reasonably have expected. There was no hope of improving them. .. On emerging from the State Department, Costa Mendez had said publicly that he had not rejected the US proposals and that the negotiating process continued...”*

The *International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)* appeals to both Britain and Argentina to discharge their obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Argentina does not accept that the Geneva Conventions apply, and

⁷⁶ There are many instances of the Islanders helping themselves and passing information back to the UK. Reg Silvey, Terry Peck, Vernon Steen and Trudi Morrison to name only a few.

view the ICRC with suspicion.⁷⁷

Francis Pym sends a message to Ambassador Henderson; *"I know that Haig will let you know, and that you will report to us immediately, when there is any clear response from Galtieri and the Junta. Should they accept the American proposals I do not have to tell you that the political situation here will be extremely difficult to handle and we will need time for appropriate consultations. .. There needs to be the closest consultation on timing and presentation. .. In the event of Argentinian acceptance, American willingness to give a precise security guarantee of the Islands and Dependencies is absolutely essential so that there can be no question of reoccupation by the Argentines or an Argentinian change of mind during the withdrawal process.."*

Her Majesty's Government's declaration of a 'Total Exclusion Zone' is delivered to the Argentine Government. Sir Anthony Parsons informs the President of the Security Council of the Zone, adding; *"Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack."*

Peruvian airport workers institute a boycott of British aircraft and cargoes.

April 29th – British medium-range, *Vulcan* bombers arrive at Ascension Island. Intelligence suggests that Brazil is selling aircraft to Argentina's Air Force

Francis Pym sends to Alexander Haig; *".. I cannot conceal from you that my colleagues were very surprised to find that the deadline had passed and that the possibility of Argentinian proposals for amendments appeared not to be excluded. The Cabinet took the view that the combination of Argentinian delay and their request for amendments, together with their repeated public insistence that there can be no compromise on the issue of sovereignty, must be construed as an Argentinian rejection of the United States Government's proposals as they stand. It is therefore our very firm expectation ... that you will confirm this publicly tonight and that we shall henceforth be able to rely on the active support of the United States .."*

President Reagan writes to Margaret Thatcher; *".. There can be no doubt about our full support for you and the principles of international law and order you are defending. You can count on that support in whatever forum this issue is debated. You can also count on our sympathetic consideration of requests for assistance."*

Costa Mendez reports the Junta's rejection of Alexander Haig's final proposal; *"We have carefully considered the document that you transmitted to us ... As my Government has already indicated to you, Argentina's objective is the recognition of its sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. That central element of our discussions is the ultimate justification for the actions undertaken by my country and .. is for us an unrenounceable goal. .. To the extent that the provisions relating to the recognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, we deem necessary, if we wish to avoid a return to the frustrating situation that existed prior to April 2, the establishment of mechanisms that give us greater powers for the administration of the Islands... The document you sent falls short of Argentine demands and does not satisfy its minimum aspirations... As concerns the question of sovereignty, all precision regarding the concept of territorial integrity has been abandoned, and a new element has been introduced, a virtual referendum to determine the "wishes" of the inhabitants, in open opposition to United Nations Resolution 2065 ..You realize Mr. Secretary, that we cannot accept these changes..."*

Argentina announces a 200 mile exclusion zone against British shipping and aircraft, extending from the

⁷⁷ PREM19/622. The Conventions apply in a state of war; or when there is another type of armed conflict or when territory is being occupied. Argentina would not declare the first, was reluctant to recognise the second and denied that it occupied foreign territory.

Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Its fleet prepares to intercept Britain's task group. Consisting of 2 attack groups, one moves towards the north-west of the Falklands, while the other approaches the Islands from the south. The British force is moving on the Islands from the east.

Prime Minister Thatcher updates Parliament, and deals with a suggestion of arbitration; *“ Although we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich or British Antarctic Territory, some of my right hon. and hon. friends have suggested that we refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. Since Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court, the issue cannot be referred for a binding decision without her agreement.*

We have never sought a ruling on the Falkland Islands themselves from that court, but we have raised the question of the dependencies on three separate occasions—in 1947, 1949 and 1951. Each time Argentina refused to go to the court.

In 1955, the British Government applied unilaterally to the International Court of Justice against encroachments on British sovereignty in the dependencies by Argentina. Again, the court advised that it could not pursue the matter since it could act only if there was agreement between the parties recognising the court's jurisdiction.

In 1977, Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind.

There is no reason, given the history of this question, for Britain, which has sovereignty and is claiming nothing more, to make the first move. It is Argentina that is making a claim. If Argentina wanted to refer it to the International Court, we would consider the possibility very seriously. But in the light of past events it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like.”

Ernesto Sabato, a staunch opponent to the Junta writes in La Nacion; “In Argentina it is not a military dictatorship that is fighting. It is the whole people, her women, her children, her old people, regardless of their political persuasion. Opponents to the regime like myself are fighting for our dignity, fighting to extricate the last vestiges of colonialism. Don't be mistaken, Europe, it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the Malvinas; it is the whole nation.”

Sir Anthony Parsons informs London; “I have spent most of the day in the company of all other members of the Security Council. There is an atmosphere amongst them of great tension and expectation; eg of a dramatic military move by us any day now, but no sign that any of them are contemplating calling the Council. This hesitation may disappear if Haig announces failure .. tomorrow...”

US Secretary Haig updates his country's House Foreign Affairs Committee; “ ... I think it is awfully important to understand how this thing has played out along the way. We went first to London, then to Buenos Aires, and then again to Buenos Aires, as you know. We had extensive discussions at the highest level. In Great Britain it was relatively easy because the government is structured and organised pluralistically and democratically. The Cabinet sits down with the Prime Minister, and business is done.

In Argentina there is no one who can make a decision. There are variously from 20 to 40 people who can cast a veto on any decision that is made. And so instead of a consensus of what you would call a majority view, it is the lowest common denominator of the most extreme view that prevails....

I must say that the British Government, from the outset, has been reasonable and easy to deal with. Their position has been that sovereignty is not a critical issue. What is a critical issue is that the will of the

population, self determination is the key issue. And if the population decides to go with Argentina, so be it; if they decide to stay aligned with Britain or seek independence, so be it. The British are prepared to accept that. ..

On the Argentine side, despite all our effort the Argentines have insisted bedrock, fundamental a priori relinquishment of sovereignty, either in the near term ... or as a precondition for negotiation, that the only negotiations that would be acceptable to them would be those that would lead to a transfer of property to Argentina.

*So it's not just a question of decolonization; its a question of recolonization on top of decolonization.*⁷⁸

During the questions that follow, Secretary Haig is asked about taking the sovereignty issue to either the ICJ or the World Court. He responds; “.. *it would be rejected out of hand by the Argentines. I have talked adjudication by the World Court, by the UN, or by a special commission. It was rejected all.*”

The US Senate passes a Resolution; “... *be it resolved that the United States cannot stand neutral with regard top the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 502 and recognizing the right of the United Kingdom, and all other Nations, to self-defence under the UN Charter, should therefore prepare, through consultations with Congress, to further all efforts .. to achieve full withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falkland Islands.*”

April 30th – the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires informs Secretary Haig; “*I asked to see President Galtieri and was received at midnight .. I told Galtieri that we came without instructions and with the only purpose of seeing what we could do to head off a fatal confrontation. I pointed out to the President that we had not received an adequate response to our proposal and that we would announce tomorrow several measures against Argentina. During more than an hour's conversation, he demonstrated no give whatsoever ..*”

The *Junta* in Buenos Aires impose general censorship for reasons of, “*national security.*”

Investigative journalist Jack Anderson, speaking on the *Good Morning America* television programme, alleges that the British Task Force is armed with tactical nuclear weapons and that the Commander has permission to use them.⁷⁹

Bud McFarlane, Reagan's deputy *National Security Advisor*, informs him that the Soviet Union has repositioned a satellite in order to keep track of the British Task Force.

President Reagan calls a *National Security Council* meeting to discuss the current situation in the South Atlantic. Haig informs the meeting that; “... *Unfortunately, the Argentine government which is, in fact, made up of many moving and conflicting parts could not agree to the plan. The Navy holds the veto and is even more intransigent after losing South Georgia, whose Argentine garrison surrendered without firing a shot - a fact known to the Argentine government, but not to the Argentine people.*”

In a press statement following the meeting, Alexander Haig announces Argentina's rejection of his peace proposals; “*We had reason to hope that the United Kingdom would consider a settlement along the lines of our*

78 *Briefing by the Honorable Alexander M. Haig Jr. Secretary of State before Key House Leadership and House Foreign Affairs Committee – Room 2172, Rayburn Building, Washington DC 4/29/82*

79 In April, 2010 an MoD spokesman stated: “*We can confirm that we did have some nuclear depth chargers. We did have some being carried with the Task Force and they were being transferred from ship to ship for safety reasons and to meet our obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The weapons themselves were not deployed in the course of the conflict. We said in 1982 that there was no question at all of our using nuclear weapons in this dispute. We said it was inconceivable that we would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.*”

proposal, but Argentina informed us yesterday that it could not accept it. Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an immediate de facto role in governing the islands, which would lead to sovereignty. For its part, the British Government has continued to affirm the need to respect the views of the inhabitants in any settlement. ... in the light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the U.S. cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes .. The President has therefore ordered: the suspension of all military exports to Argentina; the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales; the suspension of new export-import bank credits and guarantees; and the suspension of commodity credit corporation guarantees.”

At the same time as Haig's press conference, Argentina's Foreign Secretary, Costa Mendez, tells the Pérez de Cuéllar that his country does not see the Haig negotiations as being 'dead'. He also says that Argentina is ready to abide by *Resolution 502* and will accept a transitional administration; “ .. until the exercise of full Argentine sovereignty became possible.

President Reagan terminates Haig's mission; declares US support for Britain and imposes economic sanctions on Argentina.

Foreign Secretary Pym makes a statement to the British press; “*Mr. Haig has told us that Argentina has rejected his proposals for a negotiated settlement; and he has just announced this in Washington .. In deciding not to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the Argentines have confirmed their commitment to aggression in defiance of the UN ..*”

Alan Copeland of the *Daily Express* asks whether Pym's planned trip to see the Secretary-General of the UN precludes any use of force by Britain. Francis Pym responds; “*No, because we are facing force now. As I have described they have a fleet at sea, they've got thousands of soldiers on the islands, they're occupying territory which they have no right to occupy. No. We are going to maintain our total exclusion zone. That is the position. If they challenge it, then of course there will be military action and that's how it is ...*”

Ecuador's Foreign Minister makes a statement; “*I have just learnt with profound concern of the attitude of the United States in imposing sanctions against the Argentine Republic and in supporting Great Britain. I must point out that the Resolution of the .. (OAS).. is obligatory for all the States members of the Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance. ... The Resolution recalls the declaration of the Inter-American Legal Committee in the sense that, “the Argentine Republic has an unimpeachable right of sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas.” This is a legal and moral obligation which the members of the Treaty have assumed by virtue of the Resolution. In these circumstances the support which has been announced and declared by the United States for Great Britain and the imposition of sanctions against the Argentine Republic constitute disregard of the obligation which the United States assumed .. That country's vote of abstention does not prevent it from accepting and respecting the said Resolution. ...*”

Brazil writes to the Secretary-General requesting the use of his 'good offices' in finding a peaceful solution, adding; “*It is the responsibility of the United Nations to take prompt and effective measures, including those of a preventative nature, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its aspects.”*

Unconfirmed intelligence suggests that Peru is providing military aircraft to Argentine 'on loan.'

Ambassador Henderson reports on Argentina's economic position; “*Major US banks are seeking to limit use of Argentine short-term credit lines to the levels reached before the crisis. Smaller banks with a high exposure in Latin America are pulling out as soon as credits mature, and building their liquidity against the possibility of deposits being shifted away from them. One of these banks felt that even if there was an immediate political settlement, there was no way that Argentina could avoid going broke within 2 months or so, ...*”

At the UN, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, contacts the President of the *Security Council* and; “ .. made six points to him, as follows: (a) he reaffirmed Argentina's wish for a negotiated settlement: (b) Argentina was ready for the implementation of SCR 502 “as a package”: (c) Argentina hoped that there would be no confrontation. The UK was using disproportionate force and an armed encounter could have unforeseen consequences: (d) Argentina was ready to accept a transitional period in which all aspects of the dispute could be resolved: (e) the question of sovereignty was of the greatest importance to Argentina. Argentina was disposed to accept a mutually agreeable formula on sovereignty during the transitional period: (f) so far as Argentina was concerned, Haig was still in action but his latest proposals on sovereignty had not been acceptable to Argentina. Kamanda subsequently telephoned to say that Costa Mendez had telephoned him to add a seventh point ... viz (g) Argentina would accept the presence of a UN force in the Islands in order to enable Argentina to withdraw and to begin the transitional period.”

Costa Mendez then speaks to Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to repeat Argentina's position before announcing to the press Argentina 's willingness to comply with SCR 502.

Pérez de Cuéllar summons Sir Anthony Parsons to pass on Mendez's official message ; “Costa Mendez had said that Argentina was ready to abide by SCR 502. There would of course have to be a phasing out period for the withdrawal of Argentine troops: and a transitional administration until the full exercise of Argentine sovereignty became possible. Recognition of Argentina's right to sovereignty was a basic condition. Apart from that, Argentina was ready to enter into negotiations on the widest possible basis. She was ready to take into consideration the “interests” of the Islanders but not their “wishes” which had been imposed by the Administering power. But she could accept a form of local administration which retained a British flavour .. Argentina was therefore open to all possibilities, except on sovereignty.... In reply ... I said that it was impossible for the British Government to concede sovereignty in advance, or to accept conditions implying that they were prepared to concede sovereignty. I thought that when Costa Mendez said that Argentina was ready to implement SCR 502 in its entirety, he was implying that he would start at the bottom end of the Resolution. Pérez de Cuéllar said that Costa Mendez had told him that Argentina wished to begin implementation with negotiations. I pointed out that this confirmed that the Argentines were not prepared to withdraw without securing recognition of their sovereignty in advance. ... Britain could not accept a process of mediation or negotiation while the Argentines dug themselves in.... Finally, Pérez de Cuéllar said that, if Argentina stated officially that Haig's mission was dead, a void would exist which he and the Security Council would be expected to fill. ..”

Parsons telegrams the FCO; “Costa Mendez's various statements here today amount to a smart PR move... My guess is that his purpose has been to present the Argentine position in the most favourable light particularly in UN eyes and try to distract attention from US and UK responses to the failure of Haig's mission. He has succeeded in creating the impression of a change in the Argentine position ...I do not think however that we need to take Costa Mendez's PR success too tragically. His statements have been small beer by comparison with those of Haig ... and they will soon be overtaken by a presumably less diplomatic response from the Generals in Buenos Aires ..”

Ambassador Henderson agrees; “This looks like standard Costa Mendez tactics which are to pretend that the Argentinians are prepared to withdraw their forces and thereby comply with SCR 502, while they are in fact only prepared to do so if they retain a large measure of de facto control over the Islands and the question of sovereignty is pre-judged in their favour. There is a need to expose these tactics, and the fact that Costa Mendez really counts for nothing in this affair. The decisions are made by the Junta and they are taking a different line.”

Eduardo Roca, Argentina's Permanent Representative at the UN, submits a letter addressed to the Security Council; “... the United Kingdom has no legal grounds whatsoever for invoking the right of self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter in justification of the military aggression it is carrying out in the South Georgia Islands. The fact that three weeks elapsed between Argentina's recovery of those islands for its national patrimony and the British attacks which began on 25 April, and the fact that the islands are 8,000 miles from the territory of the United Kingdom, clearly show how inappropriate it is to invoke Article 51 of the Charter as justification for this manifestly illegitimate use of force. The Argentine forces ... certainly exercising the right of self-defence in order to repel a grave and imminent danger, have continued their resistance in the South Georgia Islands, thus giving the lie to the United Kingdom's statements that its authority has been restored in those territories.

With regard to the United Kingdom's allegation that my country has violated Council resolution 502 (1982), I must point out that the Argentine Republic on several occasions reiterated before the Council its intention to comply with that resolution ... However, the continuation of the British Government's punitive actions compels my country to exercise its right of self-defence ...”

Sir Anthony Parsons responds to Argentina's letter to the Security Council; “On 3 April 1982, notwithstanding current action in the Security Council and the adoption of SCR 502, Argentina carried out an armed invasion of the island of South Georgia. The small British garrison resisted but was eventually captured. On 25 April, in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, British forces re-established British authority on South Georgia. ... There is no question of the United Kingdom Government having acted aggressively, having in any way breached the terms of SCR 502 (implementation of para.2 of which by Argentina is still awaited by the international community) or of having caused a breach of international peace and security. .. No amount of selective quotation from statements of British Ministers can obscure the fact that it was Argentina which first used armed force..”

May 1st – British special forces reconnaissance teams land on the Falkland Islands.

XM607, a Vulcan bomber attacks Stanley airfield during the early hours of the morning. At dawn Sea Harriers from HMS Hermes attack targets in and around Stanley airfield and Goose Green.

HMS Glamorgan, HMS Arrow and HMS Alacrity bombard Stanley airfield, and are in turn attacked by 3 Mirages, one of which is shot down. The ships sustain only minor splinter damage. An Argentine Canberra bomber is also shot down whilst in the exclusion zone. The Ministry of Defence issues a statement; “We have been enforcing the Total Exclusion Zone since noon London time on Friday, 30 April in exercise of the right of self-defence .. The notice issued on 28 April made it clear that after 48 hours warning the airport would be closed and that any aircraft on the ground would be liable to attack...”

Spain's Government protests; “.. the British air attack on Port Stanley constitutes a serious escalation in the conflict. The possible outbreak of a more generalised and massive British action in the archipelago would mean a tragic loss of human lives and would signify great responsibility and a historic error. The Spanish Government from the beginning of the conflict has let its position be clearly known: it is absolutely contrary to the use of force, a position which it now reaffirms. On the other hand it deplors the fact that in spite of its efforts in the international fora and in bilateral contacts no account has been taken of the fundamental colonial problem which is the origin of the conflict and on which Spain has always supported Argentina's traditional position, in agreement with the doctrine of the United Nations. ...”⁸⁰

80 In fact, Spain made very little comment throughout the 1982 conflict despite protests in Madrid and other major Spanish cities in favour of Argentina. Spain's application to join the EU which was pending, and subject to a possible veto by the

The President of the *Security Council* calls for information. Sir Anthony Parsons reminds the Council; “... *In my letter of 28 April concerning the Total Exclusion Zone, I set out the text of an announcement by the Government of the United Kingdom to the effect that from 1100 hrs on 30 April 1982, “Port Stanley airport will be closed, and any aircraft on the ground in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and, accordingly, is liable to attack” ..*”

Following the attack on Goose Green, 114 settlers from the settlement are interned at the Recreation Club by Lt. Col. Piaggi. The Club has two toilets, a bar and running water but no food is supplied. Argentine soldiers loot the civilian's houses and park helicopters amongst the buildings to deter attack.⁸¹

American newspapers quote an unnamed “*senior administration official*”⁸² as taking exception to Costa Mendez's claim that Argentina had not rejected the US peace proposal.

The New York Times quotes Pentagon officials as saying that communication channels, including satellite communications, have already been made available to Britain.

A US Department of State, *Top Secret Current Report* from the *Bureau of Intelligence and Research* reports Argentina's Air Force Chief of Staff, Juan Garcia, as saying that Argentina will not be the first to open fire but that an attack on Port Stanley will trigger a full scale attack on the British fleet; “*Garcia seemed to rule out a major preemptive strike against the British fleet and reiterated that the Argentine Government could not present a peace plan to its people that did not assure sovereignty over the Falklands. He also said that British commandos have landed on the islands and Argentine forces are attempting to locate them. If the commandos succeed in mingling with the local population, measures to control the civilians would be imposed.*”

President Galtieri speaks to the Argentine nation; “*Fellow Argentines, today, the arms of the Argentine Nation have answered a new act of aggression perpetrated by the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic. They have and are still attacking us, but, we have and will continue to repel them, and this will always be our answer if the enemy intends to again establish a colony on Argentine land.*”

Prior to this attack, during long days and entire weeks, inconceivable pressures have been exerted on our sovereign will, they have depicted us as bloody aggressors; but it is well-known that upon recovering the unredeemed territory that we chose to die instead of killing, and because of this during an unprecedented military operation neither the adversary nor the population of the Malvinas experienced a single casualty.

We have been wronged with sanctions that the great powers avoid enforcing against those they consider to be their worst enemies as if our condition as a young country would make us an easy prey.

We have been slandered and insulted, moreover, we have been intimidated, threatened, intrigued against and we have been the victim of all sort of unimaginable maneuvers to discredit us.

We have stated our reasons. We have said that for almost one and a half century we either obtained an intemperate negative or the most cynical silence to our persistent claim to our proven rights.

We have proven that the United Kingdom decided to send warships in answer to the previously authorized presence of Argentine workers on the Georgia Islands.

Since we were certain that there was no other path to recover our irrevocable sovereignty, we acted as we have, and thus we have shown the world. ... our cause is no longer an Argentine problem, it has now become a

British, may be relevant.

81 No food was made available for 48 hours. The civilians included babes in arms and any detention was illegal under the Geneva Conventions.

82 Probably Alexander Haig.

cause of the Americas and the world which does not recognise colonialism as a situation which can be endured .. The British Empire, encouraged by the alleged results of its campaign of pressure, is resorting to the direct and naked use of force, therefore we have no other alternative than to respond ...”

President Belaunde of Peru puts forward ideas for a diplomatic solution including a temporary administration of the Islands until a settlement is found. Argentina demands that a temporary administration of the Islands should be made up of the representatives of Venezuela, Brazil , Peru, Canada, Germany and the USA.

Britain's Ministry of Defence issue a statement; *“British aircraft have engaged a number of Argentine bombers, believed to be Canberras, and have shot at least one down and damaged another.”*

Eduardo Roca submits a further letter addressed to the *Security Council*; *“In accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter, I have the honour to inform you ... that the successive attacks by the British Air Force against Puerto Argentina in the Malvinas islands were repulsed by my country in exercise of its right of self-defence. In the anti-aircraft action, two Harrier aircraft were shot down, a third was hit ⁸³... In perpetrating this bloody aggression against my country, the United Kingdom is persisting in violating Security Council Resolution 502 (1982). In the light of these facts, not even the most distorted interpretation of that Resolution (which was adopted in the interests of peace) can be used by the United Kingdom in an attempt to legitimise its irresponsible conduct.*

The increasing aggression by the United Kingdom against my country is today threatening to unleash an armed conflict of unknown dimensions and unforeseeable implications for international peace and security; the United Kingdom Government will be solely responsible for the breach of such peace and security.

Through these actions, the United Kingdom is seeking to arrogate to itself powers which, under Article 24 of the Charter, were granted by the States Members of the United Nations to the Security Council for the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Kingdom is thus thwarting effective implementation of a Council resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom itself. It is now declaring the resolution to be ineffective and is cynically invoking the right of self-defence in seeking to justify an open and brazen act of aggression.”

The MoD issue a further statement; *“A report has been received from the Task Force that an air engagement took place this evening within the Total Exclusion Zone between British Sea Harriers and Argentine Mirages. One Mirage was shot down. There are no reports of damage to British aircraft.”*

May 2nd – Margaret Thatcher holds a meeting at Chequers; where it is agreed; *“ .. that British forces should forthwith be authorised to attack any Argentine naval vessel (but not naval auxiliaries) ...”⁸⁴*

Francis Pym, hosts a press conference at the British Embassy in Washington; *“Last week I came here to see Mr. Haig in his role as a mediator, today I have come back to consult him as an ally. The British people are very grateful to the United States for coming down in their support. We never had any doubt that they would come down in support of the victim and against the aggressor ... the long phase of Mr. Haig's mission ended with the rejection of the United States' proposals by the Argentines a few days ago, but that does not end the search for a diplomatic solution.”*

Pym discusses a number of military, diplomatic and economic issues with Alexander Haig, including the latest Peruvian peace proposal, as amended by the Americans. This consists of (1) an immediate ceasefire, (2) a mutual withdrawal of forces, (3) a temporary administration made up of third party countries, (4) an acceptance by both

83 No Harrier losses were reported on May 1st.

84 This meeting commenced at 12.45pm British time.

Argentina and Britain that a dispute over sovereignty exists, (5) acknowledgement that the “*views and interests*” of the Islanders must be taken into account, (6) a “*contact group*” of Brazil, Peru, Germany and the USA would be formed, and (7) this group would be responsible for reaching a definitive agreement by 30 April 1983.

Spain's Prime Minister, speaking to a rally, announces that his Government has offered itself as a mediator to Argentina as the situation in the South Atlantic was, “*very serious*” and Spain considered itself affected. He says that while Spain rejects the use of force, Britain had negotiated, “*little and badly*”. He adds that Spain has a clearer claim to Gibraltar than Argentina has to the Falklands.

Francis Pym flies to New York. At the UN, the Government of Ireland demands that the Falklands issue be put again before the *Security Council*.

Reports indicate that Argentina now has 13,000 troops on the Falkland Islands, supported by artillery units armed with 42 105mm guns, 4 155mm guns, 23 quick-firing anti-aircraft guns plus surface-to-air missiles, and 23 armoured cars. Argentina attempts to jam the BBC's '*Spanish Service*' to South America.

3.57pm: Whilst approximately 35 miles south-west of the '*total exclusion zone*', *HMS Conqueror* fires 3 torpedoes at the Argentine light cruiser, *General Belgrano*. 2 of the 3 torpedoes strike the cruiser. The Argentine escorts flee.⁸⁵

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office inform Sir Anthony Parsons at the UN; “*We have just heard that the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano has been hit by two torpedoes from the submarine HMS Conqueror. ... Although the incident took place outside the TEZ it was in accordance with the rules of engagement agreed on 2 May. ...*”

Britain's Ministry of Defence issue a statement; “*At approximately 8pm London time this evening the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano was hit by torpedoes fired from a British submarine. The cruiser is believed to be severely damaged. On Friday 23 April, HMG warned the Argentine Government that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter the appropriate response. The cruiser posed a significant threat to the British Task Force maintaining the TEZ. The action taken was fully in accordance with the instructions given to the Task Force Commander based on the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The British submarine suffered no damage in the engagement and has resumed her patrol.*”

4.24pm: the crew of the *General Belgrano* are ordered to abandon the stricken ship.

The vessel sinks with the loss of 368 seamen.⁸⁶

“*Admiral Fieldhouse told us that one of our submarines, HMS Conqueror, had been shadowing the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Belgrano was escorted by two destroyers. The cruiser itself had substantial fire power provided by 6 inch guns with a range of 13 miles and anti-aircraft missiles. We were advised that she might have been fitted with Exocet anti-ship missiles, and her two destroyer escorts were known to be carrying them. The whole group was sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone. We had received intelligence about the aggressive intentions of the Argentine fleet. There had been extensive air attacks on our ships the previous day and Admiral Woodward, in command of the Task Force, had every reason to believe that a full scale attack was developing. Admiral Woodward had to come to a judgement about what to do with the Belgrano in the light of these circumstances. From all the information available, he concluded that the carrier and the*

85 South Atlantic time. In London it was 7.57pm.

86 770 men were rescued between the 3rd and 5th of May. The ship's commander subsequently described his vessel as a '*legitimate target*' and confirmed that he did have orders to attack the task group.

Belgrano group were engaged in a classic pincer movement against the Task Force. It was clear to me what must be done to protect our forces, in the light of Admiral Woodward's concern and Admiral Fieldhouse's advice. We therefore decided that British forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the same basis as agreed previously for the carrier.... The Belgrano was torpedoed and sunk just before 8 o'clock that evening. Our submarine headed away as quickly as possible. Wrongly believing that they would be the next targets, the Belgrano's escorts seem to have engaged in anti-submarine activities rather than rescuing its crew, some 321 of whom were lost ⁸⁷

Francis Pym and Sir Anthony Parsons speak to Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, and his assistant Rafee Ahmed over dinner. Pérez de Cuéllar presents a paper for the Foreign Secretary's consideration.

“Following is the text of the aide mémoire which the Secretary-General gave you ... : The Secretary-General is deeply concerned over the grave situation that has developed as a result of the failure thus far to achieve an understanding between the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom .. that would avert further armed conflict and open the way to a peaceful solution... The Secretary-General believes that, in this situation, the United Nations has a most serious responsibility under the Charter urgently to restore peace and to promote a just and lasting settlement. To this end, it is imperative that the terms of Resolution 502 (1982) be implemented without delay. Accordingly, the Secretary-General would suggest that the two Governments agree to take simultaneously the steps set out below, which are conceived as provisional measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties.

- (a) .. both Governments to complete their withdrawal by an agreed date,*
- (b) both Governments commence negotiations to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences by an agreed date,*
- (c) both Governments rescind their respective announcements of blockades and exclusion zones, and cease all hostile acts against each other,*
- (d) both Governments terminate all economic sanctions,*
- (e) transitional arrangements begin to come into effect to supervise implementation of the above steps and to meet interim administrative requirements.*

The Secretary-General wishes to reiterate his readiness to do all he can to be of assistance .. The Secretary-General expresses the earnest hope that the two Governments will speedily signify their readiness to accept the approach outlined above. It would be appreciated if written communications in this regard were received in time for the Secretary-General to make a public announcement on 5 May...”

Sir Anthony Parsons notes; *“Pérez de Cuéllar left it to Ahmed to introduce and defend his paper. He seemed to agree with many of your comments on it. Your firmness will, I think, have had a salutary effect on Ahmed who can no longer be under any illusions that his sketchy and ill-thought out ideas have much chance of acceptance. Nevertheless, the fact that the Secretary-General has given you and the Argentines some ideas, which will certainly become known here (I shall be surprised if Pérez de Cuéllar fails to allude to them when he briefs members of the Council), should enable us to gain a little more time here. It would be off-side for anyone to introduce a Resolution into the Security Council when the parties were considering ideas put to them by the Secretary-General.”*

87 Extract from Margaret Thatcher 'The Downing Street Years' 1993.

May 3rd – in the early hours, Parsons telegrams the British Embassy in Lima; “.. please get in touch immediately with the Foreign Minister and/or President's office to ensure that no announcement is made that implies that we have agreed to these proposals or even had them formally presented to us ... The Secretary of State is grateful for the efforts which President Belaunde is making to secure a settlement of the dispute on a basis which respects the basic principles of international law. We will be prepared to consider carefully any ideas presented to us which seem likely to ensure what must be the first requirement: a withdrawal of Argentine troops which unlawfully invaded and occupied the Falklands. But we must be satisfied that the withdrawal is properly supervised, that there will be effective guarantees that the Argentines will implement whatever agreement may be reached, and that any interim arrangements and the framework for negotiations for a definitive settlement are not such as to prejudice the principles to which we attach importance. We are prepared to work hard for a satisfactory solution. But we cannot cut corners when matters of such importance are at stake. Neither can we renounce the exercise of our right of self defence while Argentine troops maintain their unlawful occupation of the Falklands.”

During a surveillance mission, a *Sea King* helicopter is attacked inside the TEZ by an Argentine ocean-going tug armed with 20mm cannon. The vessel is counter-attacked by a *Lynx* helicopter from *HMS Coventry* and the *Alferez Sobral*, is severely damaged. Eight of her crew are killed.

Ambassador Henderson in Washington receives a telephone call from Secretary Haig; “He told me that he had spoken to the Peruvian President at 1.00am today. The latter complained bitterly that British action had torpedoed the chances of peace. He was critical of the USA as well as the UK. They would both now have to pay a heavy price. He hinted that the Soviet Union would now be increasingly involved. .. It was being put about that the cruiser had been hit as a result of intelligence passed by US satellites and with the help of a special weapon provided by the Americans ..I reminded him that, according to information that he would have seen, the Argentinians had ordered three frigates to attack the *Hermes*, and the carrier had been given instructions to attack British ships. It could not therefore be said that the Argentinians were behaving peacefully ...”

In an official statement Brazil “disagrees” with the armed attacks which it describes as a violation of SCR 502. Cuba condemns the UK and calls for “solidarity” from all Latin American countries. The USSR condemns attempts to “restore the Falklands colonial status by force,” Venezuela talks of “British aggression” while China deplores military attacks against the “Malvinas Islands.”

5 *Infantry Brigade* is notified that it is to move to the South Atlantic while the *QE2* is requisitioned as a troop carrier; “The Ministry of Defence of course greatly regrets the inconvenience caused to intending passengers, but the *QE2*'s speed, size and facilities make her uniquely suited to carry substantial numbers of troops who may be required to go into action at short notice. At the same time as the *QE2* we are requisitioning two roll-on-roll-off ferries, *Baltic Ferry* and *Nordic Ferry* and a container ship, *Atlantic Causeway* which will be used to transport the helicopters needed for the air support of the brigade.”

Henderson in Washington reports a further conversation with Secretary Haig; “He had just been speaking on the telephone to the President of Peru. General Iglesias and Admiral Anaya had just arrived in Lima from Buenos Aires. President Belaunde believed that something real must be done to bring about a ceasefire. He believed that the Argentinians would accept the seven proposals ... Haig was most eager to know whether we could go along with these proposals or something very similar to them. No less pressing, in his mind, was the need to do something immediately to stop the fighting He thought it was desperately urgent for the Prime Minister to propose a ceasefire ... I told him that after waiting three weeks while the Argentinians reinforced the Islands we were not in a mood to rush to an armistice just because the Argentinians were losing hands down...”

Defence Secretary John Nott is asked during a press briefing at the MoD, whether Britain is engaged in a war with Argentina. He replies; *“Certainly we have hostilities with the Argentines. It is not in legal terms, however, a war, although the ordinary layman would class it as a war. We have the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”*

Foreign Secretary Pym hold a press conference in New York; *“Following my visit to Washington yesterday and the discussions I had with Mr. Haig, both in the morning and in the afternoon, I came here last night, as you know, had talks with the Secretary-General. We explored various ideas as to how the United Nations might be able to help in one way or another ... our strategy all along has been to maintain pressure on the Argentines, diplomatic, economic and military, and we declared several days ago the Total Exclusion Zone which we are now going to protect. Yesterday there was a very real threat to that zone posed by a cruiser. There was also an attack on a helicopter from two ships which were immediately counter-attacked by British forces. I want to make it clear that the British are not undertaking these military engagements by choice. We are there to defend British soil...”*

The Junta issue a short statement; *“The Joint General Staff reports that, as a result of the attack suffered at a point located at 55 degrees 24 minutes south and 61 degrees 32 minutes west by the cruiser General Belgrano, reported in communiqué No.15, indications exist that it must be presumed to have sunk.”*

Argentina recalls its surface fleet to shallow waters.

Secretary Haig transmits the details of the peace proposal from Peru to London. The Peruvian Foreign Minister passes them to the British Ambassador in Lima.⁸⁸

Francis Pym flies back to the UK.

Argentine news reports falsely claim that *HMS Exeter* has been sunk and that 11 *Harriers* and one helicopter have been shot down. They also claim that Argentine forces have severely damaged 4 frigates, one aircraft carrier and one destroyer during raids on the Task Force. The MoD reports that in reality, *Exeter* has not been involved in any engagement and only one aircraft suffered minimal damage. There has been minor splinter damage to one frigate. Contrary to Argentine claims of serious British casualties, only one seaman has been wounded and he is described as, *“safe and comfortable.”*

Secretary Haig tells Ambassador Henderson that further successful military action might cause the USA, and western opinion in general, to swing against the UK which may be seen as over-reacting and being too bellicose. He is informed that military developments will continue to be governed by existing rules of engagement, but that nothing unprecedented is currently contemplated.

May 4th – Francis Pym, together with the Prime Minister, briefs opposition leaders in the House of Commons; *“... On the whole he felt that the events of the last few days had hardened the determination of the Argentine Government to stay on the Falkland Islands, rather than the reverse. None-the-less, they had been prepared to talk to the Peruvian Government over the weekend. It was also significant that they had given a clearer response to the ideas put to them than they had done before. The Government remained determined to try to find a diplomatic solution, but he had to say that he was not optimistic at present.*

Reports in Israel's press confirm rumours of arms sales to Argentina previously denied by the Israeli government.

88 The Peruvian proposal was referred to as having been *“virtually dictated”* by Alexander Haig to President Belaunde.

The British *Type 42*, guided missile destroyer, *HMS Sheffield* is hit by an *Exocet* missile fired from a *Super Etendard* of the Argentine Navy. The missile fails to explode but causes an uncontrollable fire.

In Lima, the British Ambassador is summoned to the Foreign Ministry; *“The Foreign Minister .. communicated to me a formal note .. about the sinking of the Belgrano. .. In the ensuing conversation Dr. Arias said he wished me to be in no doubt about the profound shock and consternation felt by the Peruvian Government on learning of the attack on the cruiser after President Belaunde had announced his peace initiative. Dr. Arias said that Costa Mendez had told him on the telephone that the 7 point plan was being considered by the military Junta in Buenos Aires when the news of the attack brought further consideration, and the meeting, to a conclusion...”*

The Irish Government issue a statement saying that they; *“ .. are appalled by the outbreak of what amounts to open war between Argentina and Great Britain in the South Atlantic and at reports that hundreds of lives have already been lost.”* Ireland's Representative at the UN, Noel Dorr, is instructed by his Government to call for an immediate meeting of the *Security Council*.

Secretary Haig tells Ambassador Henderson that; *“.. the reaction from the Peruvians and Argetinians during the night was extremely discouraging. The latter are being more intransigent than ever, saying that this is inevitable in light of our military action. Haig does not think that this should preclude us from considering the seven-point plan and if possible going along with it. If the Argentinians turned it down they would put themselves once again in the wrong with world public opinion. Haig's main emphasis this morning is on the real urgency, in his view ... for London to take an initiative. .. he regards the Irish decision as “totally irresponsible” and as, “likely to prolong the war”... He was convinced that London must come up with something to try and head off the inevitable emergence of opposition.”*

A White House spokesman comments on the *Belgrano*; *“We regret the loss of life. It points out the seriousness of the situation and the absolute necessity to reach a peaceful settlement to this tragic conflict. .. We remain available to both parties. It is our hope that further fighting will be avoided.”* The spokesman denies Argentine claims that the *Belgrano* had been tracked by the USA on behalf of the British Task Force.

Parsons reports a conversation with Dorr; *“I disembowelled him. When I had drawn breath, I summed up as follows: he could tell his Government following his conversation with me that (1) I was not pleading for a delay. I was ready to move into the Council immediately. But I was also ready to vote immediately on a Resolution which had the effect of enabling Argentina to continue to consolidate its position in the Falklands while leaving us with our hands tied, (2) a Council meeting at this stage would be polemic and divisive .. such a debate at this stage would kill the current confidential initiative taken by the Secretary-General Dorr was obviously shaken. He kept on saying that it was too late. .. However he could ask for an immediate meeting without insisting that the meeting should take place during the next day or so, ie he could give us and the Argentines a chance to respond to the Secretary-General's ideas. I said that he knew as well as I did that this idea would not fly ... As soon as he asked for an immediate meeting the nasties would press things to a head as quickly as possible.”*

The Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, asks Dorr not to press the matter until there is an answer to the peace 'ideas' put forward by himself on the 2nd. Dorr agrees. The Chinese President of the *Security Council*, Ling Qing, however schedules an 'informal' discussion to take place on the 5th.

Parsons telegrams Pym in London; *“You should be aware that the fact that the Secretary-General put specific ideas to you and my Argentine colleague over the weekend is now widely known here. This is spite of what he said to the press on leaving the working dinner with you and is, I suspect, largely accountable to Rafee Ahmed. It also results from speculation arising out of his and Ling Qing's consultations with members of the Council*

yesterday. .. At today's briefing the spokesman said that "peace plan" was not the term the UN was using, but the Secretary-General had put forward "various ideas" to you and the Argentines .. and both had agreed to consider them."

A British Sea Harrier is shot down over Goose Green. Argentine positions around Stanley are shelled.

Francis Pym sends a message to Alexander Haig; " .. I am conscious, like you, of the value of simplicity in any new diplomatic initiative. If further conflict is to be avoided and our essential aims are to be met, negotiations must not drag on. At the same time we cannot accept a cease-fire on the basis of an agreement that is too imprecise. Otherwise, Argentina could accept the proposal, and thus escape military pressure, and then play for time in negotiations and prolong the occupation. ... Subject to your very early comments I would like out of courtesy to give these ideas direct to the Peruvian President -

(1) An immediate cease-fire, concurrent with:

(2) Mutual withdrawal of forces: (a) Argentine and British forces to begin immediately to withdraw from an area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falkland Islands and to refrain from introducing any forces into that area. (b) The UK will ensure safe passage for the Argentine garrison to the mainland. (c) All British and Argentine forces to be withdrawn within 7 days from the area of 200 nautical miles radius from the Falklands and to remain outside that area.

(3) The immediate introduction of a Contact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement, the Group's tasks being: (a) to verify withdrawal; (b) to ensure that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the restored administration or otherwise, which would contravene this interim agreement.

(4) Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

(5) The two governments acknowledge that the views and interest of the Islanders must be determined, and be taken into account in the definitive settlement of the problem.

(6) The two governments will make every possible effort in good faith to reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983. The countries represented in the contact group will give every assistance in this."

HMS Sheffield is abandoned.

Canada's Foreign Minister makes a statement; "We deplore the Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands and request the removal of Argentine troops ... at the moment the British are engaged in actions of self-defence."

In outlining the thinking behind the amended proposal, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary explains; "(1) the list of points refers only to the Falkland islands, (2) military deployment outside the 200 nautical miles is unrestricted, (3) the Contact group's role is limited, (4) there must be an effective 'sounding out' of Islanders' opinions, (5) the Contact Group's role in sovereignty negotiations is also downgraded, (6) there is no mention of economic sanctions."

Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams the FCO; "I think there is a reasonable chance that I will be able to keep the Council in informal consultations for a few more days, unless there is another major military engagement. .. My insistence on .. not cutting across the Secretary-General's efforts will of course be only a pretext. I do not believe that the Secretary-General's ideas provide the basis for a negotiated settlement, and given the involvement of Rafee Ahmed, it is probably desirable to keep the United Nations out of the game, at this stage at any rate. My real purpose in delaying a formal Council meeting will be to gain time for the Haig/Belaunde

proposals to mature and, of course, to put off as long as possible a possible UK veto of a seemingly mild Resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. Such a veto would seriously undermine our position here and transfer the diplomatic advantage to the Argentines.”

May 5th – Ambassador Henderson telegrams Pym; *“I have just had a three hour session with Haig ... Haig does not consider that there is the slightest chance of the Peruvians being prepared to agree to our points or of being ready to transmit them to the Argentines. ... he insists, on the basis of hours and hours of argument with the Argentinians, that there is no conceivable chance of getting an agreement if we insist on our language... I asked him what, in the circumstances, he thought could be done and this led to a prolonged analysis of texts, the outcome of which was a new set of points .. that he hoped met some of our requirements, without involving language that would be rejected out of hand... Haig implores you to have another look at this and see whether you cannot accept his latest proposals ...”*

The new US proposals consist of (1) an immediate cease-fire, (2) mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduction of forces, according to a schedule to be established by the contact group, (3) the immediate introduction of a *Contact Group* composed of Brazil, Peru, Germany and the USA into the Falkland Islands on a temporary basis pending agreement on a definitive settlement. The *Group* assuming responsibility for (a) verification of the withdrawal, (b) ensuring that no actions are taken in the Islands, by the local administration, which would contravene this interim agreement, and (c) ensuring that all other provisions of the agreement are respected; (4) Britain and Argentina acknowledge the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the islands, (5) the two governments acknowledge that the aspirations and interests of the Islanders will be included in the definitive settlement of the status of the Islands, and (6) the *Contact Group* to have responsibility for ensuring that the two governments reach a definitive agreement prior to 30 April 1983.

President Reagan writes to PM Thatcher; *“Al Haig sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis. Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect. I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by us and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope.”*

Pym telegrams Parsons in New York; *“.. I am giving priority to the Peruvian/American initiative. We should not say anything to Pérez de Cuéllar that might encourage Argentine to look to his ideas rather than Haig's ... I should also wish you to make it clear that I am not in any way turning down his own ideas. .. we shall need his help in making it clear to Security Council members that diplomatic activity is continuing, that his own ideas are still under study and that the Council should do nothing that might cut across these efforts...”*

Australia's Prime Minister telephones Margaret Thatcher with a message of support and to tell her that there was much admiration in Australia for her actions. He adds that the American Vice-President, George Bush, had just left the country and was in no doubt where the United States would stand in the “*crunch*.”

The *War Cabinet* meet to consider the latest version of the peace plan. After a meeting lasting four hours, PM Thatcher responds to President Reagan's message explaining Britain's need to amend the Peruvian/American peace plan; *“... Above all, the present proposals do not provide unambiguously for a right to self-determination, although it is fundamental to democracy and was enjoyed by the Islanders up to the moment of invasion. We asked earlier that it should be included explicitly. Al Haig's reply was that it could not, because the Argentines would not accept it and there would therefore be no hope of a settlement. This has given me and*

my colleagues very great difficulty. This is why I have tried to temper Al Haig's latest proposal a little by suggesting that the interim administration must at least consult with the locally elected representatives. It is not much to ask ... I too want a peaceful settlement and an end to the mounting loss of life in the South Atlantic. ... That is why, with the changes Francis Pym has suggested to Al Haig, we are ready, with whatever misgivings, to go along with your latest proposal. Assuming that they are accepted by the Argentines, then during the negotiation period that will follow we shall have to fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders..."

In a statement, the Security Council express their "deep concern at the deterioration of the situation," but strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General.

Meanwhile, in Buenos Aires, President Galtieri refuses to consider the Peruvian plan; saying he wants; "a UN mediation."

May 6th – another convoy, the *Argonaut Group*, sails from Ascension Island. 2 British *Sea Harriers* crash in fog.

Unaware of Galtieri's comments, Foreign Secretary Pym telegrams the British Embassy in Lima with instructions for the Ambassador to seek an urgent audience with President Belaunde; "You should tell the President that HMG are immensely grateful for his constructive intervention. In our view, it constitutes the best prospect of securing an early ceasefire and withdrawal, before more lives are tragically lost. .. You may say that HMG have noted the ideas put forward by the UN Secretary-General and indeed are replying to him. But the Peruvian proposals are not only compatible with the Secretary-General's ideas but also provide essential clarity and precision in an imaginative and positive way."

The Ambassador is also asked to pass on a small amendment that Britain wishes to see made to the duties of the Contact Group in (3)(b): " .. (b) administering the Government of the Falkland Islands in the interim period in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands and ensuring that no actions are taken which would contravene this interim agreement.. "

Secretary-General Perez announces publicly that ; "I have got a positive reaction from the Argentine Government. They have expressed to me that they are considering with great interest and a sense of urgency the ideas I have proposed to them. I hope that I may have a positive reaction from the United Kingdom."

Secretary Haig informs Francis Pym that the Peruvian proposals have been turned down by President Galtieri and that the Argentines were now moving to the UN and; "that was the end of that."

Pym issues a statement to the press; "I am deeply disappointed that Argentine intransigence has once again frustrated a constructive initiative. Had they genuinely wanted peace, they would have accepted the latest proposals put to them, and we could have had a ceasefire in place by 5pm tomorrow."

Sir Anthony Parsons telegrams the FCO; " I recommend that I should be authorised to deliver our reply to the Secretary-General immediately. This will upstage the Argentinians whose reply consisted only of an acceptance of the Secretary-General's demarche, a call for a ceasefire, and an expression willingness to discuss details. I should also get our reply in before Costa Mendez arrives herewe must protect ourselves against the mounting pressure on us to accept calls for unqualified cease-fires, cessation of hostilities, maximum restraint, etc. These will undoubtedly be renewed at this afternoon's Security Council consultations and I intend to stand as firm as I did yesterday. Obviously we cannot accept calls for a cease-fire unless they are clearly linked to unequivocal Argentinian agreement to withdraw .."

Francis Pym responds to Parsons with a message for Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar; *“I accept the general approach embodied in your ideas ... Britain is willing to accept and immediately implement an interim agreement which would prepare the way for a definitive settlement. Such an interim agreement could provide for a cease-fire ... But such a cease-fire cannot simply leave Argentina in illegal occupation of the Islands, in contravention of Resolution 502 and with the ability to continue to build up the occupation forces. Implementation of the cease-fire must therefore be unambiguously linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal.. Withdrawal would be completed within a fixed number of days. The British forces would stand off at a reasonable distance .. After mutual withdrawal, the two sides would lift the exclusions zones .. (and).. economic sanctions...the United Kingdom would be prepared to accept an interim administration .. to be undertaken by a Contact Group .. which would act in consultation with the elected representatives of the population of the Islands ... Britain would be ready with Argentina to acknowledge the existence of different and conflicting views regarding the status of the Islands. We would be willing to engage in negotiations, without prejudice, for a definitive agreement and to accept a target date ... for conclusion of an agreement which would accord with the wishes of the Islanders. We should be willing to accept that the Contact Group .. should have a role in relation to these negotiations....”*

Parsons is interviewed for the *World at One* television programme and asked to make a statement about the Secretary-General's claim of a “positive reaction” from the Junta; *“I think there is a certain amount of exaggeration, at least there was last night, and I think it has been corrected in the American media this morning. As I understand it, because I was there at the time – I didn't actually read the Argentine letter but it was pretty short .. - I think what they have done is they have said to the Secretary-General, we need accept your de marche as it were, rather in the sense that, yes, we will do business with you. I don't believe they've accepted all the propositions, all the range of ideas that he's put forward, in fact I am perfectly sure they have not. In the American media this morning they are saying that the Argentine Ministry of Foreign affairs is making remarks like, “we have not of course agreed to withdraw” and “the whole question of sovereignty is not negotiable” and “there's a great deal more to study.” In fact, I think the letter did say that the details would be subject to discussion. So I think to put it in the sense that they have accepted it lock, stock and barrel is really very misleading.. we are still ... at a very preliminary stage.”*

NATO's “Eurogroup” (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey) issue a communiqué; *“Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Island and the dependencies as well as the failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties..”*

Ireland's Taoiseach Haughey is reported as telling the press that the Irish Government's support of EU sanctions against Argentina runs contrary to Ireland's position as a neutral country.

Pérez de Cuéllar is reported as being, “pleased” with Francis Pym's response; agrees that there is no need for a formal session of the *Security Council* and says that he will seek a response from Buenos Aires. At a meeting between Ambassador Henderson and Secretary Haig; Haig tells him that he is not convinced that the Argentines are “serious” about negotiating.

Argentina's Defence Minister, Amadeo Frugoli, speaking at the Sheraton Hotel, says that Argentina is not an aggressor country, that the aggression is being perpetrated by Great Britain and that Argentina will respond to that aggression with every means - at the right place and in due time.

President Galtieri offers, via the Mexican President, to hold a face-to-face meeting with Margaret Thatcher. He also says that in no circumstances is he willing to agree to proposals put forward by the United States or

associated with the United States, although the Peruvian proposals had been broadly acceptable. He was willing to begin a dialogue through the good offices of Mexico.

May 7th – Foreign Secretary Pym updates Parliament.

PM Thatcher sends a message to EU heads of Government; *“The collapse of the US/Peruvian initiative means that the focus of diplomatic activity moves to New York. In approaching this new phase of the crisis there is one point which I should like to put to you urgently, personally and with all the emphasis at my command. I want you to know that Britain will not acquiesce in the retention of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. The military means to terminate the military occupation are being assembled. They will be used, unless a diplomatic solution can be found. If events take this course there will be, I fear, the likelihood of destruction and casualties on a scale far exceeding what we have seen already. I am prepared for this and so is my government, and so is my country. You should be in no doubt about that...”*

In the House of Commons; *“The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made clear .. this morning, that Her Majesty's Government's highest priority is to achieve an early negotiated settlement of the current crisis, but that if the Government of Argentina did not show the same readiness and desire to reach a peaceful settlement, it should be in no doubt that Her Majesty's Government would do whatever may be necessary to end the unlawful Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands.”*

Germany and Italy call for a ceasefire and the immediate withdrawal of both British and Argentine troops. Turkey's Foreign Minister states that his country supports Britain, as a NATO ally, in the dispute with Argentina.

Press reports in Uruguay state that Argentina is willing to make some exceptions on its ban on payments to London in order to avoid London banks from declaring that Argentina is in default.

Sir Anthony Parsons speaks to Pérez de Cuéllar; *“I said that I wanted to explain exactly why the previous negotiations had collapsed. Essentially this was because the Argentines had insisted that the transitional arrangements and the diplomatic negotiations for a final settlement must be pre-judged from the outset by acceptance of Argentine sovereignty. This had in turn become a precondition for withdrawal. An associated problem was that Haig and others had, from time to time been encouraged by the reasonableness of the civilian negotiators, only to find that they were repudiated by the military at the last moment.... Pérez de Cuéllar took notes and said that he fully understood the position. He was alive to the possibility that the Argentines might simply be using him in order to get either a cease-fire and endless negotiations without commitment to withdrawal, or a British veto of a call for a cease-fire combined with negotiations. This putting them in a better diplomatic position...”*

A Ministry of Defence statement extends, with immediate effect, the 'total exclusion zone'; *“Her Majesty's Government warns that any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.”*

Peru and Venezuela assure Argentina that they will provide military aid if so requested under the framework of the *Rio Treaty*.

Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ernesto Ros, arrives in New York. Ros immediately calls on Pérez de Cuéllar to give him *“amplifications”* of the Argentine reply to the Secretary-General's proposals. Argentina's mission to the UN register a complaint about the 12 mile limit with the *Security Council*; *“.. This unlawful measure constitutes a further act of aggression ... which endangers the security of the Argentine Republic...”*

Parsons informs the FCO; *“The MoD statement .. has already caused a stir here. It has provoked a letter from Roca to the President of the Security Council, has worried Pérez de Cuéllar and is being presented dramatically in the New York media (the New York Post headline reads, “Mainland blockade: Britain expands war as invasion looms”). .. I have reassured Pérez de Cuéllar that the MoD statement should not be seen as a dramatic escalation of the conflict but rather as a clarification of earlier announcements...”*

French President, François Mitterrand, talks to his doctor; *“ I had a difference of opinion to settle with the Iron Lady. What an impossible woman, that Thatcher! With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic, she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina — unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians. Margaret has given me very precise instructions on the telephone I have been forced to yield. She has them now, the codes. If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell, it’s not going to reflect well on our exports.”*⁸⁹

Information is received that Peru is supplying Argentina with 4 Exocet missiles. Britain protests.

Argentina complains to the ICRC; *“.. the United Kingdom, in carrying out its acts of aggression against the civilian and military personnel in the region, has carried out continuous violations of the most elementary principle of humanitarian law. For example .. lack of information on the fate of the civilians captured in South Georgia; Lack of information on the situation of military personnel captured in South Georgia. In addition the United Kingdom has carried out acts repugnant to the consciences of civilised peoples such as – the incorporation in the Royal Navy Task Force of British military personnel captured by Argentine forces in the Falklands and South Georgia and the repatriated to the United Kingdom; sinking by submarine attack of the cruiser General Belgrano, sailing outside the zone defined by the UK as the maritime exclusion zone and not engaged in hostilities at the moment of sinking; attacks on similar vessels going to pick up people shipwrecked in another incident, the attack on ARA Sobral, one such vessel, was even more blameworthy since it was unarmed.”*

On receiving the complaints, the ICRC in Geneva note that the British Government had provided information about the captured Argentine troops within 5 days which *“contrasted favourably with Argentine behaviour,”* and that the *General Belgrano*, though outside the TEZ, was within the security zone of British ships in the area; was fully armed and engaged in operations.

At the UN, US Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, contacts the Secretary-General to complain that his peace initiative is likely to *“cut across”* others (unspecified) that Secretary Haig is involved with.

May 8th – Peru's Foreign Ministry issue a statement concerning the UK's announcement of a 12 mile limit; *“The Peruvian Government considers of the utmost gravity this extension of the area of conflict as far as the waters which, according to Argentine legislation, correspond to its sovereignty and therefore, to the American territorial continent. Faced with this new announcement of belligerent action on the part of the British forces, after the unjustified sinking of the cruiser “General Belgrano”, the Peruvian Government repeats its firmest protest and its request for the cessation of hostilities to make way for the peace-making measures foreseen in international law.”*

Sir Anthony Parsons has two meetings with the Secretary-General. He reports to Francis Pym after the first: *“Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides agreed with the concept that his proposals were “provisional measures,*

⁸⁹ Quoted in 'Rendez-vous', by the French psychoanalyst, Ali Magoudi, and, perhaps more importantly for confirmation, the Margaret Thatcher Foundation's web site. The French company that manufactured the Exocet missiles subsequently denied giving any assistance, but as the company was run by the President's brother, this assertion may have to be taken with a pinch of salt!

without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties.” I confirmed that we agreed with this, but said that we must have 100% precision from the Argentines on the point. Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had indicated that the Argentines envisaged a written agreement: their signature would give us the precision we needed. I said that it would depend whose signature was on the agreement. All previous negotiations had foundered at the last minute on Argentine insistence that their claim on sovereignty should be accepted. ... I think Pérez de Cuéllar has hoisted on board how crucial this point is for us and the danger that the Generals in Buenos Aires will renege on it at the last moment. As for the principle of simultaneity ... Pérez de Cuéllar said that Argentina accepted it in toto. The UK accepted it in respect of mutual withdrawal and the cessation of hostilities. It was his understanding that we did not exclude it in respect of negotiations for a diplomatic solution, but he judged from .. your message that we would prefer suspension of the exclusion zones and the lifting of sanctions to commence after withdrawal ... I suggested that the requirement of simultaneity could be met if Pérez de Cuéllar's negotiations led to the announcement of an agreement with a detailed schedule or timetable of when the various steps would be taken... On the terminal date for the negotiations for a diplomatic solution, Argentina had proposed 31 December 1982 and you had suggested “perhaps one year”. Pérez de Cuéllar would value your reaction to the Argentine proposals. On transitional arrangements ... Pérez de Cuéllar went on to say that Argentina favoured “an exclusive UN role” whereas you had proposed a contact group of States acceptable to both parties. I repeated that we needed to define what we meant.. what did an “exclusive UN role” mean? .. for us this would be a crucial question. .. On the format and venue of the substantive negotiations, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines wanted them to be conducted either by the Secretary-General or a representative appointed by him and that they should be held in New York. ..”

And again following the second meeting; “ I saw the Secretary-General and his team again at 2130 today. Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had asked Ros for an initial reaction to my request for clarification of what the Argentines meant by “an exclusive UN role” in the interim administration. Ros had relied that Argentina felt that since the interim period was likely to be fairly short it should be possible to adopt arrangements which, while not affecting individual rights, should necessarily come under the authority of the interim administrator, ie. the UN. ... She (Argentina) felt strongly that, in order to avoid confusion and so as to ensure that the transitional period was truly transitional, it should be under a clear cut administration, with a presence from both the interested parties. Pérez de Cuéllar commented that this seemed to be a repetition of the position the Argentines had maintained all along on the transitional arrangements. I questioned this: ... Their reference to “individual rights” presumably meant existing law on property, family matters, etc. What in effect they were proposing was direct UN administration without any local political structures. This was a very different concept from ours and I did not believe that it would be acceptable.... Pérez de Cuéllar said that Ros had repeated very clearly this afternoon that it was not the purpose of Argentina to prejudge the question of sovereignty, although de soto added that for the Argentines this depended on agreement on appropriate terms of reference for the negotiations .. we shall have to watch this carefully.”

Argentina's official news agency, Telam, says; “The Argentine Government has denounced the lack of good faith of the United Kingdom which, despite declaring its interest in holding negotiations and in achieving a peaceful solution, has contradicted its stated intentions with deeds and created situations which seriously undermine the possibilities of holding negotiations..”

Parson reviews his meetings with Pérez de Cuéllar; “After today's rounds, it is clear that the Argentines have organised their negotiating position very thoroughly. Perez de Cuellat told me in the strictest confidence that Ros has a prepared statement on every topic from which he reads verbatim as appropriate. I think that there are three possibilities. The first, and least likely, is that the Argentines have decided to negotiate in good faith and play it straight ... Pérez de Cuéllar is as sceptical about this as I am. I hope we are wrong. The second

possibility is that the Argentines have realised that if the search for a diplomatic solution fails because of their insistence on prejudging the sovereignty question, it will diplomatic game set and match to us. ... The third possibility is that they have decided that they cannot get what they want now, and that they should prepare the ground to get it the day after the interim period expires. This would mean that they would genuinely negotiate an agreement with us now .. But would refuse to accept anything in the agreement which envisaged prolongation of the interim period if agreement had not been reached. ... My suggestion is that I make take the following line tomorrow (9 May). We are prepared to look more closely at the possibility of UN administration, but we could not accept the total exclusion of the Islanders, as proposed in the latest Argentine formulation: this is a great deal more rigid than the ideas they discussed with Haig where the problem was the disproportionate number of which they required on the two Councils. ... I could take this line as an exploratory move without conceding our position on the Contact Group for the time being... I realise that I have not tackled the answer to the third and perhaps most sinister (third) possibility.. It is extremely hard to see a way out of this dilemma. ..”

Argentina announces, via the Swiss, that they have converted a survey vessel, the *Bahia Paraiso*, into a hospital ship.

May 9th – an Argentine spy trawler, *Narwal*, is attacked and boarded by British troops. *HMS Coventry* shoots down 2 *Skyhawk* aircraft and a *Puma* helicopter.

Instructions are relayed to Sir Anthony Parsons following receipt of the previous day's telegrams; “*We agree that Britain should demonstrate full willingness to cooperate in the Secretary-General's negotiations. We therefore wish to reply quickly and constructively ... You should convey the following British position to the Secretary-General: (a) .. We can agree that time 'T' should be set as soon after signature of an agreement as both parties can guarantee compliance by their forces to a cease-fire. For us, 24 hours after signature is acceptable .. (b) .. We can accept a period of 14 days for withdrawal of all Argentine military personnel from the Islands; half of them should be withdrawn within 7 days. (c) .. The arrangements for British withdrawal must be equal and parallel with those for Argentine withdrawal, thus involving no disadvantage to Britain. We can agree to withdraw all of or naval forces within 14 days, and half of them within 7 days, to outside a zone of 200 nautical miles from the Falkland Islands. (d) .. It is unreal to set an absolute terminal date for negotiations when everyone knows that the parties, with the best will in the world, may not be able to conclude an agreement within a specified time. For this reason we hope that the Secretary-General will return to the expression “target date” which appeared in his original proposal of 3 May. On that basis we could accept that the named date be 31 December 1982. In order however to take account of reality, without stating directly that negotiations might go on beyond the target date, the agreement would have to say that the interim arrangements will continue until an agreement on the future of the Islands is implemented ... (e) ... negotiations should take place under his (Secretary-General's) auspices ... perhaps Geneva or Ottawa...*”

In explanation of these instructions references are made to the *exclusion zone* and economic sanctions being lifted, and an interim UN administration established, on completion of the withdrawal by both sides; ie within 14 days. With regard to the interim administration Parson's instructions are explicit; “*.. we must also insist most firmly that the new Argentine suggestions to the Secretary-General about the interim administration are unacceptable. ... What Argentina is now suggesting is unprecedented and unreasonable. We can accept UN interim administration, but on the clear understanding that the Executive and Legislative Councils continue to function...*”

And with regard to the Dependencies; “*... any agreement must be about the Falkland Islands, thus keeping the dependencies out of it.*”

“ .. any agreement that is to be considered seriously by us must (a) include the concept of cease-fire being unambiguously linked to an immediate start of Argentine troop withdrawal, (b) not prejudge in any way a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, (c) be compatible with a security guarantee eg. By the US and, (d) avoid a de facto situation by which Argentina gained the Islands in default of a final settlement by a terminal date for the conclusion of negotiations.”

Interviewed on US television, Costa Mendez says that Argentina is not asking the UK to recognise Argentine sovereignty at the beginning of negotiations; provided that those negotiations conclude with confirmation of Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

Sir Anthony Parsons sees the Secretary-General and sets out the British position; *“ ...this brought me on to the all important question of Argentine acceptance that the interim arrangements would be without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. I had been seriously disturbed by Costa Mendez's television interview today. He seemed to me to have been saying that Argentina was not insisting that the UK should actually cede sovereignty before the negotiations started but that she insisted that those negotiations must conclude with confirmation of Argentine sovereignty and that they would therefore be concerned not with sovereignty itself but with how the interests of the Islanders might be protected under Argentine sovereignty. If my reading of Costa Mendez's remarks was right, there had been a major change in the Argentine position as Pérez de Cuéllar had described it yesterday.... I next stated that I wished it to be quite clear that we were talking about the Falkland Islands alone, not about the dependencies....”*

Parsons informs London; *“Today's military engagements have predictably fluttered the doves here. Roca complained to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ... the Argentines are putting it about that at the Security Council's informal consultations on 5 and 6 May tacit agreement was established that there should be no hostilities while the Secretary-General pursued his initiative. .. I telephoned Pérez de Cuéllar and Ling Qing to remind them that I had made it absolutely clear at the informal consultations that there was no question of our suspending military operations...”*

Pérez de Cuéllar calls Sir Anthony Parsons back near midnight; *“ .. he had told Ros that we did not consider that the Dependencies were included in the present exercise. Ros had objected strongly, saying that it would be impossible for the Argentine authorities to explain to their public opinion that Argentina would withdraw from the Falklands but that there would be no British military withdrawal from South Georgia. .. Ros had refused to accept our position... they wanted the lifting of the exclusion zones and of economic sanctions “to be effective as of time T”, otherwise the impression might be given that their withdrawal was taking place under pressure... On the interim administration, Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines continued to object strongly to any role for the Islanders, even of an advisory character, because this would prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. I said that we could not accept this. ... Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had had a very difficult discussion with Ros about the terms of reference of the negotiations and the linked question of Costa Mendez's television interview. The kind of language the Argentines had in mind for the terms of reference was: “ the negotiations would have to solve the disputes between the parties, taking into account relevant General Assembly Resolutions.” I said that this would not do. Costa Mendez's remarks today had been very close to Argentine statements which had caused the collapse of previous negotiations. We must have proper clarification. ... In order to remove any shadow of doubt, we would also have to insist that all three members of the Junta signed the agreement...”*

In a further telegram Parsons adds; *“This ball is now firmly in the Argentine Court and Buenos Aires will have to give Ros instructions on the sovereignty question before we come under further pressure. If they come up with the wrong answer, ie an answer unsatisfactory to us, the stage will be set either for a break down of the*

negotiations or for a final dramatic effort by Pérez de Cuéllarto persuade the Junta to think again.”

Pérez de Cuéllar's office issues a statement; *“The Secretary-General's discussions with the parties continued today and he met twice on separate occasions with the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General has also informed the President of the Security Council of his talks. Substantial progress has been made on several points but clarifications are still needed on others. The talks will continue tomorrow.”*

President Belaunde of Peru announces that he is sending his Prime Minister to Europe to argue for the lifting of sanctions against Argentina. Mexico's President, Lopez Portillo, asks the British Ambassador when he can expect a reply to his suggestion that General Galtieri and PM Thatcher have a face to face meeting.

May 10th – Sir Anthony Parsons receives a message from the FCO; *“Thank you for .. your sterling efforts with the Secretary-General. I endorse in particular your insistence on smoking the Argentines out on the question of sovereignty and the terms of reference for negotiations about the future of the Islands. If the Secretary-General's efforts were to collapse because Argentina insisted on a transfer of sovereignty or would not agree to a sensible provision about what would happen in negotiations had not succeeded by a target date, Argentine would clearly have been unreasonable and we think we could defend our position satisfactorily in Parliament and internationally. .. The question of the dependencies and of the traditional administration may, as you say, be the ones where the crunch will come. .. Meanwhile, the following comments .. are provided as general guidance for your meetings with the Secretary-General today. Dependencies: .. you should argue that the status quo in the Dependencies is as it was before the unlawful occupation and that our purpose in the present negotiations is to deal with the new situation created by the continued unlawful occupation by Argentina of the Falkland Islands themselves... Sovereignty: You should continue to insist on two major points of substance; (a) that the text of the interim agreement must not prejudice the outcome of negotiations about the future and (b) that the Argentines must state clearly to the Secretary-General that they accept this and will desist from declaring the opposite in public. Interim Administration: .. you should contest the unsupported and erroneous Argentine assertion that the involvement of the islanders in the interim administration would prejudice the outcome of negotiations... and that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter to dismantle them. Target Date for Conclusion of Future Negotiations: We see no reason why an interim agreement should not say that: (a) negotiations will start immediately, to produce an agreement by the target date of 31 December 1982; (b) the interim agreements will remain in force until implementation of a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands...”*

HMS Sheffield sinks whilst being towed by *HMS Yarmouth*.

Telam reports; *“ .. the British forces attacked and sunk the Argentine fishing boat Narwal which was in the area carrying out specific tasks that did not pose any threat to the British Fleet. The Narwal was sunk by a Sea Harrier which later did not hesitate to machine-gun the rafts that were hurled to the sea by the survivors, and even a raft that was filled with sick and wounded. This is an outrageous attack that violates the most elemental human feelings .. an inhuman deed, a hideous barbarian act that goes against all those values of the free world which the British Government has claimed to defend and uphold.”*

Parsons notifies London; *“ I asked my old Commonwealth colleagues, who have more time than I have recently to circulate amongst UN delegations, whether they felt that the overall attitude towards us was changing for the worse. They said it was not. There was still much sympathy for our position.”*

In the House of Commons, Francis Pym is asked by the *Foreign Affairs Committee* about the Government's long term objectives. Pym responds that while now British territory, the Government had never taken the view that the islands were under British sovereignty, *“for ever and a day.”* Other forms of governance were available to

ensure their future, including independence, associate status, condominium, UN trusteeship and others.

With *Communiqué No. 40*, Argentina declares the whole of the South Atlantic a 'war zone'.

Argentina submits a paper to the Secretary-General seeking to amend the proposals as they stand; "(1) This agreement is concluded within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and taking into account Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. (2) The agreement to which the parties commit themselves shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. (3) The geographical scope of this agreement shall comprise the three archipelagos considered by the United Nations. (4) The Government and the Administration shall be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations. The observers of the parties may fly their respective flags. (5) There shall be freedom of transit and residence for citizens of the parties, who shall enjoy the right to acquire and dispose of real estate. (6) The withdrawal of forces shall be effected under the supervision of the United Nations. (7) The parties commit themselves to undertake in good faith negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General with a view to the peaceful settlement of the dispute and, with a sense of urgency, to complete these negotiations by 31 December 1982."

Pérez de Cuéllar speaks to Sir Anthony Parsons; "It was a very discouraging meeting. Pérez de Cuéllar said that ... Ros had given him a paper... the paper had not originated in Buenos Aires but had been drafted in the course of the discussions here. It was therefore "negotiable." Ros had told him that the Argentines saw the paper as a "package" and thought it better to discuss all these points at the same time. Pérez de Cuéllar had said that the paper would be unacceptable to us but said he would convey it to me. I said that I was puzzled and disappointed ... it went back to general headlines (and, in its paragraph 5, added a major new point), without the detail on which I thought that Pérez de Cuéllar and I had been making progress... At the end of the meeting de Soto¹ said that as the Dependencies had been included in our earlier negotiations with the Argentines they could not be excluded from the next round. Did he understand that I wanted to exclude them from the interim arrangements? Surely, withdrawal from South Georgia, where we had few troops, would be a "painless gesture" denied this firmly .. as far as we were concerned, the agreement under discussion related to the Falkland Islands alone.... Size of Zones for Withdrawal: A major new problem arose here. Ahmed said that the Argentines had said today that the proposals discussed with Haig had been based on the complete withdrawal of the British Task Force to its bases in the UK. I said ... since then, the situation had changed enormously and there was no question of us accepting such an arrangement. It was totally irrelevant to the real situation..."

Cuba's Fidel Castro, holding the Chair of the *Non-Aligned Movement*, calls upon the other members to take whatever steps they can to delay further British action against Argentina.

US Ambassador Walters travels to Buenos Aires in order to; "probe the possibilities of an alternative government there; to emphasize to Galtieri the danger of Soviet penetration, and to indicate US economic help would be forthcoming in the event of a UK/Argentine agreement."

Sir Anthony Parsons sends a further telegram to London; "Today's experience brings me very close to believing that they are still not interested in reaching a negotiated settlement on terms which would be acceptable to us, and that it is rapidly becoming a question of who wrong-foots whom when the negotiations break down..."

May 11th – the BBC is criticised for its "biased" reporting of the war. Anthony Grant MP complains to the Director-General of the BBC; "... I do not expect the BBC to be biased in Britain's favour but, in the interests of 'balance' if nothing else, need they be so obviously on the side of the enemy?"

The French Government inform London that they had delivered 5 *Exocet* missiles to Argentina before the start of the conflict; part of an order for ten missiles. They also confirm that they have an order for 4 *Exocets* for Peru.

Margaret Thatcher writes to the other European Community Heads of Government asking them to support the renewal of the EC's embargo on Argentina due for review on the 17th; *“anything less than this could only encourage the Argentines to believe that our resolve is weakening, and that if they maintain their intransigence their aggression will eventually attain its objectives.”*

She also responds to President Portillo's suggestion of a face to face meeting with Galtieri by excusing herself on the basis of the Secretary-General's ongoing mission; *“.. I do not believe that it would be right to cut across what is happening in New York.”*

Francis Pym responds to Sir Anthony Parsons; *“I agree that your talks yesterday with the Secretary-General were very discouraging... The Argentine paper .. having been drafted by Ros in New York, must incorporate negotiating fat. Moreover, it might be disowned by the Junta and, for this and other reasons, we should be careful not to get into the position of accepting it as the basis of further discussions. .. When you see the Secretary-general today, you may use the following.. (a) Dependencies: continue to insist on their exclusion. (b) Sovereignty: the formula is clear and easily explainable. You should continue to work for as much of it as possible. (c) .. the suggestion that we should retire 2000 nautical miles is completely unreal. (d) Withdrawal: ..the State which would be best placed geographically and in terms of equipment to verify naval withdrawal effectively would be the US. (e) Interim Administration: you should suggest that the UN administration should be described as functioning “in consultation with the Executive and Legislative Councils in the Islands”.. (f) Point 5 in the Argentine text about freedom of transit and residence is obviously designed by Argentina to flood the Islands and thus change the demographic facts during the interim period .. wholly unacceptable ..”*

ARA Isla de Los Estados is sunk in Falkland Sound by *HMS Alacrity*.

Ambassador Henderson in Washington informs London; *“State Department have now advised us, with some embarrassment, that Landsat photography of the Falklands area has taken place during the period 7 – 12 May and that the Argentines have obtained the pictures.”*

The *Junta* in Buenos Aires issue a statement; *“In view of the United Kingdom's persistence in its aggressive attitude, which is reflected inter alia in the restrictions it has attempted to impose on Argentine marine traffic in the South Atlantic, and in exercise of the right of self-defence established by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is decided that any vessel flying the United Kingdom flag which is navigating in the aforementioned zone towards the area of operations and/or which may be presumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, and action will be taken accordingly.”*

The Secretary-General has a meeting with Sir Anthony Parsons; *“Pérez de Cuéllar said that, on reflection, he had decided not to give me the “rough draft” until he had had a reply from Ros on the question of non-prejudgment... There was one point he wished to raise following his conversation with Ros this morning. Ros had told him that the Argentines find it difficult to accept the concept of a target date for the conclusion of the negotiations. .. Pérez de Cuéllar wondered whether we could find other ways to meet our concern about a vacuum occurring if agreement had not been reached by 31 December. .. It was left that the Secretary-General's team would think further on this...”*

Later, Parsons is called back to the UN; *“Pérez de Cuéllar said that at last he had good news for me. The Argentines had accepted that 31 December should be a target date and that the agreement should state that the outcome of the negotiations would not be prejudged. He the handed me the following text:*

“The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982, taking into account the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome.”

Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had put this text (which is a variant on the language I gave him on 9 May) to Ros as his own proposal. Ros had told him this evening that, “after consultation with everybody” Costa Mendez had instructed him to accept it. I said that this was an extremely encouraging development .. assuming that Ros was acting with full authority.. There still remained a question about what would happen if no agreement had been reached by 31 December. Pérez de Cuéllar said that the Argentines had made a “tremendous concession.” They had also told him, on the interim administration, that they could accept that individual members of the Legislative Council, in their personal capacity, could be used by the administrator for advisory purposes, so long as the administration was also empowered to call on an equal number of other individuals from the Argentine population ... they hoped serious consideration could be given to the need to have as few restrictions as possible on communications, the transit of persons and the acquisition of property. .. Finally on zones of withdrawal, the Argentines had expressed the hope that agreement could be worked out on withdrawal distances for the Task Force which would dispel any impression that Argentines were withdrawing under pressure .. I said that, welcome as tonight's news was, there were still major difficulties ahead. One was the Argentines' proposals on representation of the Islanders. I did not believe that you would be able to accept that 1820 Islanders should have the same representation as 30 Argentines....”

Argentina's Ambassador to the United States, Estaban Takacs, approaches William Middendorf, the US representative to the OAS; “He said .. he was afraid the Department misunderstood the GOA's (Government of Argentina's) negotiating position. Takacs said he wanted to emphasize that there had been a definite Argentine change – Argentina has deliberately de-linked the sovereignty issue from the negotiating process and he asked that I pass this message on. He said this de-linkage was a major concession since the Argentine public feels strongly that “nobody should take us out of our islands.” Takacs added that he feels with this display of Argentine flexibility the ball is now in the British court... Takacs claimed that the GOA has been observing a cease-fire for sometime – that the action against the Sheffield was only in retaliation for the Belgrano. He also said that continued British shelling could be a disaster, provoking an escalation, in hostilities. He said thus far ten Islanders had been killed; many more were in peril if the British did not stop. .. He said that if negotiations go on over the next week or longer and the British at the same time show no sign of halting, he would hope the US would weigh in and ask the UK to stop.”

Sir Anthony Parsons seeks instructions from London; I realise only too well that the pressure is now on us (This was inevitable if the Argentines gave way on the fundamental question) and that you face very difficult decisions.”

May 12th – the QE2 leaves Southampton with the 5th Infantry Brigade of Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas, on board.

In a 'friendly-fire' incident, Argentine gunners near Darwin shoot down one of their own aircraft. 3 Argentine Skyhawk aircraft are destroyed by HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant in a 42-22 deployment.⁹⁰ HMS Glasgow is hit by a 1,000lb bomb which fails to explode, but causes extensive damage.

Instructions from the Foreign Secretary to Sir Anthony Parsons arrive in New York; “Ministers remain of the

⁹⁰ Type 42's missiles could deal with enemy aircraft at medium range, whilst the Type 22's were better at close range.

view the inclusion of South Georgia in the interim arrangements presents us with very serious difficulties. Quite apart from our title and the fact that we are in possession, there are practical considerations. .. we may need to use South Georgia during the period of withdrawal. Its anchorages will enable us to conduct this operation much more satisfactorily than if they were not available. .. Much the best course is to concentrate on the Falklands only... For your own information, if we were ever to come to contemplate withdrawal from South Georgia in the interim, we should have to insist upon total Argentine withdrawal from Southern Thule.”

In addition, Sir Anthony Parsons is to maintain that the British Government have reservations about references to *General Assembly Resolutions* without any mention of 'self-determination'; and further concern regarding the target date of 31 December. The British Government is also worried about the arrangements for verifying withdrawal of the two forces and the role of the UN administrator. Argentine demands about rights of residence and the acquisition of property are to be rejected although a vague reference to the Communications agreement of 1971 is acceptable.

An editorial in *The New York Post* states; “*Secretary of State Haig's Ambassador at large, General Vernon Walters, former Deputy head of the CIA, says of the British resort to arms to deal with Argentina's seizure of the Falkland Islands: “What you really have here is a problem of machismo of men”. Is that really why the UN Security Council voted to condemn Argentina's aggression and demand withdrawal of its forces? Is that why Secretary Haig travelled thousands of miles to try to negotiate a solution? Is that why the OAS refuses to support Argentina's Generals? Is that why Western Europe bans all trade with Argentina? Latins may be romantic and grandiloquent but, if Walters has got it right, Mrs. Thatcher must be quite a woman.”*

Alexander Haig is reported to be “upset” by the remarks.

Parsons goes to see the Pérez de Cuéllar at the UN; “*It was a grim meeting. ... The Secretary-General and his staff were clearly stunned .. The Argentines were coming to see him ... I had given him nothing to pass on to them in return for what they saw as yesterday's major concessions. They would be bitter and disappointed. He could not exclude the possibility that they would break off the talks immediately. .. I urged him to look at the problem from the London end. It was not we who had committed the aggression, we had nevertheless already made a number of major concessions .. Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain.... Bringing the meeting to a close, Pérez de Cuéllar said that he felt obliged to ask me formally to tell you that in his view his whole effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position.”*

Following the meeting Parsons telegrams Pym in London; “*You and your colleagues are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If tomorrow I stick to the positions I set out to Pérez de Cuéllar today and he puts them to the Argentines, as he will feel bound to do, I agree with his assessment that the negotiations will terminate there and then. We can only keep the talks going if we are prepared to make fairly substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia... I explained .. in detail that the basic British view was as follows. The only just outcome was that the aggressor should withdraw, the status quo ante be restored and the negotiations which had so rudely been broken off resumed. He must not think we were being inflexible. We had shown ourselves ready to entertain a string of concessions – UN Administration, acceptance that the outcome did not have to be British Sovereignty with its concomitant of the paramountcy of the Islanders' wishes, a target date for a final settlement only 7 months away, etc.*

However, the plain if regrettable fact is that everyone here sees the situation quite differently. The majority of the Membership sympathise with our reaction to Argentine use of force, but they believe (this includes a number of western delegations) that the Falklands should belong to Argentina provided that the interests of

the Islanders are safeguarded. The dominant view here is that the Argentine position is becoming more moderate and that we should respond... This is how it is. Hence, if we do not moderate our position and the negotiations break down tomorrow... we will be regarded as the culprits."

Pérez de Cuéllar telephones Secretary Haig to request that he persuade London to make a "comparable concession" to that made by Argentina. Haig tells Ambassador Henderson that he; *".. fully understands the absurdity of this line of argument when Argentina up to now has made no movement whatsoever, but on the contrary has stepped up its demands."* Haig also tells Henderson that Britain should not give way on South Georgia. At the end of the conversation, Haig adds; *".. he wanted me to convey one important message. .. This was that there was widespread support for us over resistance to aggression. Most Latin American countries understood how impossible the Argentinians were. Their machismo made them intolerable to deal with, but Britain would put itself in the wrong, and as a result inflame the whole American hemisphere, if it attacked the Argentine mainland..."*

US Ambassador Walters in Buenos Aires informs Secretary Haig; *"... Lami Dozo's view was that the negotiations at the UN were at a dead end. The Argentines could not give way on sovereignty because of the pressure of the Peronistas..."*

Parsons calls London again later in the evening; *"In the event Pérez de Cuéllar decided not to call me back for a further meeting .. He told me on the telephone that the following points had emerged from his fairly brief meeting with Ros: (1) a private appeal to us to be transmitted through me personally for military restraint while serious negotiations were continuing, (2) Pérez de Cuéllar told Ros that we were generally satisfied .. with the Argentine statement on non-prejudgement. However we already had fresh misgivings because of Costa Mendez's statement today. Pérez de Cuéllar suggested a moratorium on public statements .. Ros immediately started to complain about statements coming out of London, (3) Ros had nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration, (4) Ros re-opened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property in the Falklands and the point about their being able to buy shares in the Falklands Islands Company."*

May 13th – 188 Argentine prisoners captured on South Georgia are handed over to the Red Cross on Ascension Island and flown to Montevideo. Lieutenant-Colonel Astiz remains detained on Ascension while a decision is made about French and Swedish requests to interview him in connection with murder investigations regarding their nationals.

President Reagan telephones Margaret Thatcher; *"President Reagan said that he understood that the negotiations .. in New York had produced some movement. He believed that the Argentines were willing to enter into negotiations without pre-conditions ... The Prime Minister said that she regretted that this was not the case. At least two big questions remained. As regards the interim arrangements, Argentina wanted greater Argentine participation that we could accept and there were substantial difficulties about ownership of property and freedom of movement. Secondly, there was the problem of South Georgia .. President Reagan said that the United States would continue to do what it could to help the negotiations ... "*

General Iglesias tells the *Washington Post* that Argentina requires that any agreement over a peaceful solution should be a certain and guaranteed means of obtaining complete Argentine sovereignty, *"within a reasonable period."*

Sir Anthony Parsons meets with the Secretary-General; *"I judged that to make the points about South Georgia and the interim Administration .. would almost certainly precipitate an immediate breakdown. I therefore took the line that, because of the emergency debate in the House of Commons, you had not yet had time to send*

me substantive instructions on these two points .. (Pérez de Cuéllar said that he always preferred delays to bad news.)...

I did, however, have an answer of substance on the risk of a vacuum after 31 December 1982 if no agreement had been reached... It was unrealistic to think that sufficient confidence could be generated between us and The Argentines for it to be safely left in the air. It seemed to me that it was an equally important point to the UN, the UK and Argentina. ... Pérez de Cuéllar said that both sides were pressing him for ideas on it. The Argentines were prepared to let him ask for an extra month or two if no agreement was in sight at the end of the year. But they wanted to guard against the risk that the UN interim administration would last for ever. I said that we could trust the Secretary-General but not the Security Council. Might it be possible to devise some formula under which, if the Secretary-General decided that further time was needed ... the interim administration would remain in being unless the Security Council decided otherwise?

Ahmed and de Soto said that the Argentines also felt uncomfortable about involving the Security Council (because of our veto) and that the Secretariat were working on language which would contain no reference to the Security Council .. The trouble was that this formula would not meet Argentine concerns, unless it specified that only one extension would be possible. I indicated that the latter condition would not be acceptable to us.

I was then subjected to a burst of rhetoric from Ahmed to the effect that we could not expect the Argentines to make another concession. I dealt very firmly with this ...

Pérez de Cuéllar was obviously afraid that Ros would break off because of my failure to make any move on either the Dependencies or on the interim Administration. He said that he now felt that by Sunday (16 May) at the latest he would have to present some UN ideas to both of us. He recognised that one or both of us might reject his ideas, but he felt obliged to try.”

The President of the Security Council calls for an informal discussion by the Council on the 14th. Pérez de Cuéllar warns Parsons that he considers the President “biased and dangerous.”

Parsons telegrams London: “My theatrical performance this morning has helped us get through another day. The price of course was expectations that we will come up with something on the difficult subjects tomorrow. I am working on the assumption that we are on two tracks – genuine search for agreement and, if no agreement is possible, for the negotiations to collapse with us in the least disadvantageous position. I am also conscious of the need to buy as much time as we can.”

Pym responds; “I realise that the negotiations have reached a very difficult position. All here are agreed that our immediate purpose should be to keep the negotiations going, at least for some time yet. ... I see the scope for further discussion of certain of the problems with the Secretary-General before Ministers attempt to take a decision about a package covering all the outstanding questions. In particular, please pursue the following matters: (a) you should make full play with the continued statements by Costa Mendez that Argentina insists on having sovereignty... (b) you should say that the risk of a vacuum after an interim period is for us, one of the most important matters, and that more clarity must be achieved as soon as possible... I realise that you also need to say something about South Georgia and about interim administration. ... on South Georgia you may say that we should be willing to refer title over South Georgia to the ICJ, does the Secretary-General think that would help?..”

May 14th – D Squad SAS attack an Argentine base on Pebble Island destroying 11 Pucara aircraft, and a large ammunition dump. 3 Argentine Skyhawk aircraft are shot down by Sea Harriers. Stanley airfield is bombed.

Information is received that the *Bahia Paraiso*, a newly converted hospital ship, is loading large quantities of food and weapons at the port of Ushuaia. A decision is taken to request that the ICRC inspect the vessel but that if it has already left, and is found within the *TEZ*, it should be stopped and searched. Buenos Aires is informed via the Swiss Embassy.

Belgium's Ambassador informs Parsons that the Argentines have been visiting all the EU Ambassadors at the UN to say; “(a) Argentina was negotiating in good faith, (b) sanctions had not helped the British: their effect had simply been to consolidate Latin American and Third World support for Argentina; their renewal would extend the confrontation and heighten north/south conflict, (c) the sovereignty question had been resolved as a result of an Argentine concession, (d) there remained three main issues, (e) the most important of these was the nature of the interim administration, where Argentina wanted purely UN administration, but the British were insisting on retention of “the colonial structures,” (f) the other two were withdrawal, where the Argentines had accepted the Secretary-General's concept of simultaneous or parallel withdrawal, but the British had not: and the substantive negotiations where the British were refusing to accept a deadline ..”

Information is received from Caracas to the effect that the Venezuelan Government is also sending out a mission at President Galtieri's request. Their itinerary is Spain, the Vatican, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and France and their purpose is to show “solidarity” with Argentina and to seek the lifting of sanctions.

General Walters, on his return from Buenos Aires, telephones Ambassador Henderson; “.. Walters went on to outline his visit to Buenos Aires, the main purpose of which he claimed was to limit the damage to American relations with Latin America which had been brought about by US support for the UK. He had found the Argentine Junta the most difficult people he had had to deal with since his encounters many years ago with MOSSAD... Galtieri told Walters that recent US statements, particularly by Weinberger, had raised strong anti-American feelings in Buenos Aires .. he felt that the Americans could have adopted a less partial course.... if Britain assaulted the Falkland Islands, Argentina would seek help from those friends who had offered it, except the Soviets. The Argentinians had already lost nearly 400 men; they were prepared to lose 40,000 if necessary. ..

At a second meeting with Galtieri, Walters gained the impression that the Junta .. were flexible on predetermination of sovereignty (although they still insisted on a firm cut-off date) and even on the continuation of some form of local administration during the interim period. However Galtieri was unyielding on access to the Islands for Argentine nationals. .. No mention was made of the Dependencies. .. Galtieri had also proposed that the dispute should be resolved by means of a summit meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and comprising himself, Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan.”

Secretary Haig sends a message to Henderson with his “latest thoughts” including; “.. (1) We should do everything possible to ensure that it was no we who were responsible, or held responsible, for any breakdown in the Secretary-General's efforts .. (2) withdrawal from the Islands should be based on parity of time in terms of the ability of both sides to reinsert their forces... (3) the focus of the discussions should be on the Falkland Islands and not the Dependencies. This had also been the view of President Figueiredo of Brazil. .. “

At an informal meeting of the Security Council, the Secretary-General outlines the progress he has made with his peace proposals; “.. A broad framework of agreement was taking shape, covering ceasefire, mutual withdrawal, an interim Administration and negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General. There would be an important role for the UN, subject to the approval of the Security Council. ... Thanks to Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts, we have thus cleared another hurdle in the Council, but there was no mistaking the members' nervousness about hostilities if and when the Secretary-General's efforts should fail. The Council is all set to support a simple ceasefire plus negotiations Resolution in that event.”

Ambassador Henderson and Sir Anthony Parsons return to London for instructions.

May 15th – more bombs are dropped on Stanley airfield, and on two targets nearby. An Argentine cargo vessel, the *Río Carcarañá* is strafed by two *Sea Harriers* and set on fire.

The *Political Committee* of the European Community refer the decision to renew the EC's sanctions against Argentina to the *Council of Ministers*.

May 16th – in a meeting held at Chequers, a decision is taken regarding the terms of an agreement between the UK and *Argentina* - “*the absolute minimum acceptable.*” This includes: (1) no prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute, (2) no acts or activities taking place while the interim agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty, or create any rights of sovereignty, (3) 24 hours after signature (time 'T') each party undertakes to cease and thereafter refrain from all hostile actions, (4) both countries undertake – (a) to commence withdrawal at time 'T', (b) to withdraw half of her force 150 nautical miles within 7 days, (c) to complete withdrawal within 14 days, (5) exclusion zones to be lifted from time 'T', (6) following completion of the withdrawal each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces within 150 nautical from the Islands, (7) economic measures to be lifted at time 'T', (8) both parties to jointly sponsor a *Security Council Resolution* to recognise the agreement and the Secretary-General's role, (9) the Secretary-General to appoint an Administrator acceptable to both parties (10) the Administrator to ensure the continuing administration of the Islands in consultation with the representative institutions of the Islands in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine population be appointed to each of the two institutions, (11) the UN Administrator to verify withdrawal, (12) each party to have no more than 3 observers on the Islands, (12) negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General, for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of negotiations by 31 December 1982 and without prejudgement (13) this agreement shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the Islands has been reached and implemented by the parties.

The preamble to the agreement only makes mention of the Falkland Islands, and a separate message for the Secretary-General clearly states that the Dependencies are not included.

Sir Anthony Parsons instructions are that there can be no amendments; “*You should tell the Secretary-General that although the right course would have been for the Argentines to implement SC Resolution 502, we have been negotiating in good faith for more than five weeks through various intermediaries. We are very grateful for the Secretary-General's latest efforts but we cannot allow matters to drag on much longer. Midday New York time on Wednesday 19 May is therefore an absolute deadline for the Argentines' reply. If not received by then we shall have to assume rejection...*”

Germany's Chancellor Schmidt, and French President Mitterand, meet in Hamburg; “*There was clear agreement on the need for solidarity with Britain on the basis of SCR 502. Sanctions involved sacrifices for both France and Germany, but it was clear that they would be renewed..*”

US Secretary Haig and Foreign Secretary Pym meet in Luxembourg; “*Haig seemed more confident than in earlier meetings of our ability to do the job militarily, and assumed that we would not be able to wait much longer. He argued strongly against action against the mainland, but seemed otherwise undisturbed about the military prospects ..*”

Haig also informs Pym that the Argentines in New York are “*bragging*” that their concession on the pre-judging of sovereignty has thrown the British argument into disarray. In the American press, Costa Mendez is quoted as

saying; “that Sir A Parson's return to London proves that responsibility for the delay or the prolongation of the negotiations is certainly not Argentina's, but Britain's.”

An article in the *New York Times* states; “.. after six successive days, the negotiations were stalled by a British attempt to revive at least a vestige of control over the islands by restoring the Falklands' local council ... the Secretary-General had proposed, and Argentina had agreed, that a neutral team of UN officials administer the islands.”

May 17th – Margaret Thatcher raises British concerns about the order for 4 *Exocet* missiles that Peru has placed with France, with the French President. He assures her that completion of the order will be delayed; “.. as long as is necessary.”

Trade sanctions are renewed by the EEC until the 24th. Italy and Ireland make a joint statement saying that they will not apply the embargo.

Australia's Prime Minister tells President Reagan that; “Support for the British position and for what Mrs. Thatcher is trying to achieve is of critical importance to the western alliance.”

Sir Anthony Parsons arrives back in New York and delivers two documents to Secretary-General de Cuéllar. The first is the draft of the proposed *Interim Agreement* which sets out the British position in full; the second is a letter making it clear that the Falkland Island Dependencies are not a part of the *Interim Agreement*. He emphasises to the Secretary-General that this is as far as Britain is prepared to go; “.. these were major concessions. We could make no more. All that Argentina had offered .. was a matching undertaking (if it could be believed) to put sovereignty on one side, and conditional agreement to withdraw, which could hardly be regarded as a concession when Argentina was the aggressor; withdrawal, for an aggressor, was an obligation not a concession. .. This represented the bottom line for HM Government. We could not accept any amendments to it. .. Negotiations could not be allowed to drag on .. we required a reply from the Argentines by 12 noon on 19 May. Any appeals for further time, or any proposals for substantive amendment, would be interpreted as a rejection of our proposals. ...

At this point, Pérez de Cuéllar asked me to see him privately. I gave him the side letter about the Dependencies. .. Pérez de Cuéllar then went on to say that, between ourselves, he thought that our paper was perfectly reasonable and he appreciated the effort we had made... He also had some indications that the Argentines were beginning to get a bit desperate, and might genuinely want to get an agreement with us. His feeling was that they thought that we could recapture the Islands without much difficulty and that the only way to save themselves from this ultimate humiliation would be to get an agreement before it happened...”

Pérez de Cuéllar passes the proposal to Ros before issuing a statement; “As you know, Sir Anthony Parsons returned from London this morning and immediately informed me of the British position as defined during the intense consultations he had with his Government over the weekend. This afternoon I conveyed to Vice Minister Ros the information I had received. You will understand that until I hear from the parties I have nothing to add except that I am more than ever convinced that time is not on the side of peace. Therefore efforts to find a peaceful solution will be pursued with vigour. The next few days will be decisive.”

At a “super-restricted” session of the *North Atlantic Council* (NATO) ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, all speakers including the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy and Norway express their solidarity with the UK.

A *Sea-king* helicopter lands near to Punta Arenas in Chile and is destroyed by its British crew.⁹¹

May 18th – PM Thatcher speaks in the House of Commons; *“We have done everything that we can to try to secure a peaceful settlement. The Argentines have shown their intransigence by flouting every part of the United Nations mandatory resolution. Not only did they flout the resolution but they have gone in the contrary direction by piling extra men and equipment to the islands.”*

In New York, Deputy Minister Ros submits a document to the Secretary-General's office; *“Pérez de Cuéllar summoned me immediately afterwards. He said that Ros had given him a document containing Argentine “ideas and views” to bridge the differences between us. De Soto then described these. They were a mixture of requests for clarification, re-statement of known Argentine positions and introduction of new points. I undertook to report these to you but made it clear that they could only be interpreted as a rejection of our draft agreement. (a) The Argentines said that they were not clear what we meant by “in consultation with”.. Did it mean that the opinion of the Councils would be binding on the Administrator or not? .. (b) they did not like the references to Article 73 of the Charter, (c) they were prepared to change the date to 30 June 1983, but required a provision that if no agreement had been reached by then the General Assembly would intervene.. They needed a mechanism to ensure that the negotiations did not continue for ever, (d) they wanted the Dependencies included, (e) they wanted a reference to the relevant GA Resolutions in the preamble if possible, and in any case in the terms of reference, (f) they suggested that in the negotiations the Secretary-General should “resort to” a four State Contact Group, two States being nominated by each party, with each party having the right to veto one of the two States proposed by the other, (g) on withdrawal, they proposed a very general clause which would provide for complete withdrawal and return to normal areas of operations within 30 days, (h) there was also a point about communications and access to the Islands for the nationals of both parties during the interim period.*

I said that I would transmit all this to you and let Pérez de Cuéllar have a formal reaction ... but I could say right away that you would consider this Argentine response as completely unsatisfactory. It did not constitute a clear reply ... You would only be able to draw the conclusion that the Argentines were playing for time. .. I had made clear yesterday that such a response would be interpreted by HMG as rejection..”

May 19th – the differing units of the Task force join up. These include the ships *Fearless*, *Intrepid*, *Canberra* and *Norland*, with over 4,000 troops.

Argentina's document is handed over to the British mission after translation. Sir Anthony Parsons notes; *“The Secretariat gave us their translation of last night's Argentine paper. This is even worse that Pérez de Cuéllar and de Soto led me to believe ... in particular, (a) the previously agreed language on pre-judgement has been omitted, (b) there is no reference to Councils as such, but only to “persons who are members of the population of British origin” who are to be appointed as advisors in equal numbers with Argentine residents in the Islands, (c) the provisions on freedom of movement are much worse... in short, the Argentines have reverted to the negotiating position they occupied at the very beginning of Pérez de Cuéllar's initiative.”*

91 A largely unexplained incident. The helicopters crew gave themselves up to Chilean authorities and were eventually returned to the UK. All the crew members received gallantry medals, although for what has not been made clear. The suspicion is that they were dropping off *special forces* in Argentina in what was a one-way mission, as their vessel was required elsewhere and could not wait for them to return. Some sources suggests that B squad *SAS* were inserted to assess an attack on Argentine bases. Deemed unfeasible; the *special forces* were extracted by submarine. There was also political pressure to avoid any attack on the mainland that could induce other South American countries to assist Argentina under the terms of the Rio Treaty. This may have resulted in a last minute cancellation.

The proposal includes: (1) withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, (2) withdrawal to “normal bases of operation” within 30 days, (3) economic measures to be lifted from the date the agreement is signed, (4) supervision of withdrawal to be carried out by the UN, (5) the interim administration – (a) to be the responsibility of the UN, (b) the administration to perform all functions (executive, legislative, judicial and security), (c) local judicial functions may be exercised in accordance with the legislation in effect on 1 April 1982, (d) the administration to appoint advisers, persons who are members of the population of British origin and Argentine residents in equal numbers, (d) the flags of the parties shall fly together with that of the UN, (e) during the interim administration communications to be kept open, including freedom of movement and equality of access with respect to residence, work and property, (f) freedom of access for Argentina's airline (LADE) and Argentine television, (g) the way of life of the locals to be respected. (6) negotiations to be completed by 31 December 1982 with a single option to extend to 30 June 1983 – and if the period expires without agreement, the General Assembly of the UN to determine the final agreement.

In a telephone conversation, Costa Mendez and Ros both assure Pérez de Cuéllar that their paper of the previous evening is not their final word, and that they remain “flexible.” On being informed of the position by the Secretary-General, the President of the *Security Council*, Ling Qing, calls an informal meeting for later in the day.

“All this activity prompted me to accelerate my programme for giving Pérez de Cuéllar our formal response to last night's Argentine paper. Pérez de Cuéllar proposed a working lunch.. At my private meeting with Pérez de Cuéllar before the lunch I asked him to formally convey to Ros that HM Government found the Argentine response totally unacceptable. The Argentine position had not changed in substance since the beginning of the negotiations. It was clear that there was no hope of reaching an agreement ..We therefore had to draw a line... I told Pérez de Cuéllar that we recognised that this would enable Ros to wrong-foot us by blaming us for the breakdown of negotiations but this was something that we would have to accept... he noted what what I said about drawing a line but he had to tell me that he intended to keep his options open..”

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar speaks to both President Galtieri and PM Thatcher on the telephone.

Parsons notes; *“Although Pérez de Cuéllar refuses to admit defeat and the (Security) Council is supporting him in this, I do not feel uncomfortable about our own position. First, following his telephone call with the Prime Minister, Pérez de Cuéllar will not consider that we have acted in bad faith in announcing to the House of Commons tomorrow that we regard the present round as having ended with the Argentine rejection of our proposals, Secondly, he will not accuse me of bad faith if HM forces land on the Falklands in the next few days. I made the deadline clear to him ... it was therefore his choice, ... that he should give his negotiating effort one last chance... We are going to need all the support we can get from our friends and allies in the days to come – I even took the exceptional step of brain-washing Mrs. Kirkpatrick this evening on the flexibility we had shown in the negotiations, as opposed to Argentine obduracy. Some of my Community partners are so untrustworthy that I will not brief them until Friday ..”*

Haig tells Henderson that Jeanne Kirkpatrick had “urged” the Argentinians to accept the British plan.

Parsons reports on the consultations within the *Security Council*; *“This evening's informal consultations .. went well. There was no disposition to move into a formal meeting nor any proposals for Presidential statements which would have caused us difficulty. The Secretary-General and I reported briefly on the stage reached. ... In order to avoid provoking a wider debate, with the possible risk of a formal session tonight, I thought it better not to say explicitly that as far as we were concerned, the present round of negotiations had ended ... I gave no-one any grounds to claim that we had accepted the various calls for restraint and moderation.”*

Troops on the *Canberra* are transferred to *HMS Fearless* and *HMS Intrepid* by helicopter. A *Sea-king* helicopter crashes as it attempts to land on *HMS Intrepid*. 22 men are lost, 18 of them *special forces*.

May 20th – just after midnight, Sir Anthony Parsons sends an urgent telegram to London; “.. *the Secretary-General has dropped an embarrassing bombshell .. he has now launched his own paper.. When we remonstrated with his staff that this move was inconsistent with the British position as I had described it as recently as lunchtime today.. they said he had been encouraged to make it by the Prime Ministers concluding remarks .. It looks therefore as though Pérez de Cuéllar, in his desperate desire not to sign off, has chosen to ignore the clarification of the Prime Minister's remarks which I gave him this evening. The paper is very cleverly drafted and is undoubtedly more favourable to us than to Argentina, but I fully realise that it has come too late ...*”

Pérez de Cuéllar's *aide memoire* outlines four areas where he says that agreement must be reached – (a) certain aspects of the interim-Administration, (b) provision for the extension of the time for completion of negotiations and related duration of the interim-Administration, (c) certain aspects of mutual withdrawal of forces, and (d) the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the *Interim Agreement*. The proposal also includes: (1) inclusion of the Dependencies within the *Interim Agreement*, (2) references to UN *General Assembly Resolutions*, (3) the flags of the parties and the UN to fly over the Islands, (4) inconclusive arrangements to extend the UN administration if the target date is not met, (5) consideration of a relaxation of restrictions on residence and the acquisition of property.

Margaret Thatcher speaks to the House of Commons; “... *On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believe it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Pérez de Cuéllar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them. By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentine reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals.*

We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means. Ever since 2 April they have responded to the efforts to find a negotiated solution with obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith....

Since 6 May, when it became clear that the United States-Peruvian proposals were not acceptable to Argentina, the United Nations Secretary-General, Senor Pérez de Cuéllar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain and Argentina. Following several rounds of discussions, the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations was summoned to London for consultation last Sunday. On Monday Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and presented to the Secretary-General a draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full. He made it clear that the text represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. Yesterday we received the Argentine Government's reply. It amounted to a rejection of our own proposals, and we have so informed the Secretary-General.... The proposals have been rejected. They are no longer on the table... ”

Secretary Haig telephones Ambassador Henderson to give his impressions of the Prime Ministers speech; “*He thought we were “well-postured”. We had played things intelligently and efficiently.*”

Foreign Secretary Pym telegrams Sir Anthony Parsons to tell him that the Secretary-General's “*ideas*” represent a “*significant downwards from what was our absolute bottom line.*” With regard to military plans, Parsons should; “.. *emphasize, as has been constantly stated in Parliament, that our search for a negotiated settlement*

has not affected and cannot affect the pressures, including military, which we have been bringing to bear on the Argentines.”

Parsons speaks to Pérez de Cuéllar; *“I said that we appreciated the positive aspects of the aide memoire, but it differed in important respects from our bottom line. .. Even if acceptable to both sides as a basis for negotiations it would take days if not weeks to know whether success could be achieved. I had emphasised the importance of our deadline. Pérez de Cuéllar interrupted to say that he knew the importance of our deadline. His idea had been to work today with the Argentines in order to see whether he could persuade them to prepare a comprehensive paper for presentation to us in place of their unsatisfactory document... In conclusion Pérez de Cuéllar said that he had not told the press that he had produced a plan, just confidential ideas which he hoped would assist the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. He had no intention of publishing these..”*

Francis Pym instructs Embassies and Missions; *“You should now carry out the instructions .. If asked about the UN Secretary-General's last-minute proposals, you should say that we have throughout warmly appreciated Sr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts. However, given the hardening of the Argentine position in their latest text, it was clear that further negotiations would be fruitless.”*

President Belaunde of Peru announces that he has put forward new proposals to the British and Argentine Ambassadors. Belaunde states that he has been encouraged by a telephone call from Costa Mendez saying that the Argentine Government are urgently examining the Peruvian proposal. Described as a 'two document' proposal, it states ; *“ (1) Each Nation subscribes unilaterally to the latest proposal for an agreement presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (2) The Secretary-General fulfills the clauses in which there are points of agreement, such as – (a) ceasefire; (b) mutual withdrawal of forces; (c) Administration of the Government of the Islands by the UN or by a contact group, formed of various countries, within a period which is agreed in the two proposals; (3) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Pérez de Cuéllar, or the contact group, acceptable to both parties, which he will propose, will be responsible for organising and presiding over negotiations in pursuit of a permanent solution and for supervising the immediate withdrawal from the zone of conflict of the forces of both countries.”⁹²*

Parsons reports; *“The Secretary-General has spent the whole day waiting for an Argentine reaction to his aide memoire of 19 May. At 2345z this evening he had still not had one.”*

The Secretary-General speaks to Ros to say that he has not received a reply from the Argentines and has no choice but to inform the President of the *Security Council* that he cannot continue his efforts. Ros replies that he has been unable to get any response from Buenos Aires.

Pérez de Cuéllar writes to the President of the *Security Council*; *“... I felt the time for reaching agreement through negotiations that would restore peace in the South Atlantic was extremely short. It remains my view that substantial progress was achieved in the past two weeks towards a diplomatic solution, but I must now state that the necessary accommodations which were still needed to end the conflict have not been forthcoming. In these circumstances, I feel it my duty to inform you that, in my judgement, the efforts in which I have been engaged, with the support of the Council, do not offer the present prospect of bringing about an end to the crisis nor, indeed, of preventing the intensification of the conflict.”*

HMS Glamorgan bombards targets on the south coast to divert attention away from Falkland Sound.

92 Peru's initiative was based on the idea that, as there was no one document that both sides were prepared to sign; then each would sign their own document.

May 21st – British forces start to land at San Carlos. A unit of 25 men from 3 *Special Boat Service* attacks Argentine positions on high ground to the north of the bay, supported by covering fire from *HMS Antrim*. Units of the *Special Air Service* attack positions to the south of the landings, supported by fire from *HMS Ardent*.

An assessment of the effect of economic sanctions is circulated to Ministers; “.. *Externally, the most immediate impact has been the concern of international banking circles about Argentina's credit-worthiness. Argentina's total debt is US\$34 billion, of which US\$10 billion is short-term. Short-term credits are being rolled over, but longer term loans are not being replaced as they mature, and Argentina has not been able to raise any new loans since the invasion. The authorities have been obliged to introduce severe restrictions to prevent foreign currency outflows. There are now limits on imports and extensive controls on all foreign payments. .. Foreign currency reserves, which had fallen by US\$400 million in March, fell a further US\$500 million in April. Within Argentina , there has been a steady run on the banking system, as large number of people withdrew their deposits. At least 7 financial institutions have collapsed. Interest rates have risen sharply ... The economy was already in recession before the invasion: this has got worse...*”

In a press statement, the MoD announce; “*The Task Force has landed a number of raiding parties on the Falkland Islands during the night. These raids are still in progress. Early indications are that they are achieving their objectives. Bombardment from ships in the Task Force continued in the vicinity of Port Stanley and other areas in East Falklands. Harriers from the task Force have mounted attacks in the Fox Bay area. All these activities have been directed against Argentine military targets including fuel and ammunition dumps and military stores. ..*”

Following a Panamanian request that the *Security Council* meet to discuss the situation in the Falklands, an informal meeting is convened during the course of which Jeanne Kirkpatrick proposes that the *Council* meets later in closed session. This motion is defeated but, after much wrangling, it is decided that a formal meeting of the *Council* will take place at 2.30pm New York time.

2 *Para* move 5 miles inland to secure the bridgehead.

Argentine aircraft arrive over San Carlos. The British frigate *HMS Ardent* is hit and set on fire in an air attack. 22 seamen lose their lives and the vessel is abandoned. *HMS Argonaut*, a frigate, is hit by two bombs, killing 2 seamen, although the bombs fail to explode. *HMS Antrim*, a *County-class* destroyer, is hit by Argentine bombs, which also fail to explode.

2 British helicopters are shot down, as are 15 Argentine aircraft. One *Sea Harrier* is shot down by a *Blowpipe* near Port Howard. Its pilot, Flt. Lt. Jeffrey Glover is injured and taken prisoner.

Defence Secretary, John Nott, makes a statement; “*Following the raids we announced earlier today, British forces have now established a firm bridgehead on the Falkland Islands. Royal Marine commandos and the Parachute Regiment are now ashore in substantial numbers, with artillery, air defence weapons and other heavy equipment already disembarked from our ships. .. our ships have come under heavy air attack – 5 have been damaged, 2 seriously. .. Our Harriers and missiles have destroyed 7 Mirage, 5 Sky Hawks and 2 Puccaras. 2 Argentine helicopters – a Chinook and a Puma have been destroyed on the ground. We have lost 2 of our small helicopters. Seven weeks after Argentine aggression, British forces are tonight firmly established back on the Falkland Islands.*”

Pym informs his Ambassador in Lima; “*Belaunde's new formula is of course very simplistic and offers no apparent means of bridging the very wide gap between our and the Argentine position. It is concerned with procedures rather than substance .. The essential first step is, as it has always been, an unequivocal Argentine*

commitment to withdraw its forces .. If President Belaunde were able to exert his considerable influence with President Galtieri in order to bring this about, the prospect for a peaceful and negotiated settlement would be immediately transformed.”

In the formal meeting of the *Security Council*, the Secretary-General gives an account of his activities since the adoption of *Resolution 502* and concludes by saying that efforts must continue to restore peace. Argentina accuses the British of “*rigidity*,” while Japan calls for a resumption of negotiations. Brazil calls for the full implementation of *Resolution 502*. Australia says that Argentina began the crisis and is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. The debate is adjourned until the 22nd.

President Galtieri responds to an initiative sent him by President Turbay of Colombia; “*I value and appreciate every effort directed towards a peaceful solution of the conflict of the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Our Government has employed its maximum effort to help the steps being taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We have shown that we are flexible and reasonable. We have abstained from using force and we have only done so in reply to Great Britain's military aggression. We are witnessing today a new and serious phase of this armed aggression. The intransigent attitude of the Government of Great Britain which, to restore a colonial, anachronistic and illegal situation, resorts to violent means, shows itself once again as an immovable obstacle to all diplomatic solutions, .. to negotiate and attack at the same time thus creating a serious risk for world peace. In the face of this picture of aggression and intransigence we are comforted by regional solidarity expressed in concrete steps taken by a Latin America which has taken the Argentine cause as her own. Our region, Mr. President, will be strengthened by this situation and enriched in its firm will to defend the values of democracy and freedom which have always characterized it. The rejection of colonialism, as the 1948 Bogota declaration maintained, will identify our America with her most cherished ideals, with her raison d'etre. Even today when our mother country is attacked, we continue to pay attention to all initiatives which contribute to a peaceful solution to the conflict. That is why the efforts made by friendly countries will find in us the greatest comprehension and will to negotiate.”*

By the end of the day 2,400 British troops have landed and are dug in.

May 22nd – Ambassador Henderson in Washington, speaks to Senator Biden, a leading Democratic member of the US Senate's *Foreign Relations Committee*; “*.. the author of the Resolution of support for us adopted by the Senate on 29 April, Biden said that even back in April there had been some reluctance, especially amongst Republicans, to support any Resolution on the grounds that it would cut across Haig's efforts and involve the US ill advisedly in a dispute which could damage US relations with Latin America. When Haig had given the go-ahead to the Resolution, support had rallied but only after changes to the draft had been made, including removal of any reference to the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination. Biden went on to say that Senate support for our position reflects the closeness of Anglo/US relations rather than a feeling that important principles were at stake. .. We should not therefore assume that the Senate would support greater US involvement – or even maintain its present level of support for us indefinitely. .. Against this background, Biden said we should not be surprised that so many Senators had taken the view that the US could not afford to impair its interests for the rights of self-determination of 1800 sheep farmers. If, in any renewed negotiations, self-determination for the Islanders were to become the one issue on our side standing in the way of a settlement, US support for us would evaporate.*

I said that I was astonished that self-determination could count for so little in the country that had invented it ... Biden said he agreed and would continue to be our strongest supporter but we should not delude ourselves that Congressional opinion was altogether solid. He thought that President Reagan's rather tepid expressions

of support for us reflected, not just Reagan's style, but a political sense of the mood within his own party."

The MoD issue a press release; *"Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows: 9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Pucaros and 4 helicopters. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attack launched against our forces. The other three ships remain operational."*

Secretary John Nott makes a statement; *"This morning the Union Jack is once again flying on the Falkland Islands... A major bridgehead has been established in the area of San Carlos on East Falkland. The major amphibious landing yesterday was a complete success. Tactical surprise was achieved and our troops landed safely with almost no interference from Argentine forces. We are now ashore on British sovereign territory in considerable force and have three Royal Marine Commandos and two Battalions of the Parachute Regiment firmly in place with their supporting arms including artillery and rapier and other air defence weapons. From their secure base our forces will advance to place the occupying Argentine troops under increasing harassment, whilst the Royal Navy maintains and tightens its blockade around the Islands."*

To compliment the landings there were raids yesterday in other parts of East and West Falklands. In one of these Royal Marines captured an Argentine position on Fanning Head overlooking Falkland Sound. In another the airfield at Goose Green, and Argentine positions close by, were raided by our forces. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks in the course of the morning against Argentine installations at Port Stanley airfield and the helicopters on the ground nearby, as well as military installations at Fox Bay. During these operations we lost two Gazelle helicopters, and one RAF Harrier is missing. The Argentine navy has so far made no attempt to intervene.. The Argentine force has, as expected, launched heavy raids on our ships... We are back on the Falkland Islands, and back in strength. We intend to ensure that aggression does not pay"

HMS Ardent sinks in shallow water in Grantham Sound. Two Harriers attack an Argentine patrol boat in Choiseul Sound. A field hospital is established at Ajax Bay.

The Pope appeals for a cease-fire. Uruguay agrees that casualties may be repatriated via Montevideo.

Peruvian President Belaunde announces that the Argentines have accepted "in principle" the latest Peruvian ideas albeit with certain reservations; *".. which President Belaunde thought might not be insuperable. In particular, President Belaunde said that Galtieri had shown himself to be receptive to the idea of an "equidistant" withdrawal of forces. The Argentines feel that 150 miles is too near because their own bases are further away. ... The president also said that the Argentines are not opposed to a UN Group governing the Islands for six months or even one year during which negotiations could take place. If at the end of this period there was no agreement, the Argentines would propose to return the problem to the United Nations. .. he understood that Costa Mendez was on his way to the UN, and that he thought it was therefore important that you should be informed straight away of the nature of Galtieri's response..."*

Bad weather prevents further Argentine air attacks.

Sir Anthony Parsons reviews his tactics for the Security Council debate; *"We have already got Canada and New Zealand on board, they will probably speak today, thus to some extent offsetting the torrent of Latin American rhetoric which is in store for us (.. it will bore the Council to death). We are working on the Caribbeans, Americans and members of the Community... Abdulah (Trinidad) is on our side but gutless. ... The new Barbadian Ambassador is a man of sterner stuff and I have some hopes of him. Our African friends – Zambia, Botswana, Kenya etc. are cheering us vigorously from the pavillion but are reluctant to go to the wicket. ... The US and France are bound to make substantive comments at some stage but, given the personal qualities of Mrs*

Kirkpatrick and de Nanteuil, I suspect that the Guyanese statement will be more helpful. From the point of view of getting out Third World Commonwealth speakers, it might be worth your seeing if Ramphal would help ..”

When the *Security Council* convenes; Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, Guatemala and the United States contribute their views; *“Of the Latins the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed. Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text.”* The debate is adjourned until the 23rd.

Secretary Haig sees Ambassador Henderson privately to say that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests in the continuing battle over the Falkland islands.

May 23rd – the weather clears and Argentine aircraft return. *HMS Antelope* is hit and set on fire, but the bomb fails to explode. 10 Argentine aircraft are shot down and Argentina's 3rd *Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron* ceases operations because of a lack of replacement aircraft.

The MoD reports; *“.. the Argentine Air Force launched a number of raids on ships of the Task Force in San Carlos waters. The aircraft were engaged by missiles from surface vessels, shore based Rapier and by Sea Harriers. Five Mirage and one Skyhawk are known to have been shot down; a further one Mirage and two Skyhawks were probably shot down. During these attacks one of our frigates sustained some damage. No reports on the extent of the damage have been received, nor have we any indication of casualties. We have had no reports of other damage to British ships or aircraft. In a separate incident earlier, Sea Harriers from the Task Force on routine patrol saw two Argentine Puma helicopters and one Bell helicopter in Falkland Sound .. The Harriers attacked and one Puma exploded; the Bell helicopter landed but was seen to be on fire and the second Puma may have been damaged.”*

John Oakes writing in *The New York Times* says that; *“.. the venomous fury directed against the United States by Latin America demonstrates, not that America was wrong to support Britain, but that the Administration's Latin American policy has been perversely wrong.”*

President Galtieri responds to the Pope's call for a ceasefire in a message broadcast on Buenos Aires radio; *“.. Our people and our Government have made all possible efforts to avoid a military confrontation and bloodshed, and we have participated with a spirit of renunciation and flexibility in the negotiations to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict ... The call made by Your Holiness strengthens us in our unwavering desire to support all efforts which may lead to stopping a bloody confrontation we have not sought, and which is the result of an obstinate and intransigent attempt to restore an illegal colonial situation...”*

Debate in the *Security Council* continues and hears 13 speakers before adjourning until the 24th.

Sir Anthony Parsons reports that support for the UK is *“stretching very thin”* and a view is developing (exploited by the Argentines) that the crisis is bringing about a , *“kind of cultural confrontation between Latin America and Western Europe/North America.”*

May 24th – *HMS Sir Galahad*, *HMS Sir Lancelot* and *HMS Sir Bedivere* are hit. Fires break out on *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Lancelot*. *Sir Galahad* is hit again, but this bomb fails to explode. The MoD announce that *HMS Antelope* has sunk.

Conviccion, tells its readers; “*The marines, immobilized at San Carlos, await their Dunkirk. As Argentine troops concentrate to throw them into the sea, the British continue in the little beachhead without resupply.*”

Economic sanctions imposed by the European Community against Argentina are extended for an unspecified period.

Press reports in Panama have their Foreign Minister describing Margaret Thatcher as; “*Hitler with skirts.*”

The Washington Post reports; “*Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggests that Britain's successful landings on the Falklands – plus the sacrifices sustained by both sides – may make enough of a difference to permit negotiations to resume. Surely he is right. In its bridgehead and in its evident capacity to sustain operations ashore, Britain has something real to convert into political coin. Argentina may hope to raise the cost to the British and limit their military gains, but it cannot expect to boot them off the Islands again. The 40 isolated marines it swept up on April 2 are one thing, the 5,000 troops ashore, with their fleet protection, are quite another.*”

Argentina calls for a meeting of the OAS.

In the *Security Council*; “*Maina (Kenya) made an admirably robust statement which was an effective antidote to all the Latins have been saying about a cultural confrontation between the West and Latin America. He said that the Breach of the Peace had started with Argentina's aggression on 2 April. That was a separate question from the rights and wrongs of Argentina's claims to sovereignty. Some of those who “felt obliged” to support Argentina's case on sovereignty had tried to treat the two problems as one. ... The Decolonisation argument was irrelevant. All of North and South America had been colonised in the 18th and 19th centuries. .. That was a fact of the world's unfortunate past. This was not a colonial issue: Argentina was engaged in the purely territorial claim, in total disregard of the inhabitants of the Islands. The Argentine claim could not be settled at their expense: their interests were paramount. If the principle of decolonisation was distorted to redistribute peoples, the United Nations would be in real trouble.*”

The President, Ling Qing (China) speaking in his national capacity, said that the failure of the Secretary-General's efforts and the arrival of British forces had brought about an escalation which China deeply deplored. It was regrettable that the Secretary-General's negotiations had to stop because of the gap between two parties and because “the party with military strength had taken a tough stand.” There should be an immediate ceasefire and resumption of negotiations. The substantive problem was a legacy of colonialism..”

Secretary Haig expresses his fears to Ambassador Henderson; “*.. Haig said that the US Government, by coming down on the British side, had already greatly jeopardised US interests in Latin America. What was at stake in the future was enormous. It was not simply a question of the economic sacrifices involved but of the enormous increase in Soviet and communist influence. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution under the Rio Treaty later this week that would isolate the USA still further from the rest of the American hemisphere. He suggested that the clue lay in close involvement with Brazil... Haig then suggested the sort of plan which I have already hinted to you might be on his mind: ceasefire and withdrawal, US/Brazilian interim administration and discussions without prejudice regarding the future – ideas that I told Haig have gone down in London like a lead balloon. Haig repeated his view about keeping the Brazilians in play .. I reminded Haig how often he had assured me that this would not be another Suez... I repeated that if he was thinking of an appeal for withdrawal by both sides and the establishment of an interim administration, this was just not on...”*

On receiving Henderson's telegram, Pym comments; “*It is disconcerting that Haig should be so volatile. Haig was urging us only a few days ago to take military action...*”

Brazil suggests a draft *Resolution* to the President of the *Council*; .. *the Security Council of the United Nations can no longer delay taking firm and decisive action to restore international peace and security. .. there is no alternative but that the Security Council must take a decision to put an immediate end to the military confrontation and to establish the bases for a permanent settlement of the problem. The Brazilian Government wish to submit .. the following points which .. can be the basis for a Council Resolution that will ensure a just and honourable peace without winners or losers.*”

Brazil's “*points*” include: (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) simultaneous withdrawal to equal distances, (3) withdrawal to be complete within 21 days, (4) a UN administration which will consult the “*representatives of the inhabitants,*” (5) a Committee made up of both Britain and Argentina plus four other States with a mandate to conduct negotiations.

Parsons comments to the FCO; “*We have told the Brazilians here that the time for such arrangements is now past and that there could be no question of our allowing a Resolution on these lines to be adopted.*”

Ireland's Ambassador Dorr, also tables a draft *Resolution* which, *inter alia*, calls for a suspension of hostilities for 72 hours; “*.. the Non-Aligned members (excluding Panama) were annoyed with Dorr for going ahead and tabling a draft which he and everyone else knew that we would veto. The three Africans, Jordan and Guyana were desperately anxious to avoid a deadlock in the Security Council which could be followed by a major row generated by the Latin Americans in an emergency session of the General Assembly. This would only polarise relations between the regions, benefit the radicals and damage any prospect there might be of a peaceful outcome to the present crisis...*”

Representatives from Panama and Japan also prepare draft texts. The *Non-Aligned Movement* submits a proposal for an amended version of the Irish draft *Resolution* while the *Council* meeting is adjourned until the 25th. Parsons seeks instructions from London.

In an interview with the '*Panorama*' news team in New York, Costa Mendez asserts – (a) that Argentina would defend the Falklands as long as there is “*one Argentine alive in either the continent or in the Islands,*” (b) he was still looking for a peaceful solution; they had been seeking one for 17 years in the UN. .. he considered the invasion to be part of that search for a peaceful settlement, (c) Argentina had fully accepted *Resolution 502* from the beginning but they had not withdrawn because the UK sent 40 warships, (d) *502* did not authorise the UK to impose a solution on Argentina, (e) Argentina was willing to make any concession except sovereignty.

Uruguay's Foreign Minister condemns the British attack on Argentina, calls for a ceasefire and attacks the United States for its support for, “*colonial policies of confrontation.*”

Argentina seeks Chilean support for an OAS draft *Resolution* condemning British aggression; calling for a cessation of hostilities with a return to '*natural*' bases; a resumption of UN negotiations and the adoption by OAS States of measures to discourage the UK and assist Argentina. The Chilean Foreign Ministry inform the British Embassy that they will vote against each point except that calling for a resumption of negotiations.

Information is received from Caracas that the Venezuelan Government is attempting to persuade all Latin American countries to withdraw their Ambassadors from the UK. In Lima, President Belaunde is contacted by Costa Mendez and told that the Argentines have no objection to a cease-fire without the withdrawal of British forces from their, “*present positions.*”

May 25th – the destroyer *HMS Coventry*, with the frigate, *HMS Broadsword*, again using the 42-22 formation, are attacked by Argentine *Skyhawks* in Falkland Sound. *HMS Coventry* is sunk. 19 men are lost. *HMS Broadsword* is also hit, but the bomb fails to explode.

An *Exocet* missile hits the container ship, *Atlantic Conveyor*, which is set on fire and abandoned.

HMS Glamorgan bombards targets around Stanley.

Portugal grants permission for *Nimrod* refuelling at its Lajes air base in the Azores while New Zealand's offer of a frigate, *HMNZS Canterbury*, is gratefully accepted by PM Thatcher. An additional *Blowpipe* battery is deployed to the South Atlantic from British forces in Germany.

Margaret Thatcher responds to President Turbay's initiative of the 21st; “... *If you, Mr. President, can bring home to the Argentine Government not only the extent of our determination to achieve a just solution to this crisis, but also the imperative need to withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, you would be making a contribution to the peace of South America and of the World which it would be hard to exaggerate.*”

At the *Security Council*, Foreign Ministers representing Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela circulate a 'Declaration' ; “*We confirm the rejection by Latin America of the United Kingdom's military offensive against the South American continent ... We strongly protest against the British decision, officially communicated to the Government of Uruguay, to the effect that the United Kingdom has decided to extend its naval and air military action to the River Plate. This deplorable decision, in addition to violating general international law and the River Plate Treaty, carries the British aggression into the very heart of the continent.. This directly affects the integrity and security of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, while at the same time aggravating and spreading the conflict which has resulted from the United Kingdom's military adventure ...*

We reject with righteous indignation the decision taken by the European Economic Community, with the honorable exception of Ireland and Italy, extending indefinitely the economic aggression which, under the pretext of 'sanctions,' has been imposed on Argentina. This act, which is offensive to the whole of Latin America, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and presages the generalization of a conflict which, day by day, is assuming the character of an intercontinental confrontation.

We note with alarm that, although a number of weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the British fleet's armed attack on the Argentine Republic, the Security Council has taken no action ... This concern is seriously increased by the fact that, after four days of debate in the Council, during which both the fighting and the loss of life have intensified, it has not proved possible to respond to the outcry of mankind, which demands an unconditional ceasefire ...”

Sir Anthony Parsons responds in a letter to Ling Qing; “*There appears to have been some misunderstanding .. The Government of the United Kingdom are aware that the Treaty of the Rio de la Plata of 1973 between Argentina and Uruguay establishes a line at the mouth of the River Plate from Punta del Este to Punta Rasa de Cabo, San Antonio. In a communication to the Government of Uruguay, the Government of the United Kingdom made clear that they did not intend to engage in any military activities inshore of that line.*”

Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, delivers his speech to the *Security Council* attacking the UK for, “*unleashing war*” in the South Atlantic and rejecting the accusation that it had been Argentina which had been the first to use force; “.. *It was the UK which had used force to occupy the Islands in 1833. Colonialism was an act of force, permanent aggression and a crime: that was the true explanation of current events. It was not for the United Kingdom, the colonial power par-excellence, to give lectures on self-determination. The UK had abstained when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514, the Magna Carta of decolonisation. The UK's true attitude to self-determination was demonstrated in Diego Garcia where 1,400 inhabitants were compulsorily moved to make way for an American military base. Self-determination for the Malvinas was a joke...*”

Exercising his right of reply, Sir Anthony Parsons outlines the history of events surrounding 1833 before adding; *"... The Foreign Minister of Argentina in his opening remarks talked of the outrage committed by the United Kingdom. So far as we are concerned, the outrage was committed by Argentina when, out of a clear blue sky, Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands .. This was recognised by the terms of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) which are only too familiar to members of the Council. .. It is ludicrous to suggest that we are trying to create some form of British Empire in the South Atlantic. I cannot believe that anyone in their wildest dreams can credit this thesis. .. The Foreign Minister referred at length to self-determination.. It is true that we took the position in the 1960's that self-determination was a principle and not a right. However, in 1966 the two international Covenants on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights were adopted.... The United Kingdom has ratified both these Covenants, which have entered into force. Furthermore, in 1970, the General Assembly adopted by consensus – that is, with the United Kingdom joining in the consensus – the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. .. Not only has my country endorsed the right to self-determination in the sense of the Charter, the Covenants and the Friendly Relations Declaration, but we have gone a great deal further to disprove the allegation that we are the colonial power par-excellence. Since General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted .. we have brought to sovereign independence and membership of this organisation no less than 28 States. We are proud of our record..."*

In a press interview, President Alvarez of Uruguay denies rumours that the British are blockading the Rio de la Plata.

Francis Pym informs Parsons by telegram; *".. our position now is that while we remain willing to agree to a ceasefire if Argentina clearly and irrevocably commits herself to very early and total withdrawal of her forces, we are not prepared to accept any other conditions. We can not contemplate any parallel withdrawal of our own forces. Nor will we accept any interim Administration by the UN or anyone else... You should vote against the Irish draft Resolution if it is put to the vote as it stands .. You should work for the .. changes to the Irish draft as revised by the Non-Aligned..."*

Ambassador Henderson informs London; *"I went over the ground with Eagleburger this morning. He assured me that instructions had been sent to Mrs Kirkpatrick that if the Irish Resolution came to a vote in its present form the United States should veto it..."*

Sir Anthony Parsons responds; *"Through the morning and at the Security Council lunch, I have negotiated firmly on the Irish draft as revised by the Non-Aligned Movement, on the basis of your instructions. As you will see we have carried almost all our points... We have a clear reaffirmation of 502.. I am under very strong pressure to agree this evening so that we can get out of the Council before this fragile near-agreement breaks down. .. I therefore recommend that I should be instructed to accept this with a suitable explanation of vote, after the vote..."*

Summing up the day's debate, he adds; *".. Guyana was first class, as was Chile given its circumstances. The other Non-Aligned were not at all bad. Netherlands was as unhelpful as the other Europeans (except Belgium) have been, but Italy was a bit more robust. Costa Mendez was quite moderate but his speech was defensive and lackluster. In general, our support emerged more clearly as the debate developed. The Argentines had the better of the first two days, with a flood of Latin rhetoric, but by the end the general feeling, I think, was that we had won quite handsomely on points. For this we should be especially grateful to Kenya, Guyana and Belgium – the old Commonwealth support for us was taken for granted..."*

After receiving instruction from London, Sir Anthony Parsons informs the Council that Britain is ready to vote in favour of the draft Resolution initially proposed by Ireland, as amended by the Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM). His instructions include the necessity of emphasising that; *“.. the situation has moved on since the Secretary-General reported to the Council on 21 May and that an Argentine withdrawal must now be totally unconditional and not linked to any parallel British withdrawal.”*

Costa Mendez, asks for time to consider the measure and a vote is put off till the 26th.

Alexander Haig writes to Francis Pym with his *“thoughts”*; *“.. I see major advantages in an effort by you to put forward terms of a just and reasonable settlement as soon as you are sure that you can and will succeed militarily. ... No doubt you are aware of the proposal the Brazilians have introduced in New York... at the point at which British military success is at hand, it may well be possible to bring about an agreement based on a British proposal that contains elements of the Brazilian text .. If you would agree that such an effort would be worthwhile, we would be ready to assist in such an initiative ..”*

NBC television, Reuters and Associated Press all carry news reports that Secretary Haig has called on the British Government not to *“crush”* the Argentinians in the Falklands, but to *“think carefully.”* The reports suggest that the Argentinians would seek a scapegoat, and that scapegoat would be the United States. Haig is said, by Ambassador Henderson, to be *“upset”* by the leak and to consider it, *“damaging.”*

The FCO send out messages to all Ambassadors and Missions in countries belonging to the *Non-Aligned Movement* requesting that they speak to their counterparts to ensure that in the meeting scheduled for the 31st, emphasis is laid upon the original aggression by Argentina and their failure to comply with SCR 502. The FCO is very conscious that Argentina will request a statement from the NAM endorsing its position and criticising Britain's military action; *“Such a statement could have an important impact on any further debates at the United Nations, whether in the Security Council or in the General Assembly ..”*

May 26th – British troops commence their advance towards Darwin.

John Nott makes a statement to the House of Commons; *“During the past seven weeks the Royal Navy has assembled, organised and despatched over 100 ships, involving over 25,000 men and women, 8,000 miles away to the other end of the world. The task force has recaptured South Georgia and successfully accomplished a hazardous amphibious landing of around 5,000 men without a single fatal land casualty. The morale of our forces is high. By any historical standard, this will be seen to have been one of the most remarkable logistic and military achievements of recent times. ... Our force on the ground are now poised to begin their thrust upon Port Stanley; behind them are another 3,000 men of 5 Brigade, whilst reinforcements and resupply are virtually denied to the Argentine garrison on the island. Generally the military objective to repossess the Falkland Islands has gone forward exactly as we planned it. We have had losses and there may be more on land and sea, but the people of the Falkland Islands can be assured that our resolve is undiminished. We intend to free them from occupation and to restore their democratic rights.”*

Columbia's Ambassador to the UK, calls on Francis Pym to deliver a message from his President; *“President Turbay had spoken to the Presidents of Brazil and Peru, who had agreed to put forward ideas on an informal basis through the Ambassador. .. (They) were concerned to avoid further loss of life and the potential damage to Latin American institutions and relations. In the absence of any diplomatic activity to resolve the crisis, there would be strong pressures at the Rio Treaty meeting on 27 May to take radical positions against the UK. What was needed was time to allow pressures to be brought to bear on Argentina to reach an agreement which the UK could accept. .. The three Governments therefore wished to know whether we could consider agreement to a suspension of military operations for 5 days ..”* Pym politely says no.

An article in Germany's *Rheinische Post* states that Germany's support for the UK is, “*grudging and full of reservations stemming from incomprehension at many aspects of Mrs. Thatcher's Falklands strategy,*” and that Germany will not go, “*through thick and thin,*” with Britain.

In Lima, there is press speculation regarding a “*secret session*” of the Peruvian Senate to debate possible military assistance to Argentina under the terms of the *Rio Treaty*.

Ambassador Tickell in Mexico speaks privately with President Lopez Portillo; “*I underlined our resentment at accusations of colonialism and drew attention to the generosity of the draft agreement we had put to the Argentines but which they rejected. The President asked me to convey his warm thanks to the Prime Minister. He deplored the loss of life and waste of resources involved in the conflict. He did not doubt our capacity to recover the Islands and indicated that he hoped we would not be too long about it...*”

Following agreement by Costa Mendez that Argentina could accept the *Resolution* as amended, the revised draft is sponsored by Guyana, Ireland, Jordan, Togo, Uganda and Zaire.

Before the vote two more speakers are heard; Germany and Yugoslavia; “*(Germany) recognised that the Falkland Islands had been an important national concern of the Argentine people for many years, but Argentina had defied the Security Council and the Secretary-General when it chose to settle the dispute by force. Its invasion was against international law and the Charter and had led the UK to invoke its rights under Article 51... The Secretary-General should resume his efforts with a concrete and specific mandate in order to achieve a solution in full conformity with SCR 502. ...*”

Komatina (Yugoslavia) made a typically non-aligned speech ... He hardly mentioned the UK at all .. He did, however, express support for SCR 502..”

The Security Council agrees to adopt the amended draft *Resolution*.

Security Council Resolution 505 -

“*The Security Council,*

Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982),

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General at its 2360th meeting, on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements made in the debate by the representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve, as a matter of the greatest urgency, a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and the United Kingdom,

1. **Expresses appreciation** to the Secretary-General for the efforts that he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. **Requests** the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982;

3. **Urges** the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);
4. **Requests** the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;
5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution."

In explanation of their votes; Spain expresses regret that the *Resolution* did not order a cease-fire; Panama complains that there is no mention of 'decolonisation' and reserves the right to call another meeting while China also regrets that the *Resolution* did not call for an immediate cease-fire. Argentina's Representative accuses the *Security Council* of not being able to act as it should, because of the pressure; "of more than one permanent member."

Sir Anthony Parsons also provides Britain's explanation; "My delegation voted in favour of the *Resolution* just adopted .. We did so because it contains a clear reaffirmation of SCR 502. It registers beyond doubt that the Secretary-General's efforts have been, and will be, concentrated on ensuring the implementation of SCR 502. This is the key to the return of peace to the region... In particular, this key lies in the second operative paragraph of SCR 502, namely the unconditional demand for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. I must make clear, so that there is no misunderstanding, that for our part the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked to an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal. The history of the last two months has done nothing to create British confidence in the Government of Argentina ... Hence a simple verbal agreement by Argentina to withdraw its forces would not be sufficient for a ceasefire. Mr. President the Council should also be quite clear on another point. The situation has changed ... we are talking about Argentine withdrawal. We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in any way to parallel British withdrawal..."

In a telegram to the FCO in London, Parsons sums up the day's proceedings; "We owe a lot to the old Commonwealth, Kenya, Guyana and Belgium for their robust support, slightly less to the FRG (Germany), little or nothing to the rest of our partners who spoke, including France: the US statement was too even handed for our liking. However, to a greater or lesser extent, all these statements offset the Latin American barrage ... The fact that we emerged without having to veto, which seemed most unlikely at the outset, was due to a number of factors – the firmness with which we stated our own positions both privately and publicly: the reluctance of the Non-Aligned members of the Council to allow a veto situation to develop both because of basic sympathy for us and because they realised that a deadlock would effectively deal the UN out of any further useful role in the crisis: the Irish tactics which the Non-Aligned found both irritating and unacceptable: and the Latin American desire to get out of the Council in order to leave their hands free for the OAS meeting in Washington on the 27th ... It is ironic .. that our best support should have come from Africans, Asians and Caribbeans, with our partners and allies either useless or actively unhelpful. There is no doubt that Ireland was prepared to push us to a veto with full foreknowledge that their draft was unacceptable to us."

With only seven days available before reporting back to the *Security Council*, Pérez de Cuéllar requests from Argentina and Britain provide, within 24 hours, the terms each consider acceptable for a cease-fire; "Pérez de Cuéllar asked to see me privately ... Was it really the case that we could no longer contemplate any parallel British withdrawal? I confirmed that it was. ... He did not think that he would have any alternative but to

report to the Security Council that mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire were unobtainable. .. I urged him nevertheless to try to find some change in the Argentine position.”

Argentina's Central Bank announces that, with immediate effect, payments for imported goods can only be made 180 days after shipment ; *“This measure is aimed at saving foreign currency to meet needs arising from the Falklands conflict. .. and suggests that the Argentines face great difficulties in meeting their foreign exchange commitments.”*

May 27th – Britain's Ambassador to Ireland informs Taoiseach Charles Haughey that, as a result of Ireland tabling a draft *Resolution* which they knew was not acceptable to the UK, relations had taken a, *“considerable turn for the worse.”*

Ambassador Henderson in Washington reports that the Americans are still concerned that their relationships with Latin America are suffering as a result of their continued support of the UK; *“The Americans recognise that the change in the military scene has inevitably brought about a change in our attitude about withdrawal and the administration of the Islands. As they see it, we are now insisting on surrender of the Argentinian garrison and a return to British rule without any definite commitment to an attempt to achieve a long-term solution. In effect, we are basing ourselves on a return to the status quo ante. The Americans believe that this will (a) harden Argentine military resistance in the short and longer term; (b) solidify the Latin Americans in their backing for Argentina; (c) will encourage continued Argentine hostilities against us .. (d) will help the Russians to increase their influence in Latin America, and (e) .. pose for the Americans the problem of either exacerbating their relations with the whole Latin American world or bringing about a deterioration in relations between the US and the UK...”* Henderson suggest that the Islanders' interests should be safeguarded by; *“ .. some international group comprising say, two regional powers, plus the US and the UK, with the presence perhaps of the US and Brazilian forces and that, without prejudice to the future, in a given number of years this group will, in keeping with the wishes and interests of the Islanders, make proposals about the status of the Falkland Islands.”*⁹³

The OAS meet in Washington. Secretary Haig makes a *“detailed and determined”* speech in which the focus of his remarks are on the fact that, since it was Argentina which had committed the original act of aggression, it would be wrong to invoke the *Rio Treaty*. His speech is greeted in silence while those delegates that attack the United States are given ovations.

“Costa Mendez set the tone with an intemperate onslaught against the US which had failed in its duty to join with its hemispheric neighbours against an external threat. He urged Argentina's true friends to unite in solidarity against the UK, which throughout the negotiations had acted with total intransigence. British actions were an insult to the Latin American continent. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister accused the British of having a punitive obsession which was shared by the EC, ... He asserted that the locus standi of the UN in this dispute was subordinate to that of the OAS and the Rio Treaty. He accused the US of incomprehensibly deserting its friends... The Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister maintained that in future the Rio Treaty signatories should meet in Latin America and not in Washington, which was “foreign territory.”.. The US was an accomplice in British aggression... The Peruvian Foreign Minister maintained that Argentina had throughout been flexible... Colombia introduced a mild hand-wringing Resolution. Trinidad and Tobago repeated its support for self-determination and condemned Argentina for using force to resolve a dispute. Illueca (Panama) made his usual long-winded and abusive speech. Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia and Guatemala spoke without adding anything, although the last three joined the mob in condemning the US.”

93 PREM19/631 Telegram No. 1921 of 27 May. The word “No” is scrawled across the last paragraph.

Foreign Secretary Francis Pym replies to Secretary-General de Cuéllar's question; *"I am glad that you are undertaking renewed efforts for a peaceful settlement to the present crisis. You can be assured that the British Government will cooperate fully in your efforts. .. The UK accepted the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502, which remains the basis of British policy, and has participated constructively and actively in the efforts for a settlement. Argentina, by contrast, has refused to implement Resolution 502 and has turned down successive proposals by the US Secretary of State, the President of Peru in consultation with the US and then by yourself..."*

You have asked about the British Government's definition of acceptable terms for a ceasefire. In our view a ceasefire that was not linked inseparably to Argentine withdrawal would give Argentina another opportunity for procrastination through intransigence. The British answer to your question is therefore that a ceasefire is highly desirable and would be acceptable if it was inseparably linked to the commencement of Argentine withdrawal and the completion of that withdrawal within a fixed period. One reason for this British view is Argentina's record of deliberate delay and inflexibility in negotiations. A change of position by Argentina involving willingness to implement Resolution 502 could transform the situation. It would be most encouraging if in your resumed efforts for peace under the mandate of Security Council Resolution 505 you could obtain from Argentina convincing evidence of such a change. Argentina's immediate response to your question yesterday may not do this, in which case I hope you would go back to them on the point...."

On receiving the British response, the Secretary-General promises to speak with Costa Mendez.

Special forces land in strength on Mount Kent. Atlantic Conveyor sinks. Argentina terminates all contracts with German ship yards on account of the arms embargo and the interruption of supplies for the Corvettes being built there.

May 28th – Prime Minister Thatcher, in a meeting with Lord Shackleton, invites him to update the *Shackleton Report*.

HMS Arrow provides covering fire for 2 Parachute Regiment's advance on Darwin and Goose Green.

Colonel H. Jones is killed in a charge on Argentine lines, for which he is awarded the Victoria Cross.

"From Darwin (Bob Hardcastle). Very thankful to be liberated 5pm 28th. .. Some houses destroyed. All employees and visitors safe. ... Regret to advise goons occupied and looted all houses, stores, farm materials, Rovers, tractors and equipment. Settlement area a shambles. Much indiscriminate sheep killing for food by goons in helicopters ..."

Brazil's Ambassador, Roberto Campos, calls on Francis Pym in London; *".. Matters were now at a critical point. British insistence on an unconditional Argentine withdrawal would have a destabilising effect both on Argentina and the Region. If Argentina were faced with military humiliation, it might have no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. Figueiredo .. wished to know whether the British position on Argentine withdrawal and on full restoration of British sovereignty was irreversible. He hoped not .. He hoped that we might indicate a continued willingness to negotiate a solution which might involve a phased and mutual withdrawal and interim administration arrangements. I said .. following our landing on the Islands, the circumstances were inevitably different. .. We intended to repossess the Islands and to restore our administration. .. Campos, who was in a waspish mood, went on to make some sharp criticism of our position on sovereignty ... It was not a productive exchange. ..."*

Argentina's Representative in New York tells Pérez de Cuéllar of the terms upon which they are willing to accept a ceasefire. These include a suspension of all operations by troops; monitoring by the UN; separate zones to be

established on the Islands if necessary; no military reinforcement; the UN to provide food etc to the troops and civilians; negotiations to take place on the withdrawal of both parties and an interim Administration.

At the OAS meeting; “.. several countries which had not taken part in Thursday's fiesta of anti-Americanism made subdued statements, these include Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti and El Salvador, whose even-handed speech was uniquely applauded by both Argentina and American delegates. Mexico, Brazil and Chile remained silent throughout. ..”

May 29th – French President Mitterand informs Margaret Thatcher that he is under pressure to complete the order of *Exocet* missiles to Peru; “Peru has made it known to other Latin American countries that France is declining to execute the contract. Consequently, France's contracts with other Latin American countries are in danger.”

Lt. Colonel Italo Piaggi and 1,400 Argentine troops surrender at Goose Green; to a British force of 500, at a cost of 17 British dead.

“At one end of Goose Green settlement a Union Jack now flies high above the school. At the other end, the flag of the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment. After a whole day's bitter fighting and a morning's delicate surrender negotiations, the cheers of liberation came in the early afternoon. Women handed round cups of tea in Royal wedding mugs. Children carried round tins of sweets and biscuits to young Paras .. For nearly a month, 114 people had been shut up by the Argentinians in community hall. Their houses had been raided with furniture smashed and excrement on the floor. ... Now the 1200 or so prisoners are being made to clean up the mess...”⁹⁴

Argentine troops discover that Mount Kent has been seized by the SAS, providing a commanding view of Port Stanley. Efforts to dislodge them are unsuccessful.

Argentina's Representative contacts the Secretary-General to say that the terms the British are offering are terms, “for surrender.” Pérez de Cuéllar contacts Sir Anthony Parsons to tell him that the Argentines are showing an interest in a reference to “international security arrangements” and wish to know what the British meant. The Secretary-General confirms that he will not expect a reply before the 31st.

The OAS meets again. Argentina assures them that it has complied with the *Organisation's* last *Resolution*, but claims that Britain has not. “.. A closed drafting group met all day and night to prepare the final *Resolution*, which was in some ways tougher than the original draft when it finally emerged. We gather that Venezuela was outspokenly assertive throughout the meeting: reasonable drafts from Colombia and Costa Rica were swept aside. The Mexicans and Brazilians, who played a moderating role at the last meeting, seem to have had little effect this time round. The Americans were almost entirely routed .. The Colombians managed to smuggle in reference to the peaceful resolution of disputes.”

In its final form, the OAS *Resolution* refers to their *Resolution* of 28 April; “ While the Government of the Argentine Republic informed the Organ of Consultation of its full adherence .. the British forces proceeded to carry out serious and repeated armed attacks against the Argentine Republic in the zone of the Malvinas Islands, within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which means that the United Kingdom has ignored the appeal made to it by the 20th Meeting of Consultation.

Resolves: (1) To condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American hemisphere, or arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities ..;

94 From Robert Fox, BBC, with 2 Para

(2) To reiterate its firm demand upon the United Kingdom that it cease immediately its acts of war against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate return to their usual stations of its Task Force and all its armed forces.; (3) To deplore the fact that the attitude of the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate the negotiations for a peaceful settlement ...; (4) To express its convictions that it is essential to reach with the greatest urgency, a peaceful and honourable settlement of the conflict, under the auspices of the United Nations, ...; (5) To urge the Government of the United States of America to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures applies against the Argentine Republic and to refrain from providing material assistance to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity recognised in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. (6) To urge the members of the European Economic Community, and the other States that have taken them, to lift immediately the coercive economic or political measures taken against the Argentine Republic; (7) To request the States, parties to the Rio Treaty, to give the Argentine Republic the support that each judges appropriate to assist... ”

US Ambassador, William Middendorf, abstains, saying; *“We believe the resolution before us to be one-sided. It charges some; it ignores the actions of others. It ignores what the legal effects of first use of force should be. Further, there is no recognition that there must be compliance by both parties with all elements of UN Security Council Resolution 502 ...”*

Secretary Haig speaks to Ambassador Henderson; *“Haig said that if we could only consider proposals relating to the future after the surrender of the Argentine garrison, then he thought it would have to be London who put forward ideas rather than the US and Brazil. He was saying in effect that the US would not be able to go in for this sort of approach once the Argentines had been humiliated by a complete military defeat because this would exacerbate Washington's relations with the Latin American world. Haig also gave me a piece of paper containing four points .. in connection with the American ideas – (1) restoration of local administration does not include return of a Governor; (2) avoidance of publicly espousing independence or semi-independence, as the British goal; (3) agreement on withdrawal would have to say something about non-reintroduction of forces; (4) contact group to stay on indefinitely.”⁹⁵*

Haig's “ideas” include; *“When British military success is at hand, the US and Brazil would propose an agreement to the UN and Argentina containing .. - (1) General and permanent cease-fire, establishment of a temporary British military administration, lifting of sanctions by Argentina, the UK and third countries; (2) Immediate introduction of a peacekeeping force from the US and Brazil to verify cease-fire and separation of forces; (3) Rapid withdrawal of Argentine forces; (4) Creation of a Contact Group of the UK, US, Brazil and Argentina; (5) End of military administration and start of local self-government by the local Councils with the Contact Group ratifying all decisions ..; (6) Phased withdrawal of British forces, with the peacekeeping force to assume responsibility for the security of the Islands for a limited period; (7) Negotiations, without preconditions, on the definitive settlement of the dispute with the assistance of other members of the Contact Group; (8) Undertaking by both parties not to take any action that would prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.”*

Henderson tells Haig that the British Government are considering independence or some form of independence for the Islanders. Haig responds that the British should refrain from mentioning it as it would be unacceptable to the Argentines; *“They regard it as tantamount to saying that we would not in any circumstances accept the transfer of sovereignty.”*

95 PREM19/632 Telegram No. 1963 of 29 May. The word “No” is written against (2), (3) and (4) in the file.

May 30th – HMS *Ambuscade* and HMS *Glamorgan* bombard targets near Port Stanley. 45 *Commando* and 3 *Para* secure Douglas and Teal. The Argentine Navy depletes its supply of air-launched *Exocet* missiles. The MoD deny Argentine reports that HMS *Invincible* has been hit by an *Exocet* missile.

PM Thatcher responds to the French President's message of the previous day; *"If it became known, as it certainly would, that France was now releasing weapons to Peru that would be passed on to Argentina for use against us, France's ally, this would have a devastating effect on the relationship between our two countries. Indeed it would have a devastating effect on the alliance (NATO) as a whole."*

Pym advises Henderson that; *"Haig's ideas are being examined very carefully, but they require a good deal of further consideration by Ministers. We foresee that it will probably not, repeat not, be possible to transmit a full response to him through you before Tuesday 1 June.."*

The FCO advises Parsons in New York that the Argentine terms for a ceasefire are unacceptable; *"Please tell Pérez de Cuéllar on 31 May that our own position remains as set out in my message to him in my telegram No. 475 (27 May). You should hold out no hope of our altering it in the face of the continued Argentine intransigence demonstrated in their reply to him of 28 May. We naturally recognise that, in the circumstances, the Secretary-General may feel obliged to report failure to the Security Council..."*

May 31st – the French President informs Peru that the order for *Exocet* missiles cannot be met for; *"political reasons."* The Government and people of the Cayman Islands send £500,000, much of it raised by public collections, to the UK; *"at a time when their Mother Country is in need of help."*

Elements of 42 *Commando* and the SAS are airlifted to positions near Stanley. *Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre* troops attack Argentine *special forces* at Top Malo House, taking the position after a fire-fight. All of the Argentine force are killed or captured.

Argentina circulates the OAS *Resolution* as a *"document of the Security Council."* Sir Anthony Parsons recommends to the FCO that he should reply and point out that the OAS *Resolution* fails to refer to SCR *Resolutions 502* and *505* and that the Security Council has; *"the Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."*

Britain's formal response to Pérez de Cuéllar's inquiry is formally handed over by Parsons; *"You asked what terms for a ceasefire would be acceptable to us. As you know, we have already participated constructively and actively in several major efforts to secure a resolution to the present crisis... Our answer to your question is that a cease-fire must be inseparably linked to the commencement of the withdrawal of Argentine troops and to the completion of the withdrawal within a fixed period. In taking this position, we base ourselves squarely on Security Council Resolution 502, .. While we should be willing to consider in the longer term the possibility of alternative international security arrangements for the protection of the Islanders, there is no question of our agreeing to the withdrawal of British forces in parallel to Argentine withdrawal. .."*

Parsons reports; *".. He said that he was seeing Ros an hour later. If he detected any sign of change in Ros' attitude, he was disposed to make a final attempt over the next two days to bring about the implementation of .. SCR 502 (he entirely understood that there was no question of parallel British withdrawal) in an effort to avoid what looked like being a bloody battle for Stanley, with heavy casualties on both sides, followed by total Argentine humiliation..."*

Pérez de Cuéllar telephoned me after seeing Ros to ask if I would receive De Soto in my mission: Pérez de Cuéllar had some questions .. De Soto turned up about two hours later. It emerged that a 5 point plan for the

implementation of SCR 502 and 505 had been put to the Argentines who, after long deliberation amongst themselves, had agreed to forward it to Buenos Aires. However, Ros had not brought any fresh instructions to deliver to the Secretary-General: he had called only to hear our final response... Pérez de Cuéllar's 5 point plan is - (1) at time 'T' a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers; (2) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal), (3) at time 'T' plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin, (4) the withdrawals would be completed within 'X' days, (5) negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505.

De Soto summed up Pérez de Cuéllar's views as follows. Points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) would amount to the restoration of British Administration. .. He hoped this would enable us to consider "the longer term" more as "the near future".."

In a separate telegram, Sir Anthony Parsons gives his own views; "I believe that this is a genuine effort by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to find a last-minute solution .. I do not believe that he is playing some kind of double game. However, as I see it, his proposals are unacceptable. First, if UN observers were in situ under a mandatory Resolution, and the Argentines found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action. Secondly, his plan involves some British withdrawal. Thirdly, it could resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN supervision of the negotiations for a final solution. Nevertheless, it enables us to buy a little more time ... I recommend therefore that I should be instructed to give him a reasoned response.. His proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines, since they involve total Argentine withdrawal .. This is another reason why it will be in our interests to talk to him about his plan rather than rejecting it outright."

President Reagan telephones PM Thatcher to suggest that she call a halt to hostilities. "President Reagan said that the USA considered it imperative that the UK should show that it was prepared to talk before the Argentinians were forced to withdraw. Willingness to talk now could prevent a Peronist take-over in Argentina in the future. The President had spoken to the President of Brazil who shared his view that the best chance for peace was before complete Argentine humiliation...."

Thatcher responds; "I didn't lose some of my best ships and some of my finest lives, to leave quietly under a ceasefire without the Argentines withdrawing... I'm not handing over the island now ... I can't lose the lives and blood of our soldiers to hand the islands over to a contact group. It's not possible... This is democracy and our island, and the very worst thing for democracy would be if we failed now .."

June 1st – during a television interview with the BBC, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is asked whether she sees a future role for Argentina on the Falkland islands; "I cannot, myself, see a role in anything relating to sovereignty, for the Argentines on the Falkland Islands. You saw what happened in Goose Green and Darwin, how our people have been treated. They'd never wanted to go to Argentine before, they'll be even less likely now. ... It is after all a cardinal part of the United Nations Charter, that countries should come to self-Government and independence and I believe that we can do that with the Falkland Islands."

Ambassador Henderson speaks to Judge Clark at the White House; "Clark said that he believed the President did understand the firmness of our position. Neither he nor Haig were wishing to undermine this. The President had told Clark, following his conversation with the Prime Minister, that he was particularly concerned by her remark that "we are going it alone." This was not how the Americans saw it. "We are in it with you," Judge Clark said. This was very much the President's conviction. But this did not prevent him from believing that considerable damage had already been done to the USA's relations with its Latin American

neighbours, that the US should not neglect any chance of preventing further bloodshed and the humiliation of Argentina that could give a hostage to the future, and that in the long-term there had to be a settlement ...”

Henderson reports; *“Haig has spoken to me in the light of the Prime Minister's talk with the President and my talk with Judge Clark. He says that there is no good in pursuing his ideas. It is a pity, but he understands.”*

Ambassador Hutchinson in Montevideo is invited to speak to the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, in company with the Argentine Ambassador, to see; *“what could be done to achieve a cease-fire.”*

Secretary Haig sends a message to Ambassador Henderson; *“He did not expect a Resolution to come forward for another day or two. The Argentinians were still putting forward wholly unrealistic requirements for a cease-fire, asking for mutual withdrawal. But he hoped that we could again manoeuvre, as we had so successfully last week, to avoid a situation in which we and the Americans were isolated in the UN. It was, as usual, clear throughout this conversation that Haig has no confidence whatever in Mrs. Kirkpatrick, with whom he has just had another major row on this issue, and foresees more trouble from her. Haig thought we should be in a position to win militarily in the near future. The question was, how, after the garrison had surrendered, to bring the conflict to an end. I said it seemed clear that the Argentinians actually preferred military defeat to any diplomatic settlement. I also pointed out that their prospects of continuing with air attacks would be much diminished once we had recovered control of the Port Stanley airfield. Haig agreed but said the President would want to discuss with the Prime Minister, ways of trying to mend fences with Latin America and limit soviet opportunities to exploit the aftermath .. He said again that he did not think that independence could be a viable solution..”*

Francis Pym advises Parsons; *“Pérez de Cuéllar's five-point plan is certainly unacceptable as it stands. But I agree that without raising false hopes or misrepresenting our position you should give him a reasoned response... You should tell the Secretary-General that while other aspects of his plan give us difficulty we approve the emphasis on total Argentine withdrawal with a fixed period of time. We look forward to learning of the Argentine response.”*

An Argentine C-130 reconnaissance aircraft is shot down. 5 Brigade commences its disembarkation at San Carlos. Peru offers the use of its Air Force for the evacuation of Argentine wounded while President Belaunde sends a personal message to President Reagan urging him to arrange an immediate cease-fire as; *“his word would be decisive in averting the final battle.”* Information is received that Libya is supplying missiles to Argentina. The aircraft including military and civilian Boeing 707's are transiting via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil.

HMS Avenger bombards Argentine positions on Pebble Island, while *HMS Active* and *HMS Ambuscade* hit targets around Stanley.

Parsons responds to Francis Pym; *“I acted this afternoon on the instructions in your telegram under reference. Pérez de Cuéllar was disheartened by them. Pérez de Cuéllar subsequently saw Ros.Ros had given Pérez de Cuéllar a piece of paper in the following terms - “The Secretary-Generals proposal would be acceptable if: (1) .. the completion of the total British withdrawal, whatever its rhythm, would be within Y days (2) It is clearly understood that in no case would British forces remain alone on the Islands. The Blue Helmets should be on the Islands before the completion of withdrawal of Argentine forces. The withdrawal of Argentine forces from the areas occupied by them should correspond with a gradual takeover of control of those areas by Blue Helmets (3) The British forces shall abstain from widening their areas of occupation at the date of ceasefire. ... Pérez de Cuéllar recognises that his current efforts have come to an end.”*

The new French President of the *Security Council* calls a meeting for the 2nd so that the Secretary-General can present his report.

Ambassador Henderson in Washington considers the assistance provided by the United States; *"I do not need to go into the details about the value of the intelligence cooperation which has been given, the full extent of which is well known to the JIC. So far as communications facilities are concerned, the Americans have made especially available satellite communication channels at considerable cost to their own operations, communications sets for our special forces on the Islands, secure speech facilities with the fleet and satellite weather information. So far as equipment is concerned, we have over the last month procured at least \$120 million of US material made available at very short notice and frequently from stocks normally earmarked for US operational requirements. This equipment has included the latest air-to-air Side-winder missiles urgently required for use by the Harriers, the Vulcan phalanx anti-missile gun system for HMS Illustrious, 4700 tons of airstrip matting for the Port Stanley airport once it has been recaptured, conversion of the SS Stena inspector for use as a repair ship in the South Atlantic, Shrike missiles for use by the Vulcans, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for use by the Sea King Helicopters, Temporary accommodation on a large scale for Ascension Island for our forces, Stinger ground-to-air missiles (already used successfully against Argentine aircraft), as well as the usual array of weapons and ammunition..."*

June 2nd – 2 Para reaches Bluff Cove. Surrender leaflets are dropped on Port Stanley. *HMS Arrow* bombards Fox Bay. *Harrier* reinforcements arrive from Ascension Island. Hospital ship *Hecla* arrives in Montevideo and disembarks 24 Argentine prisoners and 18 British casualties.

President Turbay of Colombia writes to PM Thatcher appealing for her to; *".. consider the possibility of reaching an honourable peace agreement with Argentina, thus avoiding the unnecessary holocaust of many innocent lives."*

In New York, Sir Anthony Parsons informs Pérez de Cuéllar that the British Government are disappointed, though not surprised, by the terms of the Argentine response to the 5-point plan that he had put to the two sides.

The Secretary-General then reports to the *Security Council* that he has been unable to negotiate mutually acceptable terms for a ceasefire; *"At the informal consultation of the Security Council .. the Secretary-General read out his report. .. You will see that it is a brief and even-handed account of his efforts during the last seven days and it does not apportion blame for their failure. He affirms his readiness to remain in close contact with the parties and to continue to exercise his good offices. The mandate he was given in SCR 505 thus remains in being..."*

Following a call for a formal meeting by Panama, the *Security Council* reconvenes. Spain and Panama co-sponsor a draft *Resolution* for the *Council's* consideration which calls for an unconditional ceasefire.

"Ros spoke at length. The negotiations with the Secretary-General had shown that the UK did not intend at any time to heed the Council's appeals. Its only objective was to continue its aggression, with the intention of installing in the islands a military system as part of its plan to dominate the South Atlantic. The wishes of the Islanders were simply a mask. .. Argentina, on the other hand, had replied promptly and positively to the Secretary-General's efforts under SCR 505. .. The intransigence of the United Kingdom was evident. In its view, the Council ought not to endorse the restoration of a colonial situation, plus a military force to preserve it. This confirmed the pattern of threat and aggression pursued by the British since 1833. It recalled Guantanamo, Diego Garcia and Ascension. .. Ros then read out the Resolution adopted by the Rio Treaty powers.. (Brazil) then made a notably pro-Argentine speech. ... The UK had no right to try unilaterally to enforce SCR 502. The Council should demand an immediate ceasefire, with UN participation..."

Sir Anthony Parsons speaks next; *“I pay tribute once again to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made during the past few days to implement Resolution 502 and 505. ... I have said before, but it cannot be repeated too often, that the current breach of the peace was caused by Argentina. It was Argentina which closed the diplomatic channels on 1 April. It was Argentina which remained silent in the face of the Security Council's appeal not to use force .. It was Argentina .. which invaded the Falkland Islands... It was, and is, Argentina which has failed to comply with Resolution 502 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops. .. It is the United Kingdom which was the victim of the Argentine act of aggression.... Everything we have done since has been in exercise of our inherent right to self-defence. .. The plain fact is, Mr. President, that until the Government of Argentina changes its position it is clear that the conditions for a cease-fire do not exist. Against this background the call by the distinguished representatives of Spain and Panama for an unconditional cease-fire is not acceptable to my delegation. A cease-fire which is not inseparably linked to an immediate Argentine withdrawal would not be consistent with Resolution 502.. When we talk about security arrangements for the future, we are talking about security arrangements to shield the Islanders against any threat of renewed aggression – that is all.”*

Spain presses the *Council* for an immediate vote but the meeting is adjourned until the 3rd so that other countries can obtain instructions from their Governments.

Parsons advises London; *“Spain and Panama will press hard tomorrow morning for an immediate vote on their draft Resolution. They can count on six affirmative votes (China, USSR, Poland, Spain, Ireland, Panama). I think we can count on five negative votes or abstentions (France, UK, US, Guyana, Japan). Spain/Panama therefore have to get three out of the following four in order to get the necessary nine votes to turn our negative vote into a veto: Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire... I recommend that the most urgent lobbying should now be carried out ..”*

June 3rd – a New Zealand business man and his wife contribute \$NZ 1,000 for a supply of *Dunbar Whisky* to be sent to the troops in the Falklands, for; *“immediate consumption.”* The Canadian Ambassador in Buenos Aires is asked to leave the country following supposedly *'pro-British'* remarks he has made. Argentina recalls its Ambassador to France.

HMS Plymouth bombards Argentine positions at Port Howard. Two *Harriers* are lost following attacks on other Argentine military installations, although the pilots are recovered safely.

Secretary Haig sends a direction to Jeanne Kirkpatrick in New York asking the Ambassador to work closely with Sir Anthony Parsons to see if the proposed *Resolution* can be made to work. If this is not possible, Kirkpatrick is instructed to join the UK in a veto. The French Ambassador is also instructed by his Government to stay in close contact with Sir Anthony Parsons. Japan confirms that its Ambassador will abstain.

A *Vulcan* bomber is diverted to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil as it is short of fuel. The aircraft is held at a military airport, and its missile removed by the Brazilian authorities.

At a meeting of the *Non-Aligned Movement*, Costa Mendez, in an attempt to get a *Resolution* calling for a ceasefire, makes a speech in which he refers to countries such as Algeria, India, Cuba and Vietnam which had fought for their freedom and talks about the South African peoples fight against apartheid. His speech is greeted with laughter by some African representatives who recall that Argentina has never previously supported their efforts against the Government of South Africa. *“Costa Mendez's reference to Britain having expelled original inhabitants of Falklands does not seem to have misled most delegates.”*

The Security Council continues its deliberations on the Spanish/Panamanian draft Resolution; “.. Spain and Panama failed to line up nine votes for the draft Resolution .. The Americans, and to a lesser extent the French, made frenzied efforts to avoid a vote today, lest they had to veto with us. (Spain) finally agreed .. to postpone a vote until 2000z tomorrow (4 June). .. It was clear at the start of play today that we had six negative votes or abstentions (France, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, UK, US). As soon as the members of the Council gathered .. the Non-Aligned went into a private meeting. At this Guyana pressed hard, with some support from Jordan, for major changes to the draft in order to make the cease-fire conditional upon the commencement of Argentine withdrawal. Panama was not prepared to accept these amendments. .. This led Panama to propose a new operative paragraph which would have asked the parties to implement immediately SCR's 502 and 505 in all their parts. This was acceptable to the Africans and Panama undertook to sell it to Spain.”

Panama's suggested amendment is debated. Parsons asks for time to seek instructions but says that he would expect further, and substantial, amendments to be suggested by London; “De Pinies (Spain) said that there was no question of the Argentines and the Panamanians accepting the kind of amendments I was talking about. He saw no alternative to voting straight away. This led to frenzied efforts by the Americans to persuade the Argentines to discourage de Pinies from pressing for a vote (I dread to think what promises were made..). At the same time it became clear that both Zaire and Togo, in spite of their positions in the morning, were inclined to abstain on the revised draft. So de Pinies still had not got his nine votes and American and French efforts to postpone the vote therefore met with success...”

The revised draft reads: “Reaffirming its Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all the parts thereof, (1) Requests the parties to the dispute to cease-fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), (2) Requests the parties to initiate, simultaneously with the cease-fire, the implementation of Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) in their entirety, (3) Authorizes the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify the cease-fire, (4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on compliance with this Resolution within 72 hours.”

A vote is deferred until the 4th.

Parsons reports; “.. I believe that our best tactic is firmly to put forward all the amendments we need to make the latest draft acceptable to us, .. Spain, Panama and the Argentine friends will explode, and may insist on an immediate vote on a text designed to leave us in maximum isolation. If they succeed, we will have to face its something we always anticipated, in the not unsatisfactory knowledge that we have now held out for over 60 days.”

June 4th – prior to a G8 summit meeting at Versailles, Margaret Thatcher meets Ronald Reagan at the US Embassy in Paris to tell him that the only proposal that Britain is willing to accept is a ceasefire, irrevocably linked to Argentine withdrawal within 14 days.

In the Security Council meeting, Sir Anthony Parsons informs Spain that he will not be proposing any amendments to the Panamanian/Spanish draft Resolution; “Both sides said that in that case, there was no alternative to voting... There followed a delay of about two hours while both sides counted heads, and Mrs. Kirkpatrick made several efforts to persuade Haig in Versailles to switch .. to abstention. With abstentions assured from Guyana, Japan, Jordan and Togo, and probably from Zaire, it looked as though De Pinies would not be able to get his nine votes. But, at the last minute, my Japanese colleague, to his obvious chagrin, received instructions from Versailles to switch from an abstention to a vote in favour. He took with him Zaire, and nearly Jordan as well. ..”

Ambassador Henderson in Washington receives a message; *“Stoessel then telephoned me back, after the meeting was well under way in New York, to say that Haig had now considered the problem and had decided that, given that no effort had been made to improve the draft, it was no longer appropriate for the United States to vote against it. He had therefore given instructions that Mrs Kirkpatrick should abstain. ... Stoessel had the grace to be extremely embarrassed...”*

President Hurtado of Ecuador sends a personal appeal to Margaret Thatcher for an, *“immediate cease-fire and the suspension of hostilities .. in accord with the happy initiative presented by Spain and Panama in the UN Security Council...”*

Parsons reports; *“A slightly amended version of the Panamanian/ Spanish draft failed to secure adoption this evening because of vetoes by UK and US. The voting was 9-2 (UK, US) – 4 (France, Guyana, Jordan Togo). The Resolution secured nine votes only because of a last minute switch by Japan. After the vote, Mrs. Kirkpatrick astonishingly stated that she had been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast, the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an abstention.”⁹⁶*

In explanation of the UK veto, Sir Anthony Parsons tells the Council; *“The situation facing the Council this afternoon is straight forward. If Argentina had not invaded the Falkland islands at the beginning of April there would be no crisis and we would not be meeting today. If Argentina had obeyed the mandatory demand in SCR 502 immediately to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands, the crisis would have passed and we would not be meeting today. But Argentina did invade the Islands, and defied the mandatory demand of the Council to withdraw.... there is no direct and inseparable link between the ceasefire and immediate Argentine withdrawal with a fixed time limit. The wording of the draft, without any shadow of a doubt, enables Argentina to reopen the endless process of negotiation, thus leaving Argentine armed forces in illegal occupation of parts of the Islands. This is totally unacceptable to my Government.”*

Argentina's Representative condemns Britain's use of her veto and asserts that the UK is now responsible for all further deaths.

Sir Anthony Parsons rounds the day's events off; *“It was a very close run thing. Had it not been for the last minute Japanese switch (for which my Japanese colleague was bitterly ashamed) the Resolution would have failed for lack of votes. I confess that, with the amendments, I expected it to do better. If anyone had told me on 9 April, when we notified to the Security Council the establishment of the EZ (exclusion zone), that we would last out until 4 June without having to veto a cease-fire Resolution and that the eventual Resolution would only scrape 9 votes, I would not have believed it. I think we owe this not unsatisfactory result to a number of factors. First, basic sympathy for our position amongst NAM members .. Argentine unpopularity, de Pinies' bullying methods: and powerful lobbying both here and in capitals. Another unexpected bonus was Mrs Kirkpatrick's truly grotesque intervention when she last received instructions from Haig to abstain having cast a negative vote. .. Her performance has already excited much more media attention than out veto. The important thing now is that we firmly kill any suggestion that we are isolated in the UN. .. The fact is that we are not. The Latins got a poor result for what looked like a reasonable Resolution to many people, and I have already received numerous expressions of sympathy and support from third world delegations from Africa and Asia. It is difficult to see what the UN will now do. There has been very little talk about an emergency special session of the General Assembly and there would definitely not have been nine votes for such a proposition had it been tabled tonight... We owe a great deal to David Karran, the charge d'affairs of Guyana, who has been a tower of strength and helpfulness throughout..”*

96 9 votes for, was the minimum required for the *Resolution* to be adopted.

Brazil's refusal to release the detained *Vulcan* is the basis of a protest; *"This prevarication is, I fear, typical of Brazilian spinelessness and exemplifies their acute anxiety not to offend the Argentines unless they feel they have no alternative.."*

June 5th – a military situation report is passed to the Prime Minister in her meeting in Versailles; *"Sea: Sir Galahad is unloading at Teal Inlet. Andromeda, Penelope, Blue Rover and Sir Geraint to San Carlos early 5 June. The carrier battle group remains to the east of the TEZ. Naval gunfire support operations to be carried out tonight by Cardiff and Active on the Port Stanley area. Glasgow and Argonaut have been released from Op. Corporate due to extensive damage from earlier actions. .. Land: 3 Para remain in area of NW Mount Longdon. 45 CDO are moving from Teal Inlet to the area of Smoko Mountain. 2 Para are at Bluff Cove with 1/7 Gurkha Rifles moving forward from Goose Green to join. 2 Scots Guards and 1 Welsh Guards are moving to Bluff Cove area by the night of 5/6 June. It is intended that two CDO attacks will be made on Two Sisters Mountain within next 48 hours. Air: Weather conditions continue to be poor. Fog has severely limited all air operations. There are no reports of Argentine air activity. The deployment ashore of GR3/Sea Harrier aircraft is not yet confirmed but the forward operating base is ready for them. Incidents: A 42 CDO patrol struck a minefield during the night of 2/3 June; one own forces wounded. In a separate incident an Argentine patrol of 5 was engaged and 3 enemy killed."*

HMS Hydra takes 51 casualties to Montevideo. *ARA Bahia Paraiso* embarks Argentine wounded from *HMS Uganda*.

A message from Pérez de Cuéllar for Margaret Thatcher is delivered to Sir Anthony Parsons in New York; *"The armed conflict in the region of the Falkland islands threatens to enter into a new and extremely dangerous phase that is likely to result in heavy loss of life on both sides. This would gravely prejudice, for the foreseeable future, any prospect for a settlement of the underlying dispute... I feel it is my duty in this situation, in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, to appeal directly to Your Excellency and to President Galtieri, in the hope that a way can still be found to bring the fighting to a halt and to initiate negotiations towards a settlement of the crisis... I therefore wish to suggest the following plan which should be considered as an integral whole:*

(1) a truce comes into effect as of 11.00am, New York time, on Monday, 7 June 1982. (2) On Wednesday 9 June, the two military commanders on the Islands meet in the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General for the purpose of agreeing on the modalities of a cease-fire, which is to come into effect by 11.00am,.. Friday, 11 June. (3) simultaneously with the cease-fire, withdraw of Argentine forces from the Islands will commence, to be completed within 15 days... (4) within this time frame, the United Kingdom will inform the secretary-General of plans for the reduction of its forces in the region of the Falkland Islands. In the light of these plans, the Secretary-General will undertake consultations on the possibility of security arrangements under United Nations auspices. (5) the parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31 December 1982. Taking into account the Charter and the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome...(6) the negotiations will be inaugurated on 1 July 1982. (7) should the Secretary-General, after taking account of the course of negotiations and the views of the parties, determine that the achievement of a negotiated settlement will not be possible within the time frame envisaged, he may establish a new target date which will be in keeping with the urgency of a diplomatic solution .. "

Parsons comments; *“I believe that this is another genuine last minute attempt by Pérez de Cuéllar to try to bring about Argentine withdrawal without further bloodshed. Obviously it has come too late ..”*

Argentina formally requests Brazil to intern the *Vulcan* bomber, quoting the *Rio Treaty*. Britain presents a *bout de papier* condemning the Brazilian decision to retain the *Vulcan* bomber and threatens “serious consequences” for continuing friendly relations between the two Nations.

A meeting of the *Non-Aligned Movement* deplores the military operations being carried out by the UK with US support and reaffirms; “*solidarity with Argentina in its efforts to end an outdated colonial presence.*”

“The Latin Americans had taken the whole place over in a big way on the Falklands, with Castro acting as impresario for Costa Mendez. He frankly admitted that Britain's friends had been swept away by the torrent of Latin American rhetoric, pressure and theatricality. All under the TV cameras. He had attended many NAM meetings over the years but had never heard anything like the violence of Costa Mendez's rhetoric. Pretty well every Latin American under the sun had spoken on similar lines. Almost all the vitriol had been directed against Britain, with the United States as a footnote ... Costa Mendez had received a long standing ovation with Castro capering in the public gallery ..”⁹⁷

June 6th – Scots Guards land at Fitzroy, bringing the troops now on East Falkland to some 8,000 strong.

MV Norland sails towards Montevideo with 1400 Argentine prisoners. *HMS Hydra* arrives in Montevideo with 50 British walking wounded. Argentina demands that the casualties be interned, but Uruguay declines.

Sir Anthony Parsons is instructed to contact the Secretary-General and tell him that his proposals are “unacceptable.”

“I saw the Secretary-General at 2300z this evening, ie one hour before his deadline. He had not by then heard from the Argentines... I said that you (Pym) and the Prime Minister had studied the Secretary-General's message very carefully... But for the immediate future you had a single objective, namely to bring about Argentine withdrawal by one way or another and as quickly as possible. The military situation on the ground was now too complex to make it practicable for a third party to intervene. You could not at this stage accept an integrated package involving many other aspects of the crisis. Nor at this stage could you commit yourselves to any proposition about the reduction of UK forces or about long term security arrangements under the UN's or anyone else's auspices. These were matters that would have to be worked out after we had repossessed the Islands. I went on to say that we had become disillusioned by the course of negotiations during the last two months. ..

Most recently our complete lack of confidence in the Argentines had been compounded by the Non-Aligned communiqué which had just been drafted in Havana. This had been an Argentine text. It showed absolutely no disposition on Argentina's part to compromise. .. Against this background you were not prepared to take another chance which would involve the risk of re-involving ourselves in interminable negotiations. We had reached the point where the only practicable way of bringing about a cease-fire and Argentine withdrawal was through direct negotiations between the military commanders on the spot.

It was clear that none of this came as any surprise to the Secretary-General. ... De Soto has since told me that the Argentine response was negative, he would not reveal the details ..”

The mood amongst American officials, including Jeanne Kirkpatrick, is described as “glum.”

97 Conversation between Sir Anthony Parsons and Amin Doha, Minister for Information of Bangladesh on 7 June 1982

June 7th – the Royal Navy bombards Argentine positions near Stanley while *Gurkha* patrols mop up pockets of resistance behind British lines.

In a letter to the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, the *Irish Exporters Association* inform their Government that the policy of opposition to EU trade sanctions against Argentina had caused a severe trade backlash in the UK.

President Reagan visits Britain, while the Pope visits Argentina. Following Zaire's support for the vetoed *Security Council Resolution*, a decision is made in London not to finance military equipment for the Zairean contingent in Chad, amongst other punitive action.

June 8th – President Ronald Reagan addresses both Houses of Parliament; “... *On distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause -- for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and the people must participate in the decisions of government -- [applause] -- the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.*”

An article in the French newspaper *Le Monde* declares that President Mitterrand does not endorse the British claim to sovereignty and that while France agrees that international law must be upheld, Britain should negotiate with Argentina for a new status for the Falklands which would be fair for both sides.

After overnight shelling of Argentine positions by *HMS Active* and *HMS Ambuscade*, the Ministry of Defence issue a press release; “*Elements of 5 Brigade are now firmly established at Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove.*”

HMS Plymouth is attacked by *Dagger* fighter bombers and hit by 4 bombs, none of which explode. *RFA Sir Galahad* and *RFA Sir Tristram* are hit by 500lb bombs launched from *A4 Skyhawks*. Both ships are abandoned. 3 Argentine *Skyhawk* aircraft are shot down by 2 *Sea Harriers*, as they attack landing craft near Fitzroy.

A crude oil tanker, *Hercules*, owned by a Liberian corporation is attacked and bombed by Argentine aircraft 600 nautical miles from Argentina and more than 500 from the Falklands. After failing to defuse an unexploded bomb, the vessel is scuttled by its crew. The hospital ship, *HMS Hydra*, sails from Montevideo to assist.⁹⁸

4 Argentine *Mirage* aircraft are shot down by two *Sea Harriers*. 3 other Argentine aircraft are also reported to be down.

June 9th – in an interview with NBC, Prime Minister Thatcher is asked about the chances of a political settlement. She responds; “*We've been trying for a political negotiated settlement for 8 weeks. For 8 weeks the Argentines could have withdrawn at any time. They haven't withdrawn. It is now beyond a negotiated settlement.*”

French President Mitterrand, at a press conference, says that although he felt solidarity with Britain; “*This war must not turn into a war of revenge. There are limits to this conflict which I fully intend to make known at the right time, which will not be long.*”

Michael Foot, leader of the main opposition party in Parliament, the Labour Party, writes to the Prime Minister; “*.. All the indications from the Argentines are that, so long as their only alternative is unconditional surrender to a British ultimatum, they will persist in defending Port Stanley and other points on the Islands. This may*

⁹⁸ *Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v. Argentine Republic*, 830 F. 2d 421. 423 (2d Cir:1987). Decided on appeal 1989. The petitioners took their case to the US after failing to find an Argentine law firm that would represent them in Argentina.

well lead to heavy casualties. Both for Britain's good name, and for the sake of the servicemen on both sides who may be killed and wounded. Is it not worth giving the Argentines an undertaking that discussions will reopen as soon as they complete their withdrawal?"

Foreign Secretary Pym instructs Ambassadors and Missions around the world; *"Please deliver as soon as possible the following message from me to the Foreign Minister of the country to which you are accredited. Quote. I am very concerned to ensure that, once Argentine forces have been obliged to leave the Falklands, all military action by Argentina against us in the South Atlantic must stop. We want the next period to be one of rehabilitation and reconstruction and not one of continuing bitterness and hostility. I hope that this would also be the Argentine mood, and presumably they will be concerned for the return of their prisoners of war.... We do not want a situation where we have regained the Falkland Islands but Argentina refuses to give up the fighting against us. There may be a need to maintain economic measures until Argentina agrees to cease all hostilities in the South Atlantic. The embargo on arms supplies might remain rather longer, so that we can be sure that Argentina has finally abandoned her aggressive intentions."*

HMS Yarmouth bombards the Moody Brooks area.

Newspapers in Buenos Aires headline a, *"serious British setback at Fitzroy Settlement,"* and talk of many, *"British losses in landing attempt."* *La Nacion* claims that a frigate has been sunk and three other Royal Navy vessels, *"destroyed."*

In the Madrid daily, *Ya*, President Galtieri is quoted as saying; *"Argentina will not accept a return to the status of 1 April in the Malvinas.. but is willing to withdraw her forces at the same pace as the British, leaving a UN Administrator to govern the Islands."* *La Nacion* quotes Galtieri as saying that Argentina; *"is prepared to continue the war for as many months and years as necessary."*

June 10th – Lord Shackleton launches the *Falklands Appeal*.

Defence Secretary John Nott speaks to the House of Commons; *"Since I reported to the House on 26 May British forces have moved forward to positions surrounding Port Stanley and are in firm control of high ground on an arc surrounding the town."*

Thatcher responds to Michael Foot's letter; *".. We are not demanding the unconditional surrender of Argentine forces. We have made it clear that if the Argentine Commander on the Falkland Islands announces his wish to withdraw all Argentine forces to the mainland, we will allow him to do so in good order. There need be no humiliation involved. .. Since our landings on the Islands and the losses which we have incurred it would be unthinkable to negotiate about the future of the Islands as if everything were still as it had been before. .. We cannot allow the Argentines to demonstrate that they have been able to achieve progress in their attempts to impose sovereignty over the Islands as a result of their aggression. On the future of the Islands, we must, of course, consult the Islanders ..."*

HMS Yarmouth's bombardment continues. Peru supplies 10 *Mirage* jets to Argentina. The *Vulcan* bomber detained by Brazil is allowed to leave on an undertaking that it will take no further part in *"warlike operations."* The missile removed from the aircraft remains in Brazil.

At the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar makes it known that he is thinking of asking the Pope to intervene with President Galtieri in an attempt to persuade the Argentines to accept his last proposals. Sir Anthony Parsons dissuades Pérez de Cuéllar from this course.

June 11th – in Paris, the French Ministry of Foreign affairs suggests that it might be possible for the British to come to an arrangement with the Argentines without driving them off the last square metre of the Islands. The French argue that relations between Europe and Latin America could be poisoned for years if Britain did not seize the right moment to begin working towards a solution.

The battle for Port Stanley commences. Argentine positions to the west of Stanley are attacked. 3 Islanders are killed in a naval bombardment of Stanley. Argentina's military command post inside Stanley police station is also attacked. RAF *Harriers* bomb Argentine positions at Two Sisters, Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, Mount Tumbledown and Moody Brook Barracks.

A member of Pérez de Cuéllar's staff flies to Buenos Aires with a mission to contact the Cardinal accompanying the Pope in order to give him a full briefing of the Secretary-General's proposals of 5 June. Parsons reports; *“This is tiresome. It is naïve to suggest that De Soto will not be in contact with Ros in Buenos Aires and if his mission becomes public it will arouse expectations...”*

In Lima, the Peruvian Foreign Minister, Dr. Arias, tells the British Ambassador that Costa Mendez had telephoned him to say that the Argentines would withdraw if only, *“some suitable formula could be found.”*

June 12th – *The Times* newspaper publishes an interview with President Galtieri, conducted by the Italian journalist , Oriana Fallaci:

Fallaci: *“.. the islands are practically back in the hands of the British ..”*

Galtieri: *“ No, madam journalist. The Malvinas are not back in the hands of the British. The British have still to capture them, and the result of the battle which is going to take place at Puerto Argentino is not so sure as you expect. I am much more optimistic than you. However, even if Puerto Argentino should fall as you say, I should not ask myself “was it worth while,” even less would I think I had made a mistake. ... Listen to me, madam journalist, not even the fall of Puerto Argentino would be the end of this conflict and our defeat... In fact I am not alone in believing that what we did on the second of April was right. The whole Argentine people believe it. Madam journalist, for 149 years the Argentines have denounced the aggression by the British .., and for 17 years they have tried to settle the problem through diplomatic channels, through the United Nations.... The British colonisation could not last any longer.”*

Fallaci: *“But why do you say colonisation? ..Whom did the British colonise in this case – the penguins?”*

Galtieri: *“They are all British because the British never permitted the Argentines to buy a piece of land there, to start a business, some kind of commerce or presence. .. The British .. kept these islands as a personal farm, and did not let any Argentine settle down.”*

Fallaci: *“.. you are a coloniser too, Mr. President..”*

Galtieri: *“ .. let's not go back that far in the past. Let's look at things as they are since the British stole the Malvinas from us. Let's observe where these islands are situated, how the under-water terrain extends itself in that area and connects with the islands. One can easily see the natural correlation existing between them and the terra firma. Not only historically, but geographically, the Malvinas belong to us...”*

Fallaci: *“ But apart from that underwater terrain, what is it that appeals to you so much in those ugly islands? ..”*

Galtieri: *"You should ask Mrs. Thatcher, who is dealing death to us and to her people because of these islands, and because of these islands has lost half her fleet. Go ask her."*

Fallaci: *"Now I am asking you."*

Galtieri: *"Madam journalist, its the sentiment... the sentiment of the Argentine nation since 1833."*

Fallaci: *".. should I say illusions? To begin with the illusion that Great Britain would not react.."*

Galtieri: *"No, I'll tell you that though an English reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable. In any case, I never expected such a disproportionate answer. Nobody did. ... It seems senseless to me."*

Fallaci: *"Haig claims that the fault is yours because he did not know with whom to deal .. Even on the 502 Resolution, the one that asked the Argentines to withdraw, he claims you and your generals had different views.."*

Galtieri: *".. the 502 Resolution contained a series of consequences that we could not accept because Argentina had not shed on drop of English blood to take back the Malvinas and the British were attacking us .."*

Fallaci: *".. you said that the complete fall of the islands would not mean the end of the war..."*

Galtieri: *"... Argentina does not give up her rights on the Malvinas, on South Georgia, and on the South Sandwich Islands. It means that Argentine will never accept a return to where she was on the first of April. It means that we shall not have peace until we have obtained what we want."*

Fallaci: *"What is wrong with accepting, for example, the United Nations flag on those islands?"*

Galtieri: *".. the United Nations flag is alright until the negotiations take place. But not after. Not in the future. The future must see the Argentine flag on the Malvinas. And it will."*

Royal Marines capture Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. A Vulcan bomber drops 21 x 1000lb bombs on Stanley Airport. Sgt. Ian McKay is killed on Mount Longdon in an action for which he'll be awarded a Victoria Cross.

HMS Glamorgan is hit by a shore based Exocet missile, killing 13 and causing extensive damage but not putting the vessel out of action.

In Buenos Aires the Junta claim that British forces have attacked the hospital ship Bahia Paraiso. This is denied by representatives of the ICRC who are aboard the vessel. The Argentine postal services on the Islands issue a stamp celebrating the 153rd anniversary of the Civil and Military Command, headed by Luis Vernet.

June 13th – battles for Tumbledown, Wireless Ridge and Mount William commence. 3 Argentine aircraft attack British ships near Port Stanley. One of the aircraft is shot down. *HMS Glamorgan* fires 147 rounds at 6 targets in support of the assault on Two Sisters. *HMS Avenger* and *HMS Yarmouth* fire 200 shells at targets in Port Stanley and Port Howard.

"Phase 1 of the attack on Stanley began .. It involved a night move and silent attack supported by naval gunfire engaging targets further east. Initial surprise was achieved but there was stiff fighting as final objectives were taken. All units .. are firm on high features Mt. Longdon, Two Sisters and Mt. Harriet. First, unconfirmed, casualty figures are thought to be 19 killed and 80 wounded. 300 prisoners taken, including CO 4 Inf. Regt. .."

Asked about the Falklands in a television interview, Alexander Haig says that; *“the problem will ultimately have to be solved in the context of the traditional friendships between the US, UK and Latin America, and in a way which ensured stability and justice.”*

June 14th – Scots Guards and Gurkha detachments capture Tumbledown and Mount William.

“During this action 1/7 Gurkha Rifles had as their objective Mount William. Believed to be held strongly by a Battalion of enemy which, by all accounts, faced with the panache and reputation of the Gurkhas appeared to have turned tail and fled ... So no heads were cut off with kukris or anything messy like that... The mere presence of the Gurkhas actually helped to quicken the final stages and save casualties....”

Governor Mendez manages to speak to President Galtieri in Buenos Aires. Galtieri reminds his Governor that the Argentine military code calls for a commander to fight until he had lost 50% of his men, and 75% of his ammunition. Mendez replies, *“I cannot ask more of my troops, after what they have been through ... We have not been able to hold on to the heights ... We have no room, we have no support.”*

2 Para are in Stanley. White flags are seen and a cease-fire is called.

Instrument of Surrender

I, the undersigned, Commander of all the Argentine land, sea and air forces in the Falkland Islands unconditionally⁹⁹ surrender to Major General J.J. MOORE CB OBE MC as representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

Under the terms of this surrender all Argentine personnel in the Falkland Islands are to muster at assembly points which will be nominated by General Moore and hand over their arms, ammunition, and all other weapons and warlike equipment as directed by General Moore or appropriate British officers acting on his behalf.

Following the surrender all personnel of the Argentinian Forces will be treated with honour in accordance with the conditions set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949. They will obey any directions concerning movement and in connection with accommodation.

This surrender is to be effective from 2359 hours ZULU on 14 June (2059 hours local) and includes those Argentine Forces presently deployed in and around Port Stanley, those others on East Falkland, (Menendez's signature) West Falkland and all outlying islands.

[Menéndez's signature] Commander Argentine Forces

[Moore's signature] J. J. MOORE Major General

[Pennicott's signature] Witness

2359 hours 14 June 1982

In a message to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet, General Moore reports in a telex message: *“In Port Stanley at 9pm Falkland Island time tonight, 14th June 1982, Major General Menendez surrendered to me all the Argentine Armed Forces in East and West Falkland, together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather in their arms and equipment, and to mark and make safe their ammunition.*

“The Falkland Islands are once more under the Government desired by their inhabitants.

God Save the Queen.”

99 Menéndez crossed-out and signed over the word “unconditionally.”

Margaret Thatcher, makes a speech to the House of Commons; "... in Port Stanley, 74 days after the Falkland Islands were invaded, General Moore accepted from General Menendez the surrender of all the Argentine forces ... General Menendez has surrendered some 11,000 men in Port Stanley and some 2,000 in West Falkland. In addition, we had already captured and were holding elsewhere on the islands 1,800 prisoners, making in all some 15,000 prisoners of war now in our hands.... We have today sent to the Argentine Government, through the Swiss Government, a message seeking confirmation that Argentina, like Britain, considers all hostilities between us in the South Atlantic—and not only on the Islands themselves—to be at an end. It is important that this should be established with clarity and without delay."

She also confirms that the Governor, Rex Hunt, will return to the Falklands as soon as is practicable.

Sir Anthony Parsons reports; "I saw the Secretary-General .. we have told the press that the meeting took place at my initiative: and I wished to inform the Secretary-General of the statement which the Prime Minister had made shortly beforehand in the House of Commons.... We have said nothing to encourage the speculation about a future role for the United Nations..."

Sri Lanka's President, speaking to the British Ambassador, conveys to the Prime Minister his; ".. personal assurance of Sri Lanka's support for Britain over the Falkland Islands." Messages of congratulation for Margaret Thatcher pour in from both Commonwealth, and other, countries.

June 15th – in a message to the Junta in Buenos Aires, sent via the Swiss Embassy, the British Government seek a confirmation that hostilities are now at an end; "Following the ceasefire in the Falkland Islands, there are a large number of Argentine personnel who will wish to return as soon as possible to their homes and families in Argentina. The British Government is prepared to start the process of repatriation as soon as possible, provided that they receive confirmation from the Argentine Government that there is now a total cessation of hostilities between the two countries and that Argentina is ready to accept the return of Argentine prisoners of war and others from the Falkland islands and dependencies direct to Argentine ports on British or other ships or aircraft. The British Government would also require confirmation of safe passage for any ships or aircraft used for this purpose. ..."

A press statement is released from the Islands; "Hundreds of Argentine prisoners on the Falkland islands could die from malnutrition, hypothermia and disease unless Argentina declares an immediate end to all hostilities. Fifteen thousand Argentine troops who surrendered to British forces yesterday pose a problem of disaster relief proportions ... This is a problem of the Argentines own making. It was foolish to put 15,000 troops out on a line where they could not be resupplied. They are already suffering from malnutrition, exposure (in some cases hypothermia), trench foot, scabies and diarrhoea, brought on by lack of food and pure water, proper clothing, shelter and sanitation..."

British Ambassadors in South American capitals are asked to ask the respective Presidents to bring pressure to bear on Argentina to accept a cessation of hostilities. Similar requests are sent to Governments world-wide. Ambassador Henderson speaks to the State Department; "The US Ambassador has been instructed to speak immediately to the Argentinians; the US Ambassador in Brasilia has been instructed to encourage the Brazilians also to advise the Argentinians to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities. It is not clear, however, whether the Junta is in any state to take decisions."

Faced with a similar instruction, Sir Anthony Parsons responds; "I do not wish to seem inhumane, but I am reluctant to involve the Secretary-General in this exercise. We would in effect be asking him to persuade the Argentines to accept a cessation of hostilities including the lifting of economic measures/exclusion zones so that their prisoners could be returned immediately. I believe that the Secretary-General and his staff would see this

as a golden opportunity to get the UN into the act again... If we ourselves invoke the Secretary-General's help and, having consulted the Argentines, he comes back with proposals for UN involvement ostensibly on humanitarian grounds, we could find ourselves in a difficult position. There is already a strong feeling here that we should accept some kind of UN involvement even at this late stage in order to save Argentine face, avoid the ultimate humiliation, etc. .. We should stick to the ICRC as the correct agency for dealing with such situations."

President Galtieri tells his people that the fighting at Port Stanley has ended;

"Our soldiers made supreme efforts in fighting for the dignity of the Nation. Those who fell will always be alive in the hearts and great history of the Argentinians. ...

They fought against incomprehension, contempt and arrogance with more courage than arms. They faced up to the overwhelming superiority of a power supported by the military technology of the United States of America, which was surprisingly the enemy of Argentina and its people. They fought to remove from our soil the last vestige of colonialism. They fought for the very essence of our national and American identity, they fought for the same causes which prevailed over the glorious birth of our Fatherland. Our Nation has fought for its spiritual and material integrity, convinced that ever tolerated insults break the spirit of peoples and of men.

Those who hitherto have not wanted or been able to acknowledge the truth of our cause will have to listen to their consciences and understand that there must exist profound reasons of justice for a peaceful Nation to take up arms to the point of heroism.

Puerto Argentino will not be the last step in the National endeavour which we began in 1833 and which we continued on 2nd April. In all cases the nation, standing united and spurred on by a sole cause, will continue marching forward.

Let nobody try to disturb or interfere in the path of the Argentinians. Let nobody try to play with our wounds or our emotions. Let nobody be misled into believing that we are tough in the fight but weak in spirit. The World knows that we are not a people which has forged its existence in the fires of wars of conquest, and it is well attested that we never said "No" to peace.

The majority of States acknowledge the legitimacy of our claim to the Malvinas. What we are claiming belongs to us, will always be within our reach and sooner or later we will obtain it... "

The Plaza de Mayo is filled with crowds shouting; "Cowards!". Demonstrators set off a bomb near the US Embassy.

Multipartidaria, a grouping of Argentine political parties, calls for democracy but states; "The result of the battle does not leave a stain on the heroism of our fighters, nor should the lives sacrificed or wounds suffered be for nothing. The reconquest of the Malvinas Islands for the integral sovereignty of the Republic will be a permanent national objective for this generation and those to come."

President Burnham of Guyana telephones PM Thatcher to offer his congratulations, and to hope that a lesson had been learnt.¹⁰⁰

Telam asserts that an agreement has been signed allowing for a withdrawal of Argentine forces - (1) the courage of Argentine troops is recognised, (2) a joint Argentine-British Commission is to be set up for the transfer

¹⁰⁰Guyana had its own territorial dispute with Venezuela and there had been a fear in 1981 that when the *Protocol of Port of Spain* agreement expired in July 1982, Venezuela might resort to force. This was thought to have been more likely had Argentina resolved its dispute successfully through force.

ceremony of the Island's Administration, (3) Argentine troops to remain under General Mario Menendez, (4) British and Argentine troops will be involved in clearing minefields, (5) the flag will not be turned over to the British, (6) the ceremony will be held in private, and (7) Argentine troops will withdraw on Argentine vessels.

Ambassador Tickell in Mexico, is asked by the Deputy Foreign Minister about future negotiations over the Falklands; *"I said that it was too early to think about negotiations with the Argentines. They had caused the loss of many lives, wasted vast resources and done enormous damage. We were more inclined to send them a bill than to join them in a cosy chat about the future."*

At the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick tells Pérez de Cuéllar that the Argentines and the British have reached agreement that there is to be no surrender ceremony; Argentine withdrawal will take place in implementation of SCR 502; all Argentine troops will withdraw with their weapons and equipment except POW's taken before the final assault and, on this basis, Argentine aircraft will not carry out further attacks on the British Task Force.

Sir Anthony Parsons denies any knowledge of such an agreement; *"It is characteristic of Mrs Kirkpatrick that she should choose to act as a relay between Argentina and the Secretary-General. If there is any truth in her statement – I have no doubt that she is in touch with the Argentines, probably General Miret – it may represent the conditions that Argentina will try to put forward .."*

Parsons telegrams London; *".. I should notify the Security Council of the Argentine surrender, having regard to our obligations under Article 51 of the Charter. We did this for South Georgia. At present, our prime objective must be to avoid any revival of activity by the Secretary-General or in the Security Council, whether at the behest of Argentina (through Panama) or of the do-gooders. I have therefore concluded that we should do nothing vis-a-vis the Council, at least until we know the Argentine reply .."*

June 16th – American Vice-President Bush, and Senator Percy, telephone Margaret Thatcher to offer their congratulations. The US Ambassador in London writes expressing his; *"profound admiration."* Similar messages continue arrive from around the world.¹⁰¹

Information is received, via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires, to the effect that the *Junta* wish that; *"Argentine prisoners not be considered as prisoners of war because this would suggest capitulation and instead would like the evacuation of their troops to be considered as "withdrawal" linked with Security Council Resolution 502."* The Swiss are also informed that only the *Junta* can make a decision on a ceasefire, and when they are ready to do so the Swiss Embassy would be informed.

Chile's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informs the British Embassy that they cannot assist in the repatriation of prisoners of war unless Argentina agrees. Argentina maintains that the existing route via Montevideo is sufficient and they are not prepared to consider other ports. Buenos Aires informs the ICRC that it has no objections to the *Canberra* or the *Norland* repatriating its troops via Montevideo; *"In the Junta's view in no event could a British ship enter an Argentine port. Moreover, the infrastructure.. for the reception of the soldiers was not ready. The proposal by Great Britain was described as "cruel"..."*

Brazil's Government issue a statement; *"At this time Brazil cannot fail to express to the brother nation its solidarity and its conviction that just as the Argentine people has the right and the duty to feel pride in the patriotism and courage of its sons, so it will also, united and strengthened, overcome the difficulties of the moment ... Since 1833 Argentina has never ceased to claim sovereignty over the Malvinas. Brazil has always recognised the just title to that claim. At all times, we favour and continue to favour a political and diplomatic solution for the issue, for we believe that controversy cannot be extinguished by force of arms..."*

¹⁰¹Many whispered or muttered quietly to Ambassadors on the understanding that they should not be made public.

June 17th – a message is received in London, via Brazil; *“The Argentine Government is ready to receive as soon as possible, the Argentine personnel who are now in the Malvinas Islands. For this purpose, it is understood that the procedure followed up to this moment since the beginning of the conflict should continue to be applied ... Any attempt to impose unilaterally other conditions of a political character aside from humanitarian purposes is unacceptable to the Argentine Government. Otherwise, the British Government will bear the responsibility for using the fate of those thousands of people for political purposes.”*

Francis Pym informs the Swiss; *“We are deeply concerned that the condition of Argentine POWs on the Falkland Islands, and our efforts to repatriate them as soon as possible have been misunderstood (or in some cases misrepresented). ... We have asked the Argentines to agree that we should repatriate these troops to Argentine ports and for this purpose need a guarantee of safe conduct for our ships. We are not unreasonable using the POW's as a bargaining counter. The Argentines in response have said merely that the prisoners should be repatriated to Montevideo. .. If the prisoners are repatriated to an Argentine port.. the return journey .. will take 46 hours. For a journey as short as that we could load the Canberra with 5000 prisoners of war. .. to Montevideo the travel time would be considerably longer. Moreover, we cannot dock the Canberra alongside at Montevideo ... the Argentine insistence upon Montevideo displays an incomprehensible lack of interest on their part in the well-being of their own people.”*

General Galtieri resigns as President of Argentina.

In Brazil, an editorial in *O Globo* notes that British policy is now to offer the “*Kelpers*” self-determination and subsequently independence. With implied approval, the newspaper says that this is in line with the traditional British policy of decolonisation and notes that Britain has fought an “*ethical*” war. An editorial in the *Estado de Sao Paulo* states that Britain, by defending a principle without which international life would become impossible, had done the international community an exemplary favour.

The FCO send information to all Ambassadors about the repatriation problem; *“There remains widespread international confusion about the basic issues involved in our current problem of repatriating the Argentine POW's and achieving an end to hostilities. This confusion is being worse confounded by deliberate Argentine misrepresentation of our position. Ministers should take every opportunity to set the record straight. (1) what we are demanding from Argentina now is a ceasefire and an end to hostilities: ie we want peace. We are not demanding a 'Peace Settlement', nor that they should explicitly renounce their sovereignty claims over the Falklands, nor that they should give up any long-term understandings. (2) We are not using the POW's as hostages or as a bargaining counter to achieve this ceasefire... the Geneva Convention does not envisage a return of POW's until a cessation of hostilities has been agreed. Premature return risks prisoners being recycled for war. (3) Despite this, we are prepared as a humanitarian act, to return the vast bulk of the Argentine POWs even in advance of a ceasefire providing only that we have a guarantee of safe passage. Reports from Port Stanley have shown that the Argentine prisoners were in very bad condition when captured and that local resources are quite inadequate to provide shelter and nourishment in the prevailing blizzard conditions. (4) Our evacuation plans are being dangerously frustrated by the Argentine refusal even to give safe-conduct for the ships on which we would propose to return their prisoners. We are prepared to send these to any port in Argentina or a neighbouring country where they may be safely delivered. But the closer the port to the Falklands the faster we can undertake the operation and therefore the more chance we have of avoiding even more sever hardship and even fatalities among the POWs. (5) The Argentine Junta's intransigence demonstrates their lack of regard for the safety and well-being of their own troops: they appear to be using POWs as an expendable factor in their own efforts to avoid political embarrassment.”*

HMS Endurance, HMS Yarmouth and MS Salvageman arrive off Southern Thule.

Argentina presents a letter to the Security Council; “.. I have the honour to refer to certain actions taken by the British Government with regard to the scientific station 'Corbeta Uruguay', which the Argentine Republic set up in March 1977 on Morell Island (Southern Thule), in the South Sandwich group. Previous work on this station had begun at the end of 1976.... It should also be noted that, before the construction of the scientific station, no permanent installation like 'Corbeta Uruguay' had been built on the South Sandwich Islands and that consequently there was no permanent settlement on the islands up to that point. .. We have now been informed that the British warship Endurance has informed the personnel of the Station that they should abandon it and give themselves up as prisoners, otherwise the ship will open fire...”

Parsons' comments; “The letter is remarkable for not asserting Argentine sovereignty.”

June 18th – President Reagan writes to Prime Minister Thatcher; “Let me extend my congratulations on the success of British arms in the South Atlantic. Your victory was both a brilliant military feat and a defence of our shared principle that disputes are not to be resolved by aggression. The minimum loss of life and the generous terms of withdrawal were also in the finest British tradition. A just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you and to assisting in building such a peace. It must of course take into account the sacrifices of your men in battle. Its elements in my judgement must include enhancement of the long-term security of the South Atlantic, mitigation of Argentine hostility and improvement in the relations of both our countries with Latin America.”

A message is received from the Junta, via the Swiss; “It is absolutely forbidden for any British ship to dock in Argentine continental territory.... Argentina will not accept any British proposal for a ceasefire as long as there is no mention of the possibility of being able to reopen the discussion on sovereignty.”

Argentina complains to the President of the Security Council alleging that Britain is refusing to implement paragraphs 1 and 3 of SCR 502; “Argentina comes back again today to the Security Council to establish clearly, as it has on previous occasions, its full readiness to implement Resolutions 502 and 505. My Country hopes at the same time that the Council will pursue its efforts to get the United Kingdom to implement those Resolutions in full. .. There exists de facto in present circumstances, a cessation of hostilities which Argentina is observing. But this cessation of hostilities will be precarious as long as the British attitude, as shown by the military occupation, the blockade and the economic aggression, continue. The complete cessation of hostilities will only be achieved when the United Kingdom lifts its sea and air blockade and the economic sanctions already referred to and when it withdraws its military occupation forces on the Islands, the naval Task Force and the nuclear submarines which it has deployed in the waters of the region.

Argentina indicates once again that only a negotiation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant Resolutions, for which Argentina has always been ready, can lead to a definitive solution of the dispute, removing the situation of illegal colonial domination, sustained by force and which in itself constitutes a permanent threat to peace”

Sir Anthony Parsons, aware that there are moves to initiate negotiations, tells the Secretary-General that it is; “.. absolutely and totally out of the question that we should sit down to diplomatic negotiations with the Argentines through any third party in order to discuss the future of the Islands or anything else. .. It was no good talking of exchanging a full cessation of hostilities for an opening of diplomatic negotiations. If we could not get an unconditional cessation of hostilities out of Argentina, we would have to live with that. .. What we now needed was a long cooling off period with no outside interference while we restored normal life to the Islands.”

"I told Urquhart afterwards of the .. conversation. He said that he was glad I had spoken as I had. He had been present at all Pérez de Cuéllar's recent meetings. A number of visitors, including Reagan/Haig, Schmidt (rather offensively to us), and Trudeau had been wringing their hands about the need to heal the breach between the West and Latin America and about the need for the British to show flexibility etc. Pérez de Cuéllar had told each of them that, in his judgment, the Argentines had been in the wrong from the start, that they had been vastly mistaken not to accept our offer of 17 May "which involved major concessions which he knew we had been reluctant to make," that Argentina had wrecked his negotiations, thus leaving us no choice but to repossess the Islands by force."

The ICRC informs the British Government that Argentina has now agreed to the repatriation of POWs through both Montevideo, and Puerto Madryn.

Ambassador Henderson in Washington telegrams the FCO; *"Eagleburger has told me about a proposition which was put to Haig this morning by the Secretary-General in New York. This was that since paragraphs 1 and 2 of SCR 502 had now in practice been fulfilled, the way was open for HMG and the Argentines to negotiate a diplomatic solution under para 3. Pérez de Cuéllar seemed to think that he might have a role in bringing the two together. Eagleburger said Haig would like our views. I said that there was no future in the Secretary-General trying to pursue this thought. Things had changed fundamentally since the Resolution was passed. Eagleburger said that was Haig's view too."*

June 19th – Argentina's charge d'affaires at the UN, Arnaldo Listre, presents a note to the Security Council; *"(1) On express instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to the attention of the Security Council with regard to the question of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. (2) After vetoing the draft Resolution ordering the cease-fire which was voted by the majority of the Council on 4 June 1982, the United Kingdom ... has continued its armed aggression against my country and has completed the military occupation of Puerto Argentino, the capital of the Malvinas, on 14 June. The self-defence exercised by Argentina in order to safeguard its territorial integrity could not prevail against the military superiority of the aggressor. (3) Consequently, the Commander of the Argentine forces defending the Malvinas had to surrender the personnel under his command in order to avoid greater loss of human life. (4) Throughout the developments which led to this situation the United Kingdom ... ignored the demand for an immediate cease-fire contained in Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and also the exhortation of the Council contained in paragraph 3 of that Resolution to the Governments concerned to seek a peaceful solution of the dispute by means of negotiations. (5) As is well known, the United Kingdom vetoed the draft Resolution of 4 June, submitted by Panama and Spain, thus making clear its refusal to carry out the cease-fire and to accept Resolution 505 (1982), although it had been adopted unanimously and, obviously, with its own affirmative vote. (6) Argentina cannot and will not accept the situation of force which Great Britain has thus sought to impose. Today, it is clearer than ever that the United Kingdom's aim is to ensure by any means the continuation of a situation of colonial domination in the South Atlantic, in open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. (7) The Argentine Republic is now addressing the Security Council again to make clear, as it has done on previous occasions, its full readiness to carry out Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982). My country hopes likewise that the Council will continue its efforts to secure the full compliance of the United Kingdom with these Resolutions. (8) The United Kingdom is maintaining its troops on the islands, its fleet in the South Atlantic, the naval and air blockade against Argentina and also economic aggression carried out with the participation of other industrialized countries. (9) In addition, the United Kingdom has now extended its military operations to the South Sandwich Islands, as the Argentine mission informed the Security Council in Note No.171 of 17 June circulated in Security Council Document S/15230, by*

attacking the scientific station “Corbeta Uruguay” which the Argentine Republic has maintained in those islands for a number of years. (10) In view of the present circumstances, there is a de facto cessation of hostilities which Argentina is now observing. However, this cessation of hostilities will be precarious as long as the British policy of continuing the military occupation, the blockade and the economic aggression continues. (11) the total cessation of hostilities will be achieved only when the United Kingdom agrees to lift the naval and air blockade and the economic sanctions referred to above and when it withdraws the military force occupying the islands and the naval task force and the nuclear submarines which it has deployed in the area. (12) The Argentine Republic points out, once again, that only negotiations within the framework of the United Nations and in conformity with the pertinent Resolutions – negotiations in which Argentina has always been ready to participate – can lead to a final settlement of the dispute, thus eliminating a situation of illegal colonial domination, which is sustained by force and which in itself constitutes a permanent threat to peace.”

Sir Anthony Parsons reports; “It looks as though Costa Mendez's propaganda machine is making the most of the Argentine note... Officials said that the note had been approved by the ruling three man Junta, including General Nicolaidis. Senior military officers said that it was the resignation of Galtieri that opened the way for the note. Foreign Ministry officials favoured a resumption of the Secretary-General's mission because he seemed fair and well-versed in the issues. Argentina would continue to seek sovereignty over the Falklands... Pérez de Cuéllar and I looked ... but thought it did not amount to a serious offer of an immediate cessation of hostilities...”

June 20th – British troops occupy the South Sandwich Islands in *Operation Keyhole*. No shots are fired.

Argentina's representative at the UN submits a further note to the Security Council regarding Southern Thule; “This action constitutes a clear violation of the cessation of hostilities existing under the terms of my note No. 172 of 18th June and also constitutes a new act of aggression committed by the United Kingdom, in violation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982).”¹⁰²

A 150 mile *Falkland Islands Protection Zone* (FIPZ), with its center in Falklands Sound, is established by the British Government. Economic sanctions imposed by the EEC are lifted, although an arms embargo is maintained. Norway announces its intention to do the same.

June 23rd – Margaret Thatcher calls on Secretary-General de Cuéllar at the UN. Pérez de Cuéllar informs her that he still has a mandate from the *Security Council*, but realises that there is not very much to be done at the present. Thatcher appraises de Cuéllar of the problems being addressed on the Islands including unmarked plastic minefields. Britain had repatriated about 10,000 POW's, some in a poor condition, but would retain 600 – 700 technicians, pilots and senior officers pending a cessation of hostilities. As regards a cessation of hostilities, lifting of exclusion zones, etc, the British Government had sent a message via the Swiss, but it was difficult to know who to deal with. If there were no hostilities for a long period, she might assume that there had been a cessation in the absence of a clear message, and return the remaining POW's. Thatcher also explains the British attitude to self-determination and the intention to act in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter.

Sir Anthony Parsons reports that there is no sign of the *Security Council*; “resuscitating the subject.” The Ugandan Representative had also made a comment about; “the British people would lynch anyone who talked of negotiating with Argentina for at least a year.”

¹⁰²After this was submitted, Parsons began to think that the note of the 18th had possibly contained Argentina's recognition that hostilities had ceased. However this was not very clear; and remained unclear. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar did not see the note of the 18th as confirming a cessation of hostilities.

The Prime Minister tells a special session on disarmament at the United Nations that, "*The fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types, ...It is the disposition on the part of some states to impose change on others by resorting to force.*"

Canada lifts its economic sanctions against Argentina but maintains its arms ban.

June 24th – the *Foreign and Commonwealth Situation Report* (FCO SITREP), issued by the *Emergency Unit* at 0700 every morning since April 2nd, simply states; "(1) *There is nothing to report.* (2) *This is the last SITREP.*"

June 25th – Governor Hunt arrives back in the Falkland Islands, with instructions to carry out an urgent assessment of what is required immediately and in the longer term.

New Zealand announces to the British Ambassador that it is not prepared to normalise its relations with Argentina until the UK; "*are satisfied that hostilities have ceased.*"

Three British journalists seized in Ushuaia on April 17th, are 'bailed' in the sum of \$20,000 each. Further enquires are initiated via the Swiss Embassy regarding the oft delayed repatriation of Flt. Lt. Glover, captured on May 21st. The Argentine authorities are reminded that all their wounded have already been repatriated.

Argentina's postal authorities issue a decree saying that any mail carrying the words 'Falklands' or 'Port Stanley', will be stamped; "*RETURN TO SENDER. Postal communications have been interrupted in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias and South Sandwich due to the illegitimate occupation by Great Britain of these Islands, which form part of the Argentine Republic and belong to its sovereignty.*"

The *Junta* in Buenos Aires announces that there will be a return to democratic rule early in 1984. Its new leader, General Reynaldo Bignone, rejects any possibility of any bilateral agreement with Britain, indicating that Argentina's sovereignty claim will still be presented in international fora.

In an article in *La Prensa*, Iglesias Rouco says that; "*..if Buenos Aires now decrees a cessation of hostilities without even a minimal negotiating recompense from London, the Argentine Government's future will become much more uncertain still.*"

July 1st – General Reynaldo Bignone takes over officially as President of Argentina.

"*President Bignone's inauguration speech on 1st July threw no new light either way on Argentina's willingness to consider hostilities with the United Kingdom at an end.*"

July 2nd – a message is sent to the new Argentine Government in Buenos Aires, via the Swiss and Brazilian authorities, to the effect that the UK is willing to proceed with an exchange of prisoners on; "*the assumption that active hostilities were over.*"

July 5th – at a meeting of the *War Cabinet* in London; "*If it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office view that a positive response is unlikely and that the Argentine Government can be expected to opt for a de facto cessation of hostilities becoming effective simply through the passage of time, the question arises whether, and if so, at what point, we should offer to return the prisoners on the basis of a unilateral statement by the United Kingdom that we regard active hostilities as being at an end. (Provided that Argentina then accepted the prisoners back – and a fortiori if they agreed at the same time to return Flight Lieutenant Glover -it could reasonably be assumed that Argentina too regarded active hostilities as over even if they declined to say so.)*"

Argentina's Foreign Minister, in a speech, refers to a, "*de facto cessation of hostilities.*"

July 6th – Lord Franks is selected to head a commission of inquiry by Privy Councillors. "*To review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland islands and their dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, taking account of all such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report.*"

Pérez de Cuéllar at the UN receives a telephone call from the Argentine Foreign Minister to say that they have decided to release Flight Lt. Glover.

July 7th – financial aid for the Falklands is agreed by the EC.

July 8th – at a further meeting of the War Cabinet; "*There has still been no response to the message conveyed to them through the Swiss on 3rd July. The Swiss believe that a direct response is unlikely to be forthcoming for some considerable time, if ever.*"

July 12th – trade sanctions imposed on Argentina by the USA are ended.

July 19th – a Parliamentary Question is asked and answered; "*Mr. Cook asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in what area of the South Atlantic the United Kingdom is prevented from deploying nuclear weapons by its adherence to the treaty of Tlatelolco; and if he is aware of any infraction of the treaty by a signatory country.*

Mr. Hurd: By ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United Kingdom has undertaken not to deploy nuclear weapons in territories, including their surrounding territorial waters and airspace, for which it is de jure or de facto internationally responsible, and which lie within the geographical zone established in the Treaty. This covers the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands dependencies. The Treaty is not in force in the south Atlantic outside these territorial limits because there are countries in the area to which the treaty applies which have not ratified it. I am aware of no infractions of the treaty."

Secretary Weinberger provides an initial assessment for President Reagan; "*In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have been a closer call than many would believe. The British won primarily because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in training, leadership and equipment. But luck played a significant role. The failure of the Argentine bombs is but one example; others exist. The British prevailed and pushed to victory just in time as they were critically low on artillery rounds and other supplies (8 rounds per barrel of artillery and no helicopter fuel) when they retook Stanley.*"

July 22nd – the Total Exclusion Zone around the Islands is lifted.

August 13th – *The New York Times* reports on events in Buenos Aires; "*At least 1,000 people gathered in a down-town meeting hall to shout slogans condemning Argentina's surrender to Britain in the Falkland Islands and demand the continuation of the war to regain the archipelago. Local news agencies said that between 1,000 and 2,000 people attended the Thursday night rally. One speaker, Gerardo Palacios Hardy, a journalist, told the crowd, "For us, the war has not ended and we do not want peace but demand victory." The rally was organized by a group called Militant Patriotism. The organization recently placed advertisements in Buenos Aires newspapers calling on the Government "to continue the war effort in the propitious moments, forms and opportunities until the enemy is completely expelled from the South Atlantic."*

August 19th – two members of the Falkland Islands' *Legislative Assembly*, John Cheek and Anthony Blake, go to New York to tell the UN's *Decolonization Committee* that the Islanders wish to stay with Britain.

Venezuela, Cuba and Czechoslovakia try to stop the Islanders from speaking, claiming that they first had to be approved by a sub-committee, headed by Czechoslovakia. *The New York Times* reports; “.. the committee chairman, Frank O. Abdullah of Trinidad and Tobago, refused, suggesting that diplomats should listen to representatives of people whose territory was under examination. Bulgaria, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union grumbled, but nobody challenged Mr. Abdullah's ruling. The islanders went ahead with their case.

"We believe passionately in the United Nations idea of self-determination," Mr. Cheek said. "We look to you to support us."

Mr. Blake described the islanders' life until British troops forced the Argentine invaders off the islands. The Argentine authorities, he said, curbed free speech, interned people for listening to English-language broadcasts, jailed others arbitrarily, scattered mines without maps creating a danger that still imperilled islanders and "smashed, soiled and looted" homes. He said the Argentines told the islanders that "we had no right to determine our own future." "These ideas seem to us preposterous and offensive," he said."

In **September** – the UK Government eases financial sanctions.

Lord Shackleton publishes his updated *Report*, noting the changes that have occurred between 1976 and 1982, and recommending a transfer of land ownership to the inhabitants. He also notes the advantages of a 200 mile limit and suggests that greater economic emphasis be placed on offshore fishing.

September 30th – Falkland Islanders compete in the Commonwealth Games for the first time.

October 12th – a victory parade is held in London.

November 2nd – Argentina's new representative to the UN, Juan Aquirre Lanari, outlines Argentina's argument to the *Decolonization Committee*, claiming that:

- Argentina succeeded to Spain's historical right to the Islands,
- that the principle of 'territorial integrity' over-rides that of 'self-determination',
- that *Uti Possidetis De Facto* is ruled inapplicable by UN *Resolution 1514*, and that¹⁰³
- the UN had favoured the Argentine claim with *Resolution 2065*.

President Reagan writes to PM Thatcher concerning the US position with regard to a new draft *Resolution* submitted to the *General Assembly*:

"I fully understand that negotiations are not acceptable to you, having just paid so much in blood and treasure to repulse the Argentine invasion. We have no intention to press you – or to see you pressed – into negotiations before you are ready. Equally, we have no intention to take a position on the substance of the matter that is in any way prejudicial to your position on the questions of sovereignty and self-determination. Indeed Resolution 1514 contains stronger references to self-determination than it does to the principle the Argentines proclaim, "territorial integrity". Margaret, my country has always supported you and always will in defeating any

103 Commonly rendered as - "to the winner the spoils"

effort to solve the Falklands dispute by force. You know that we have always been neutral on the question of sovereignty. And we have always favored peaceful solution of the issue by negotiation. I am well aware that it was the Argentines that interrupted negotiations by attacking the islands. But I do not think that in itself is reason not to support a solution by negotiations sometime in the future. It is hard for the United States to have any other position.

... I believe more weight ought to be given to the text of the Resolution as it now stands. The Brazilian amendments have made it much less objectionable. It was on the basis of this new text that my colleagues informed Argentina and other sponsors that we would support it. In particular, the references to *de facto* cessation of hostilities and the intention of the partners not to renew them takes us a good ways towards the formal renunciation of hostilities we both have been working for, ... At the time of the vote, our representative will put clearly on record our views that force must not be used again to solve the dispute, that the underlying question of sovereignty is not and cannot be prejudiced by the Resolution, and that the aspirations of the islanders must be taken into account.”

Sir Anthony Parsons is appointed to the post of *Special Adviser on Foreign Affairs* to the Prime Minister.

November 4th – Resolution 37/9 is passed at the United Nations.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,

Recalling further Security Council Resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

Taking into account the existence of a *de facto* cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them,

Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII),

Reaffirming also the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present Resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to that end:

3. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present Resolution;

4. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Question of the Falkland Islands. "

In the last act of the year, the *Corbeta Uruguay* military base in the South Sandwich Islands is destroyed by the Royal Navy after *HMS Hecate* discovers that the Argentine flag has been raised again.



i UN Resolution 1514 (1960)

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

" The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence.

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognising that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of Segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

And to this end **Declares** that:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non- interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity."