Farming Improvements in Central Province

Agricultural Training

"One point I should like to make with all emphasis, having been involved with the post-colonial process of development administration (not in the narrow academic sense) in United Nations programmes over the past fifteen years, is that the administration of the East African territories (and no doubt the others) was not simply a matter of law and order. Development was the preoccupation, the pride and the pleasure of almost every administrative officer. Even the development planning process was well ahead in world terms. (The Swynnerton Plan for Kenya predated the 'Whitaker' plan for Ireland by some years). It is true that the Colonial power, Britain, was niggardly (or sometimes ideologically profligate, as with the ground nuts scheme), but the resources made available were expended with committed zeal by the teams of administrators, specialists, and missionaries, not to speak of the African participants, The charge that it was otherwise is either ill-informed or ill-motivated." (Gavaghan)

This preoccupation with development was hardly affected by the political situation even after the first Lancaster House conference of early 1960. True, the D.O.'s barazas became longer as they had to include information about the implications of constitutional change and many questions (from African tribesmen and officials who were often worried or frightened about what the future might hold for them) had to be answered in these barazas, in African District Council and Locational Council meetings and on any occasion where groups of farmers or officials were gathered together. Very quickly, however, discussion would return to local issues concerned mainly with development of various kinds. As McLean remarks, however, "it would have been different had I been working in an area where Mau Mau were a real problem..." Gavaghan's account of some of the main events in Kiambu where he was D.C. in 1959 indicates what some of the issues were in Central Province;-

Dr and Mrs Kiano

"The position of D. C. Kiambu, in particular, was set in all the main ferments and developments of the time. My tenure saw the fall-out of the fighting emergency, the mass return of the same Mau-Mau detainees with whom I had lived, the apparent recrudescence of Mau-Mau in the guise of the Kiama Kia Nuingi with its, probably fortuitous, but cleverly exploited links with The (Nairobi) Peoples Convention Party, the platform of Tom Nboya; the emergence and election of a new wave of Kikuyu politicians and parliamentarians, such as Dr. Kiano, my own M.P.; the effective implementation of land consolidation (made possible by the emergency policy of villagisation) despite the opposition of the 'absentee' detainee landowners; the landless squatters and the multi-racial parliamentary lobbies that supported them; the rise and fall of the white proponents of multi-racialism, their replacement by former white 'die-hards', converted to the espousal and service of African power; the ambivalent attitude of the Government (and Colonial Office) towards African political activity where it confronted the last vestiges of the 'native authority'. Somewhere in all this, mention must be made of the sincerely felt, and classically British, attitude towards African 'loyalists' who had to be protected and sustained while the policies for which they had loyally stood and died were being abandoned by their colonial mentors." (Gavaghan)

The later case studies illustrate the nature of the field administrator's work in some districts in the 1958-63 period.

Nyanza District Commissioner

Gavaghan is more specific:-

"It is very difficult to pin down, even by examples, the extent to which there were policies, but no policy. A District Commissioner needed guidance on a multiplicity of issues, from security (as late as 1952 there was high level evasiveness about the very existence of Mau-Mau, and from 1954-58 continuous ambivalence on the subject of the release or 'perpetual' detention of Mau-Mau leaders) to African chairmanship of African District Councils, to the allocation of land to Africans in the Scheduled Areas (The 'White Highlands'). A general impression of advance towards independence was given... but there was no apparent linking of the relevance of separate policies to this end, and certainly no.... explanation to District Commissioners upon which they could base decisions or risk dissent. As a result there was an uneasy fluctuation between service loyalty and a sort of dutifully mutinous liberalism."

Mothercraft Class

Most District Officers welcomed the freedom which an administrator enjoyed, after all, this was one of the reasons why many of them had joined the Colonial Service. "Even after due allowance for youth and the softness of distant recollection the scope for using initiative seemed endless. I personally was almost never instructed from above on what to do - except on e.g. organising elections on new franchises - and even less frequently on how to do it. Most of the time what I did was up to me rather than my masters. Unwelcome instructions could be and were avoided by a variety of means." (McLean)

Relationships with superiors were generally good and there are several reasons why this was not surprising. As Gavaghan recalls - "We were an elite corps of an elite system, created for the benevolent exercise of paternal power". One was made to feel at home early on - an 'insider'. "We all had quite enough to do without interfering with each other, though there was a strong element of my parishioners first, last and all the time". (McLean) One's D.C. or P.C. understood this - they had been there themselves and this was also their attitude in their occasional battles with the Secretariat in Nairobi. "I always felt a Kenya D.C. had a high degree of discretion to do as he saw fit, I felt very free to act, while at the same time was sure of the fullest support from my P.C." (Scott). The difficulties of physical communication made delegation necessary and officials from the Chief Secretary downwards relied heavily on the integrity and good sense of their subordinates. Despite this general picture of paternal D.C.'s and avuncular P.C.'s there were clashes of opinions and personalities. As one of our contributors records "....too frank an expression of opinion between D.C. and P.C. levels could become hazardous to career". (Gavaghan)

The relationships between the expatriate administration and the 'native authority (Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, Headmen etc.) are not easy to analyse. At the personal level, with few exceptions, they were good. The officials of the native authority formed a crucial link in the organisation, between the senior administrators and the general public. "The close working companionship with the chiefs, headmen, tribal a vivid memory" (McLean). However officials of the native authority were in a difficult position, reference to which will be made shortly, just as were their fellow nationals who occupied more senior posts in the administrative service. Our relationships with the latter were also generally good, initially because they were 'one of us! and later because they earned our respect. An extract from Scott's comments on the Africanisation of the Provincial Administration illustrates the high regard in which African officers were held. "I wish to record our debt to Kenneth Hunter, P.O. Nyanza in the 1940s, who secured this appointment of the first African Assistant Administrative officers, who were a well-regarded group in the service throughout my earlier days, and provided some of the first African District Commissioners about 1962. By the early 1960's many African District Assistants were in the service in South Nyanza in 1962/63 the major divisional centre Migori on the Tanganyika border was entirely African-run, with no major shortcomings. About the time of the General Election we received our first African D.0. at Bungoma, a Makerere graduate who made himself thoroughly at home in the job much sooner than a cadet of former years straight out from England could have been expected to do... I had no qualms about handing over at Bungoma in November 1963 "to Mathew Mwenesi who was then taking over his second post as District Commissioner." (Scott)

Chief Nderi

The difficult position of African officers of all ranks in the administrative service referred to above (and this applied to other departments too, especially the Kenya Police) arose because they were regarded or had to operate, as though they were separate and removed from the nationalistic political aspirations of their countrymen." Gavaghan describes this as follows:-

"The concentration of effort on the building up of the 'native authority', as against the political representation, was debated as early as the 1948 Senior Devonshire Course and related Cambridge Summer Conference. (Lord Milverton, Sir Grantly Adams, Prof. Arthur Lewis, Andrew Cohen).- It was seen that the induction of the best available Africans into the Colonial Administration was 'scaffolding', while the democratic process, was 'building', but the dichotomy was never resolved, nor any real policy thrashed out. The result was that African Administrative Officers were, and were seen to be, on the other side of the divide from the elected members or leaders of political factions, to the detriment of both and of peaceful evolution. It has token independence for the two to grow together, parallel with the fusion of 'loyalists' and 'freedom fighters'."

"The ramifications of this basic practice (rather than policy, because it did not seem to be at all thought out) were very extensive. The apparatus of the 'native authority' was maintained, albeit often in a very shabby, low paid, untrained and uneducated form, (how to put into the hand of a Headman or Sub-Chief 37 shillings and 3 cents monthly wage?), long after it had been overtaken by the quality of person available to the main thrust of political activity."

"A dangerous gulf was opened between the 'loyalist native authority' allied with the Provincial Administration (and often with white settler and some Asian traders), on the one hand, and African political aspiration of all shades, ages and educational level on the other."

"I recall a District Commissioners' meeting in Nyeri in 1958, when I was unanimously outvoted on the issue of allowing universal suffrage for a proposed post of paid Town Mayor (regardless of former Mau-Mau affiliation) for the hundreds of new towns created out of emergency villages and land consolidation. It was decided that the 'native authority' must be maintained intact, rather than intermarried with the newly emerging pressure groups." (Gavaghan)

Thus, in commenting on relationships with the native authority, Gavaghan feels that there was "a fair degree of exchange of information and views, often on a cordial and mutually respectful basis, but I-doubt whether we were really 'talking' to each other, except at the level of the realities which we had imparted. Their own realities were occluded by the dilemma in which they were placed, between the colonial power and the people." (Gavaghan)

Local Farmers' Production Committee

Relationships with European farmers and businessmen and with the Asian community were "infinitely complex and varied, but always coloured by rank, influence, social prestige (not always on the side of the District Commissioners), which were part of the colonial situation. Individual warmth there could be, but this situation was essentially artificial and mutually uncomprehending." (Gavaghan). One was always conscious of the fact that being an administrative officer created barriers. Initial acceptance and friendliness in games of rugby or cricket would often change to a more reserved atmosphere when one's occupation was revealed. As McLean relates. "Relations with other expatriates, (i.e. non-administrative service) especially farmers were more difficult. Most of them, unlike most of at least the younger administrators, could not see that decolonisation was inevitable. They imparted feelings to the Africans that bore no relation to reality. With honourable exceptions they believed the Africans were and would continue to be better off under colonial rule. Sometimes their actions were so ill-judged as to be almost unbelievably provocative. We got on well as individuals but there was an underlying feeling that the administrators were selling them out which made it difficult to obtain the degree of cooperation that one would have wished." (McLean)

Party political position

Nandi Woman

Nandi was a political backwater in early 1960. The District Commissioner, Dick Symes-Thompson, felt it necessary to campaign to get the people to realise how rapid constitutional change would be after the first Lancaster House Conference which had just taken place.

The Congo debacle in mid-1960 seriously alarmed the Nandi, raising the spectre of a disastrous premature independence for Kenya. It is likely to have been one of the factors that prompted them to support the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), an alliance of the pastoral, coastal and certain west Kenya tribes, formed about August of that year when national political parties were once again allowed.

The General Election of early 1961 was a foregone conclusion. The KADU nominations were won by the more sophisticated Nairobi politicians who although originally from the area took little interest in district affairs before or after the elections but managed to sweep the board on the day. Kenya African National Union (KANU) candidates made little impact in the district. The election, on a limited franchise, was a good-humoured affair.

Political and consequent administrative priority issues.

During my period as Acting District Commissioner I continued the policy of alerting the Nandi to the rapid acceleration of political change. From July onwards I had to devote much effort to reassuring them that the British would not do a bunk, Congo-style, and leave them with a ruined country.

The one major conflict of my time in Nandi arose from my pressing land registration and water reticulation in one area of North Nandi. The scheme was well under way when I took over, with the support of the majority of the landholders. But a small, vocal minority objected, prompted by a leading Nyanza politician who was restricted to that area. I was encouraged by the older Chiefs to insist on the completion of the scheme, but the matter was not so easily resolved as it proved a convenient rallying point for the younger politicians. The Provincial Commissioner, Jack Wolff, told me that Government did not want development pressed against the wishes of the people, and there matters rested, to be resolved by Dick Symes-Thompson on his return from leave. Similar programmes continued unhampered in other areas of the district.

Apart from these preoccupations I continued the administration and development of the district, working closely with the smallholder development. Towards the end of my time as Acting D.C. manpower resources were shifted from development work to cope with the registration of voters for the 1961 General Election. Officers of the other departments felt that I had made unnecessary calls on their staffs for help with this task, which proved not to be as heavy as I had expected.

Party political position

The district was the home of the great (now greatly-lamented) Tom Mboya, but Nairobi was his power base and he played little part in district affairs during my short time there.

The district was pro-KANU to a man, but in this period I recall no significant political activity. The census of 1962, on which future district representation was to be based, was over before I arrived, and the election of 1963 was still to come when I left.

Political and administrative priority issues

As I have said, politics had minimal impact on this district's affairs during my time.

Before going on leave in early 1962 I had informed the Secretariat of my wish to undertake the role of District Officer to one of the new African District Commissioners, the first of whom were taking up their positions about that period. Soon after my arrival in South Nyanza my request was granted with the appointment as D.C. of Ezekiel Josiah. All I knew about him was that he had only quite recently been appointed a District Officer, and I recall wondering what it would be like to work for a young and inexperienced man in such a senior position. However when I looked him up in the Staff List I found he had joined the Service about the time I was born. He needed none of the propping that I had expected to have to provide in the role I had volunteered for. I don't recall that he wrote many letters, but he was good on the telephone and in face-to-face contact with callers and in barazas.

Harvest Time in Nyanza

Not that South Nyanza was a difficult district to run at that period. When the D.C. had a serious motor accident in early 1963 and was away for a month to six weeks and I had to mind the store I had no difficulty in combining the largely routine duties of D.O. with keeping an eye on matters that were the proper concern of the D.C.

The one near-crisis was the threatened African civil servants' strike of early 1963. The caretaker government with an African Minister of Finance, Tiad refused them a pay rise, and the entire work force was to come out. I recall being invited to an eve-of-strike meeting in the District Clerk's office, next to my own. They were worried about my reaction as de facto District Commissioner, and I suspect also because there had not been a strike in the service before. I did not see any important consequences for government in tha.t district and was mainly concerned about ongoing relationships within the service. I assured the meeting that as a fellow trade unionist (as indeed I was, as a member of the Senior Civil Servants' Association) I did not criticise their proposed action, and neither I, nor any member, of my association would perform the functions of any striking officer. I did however urge them not to let any equipment in their charge get damaged, and not to let their standing in the eyes of the African public suffer in any way. They were plainly relieved at my taking this line. In the-event, as far as I can recall, the dispute was settled and the strike was called off before it ever started.

In my last weeks in South Nyanza I was initiating preparations for the 1963 General Elections, and considering the vast population and the limited manpower resources I felt that whoever was going to be responsible on the day would have his hands full.

Party political position

Mount Elgon

Bungoma (or Elgon Nyaza as it was when I first took over) must have been one of the most deeply divided districts politically in the country at that time. The predominant Abaluhya population was mainly pro-KADU, but one of their sub-tribes on the boundary with Kakamega supported the main nationalist party. The area that gave most concern was on the slopes of Mount Elgon, in the north of the district, where the ethnically distinct Elgon Masai had secured a constituency of their own when parliamentary boundaries were redrawn after the 1962 census. Even though the population of this constituency was only about half that of either of the other two in the district, the Elgon Masai were only a bare majority of its population, the rest being mainly Bukusu. This did not stop the Elgon Masai from regarding it as their constituency, from which their candidate should be returned unopposed. As they chose to back the opposite party (KANU) to that of the Bukusu majority of the rest of the district, great tension - and later considerable disorder - followed from this situation.

Shikuku, Odinga and Muliro

Only one national political figure, was associated with the district at this time. This was Masinde Muliro, who had entered the Legislative Council at the first African elections in 1957, and had been one of the founding fathers of KADU in 1960. Although still representing the district when I arrived, he had chosen to make his future power base the neighbouring town of Kitale, in Trans-Nzoia District in the former White Highlands. He descended on Bungoma District frequently during the election campaign when he was of course still a minister in the caretaker government.

The 1963 election was the largest of its kind yet held in Kenya (or since, I suspect) as it was: the first with full adult franchise and on a common roll. It involved separate elections, each lasting two days of polling, for the new Regional Assemblies, for the Senate, another-new institution, and the House of Representatives, in that order, the whole extending over a ten day period. In Bungoma it provided for the election of one Senator, three Members of the House of Representatives, and no less than nine Members of the Regional Assembly. The overt issues were immediate independence under Jomo Kenyatta (the KANU platform) versus the establishment of a confederal Kenya based on strong Regional Assemblies (KADU).

I must say I despaired of the regional government system, on nomination day when I saw the poor quality of candidates offering themselves. I should add here that a dozen or so more ambitious people had staked their political future on the four senior seats, that is to say, for the National Assembly. The next thirty or more aspiring politicians in this mediumsized district, which had never before sent more than one member to a representative body outside the district, were the contenders for the regional seats.) The underlying issue for the local majority party (KADU) was the defence of the tribal homeland through the development of suitable alliances.

Malcolm Macdonald's master-stroke as Governor was the decision to allow Internal Self-Government immediately after the election. This was a giant step towards early independence. At the same time it was the death-knell of the Regionalism which KADU had fought so hard to achieve. If there had been a period' of some months, better still a year, between the election and self-government, the Regional Government system would have had a change to get established. (I write not as a supporter of the notion but as an observer very much participant in the situation.) Instead it was strangled at birth by the KANU government.

Political and administrative priority issues

In the Pre-General Election period, I took over the old Elgon Nyanza District about two months before the great upheaval of the General Election. In this period I had to:-

1. maintain security in a notoriously inflammable district, the point of origin of the Dini-ya-Msambwa troubles a decade earlier;

2. hand over the western third of the district to be incorporated into the new Busia District, a last minute political creation to bring the future Western Region's complement of districts up to three - the rest of the district being formed from the Abaluhya areas of the old Central Nyanza;

3. provide physical and moral support to the staff of this new district, which was being established with no capital input from Central Government;

4. administer the old Elgon Nyanza African District Council 'in commission' until its responsibilities and assets could be taken over by the future Bungoma and Busia County Councils;

5. make physical preparations for the six days of polling at widely scattered points throughout the district;

6. hold the ring for the competing politicians and their respective supporters during the election campaign, a task of some delicacy in view of 1 above and the political situation already described. In practice this meant licensing political meetings after a weekly meeting in my office with all candidates, listening to their complaints against each other and generally keeping an ear to the ground;

7. maintain existing development policies (aid to better farmers, land registration and water reticulation in selected areas) and routine district administration.

I felt I had minimal experience for a task of this nature, though certainly the difficulties in Nandi had alerted me to some of the problems of dealing with political situations. I also had minimal staff resources, particularly after my D.O. was removed to go and fight a fire somewhere else a fortnight after I arrived, and his replacement only arrived after the elections. I had a most supportive and encouraging boss In Bob Wilson as Provincial Commissioner at Kakemega, only an hour's drive away. It also helped that financial resources for the election were virtually unlimited - we could spend as required from the D.C.'s votes to set up the administrative machinery for polling. I should add that I had in Abdul Naag, our Pakistani District Assistant, a most capable executive officer for the administration of the election.

All in all, I had to cope with a complex and quite open ended situation in a period of great tension. With the rest of the country going through the same 'traumas there was no-one available to help if very much went wrong.

As for the post-General Election period, I have chosen not to go into detail on the election itself. It was a nightmare period of constant activity, stress, near-breakdown in the early stages until the polling machinery got run in, and we were glad to be able to call on a company of the military to show the flag in the tricky Mount Elgon area.

When the dust settled and counting was over I found myself in an internally self-governing Kenya but with my role changed from District Commissioner to Regional Government Agent, answerable (as I then understood matters) to the elected assembly at Kakamega, where my boss was now Civil Secretary,

One early issue was to establish the financial and establishment consequences of Regional Government. Under the Constitution the Central Government had to transfer the necessary revenue and field staff to the Regional Governments, and we were deluged with paper from the. Secretariat on preparations these changes. African officers were to have the option to transfer to the Region.of their choice: as far as I can recall expatriates were to be seconded. I debated with Keith Foot, my opposite number at Busia, where our loyalties lay. For him no 'mucking around with constitutions' made him anything but a servant of the central government of the day, and therefore a Kenyatta man. I on the other hand understood my duty, in my new role, to lie towards the Regional Assembly.

Oginga Odinga

Any doubts were cleared up when the new Minister for Home Affairs, the redoubtable veteran Nyanza politician Oginga Odinga, visited the Region perhaps six weeks after the election. The Minister called all the Administrative Officers in the new Region together at Kakemega and told us there would be no transfers of staff or funds to regional control until the Regional Assemblies were clearly capable of administering them responsibly. In the event this never happened, and the regional system finally lost all significance when the KANU government, crossed the floor in late 1964, linking up with the former KADU opposition and clipping the wings of its own radical supporters. I therefore continued nominally as Regional Government Agent, but for most practical purposes was the direct representative of the Central Government.

For most practical purposes responsibility for law and order was transferred to the Police, a matter of immediate relevance in Bungoma from the first weeks of Internal Self-Government. Our success in keeping the parties from each other's throats during the election period had an unhappy sequel about a fortnight after the end of counting, when the two distinct tribal elements in the Mount Elgon area set on each other, leaving a number of dead and some hundreds of houses burnt down. Operational control in such a situation now lay with the police, and I put the bulk of the Tribal Police (later to be known as Administrative Police) under the control of the capable African Assistant Superintendent of Police for the duration of the troubles. I was instructed by the Civil Secretary to keep out of active operations, and found my own most useful role in this situation was as a rear link in support of the police commander, negotiating, the provision of General Service Unit (para-military police) reinforcements from national resources. I do not recall the details, but I believe the constitution had important provisions about G.S.U. reinforcements crossing regional boundaries. Matters calmed down after a week or so of arson and general disorder. No ring-leaders were ever identified; curfew-breakers and other minor offenders were allowed to go home after a period on remand, the confiscation of their weapons and the payment of small fines. A Commission of Enquiry sat many months after the event but as far as I know never published its findings - a reflection, I believe, of the KANU/KADU rapprochement of late 1964.

All else seems in retrospect to have been anti-climax. A visit by Jomo Kenyatta as Chief Minister to this strongly KADU district in August passed off unexpectedly most amicably. It must have played some part in demonstrating to the people that the elaborate Regional system was a defence against potentially friendly forces.

Once the Mount Elgon upset had subsided I set about running the County Council elections, which passed off peacefully in October. As Returning Officer I played a potentially dangerous and no doubt improper role in dissuading a Bukusu candidate from standing in the Mount Elgon area. I was sensitive to the anxieties of the Elgon Masai about their representation in the new County Council. As it turned out the Bukusu candidate, who appreciated that what I was trying to do was for the peace of that turbulent area, nearly got lynched by his own supporters outside the office where I had been receiving nominations, so I had to let him put in his papers after all.

Neither Central Government nor the Regional Government appeared for the moment to have the least interest in determining district development policies, and we staff at district level carried on with what seemed good to us and the local people: the encouragement of better farming and in particular the process in a few gazetted areas of land adjudication and registration. In fact (although this is not properly part of my story here) it was years rather than months before the Central Government had much idea of what its policies should be in rural development.

I could have stayed on for some months at least as Regional Government Agent. In spite of my ambiguous position I found myself persona grata with both the Regional assembly and with the new African Civil Secretary, Sila Beit, an old friend from my days in Nandi, who was of course the central governments Provincial Commissioner in all but name. However with a very young family I found deteriorating living conditions and particularly worsening medical facilities too great a worry and so sought a further Secretariat posting. Even in my last weeks in the field the possibility of a major break-down of security remained a very real concern as the KADU bosses at the final constitutional talks before independence threatened to secede and split the country into fragments.. Had this happened I would have implemented plans we had drawn up in Bungoma to evacuate the expatriate families to neighbouring Tororo in Uganda. Again, we owe it to the political genius of Malcolm Macdonald, that this crisis never eventuated.

Oginga Odinga was helpful both in Ukwala, and when I was at the KIA. In Ukwala one (i forget which) of the various electoral rolls was being boycotted by the citizens. Oginga Odinga was cross about this. He organized a series of meetings at which we both appeared on the platform. Only Oginga Odinga spoke for him briefly. He simply said "We the political leaders of the African people do not like this franchise. But we want it to work so that we can show how overwhelming your support is for our policies. So register, all of you Mr McLean here will explain how it is done. Do what he says, and we can get rid of him and his like all the quicker".

Arap Moi was a frequent visitor to Eldama Ravine. He asked for action over constituents' difficulties and in return defined the support he was prepared to give for government sponsored measures. It would be tedious to list the range of issues on which we cooperated.

Native Tribunal

There were the ongoing tasks of all D.0.s (supervision of the Locational Councils and Tax Clerks and of the African Court; magisterial duties etc.), but my main duties were:

a) The establishment and administration of a 4000 acre pilot scheme for land consolidation and registration, linked to which was the planning of new roads for the area, a water reticulation system for domestic and dairy farming purposes and farm planning.

b) The building of some twelve primary schools in different parts of the division which comprised a high plateau in the West (8000-9000 ft.), thorn scrub lowland in the east (3500-4000 ft.) and a 5000 ft. escarpment between the two.

c) Building an office for the Coops.Officer and houses for African staff of the Tribal Police, Coops and Community Development Departments.

d) Assisting my colleagues at Division H.Q. (the District Agricultural Officer, Divisional Livestock Officer, and District Coops. Officer) and the local farmers in their efforts to develops agriculture and dairying and marketing cooperatives.

Native Court

The plateau area was exceptionally fertile (almost virgin forest soils down to more than 25 ft. in many areas arid a reliable rainfall of about 50 inches) and was capable of producing vegetables (especially potatoes) of high quality and yield, pyrethrum and grass which was the basis of a flourishing dairy industry. The problem was not one of trying to stimulate the local farmers, but one of trying to cope with their persistent demands for assistance of all kinds.

This was, without doubt, the most enjoyable part of my service life, when I felt I was really helping the process of development. The Elgeyo were almost exclusively concerned with development - of schools, agriculture and dairying. Despite the significant and rapid changes which were taking place in national politics their only real interest in political events was forced upon them and was that of how to avoid domination by the large tribes (especially the Kikuyu). There was very little evidence of a positive desire to be responsible for the running of their own affairs. In terms of politics, therefore, my main duty in barazas was to help explain the constitutional changes which were taking place, encourage the people to take a constructive interest and reassure them (more in hope than certainty) that their land would not be taken from them.

The only other memorable event of a political nature was of two days in 1960 when I escorted Margery Perham round the division and to a meeting with European farmers at Moiben. She had the difficult task of speaking to them and answering questions about their future in Kenya and the attitude of the Colonial Office.

When I returned from leave in December 1960 I was posted to Kilome in southern Machakos as Divisional District Officer. My nine months in this district contrasted strongly with my experience in Elgeyo. The Wakamba were much more politically aware also that they were not nearly as strongly represented politically at the national level as their numbers (3rd largest tribe in Kenya after the Kikuyu and Luo) might suggest.

In Kilome I had my first experience of active local politicians, some of whom exploited their growing power and influence to their own advantage by suggesting to the people that they need no longer observe certain practices which had been an integral part of development policy. The non-observance of the Land Usage Bye Laws was perhaps the most glaring example of this. There were some instances (not only in Machakos District) where soil conservation works were actually destroyed, no doubt to illustrate to the people and the administration the power of the local politicians and their contempt for what they regarded as examples of colonial institutions. To their credit, most of the 'national leaders' denounced this practice as illegal and folly as soon as .it was brought to their attention.

This situation did, however, lead to pressure from one's departmental colleagues, particularly, the agricultural staff, urging one to show strength and bring any miscreants to justice. Some of them were rather too fanatical in this respect and revealed insensitivity to the rapidly-changing political situation, but one could understand their concern at the prospect of many years hard work almost literally flowing down the rivers into the Indian Ocean.

Gavaghan agrees however that the "...morale of the colonial administrative service at District level remained remarkably high and fairly unified through all vicissitudes, largely because it was based upon a broadly homogeneous cultural background and training, with a sincerely held view of duty in 'trusteeship'." McLean supports this - "Morale was, in my case, high. I had expected the job to last ten years and said so at my selection interviews so there was no question of disappointed career expectations. The experience was invaluable. Nor did I hear any of my contemporaries complaining. The older men had perhaps more reason for unease, but said little. Wives and children had a harder time, but without them it would have been a lonely business".

With reference to the post 1959 situation, Scott writes - "The first Lancaster House Conference was a big shock to expatriate morale in Nandi, but a far bigger one was the disorderly Belgian retreat from the Congo a few months later. My own statements in barazas notwithstanding, this fiasco and the earlier Mau-Mau troubles provided details for one's picture of Kenya's ultimate independence... Expatriate families at Homa Bay two years later had no particular worries over politics or security; in any case we were all too taken up with trying to ward off serious illness in the absence of proper medical support. In Bungoma, morale remained high through all the ups and downs of 1963, supported in particular by the thriving multi-racial club where the 'bright young things' were not D.0. Cadets just arrived from Oxbridge but African Land Registration Officers and the like not long out of High School. The worst moment was when KADU threatened to split the country a few months before Independence."

Unhappily, the Emergency created special problems for the administration in Central Province, particularly for African District Officers and Chiefs, ".... who were allowed and encouraged (not in writing) to get on with the hard graft security, interrogation, control, enforcement, rehabilitation and so on, as long as things went well. Sometimes they did not, as for District Assistant Sam Githu, G.M., who stood trial for murder/manslaughter (of a detainee who died of pneumonia after a blow) before a newly arrived judge from England, without any official submissions (despite urgent representations that they should be made) as to the general (and officially acceptable) background to the offending blow, or to his own remarkable record of 'loyalty'. After his conviction and sentence a collection was organised to alleviate the damage to his personal circumstances (and perhaps to a few consciences). Morale was severely dented by such examples, which were not confined to Africans." (Gavaghan).

This experience is related to indicate that, within the general situation of high morale, the Emergency was a sad and often dirty business which created a severe clash of loyalties for the African administrators and Native Authority caught up in it, as well as a repugnance which they and their European counterparts shared in what was often a nauseous task.

Luo Askari

"The short answer is 'great fun'. It soon became obvious that constant effort was needed to keep even very simple benefits generally available. Law and order is basic, and very little of the results of violence had to be cleared up in order to forge a conviction of how important it was to achieve it. Justice was inseparable from law and order, though the need for due process amongst tribesmen who seldom argued the toss took rather longer to sink in. Collecting the revenue was essential if any kind of service was to be provided. It could be tedious, but it also, like law and order work, got the D.O. out into the country, talking to the people, beginning to understand how society worked."

"Law, order and justice were a considerable advance on what some old men remembered of the time before the Europeans a arrived. But the most interesting and rewarding work was on development; - on raising the standard of living. The business of getting two blades of grass or two ears of corn to grow where only one grew before was, in predominantly pastoral or agricultural societies, the foundation, but had to be tied in with work on health, education, communications and local authorities. Seeing results in this field was very satisfying. In my experience, however, those engaged in it tended to see the trees and not the wood, the failures rather than the successes."

"It is impossible to pronounce on such a matter, unless one takes the right wing view that 'they were not ready', or the view of absolute morality that colonialism is indefensible anyway and should be terminated forthwith. Nevertheless, there were ways in which matters could have been advanced; in integration, in Africanisation of the civil service, local government and industry. There could have been an attitude of 'let's run ahead and see if they can do it', rather than of waiting to be pushed or threatened into responsive movement. Turnbull, in Tanganyika, may well not have been intended to be the last colonial Governor, but he (and Nyerere) saw to it that he was, ahead of Kenya and with less resources. Conversely, Kenyatta is reported to have expressed the view that his nine years of imprisonment and detention gave Kenya and himself a needed opportunity to build up the capability of self-government." (Gavaghan)

"On Africanisation - we could have done more sooner, but one has to see this question in terms of the great foreshortening of the timetable that occurred with the first Lancaster House Conference in early 1960, Before this I saw our aim as the long term improvement of the Africans' situation under some form of power-sharing constitution. After that conference my own expectation was of independence under majority African rule within two years, That this grew into nearly four years was an outcome of the KANU/KADU split. My own feeling is that once we had got into gear for the decolonisation process the additional time was well spent. But I do wonder what was done to accelerate the Africanisation of the Provincial Administration during the first six to nine months after the conference. I do not feel that there had been much change in pace evident in postings to Nandi by the time I left in March of the following year," (Scott)

"... having arrived, the colonial powers willy nilly created the forces that were to cause their expulsion, in good or bad order, depending on the accuracy of their political perceptions and the strength of their resolution. Whether better policies would have avoided the Emergency altogether I do not know. But it was stupid to attempt to pretend that Kenyatta would never be allowed to take over. Thereafter progress to independence seemed at the time to be too slow. Whole hearted commitment to it and effective preparation could have speeded it up by a year or so, This might have paid dividends, in goodwill and trust, and in bettor government. It was noticeable how first internal self-government and then independence got government moving again with a real sense of purpose. But with hindsight the timing may have been spot on. It worked. Kenya has remained stable and relatively prosperous and better disposed to its erstwhile colonial power than most." (McLean)

Scott has no doubt that "where we were rightest of all was Malcolm Macdonald's inspired decision as Governor, to go straight into Internal Self-Government after the 1963 election result was announced. The country got the benefit of regionalism as a very short-term political expedient, without lapsing into the balkanisation which could have occurred if the regional system had had a chance to get established."